

**ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA**  
**NO. 21**

## ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA

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SURENDER BHUTANI

## A New Passage to India? A Bold New Deal between India and the United States

E.M. Forster's best known novel, *A Passage to India* is a tale, above all, of misunderstanding, of wrong signals, exaggerated expectations, offence unwillingly caused and taken, and inevitable disappointment. It is a parable of the complications that arise when eager Anglo-Saxons go travelling on the Indian subcontinent. As Forster knew, no passage is ever entirely smooth.

In today's fast changing global scenario, where there are no permanent allies and only strategic considerations decide matters, most of the states base their international relations on business considerations. The tempo of economic growth maintained by India in the past few years needs a fillip in the form of financial investments and technological inputs in the various sectors of the economy. President George W. Bush's popularity rating as a politician may not be high, but as an ally he means business. During his visit to India in March 2006 he had shown eagerness to reach out to India in an ample way. It was a rare opportunity for Indian leadership to seize the chance and they did rather well in accepting the United States as a willing partner. In their perception India has more to gain by collaborating with the United States than by being hostile to it. The United States being the richest nation and the only superpower in the world commands attention and collaboration not only in economic but defence field also. Second, India has always to reckon two hostile neighbours, China and Pakistan, on its borders while maintaining the integrity of the state. The blessing of the only superpower helps India which is a medium-scale power to chalk out a well-defined agenda for the coming decades for its prosperity and development. Third, the increasing influence of the Indian community, more than two million, has become a strong bridge between the two countries. The educational achievement and economic status of this upwardly mobile community has succeeded in changing the perception of Indians in the United States. Thus, Indian community had a new, unexpected and strong effect on policy in both Washington and New Delhi. The concentration of the Indian diaspora in a few areas, like information technology and space, and their growing financial contributions to the electoral funds of the members of the US Congress and two major political parties, as well as and their increasing determination to act together in taking up causes dear to India began to have effect by the late 1990s. The India caucus in Congress grew rapidly in membership, and US legislators who hitherto had little interest in India began to support Indian positions and put pressure on the administration to be more accommodating of India's political concerns.

Both Bill Clinton and his wife Hillary took full advantage of the growing clouts of Indian money for their campaign and Indian lobby is now being regarded second to the Israeli lobby in US political and commercial circles. During his visit to India, Bill Clinton observed, “My country has been enriched by the contribution of more than a million Indian Americans, from Vinod Dahm, the father of the Pentium chip [...] to Sabeer Bhatia, creator of the free mail system, Hotmail”.<sup>1</sup> The Clinton magic was such that the entire Indian parliament, for a long time the deepest sceptic of US intentions towards India, was swooning over the US President. In one speech, he had transformed the atmosphere of Indo-US relations. When George W. Bush entered the White House in January 2001, he was equally aware of the importance of Indian-Americans. By the beginning of his second term of office, he started taking more interest in Indo-US relations.

What does India stand for? As it seeks a place at the high table of global diplomacy, it is a question that India’s international interlocutors in the West, particularly in the United States, keep asking. “India, striving neither to spread its culture nor its institutions, is thus not a comfortable partner for global ideological missions”, said Henry A. Kissinger. “What it analyses with great precision is its national security requirements. And those owe more to traditional notions of equilibrium and national interests – partly a legacy of British rule – than to ideological debates”, Kissinger maintains.<sup>2</sup> The defining aspect of Indian culture has been the awesome feat of maintaining Indian identity through centuries of foreign rule without, until recently, the benefit of a unified, specifically Indian, state. However, that is not the way Indians view their international role. Hindu society does indeed also consider itself unique but, in a manner, dramatically at variance with the American one. Democracy is not conceived as an expression of Indian culture but as a practical adaptation, the most effective means to reconcile the polyglot components of the state emerging from the colonial past. Why is India so special that the United States makes a special effort to have a partnership with New Delhi? India is not demanding a say in the management of the affairs in Asia and the world merely on the such grounds as the fact that it is an ancient civilization, the large size of its population and its potential to emerge as a major economic force. India’s claim for a special status is rooted in its ideological claim to being the world’s most important democracy. India was reluctant during the cold war to trumpet its virtues as a democratic and secular example as the West and the United States were more keen to contain the spread of communism in the newly liberated countries of the Third World than to listen to the sermons from an underdeveloped country like India. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, however, revealed one simple truth – that the United States and India shared basic ideas of European Enlightenment.<sup>3</sup> Second, India was forced to leave its socialist baggage in the 1990s and it joined the process of globalisation through World Trade Organization (WTO) willingly. It is true that globalisation frequently imposes asymmetrical sacrifices – benefits and costs affect different elements of society differently. The losers in that process will seek redress through their political system, which is essentially national. The success of globalisation breeds a temptation for protectionism and the need to combine technical achievements with human concern.

<sup>1</sup> “Visit of the U.S. President”, March 19–25 2000, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> “Anatomy of a partnership”, *International Herald Tribune*, (Paris), 11–12 March 2006.

<sup>3</sup> C. Rajamohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*, New Delhi, 2002, p. 81.

Both India and the United States have an opportunity to overcome these temptations by joint efforts.

The slow pace of this apparent change and the unending arguments between India and the United States on nuclear weapons and Kashmir during the 1990s tended to hide the importance of this transformation. The Clinton administration's early emphasis on the promotion of human rights, non-proliferation and preventive diplomacy fused into activism on Kashmir. Just when the two sides needed to build trust and confidence in each other, US diplomacy on Kashmir and nuclear non-proliferation stirred anxieties in India about US intentions. What from the US viewpoint appeared as an attempt to address the problems of stability in the Indian subcontinent was seen as inimical to two of India's core national security interests – its territorial integrity and the preservation of the nuclear option.<sup>4</sup> The US forays in Kashmir, at the behest of Robin Raphael, an Assistant Secretary of State in charge of South Asia (who unnecessarily tried to play an active role), appeared to India as an intervention on behalf of Pakistan when Islamabad was determined to take advantage of India's political problems in the Kashmir Valley, the US refusal to countenance the brazen Pakistan's support of terrorism in Kashmir added insult to Indian injury. Only with Madeleine Albright becoming the Secretary of State, and her packing off Robin Raphael brought some thaw in Indo-US chilly relations. Gradually, the creation of a new relationship with the United States became the main focus of the Indian foreign policy-makers. At first the United States was slow in appreciating Indian change of heart but step by step it came around to the point by giving India more attention and help to strengthen the budding relationship. To the US policy-makers India was a beacon of tolerance and stability. Due credit must be given to President Clinton when in his second term of office he took personal interest in promoting India in the Western media. Initially he was furious on the nuclear tests which India had conducted in May 1998 but by 2000 he was convinced of India's importance and made a state visit to India in the same year. Earlier in 1999 during the Kargil War, he had forced the Pakistani forces to vacate the occupied hilltops in the Kashmir Valley which they had captured under the mastermind of Gen. Pervez Mushraff. Clinton made it clear to Pakistan that no occupation by force was acceptable and there was no military solution to the Kashmir problem. He insisted Pakistan's withdrawal must be unambiguous and unconditional. At the same time he persuaded India not to cross the Line of Control (LOC) which India abided. His sensitivity to India's extraordinary diversity and his celebration of India's multicultural tradition put democracy back at the centre of Indo-US relations.<sup>5</sup> The Clinton administration's Community of Democracies initiative brought democracy back into reckoning in Indo-US relations. At its first meeting in Warsaw in June 2000, India played a prominent role as one of the original members of the convening group and led one of the working groups. He was forthcoming to show India as a successful example for the other Third World countries to the extent of being very preachy. But he kept on persuading India to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) so that he could persuade Pakistan to do so. What he forgot to realise was that China was a big factor for India going nuclear. Nonetheless he laid the foundation of a new and strong partnership between the two largest democracies. One should also add that India's nuclear defiance of the United States from 1996 to 1998 and the process of the reconciliation from

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 88–89.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 98–99.

1998 to 2001 are likely to go down in the history of Indian diplomacy as the most complex, daring and successful manoeuvre India ever initiated. Never had India confronted the dominant discourse of the international system so directly as when it walked out of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and then challenged the existing international norms by testing its nuclear weapons in 1998. Nor had India ever undertaken a diplomatic effort of the magnitude that it did in getting the dominant power of the international system to accept India's apparent nuclear transgression as a *fait accompli*. Earlier in December 1995 India's attempt to test nuclear weapons was leaked out and the United States could put pressure of sanctions against the Narasimha Rao's Congress-led government successfully. But the Vajpayee-led government surprised everyone when it suddenly took the immense risk to go for nuclear tests. A big credit for this success should be given to Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and National Security Advisor and the principal secretary to the Prime Minister Brijesh Mishra as they astutely handled the Indian case and did not succumb to the US pressure.

Many Indians believe today that historical circumstances and failures of the past leadership have robbed their country of its rightful place in the international system. Having contributed significantly as a British colony to the two world wars on the side of the victors India should have been a permanent member of the Security Council. India, which failed to become a nuclear power in 1968, should be accommodated as such in the present global system. As an aspiring power, India is more sympathetic to the US efforts to rework the rules of the global politics in the wake of the war against terrorism. The US war on terrorism has opened up a big debate on the future of the international system. European reluctance to go all along with the United States has opened a new way for new players to join the American war on terrorism. India being a victim of cross-border terrorism for more than a decade saw virtue in embracing the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive strikes. In the region between India and Morocco, Indian and American interests in defeating radical Islam are nearly parallel. Until 9/11, governance in the Islamic world was largely in the hands of autocrats. Indian leaders used non-alignment to placate their Muslim minority by cooperating with the Muslim autocrats. That condition no longer prevails. Indian ruling elite knows that fundamentalist jihad seeks to radicalise Muslim minority by undermining secular societies through acts of terrorism. This elite also understands that if demonstration of restlessness spreads India will sooner or later suffer comparable attacks. In that sense, even if India had preferred some other battlefields, the outcome of the US struggle against terrorism involves Indian long-term security fundamentally. Further in the new agenda of democratisation of Asia that the Bush administration set for itself, India stood and stands out as an important partner. India is boxed in between two regions – the Middle East and Far Eastern world – that continue to resist the core values of Enlightenment. If the Middle East is an area of political instability and breeds extremist and anti-modern ideas, China with its supranationalism remains the main source of uncertainty in East Asia and the Pacific. It is within that context the US policy-makers envision an arch of democratic stability that includes Turkey, Israel, Russia and India. Both Turkey and Israel have been traditional allies of the United States; can Russia and India become part of an American project to promote Western values in Asia?<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

Can India, however, overcome its long-standing distrust of the United States and join in the great political enterprise launched by the Bush administration? Can India make the historic choice of alignment with the United States? It is easy for India to talk about a natural alliance as a rhetorical device in public thinking about a different future for Indo-US relations. It is entirely another matter to embark upon security cooperation with Washington, which could involve considerable short-term political risks that might be seen as outweighing long-term advantages. Paul Wolfowitz, who later on became number two in the Pentagon in the Bush administration, as early as in July 2000 said that though India had been the “black hole” of the US foreign policy, there was a sea change. His other remarks presaged the coming qualitative change in the as-yet-unborn Bush administration’s engagement with India. In April 2001, a few months after Bush became president Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh visited Washington to meet US national security advisor Condoleezza Rice. As Jaswant Singh mentioned in his interview with *Outlook* (New Delhi), “I hardly sat down with Condi Rice then the president dropped in. It was a very deliberate statement. It was supposed to be a 15-minute drop-in. We were one-to-one for 45 minutes. I assessed that certainly the new administration was as committed to the relationship with India as the Clinton administration. But they wanted to move further and faster. Later, Colin Powell joked: ‘Well, my boss has upstaged everything. There is very little left for us to do’”.<sup>7</sup> The indication was unmistakable: Bush was going to push “strategic” relationship with India. The US National Security Strategy in its document released in September 2002 noted inter alia: “The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong relationship with India. [...] We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia”.<sup>8</sup> Subsequently, Bush invaded Iraq, which highlighted some of the divergences between the two countries. It was made clear to New Delhi that it could not hope for a slice of the Iraqi reconstruction pie unless it contributed substantially to the US efforts there. The Indian cabinet was divided on this issue, but the role of the Indian envoys in the Middle East was remarkable. Practically all of them told the foreign office not to send Indian forces to Iraq as it would create a backlash against India in all the Arab countries.<sup>9</sup> How prophetic they were in their assessment can be testified by the ongoing civil strife in Iraq. The concern of Muslims’ sensitivity was also taken into account.

One has to praise the efforts of Robert Blackwell, the former US ambassador to India, who steadfastly advocated a more robust relationship with India. He never tired of proclaiming relations with India as a “strategic” opportunity. He was many a time overlooking his brief when he denounced Pakistan’s active role in promoting Jihadi terrorism in Kashmir. Blackwell was very clear in his mind about the value of India’s support in the global war against international terrorism. The anxiety about terrorism was palpable on both sides, as also the complex challenge about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, more so after the revelations associated with the Abdul Qadar Khan episode when it was found

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<sup>7</sup> *Outlook* (New Delhi), 15 November 2004.

<sup>8</sup> As quoted by C. Uday Bhaskar in Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), 16 November 2004.

<sup>9</sup> Author’s interviews with Indian Ambassadors to the Middle Eastern countries in New Delhi during 2003–2004.

out that the top Pakistan nuclear scientist was selling nuclear technology and material to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

As long as the rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was ruling India till May 2004, it had covered a vast distance to be close to the American thinking, by allowing American airmen and naval forces to do joint air and naval exercises over Indian skies and in the Indian Ocean and defence cooperation with Israel went much further as Indians could get US sophisticated technology via Tel-Aviv. The situation was supposed to be reversed when unexpectedly the Congress Party under Sonia Gandhi won the elections and made the alliance with Communist (Marxist) Party (CPM) at the centre. But the new ruling alliance did not rupture close relationship with the United States and saw it beneficial to strengthen the relationship further. One of the first initiatives of the new secretary of state Rice was her visit to the Indian subcontinent in March 2005. In New Delhi, she emphasized the American de-hyphenation of India from Pakistan and elevation of the Indo-US relationship to a higher level. Clearly, the new administration had decided on a radically new strategy, later revealed by the State Department: "Its goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. We understand fully the implications, including military implications of the statement".<sup>10</sup> Adding substance to the declaration about the changed relationship between the two countries was the signing in June 2005 of a wide-ranging ten-year defence partnership agreement, assuring arms trade, technology transfer, and even co-production of military equipment. Meanwhile Washington cleared the possible sale of an advanced patriot anti-missile defence system and allowed American defence manufactures to bid for India's combat aircraft requirements. In July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went to Washington on a state visit and this visit can in retrospect be termed historic in the relationship between the two countries. By engaging India on a range of critical issues, including economy, energy security, high-tech and space, the Bush administration signalled a quantum leap in bilateral relations. Second, by agreeing to treat India as a *de facto* nuclear power, the United States agreed to end a three-decade stand-off, which could open doors on civilian nuclear and high-tech cooperation. Third, by laying down a larger vision of helping India to be a global power, the United States started building a balancing power in Asia as a counterweight to China. In other words, the moment of truth was finally realised by both countries and a new transformation in relations "that is here to stay" was immediately felt by the officials of both countries. The developing relationship reached its climax when Manmohan Singh paid his glorious tributes to President Bush and he said: "The issue of nuclear cooperation has been addressed in a manner which gives me great satisfaction. I thank the President for his personal role and interest in facilitating a solution to this complex problem".

The joint statement made it obvious that Bush had hit the bullet on the nuclear issue. For there was explicit presidential commitment to work towards "achieving full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" that included getting the Congress to agree on adjusting US laws and policies and persuade its allies to do so. "It would also work out-ways to supply much needed nuclear fuel for India's civilian reactors. It is a shot that is going to be heard around the globe. It is a signal from the US to the rest of the world that India has

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Background Briefing by Administration Officials on US-South Asia relations", 25 March 2005.

arrived”, said an ecstatic Ashley Tellis, a senior associate for Carnegie Endowment, a prominent think-tank for the US policy-makers.<sup>11</sup> Tellis, an Indian-born specialist on nuclear issues, now a US citizen, had worked hard for five years with former US ambassador to India Robert Blackwell to change mindsets in the Bush administration. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs in the State Department added, “What we have is to develop with the Indian Government a broad, global partnership of the likes that we have not seen with India since India’s founding in 1947”.<sup>12</sup> What was of geopolitical significance too was the US committing itself to make India balancing power against China in Asia. Tellis quipped, “The Chinese don’t have to go back to a school for cultural re-education to understand the implications”.<sup>13</sup>

Officials privy to the Oval Office discussions revealed that since his re-election in 2004, Bush had been very keen to keep his commitment to help India become a world power. To do that he would have to find a way of settling India’s contentious nuclear status. At any time it would be a bold choice. His close advisers argued that if a choice had to be made, why not now. It would give Bush sufficient time to bring it to fruition by the time his final term ended. So Bush told his advisers, “Just do it”.<sup>14</sup> For the first time since 1974 (when India had made its first nuclear test) the United States had decided to treat India as a de facto nuclear weapons state. Anil Kakodkar, chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission said, “It is a recognition of India’s achievement in nuclear technology and also that we have been a responsible power”.<sup>15</sup> The story did not end there. While the agreement merely stated that India will begin “identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner”, Washington added specific conditionality – that such a separation plan be “credible”, “transparent” and “defensible”. Put simply, America had set itself up as the arbiter to whom India was answerable. In contrast, Manmohan Singh assured Indian Parliament that “It will be an autonomous Indian decision as to what is ‘civilian’ and what is ‘military’”.<sup>16</sup> In the next seven months there were rounds of discussions and disagreements between the officials from the two sides and no final draft was ready to state what would be termed as a military reactor or a civilian reactor in the Indian nuclear establishment. Finally, Bush decided that time had come for him to sort out the difficulties himself during his three-day state visit to India in March 2006.

The moment he landed at New Delhi airport on 1 March 2006 he told Manmohan Singh that he would like to sign the nuclear deal and asked him and his national security advisor M.K.Narayanan to meet Secretary Rice to thrash out the differences. Officials from the both sides deliberated the whole night and by next morning the agreement was ready. Obviously, Bush had no patience with the bureaucratic nitpicking that went on for seven months between the hard-liners in both the capitals which was threatening to undo the agreement signed in July 2005. Somehow, American officials kept on maintaining goal-post shifting approach and this mindset had to be changed. American negotiators were insisting

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<sup>11</sup> *India Today*, (New Delhi), 1 August 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Nicholas Burns’s interview with International Herald Tribune, 4–5 March 2006.

<sup>13</sup> *India Today*, 1 August 2005.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>16</sup> *Times of India* (New Delhi), see the issues of last week of August 2005.

on a watertight civil-military separation in India, contrary to the practice in other nuclear powers, most of which do not even pretend to have carried out any such segregation. Obviously, the negotiators were seeking to constrict India's nuclear military capability before India had built a credible minimal deterrent against China. So, Bush went out of his way to accommodate India's reasonable concerns because he was not prepared to leave India without signing the deal.

When Martin Luther King, the legendary civil right campaigner arrived in India in 1959, he said to other countries, "I may go as a tourist to other countries, but to India, I come as a pilgrim". President Bush echoed those words and added, "I come to India as a friend". With one simple sentence Bush won the hearts of a big majority of India immediately. He further stated, "The United States and India, separated by half of the globe, are closer than ever before, and the partnership between our free nations has the power to transform the world". Bush was clearly enchanted with the reception he got in India and openly said, "I have been received in many capitals, but I have never seen a reception as grand as the one we have just received".<sup>17</sup> Thus the president's visit put a personal seal on that budding partnership even if it was a couple of years late. The main achievement of Bush's visit was to sign a nuclear cooperation with India which till 2005 had been an anathema for US policy-makers who were pressurizing Indian policy-makers to sign the NPT. India which had steadfastly refused to budge on this issue after it conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 as a result had to face sanctions from other countries of the Nuclear Club (USA, UK, France, Russian Federation and China) as they refused to give any help to run Indian atomic reactors even for civilian purposes. But the global situation changed dramatically after 11 September 2001 when al Quida blasted twin World Trade Centres in New York and American immediate war on terror started by uprooting the Taliban menace in Afghanistan. India's total support to the USA without asking anything in return forced the US policy-makers to change their perception of India. Now India has been regarded a strategic ally of Washington and suddenly the virtues of India as the largest democracy started getting due attention in the corridors of US economic and political power centres.

With this deal India has agreed to classify 14 of its nuclear power reactors as civilian facilities, opening them up to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based in Vienna. The others, and a fast breeder reactor in development, will remain closed as military facilities. That India will go on making nuclear weapons is clear. "Our conclusion was that India should be an exception. It has not been proliferating nuclear technology. For 30 years, we have had zero transparency. Now we will have well over half open to supervision and safeguard", said Burn after the deal.<sup>18</sup> Of course, having 65 percent of a programme opened to international oversight still leaves 35 percent without it. The heart of the American calculation is not reining India in, it is bringing an ever more powerful India along. A section of the Indian nuclear establishment was of the view that the proposed deal would come a breather for India's nuclear power sector. India could now look forward to expeditious completion of 4 planned atomic energy plants at Kudankulam (Tamilnadu state), Kakrapara (Gujarat state), Rawatbhata (Rajasthan state) and Jaitapur (Maharashtra state), having a total capacity to generate 8,000 MW. With this deal in place, India also

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<sup>17</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 3 March 2006.

<sup>18</sup> Roger Cohen, "Nuclear Deal with India", *International Herald Tribune*, 4–5 March 2006.

sees the option of expanding its capacities far more rapidly by importing larger reactors from overseas suppliers.

Bush now counted on India to support his non-proliferation efforts, also in Iran, where India has some influence. He was looking for intelligence and military support against terrorism. India did help the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to uproot the Taliban from the seat of power. India has given constant aid to Afghanistan since 2001 and that helps the Karzai regime to maintain its control. This has been appreciated by the Bush administration time and again. Bush was also counting on US growing export market becoming a strategic partner in the full sense of that term. India's foreign exchange reserves of \$ 340 billion is a charming sum for US businessmen to expand business in India. Over the years India has emerged as an important service provider in the new economy. The Information Technology exports from India to the United States have been increasing year by year to the extent of 40 per cent annually. In 2005, this figure touched \$35 billion and thousands of call-centres are operating from Indian soil to cater the demands of US citizens. The sky is the limit in this sector of cooperation and collaboration.

As Mayank Chhaya put it, "After throwing its weight behind an assortment of despots, tyrants and military dictators for decade, the United States is now for the first time investing in a democracy. And that too, the world's largest democracy".<sup>19</sup> In other words, India is the first functional democracy and stable plural society that the United States has chosen to reach out in modern times. Bush's visit may turn out to be far more consequential for the Bush administration with the exception of war in Iraq. If Iraq was on the verge of consuming Bush's legacy for ever, his civilian nuclear deal with India could be the only one that could salvage his reputation for posterity. Quite fortuitously, the Bush administration does not have to look farther than India's immediate and restive neighbour Pakistan. They find a contrast between a robust democracy and a volatile militarist society where all the elected governments have been thrown out of power by a military coup since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. So there was no question of parity between India's genuine requirements versus Pakistan's desire to have a civilian nuclear reactors from the United States and it was no surprise that Bush turned down Mushraff's request by saying that Pakistan still had to do more work to safeguard its nuclear facilities as Pakistan was caught in selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

It was quite clear that behind the profusion of compliments and effusion of praise there was purely utilitarian instinct which told Washington that having tried all else and failed perhaps it was time to try out India. When foreign policy thinkers in the administration look at Asia, they see four clear power centres: China, Japan, Russia and India. Although Japan may be the second largest economy in the world, it is politically and militarily insignificant. With its population of 127 million and GDP (purchasing power parity) of \$ 3.86 trillion, it pales in significance with growth prospects and population numbers of China and India. Russia with its population of 143 million and GDP of \$ 1.53 trillion has the potential to rival the United States in global influence but it still has problems which will keep it tied down for another decade or so. China with 1.3 billion people and a GDP of \$ 8 trillion (on the basis of purchasing power parity, PPP) is by far the most serious potential rival that America sees in Asia. China has the will and the capacity to eventually take on the United States when it gets global

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<sup>19</sup> IANS, 7 March 2006.

supremacy. It has steadfastly refused to change the political system in line with what the West wants but quite intelligently integrated its economy into the global free market system. That leaves India with one billion plus population and a GDP of \$3.67 trillion (PPP). Indians are often seen as the most pro-America people even though there are many shades of opinion against it. However, Washington draws comfort from the fact that it has established itself with a viable democracy with a strong emerging economy which will remain a dependable ally in the decades to come.

Although the mainstream US media have generally been sceptical at best and critical at worst by calling the nuclear deal a “reward” for a defiant nation, they missed the larger point about ending isolation of a remarkable democracy with an exemplary record of nuclear self-restraint. Unlike North Korea, Pakistan and even China, it has not given its nuclear know-how to those countries whom the United States regarded as “an axis of evil”. The US media also chose to ignore that India was the only example in human history of a nation of a billion plus people, with six often-conflicting religions, resolutely battling its way out of degrading poverty, and that not once in its modern sixty-year history as an independent nation has its military ever contemplated usurping political control – an accomplishment of no mean proportion. India may have its million mutinies, in the words of V.S. Naipaul, but it also has its million triumphs.

There are sensible and foolish arguments against the nuclear deal. The foolish ones are those based on a theological approach to nuclear non-proliferation. The serious ones relate to the new US-Indian “strategic partnership” and to wider US strategies in the region. When the Islamic world (from Morocco to Indonesia) is in a constant turmoil, the only landmass in the region is India which poses practically no threat to US interests, be it economically, culturally or militarily. The argument that India must not be rewarded for developing nuclear weapons is a foolish one. In the real world, there is no more chance of India giving up its nuclear deterrent than there is of the United States, Russia or China giving up theirs. To equate India with Pakistan also does not make much sense as India is seven times bigger than Pakistan and India has to face China on its borders which is more than 3000 km long. There are strong arguments, therefore, for the United States to help India develop its nuclear industries and weapons in as responsible and safe fashion as possible. By contrast, trying to punish India indefinitely simply means spoiling the US-India relationship to no good purpose, because sooner or later other legitimate nuclear powers like Russia and France are bound to start selling India nuclear fuel and technology. Another vital point is that the US atomic companies will reap a harvest of \$35 billion in the next decade if they get a foothold in the Indian market. The United States will also be using the nuclear deal to revive its nuclear power industry that has been lying dormant for decades. Rice herself admitted it when she said: “This initiative will create opportunities for American jobs [...]. The initiative may add as many as 3000 to 5000 new direct jobs and about ten to fifteen thousands indirect jobs in the US. [...] By helping India’s economy to grow, we would thus be helping our own”.<sup>20</sup> The United States clearly hopes to get a sizeable share of this amount that incidentally is far more than what India has invested in building nuclear weaponry and missiles since it conducted nuclear tests in 1998.<sup>21</sup> Washington will

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<sup>20</sup> *The Asian Age* (New Delhi), 15 June 2006.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*.

also have the satisfaction of gaining, for the first time, a transparent insight into India's nuclear programme and of placing ceiling on its nuclear capability.

There are some deeply troubling aspects to this deal. Too much of the American inner motivation for it seems to come from misconceived obsessions with "balancing" against China and isolating Iran. American attempts to turn India into an ally against China and parts of the Islamic world derive from misunderstanding the nature of India's vital interests and its determination to defend those interests. Rather than leading to a stable and close long-term relationship with India, these US attempts may well collapse in a welter of unfulfilled hopes and mutual recriminations. One should not forget that India has the second largest Muslim population in the world next to Indonesia, though it is not a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Countries (OIC). The Indian policy-makers cannot overlook the sensitivities of its 12 percent Muslim population. Second, India has vital energy needs which Iran can fulfil to a great extent, particularly when India and Pakistan are jointly approaching Iran to construct a gas pipeline. The construction of a gas pipeline would be much cheaper than to buy high-tech nuclear reactors which are very expensive. As for using India as a strategic balance against China, this tends to ignore a little geographical feature called the Himalayas. The fact of the matter is that India and China point to different directions, and given minimally sensible diplomacy, do not threaten each other. The trade between the two countries has zoomed to \$24 billion as compared to one billion dollars in 2001. Over the years the two Asiatic giants have developed a mutual interest in economic field and both of them want and need a sustained peaceful global atmosphere to develop and prosper in the coming two decades. Nonetheless things can still go wrong between them if China wants to spoil the relationship as it did in the early 1960s when it attacked India. If one sees the history of last 5000 years between the two countries, there has been hostility of only last 40 years, which is not even one percent of their histories. Otherwise both Indian and Chinese civilizations have been very cordial and compatible thanks to Buddhism which went from India to China peacefully without any state patronage or assistance.

In dealing with China as a rival rather than an adversary the US strategy is radically different from the one adopted towards the Soviet Union during the cold war era. The strategy is not containment but its opposite, engagement. While the United States avoided trade and economic links with Moscow, it is the largest trading partner of China. It has heavily invested in the Chinese economy. It has succeeded in persuading the Chinese leadership to abandon communism in economic terms in so far as the international trade is concerned. The problem for Washington with China is that it is the only major global player which does not subscribe to democracy. US effort is to bring about change in China to make it accept democracy. Secretary Rice has made it clear that the US will attempt to bring China round through its own relationship with Japan, South Korea and India. Towards this end, Asia must have a balance of power. Though it has not been articulated specifically, the US initiative to help India become a regional power with global reach is related to the emergence of this balance of power in Asia, in which all major economies will be intensively engaging each other. In any balance-of-power system (like the one developing among the six power centres of the world), it is natural for a power to have different alignments with others from time to time. In any stable balance-of-power this will be a dynamic process. Given the pre-eminence of the United States, the expectation will be that it would attempt to have better relations with each of the other five powers than they would have with one

another.<sup>22</sup> So, India does not really have much to gain by joining a US-sponsored strategy of containing China, and in any case, being a subordinate US ally would be deeply humiliating for many Indians who have been brought up on the dose of patriotism and independence which they have demonstrated in their history of independent India even at the height of the cold war era. Instead, the dominant view in New Delhi at present is that rather than choose sides permanently, India will gain leverage with both Beijing and Washington by eschewing an alliance with either.

Had Bush just made the world a safer or a more dangerous place? That question lingered on after he reached a deal with India recognising that India was never giving up its nuclear weapons, and declaring that a country which the United States once treated as a nuclear pariah could be trusted. In doing so, Bush took a step in his efforts to rewrite the world's long-standing rules that for more than 30 years had forbidden providing nuclear technology to countries that do not sign the NPT. "I am trying to think differently", he said in New Delhi after signing the deal. According to him, the deal at least puts the United States in the position of dealing directly with Indian plans to maintain or expand its arsenal.<sup>23</sup> Bush's team designed the nuclear deal as a way to build a "strategic partnership" with the world's largest democracy, after decades of estrangement. India has proved itself a responsible power. The deal does not hurt India as it is one of the fastest-growing emerging markets, a favourite destination for technology companies, and a potential friend if trouble breaks out in a tense relationship with China and Pakistan. The part of the deal the Bush team liked to talk about allows India to buy US fuel for its civilian reactors for the first time, in exchange for opening them to international inspection. At the same time he emphasized that a way had to be found to help India build safe civilian nuclear reactors. Otherwise, India and China, each with a billion-plus population and a rising appetite for energy supplies would end up struggling with each other and the West over resources to keep their economies growing. Bush saw a pocketbook issue: "Increasing demand for oil from America, from India and China, relative to a supply that is not keeping up with demand, causes American fuel prices to go up", he said.<sup>24</sup>

The deal had to be passed by the both houses. The media in both the countries developed very strong magnifying glasses. Each and every nuance was picked up by their radar screens. The liberal press in the United States was highlighting the effects it would have, setting one rule for India and other rules for the rest of the world. Indian press was equally quick to observe that any change of goalpost would betray the true meaning of the deal. The heated debate went on which is very common in free press. Allaying anxieties about some aspects of the deal, Richard Boucher, US Assistant Secretary for South Asia, made a trip to India in August 2006 and said categorically, "The nuclear deal is on track. It is moving swiftly".<sup>25</sup> He was justified in his pronouncement because on 26 July the US House of Representatives had passed the bill with a very convincing majority; 359-68, rejecting several amendments unpalatable to New Delhi. The House vote was largely bipartisan with 84 percent backing it from both side of the aisle: 218 Republicans and 141 Democrats

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<sup>22</sup> K. Subramanyam in *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 17 July 2006.

<sup>23</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 4–5 March 2006.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>25</sup> IANS, 8 August 2006.

supported the deal, with 9 Republicans and 59 Democrats opposed. Representative Tom Lantos said after the vote, “This will be known as the day Congress signalled the end of the Cold War paradigm governing interactions between Washington and New Delhi”.<sup>26</sup> In this context, one should realise the role of the US business companies which successfully pleaded for the deal to be passed in both houses. Top executives at J.P Morgan Chase, General Electric and Boeing were among those lobbying lawmakers to approve the deal – a demonstration of the rapid emergence of pro-India groups as a political force in Washington. “The lobbying was a very impressive organizational effort”, said Representative Jim Leach, an Iowa Republican who voted against the measures because of concern it might erode limits on nuclear-weapons technology.<sup>27</sup> Leach is also a chairman of a House subcommittee that oversees US-India relations. “India, one of the world’s largest economies, may one day be second only to Israel’s among international interests able to influence Washington policy makers,” said Robert Hoffman, a lobbyist for Oracle, which has a majority interest in Indian software-makers I-Flex Solutions.<sup>28</sup>

Proponents maintained the outline of the agreement – which according to the US Chamber of Commerce, the nation’s biggest organization, could generate \$100 billion in energy sales for US companies, including General Electric and Bechtel Group, the biggest US engineering contractor. Similarly, Boeing company was very active as it had won a contract to supply for Indian national carrier Air India, worth \$5 billions in the coming five years. Barack Obama, who was then a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that “there appears to be a very coordinated effort to have every Indian-American person that I know contact me before the vote”. One could see the heightening role of the influential and rich Indians living in the United States. On another front, political committees made up of Indian-American executives were increasing their political donations. Sanjay Puri, president of the US-Indian Political Action Group, estimated his group had held 17 fund-raisers in 2006 for lawmakers including Representatives Frank Palone of New Jersey and Jim McDermott of Washington, both Democrat members and the co-founders of 185-member House India Caucus.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, the toughest challenge for the ruling Indian policy-makers was to rebuild a national consensus around a foreign policy that would behove a rising power. Building a partnership with Washington emerged as the key to India’s rapid economic growth and big power status. That is precisely what China had done since the early 1980s. But this idea invited strong resistance not only from the Left and the Islamic group, but even by the rightist BJP which was ruling from 1999 to April 2004 and which promoted a strong relationship with the United States. Such are vagaries of the Indian politics where parties change their tune on the spur of the moment. Former foreign minister Yashwant Sinha lambasted the Manmohan Singh government when on 17 August 2006 he said in the parliament: “Departures have already been made from the July 2005 statement. The government has accepted a watertight separation plan that does not apply to nuclear weapons states. We have accepted the safeguards agreement in perpetuity. [...] Above all,

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<sup>26</sup> *Times of India*, 28 July 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Forsythe and Veena Trehan in *International Herald Tribune*, 17 July 2006.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*.

reciprocity and non-discrimination, the highest pillars of the July 2005 agreement have been turned on their head”.<sup>30</sup> The leftist member Sitaram Yechury questioned the very rationale of the civil nuclear agreement and said that if it was meant to promote energy security, then the government was working on “fundamentally” flawed premises. According to him, the projected increase in India’s nuclear electricity production would be only five percent in the next 10 years, and that was too costly and unrealisable an option to gain energy security.<sup>31</sup> The surprising concern was raised by the former foreign minister of Manmohan Singh government, Natwar Singh, who was present during the negotiations in July 2005, when he stated: “My concerns and my unease began on April 5, 2006 when Rice appeared before the two houses’ committee and said, ‘The nuclear deal is about energy, not non-proliferation’. It is about reciprocity, not about unilateral steps taken by the USA”.<sup>32</sup> In reply to these reservations, the minister of state for External Affairs, Anand Sharma, categorically assured the house by saying: “No legislation of any other parliament will be binding on us. We will be bound only by a bilateral agreement on civil nuclear agreement with the United States [...] This government has a transparent approach. India will not accept any extra obligations”.<sup>33</sup> In a sense part of this debate in the Indian parliament was to send signals to the US administration not to expect any more obligations from India and get the resolution passed in the Senate.

The path-defining deal cleared a major hurdle on 16 November 2006 as the Senate passed the bill by an overwhelming 85-12 with wide support from both sides of the political divide. Ten days earlier the Republicans had lost their majority in the mid-term elections and there were some worries that the Democrats might sabotage the deal or delay the voting until January 2007 when they would be in a clear majority. But the final count was so impressive that both the Bush administration and the Indian government were surprised. It seemed the national interest to pop up India as a regional power in Asia to counter China overruled all other reservations with which few bipartisan Senate members had unnecessarily tried to block the deal. The six “killer” amendments were rejected with wide margins with naysayers getting only between 26 and 38 votes. Obviously the big bipartisan majority was more impressed with economic benefits of the deal as this would create 25000 new jobs in the United States. Bush immediately hailed the Senate approval, describing it as a historic agreement that creates new business opportunities for US companies and enhances their trade relationship. He said: “I appreciate the Senate’s leadership on this important legislation and look forward to signing this bill into law soon”.<sup>34</sup> In every regard, this bill presents a “win” – a win for the US-India commercial and strategic partnerships. During the vote debate Democrat Senator Joe Biden said: “When we pass this bill, America will be a giant step closer to approving a major shift in US-Indian relations. If we are right, this shift will increase the prospect for stability and progress in South Asia and in the world at large”.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> IANS, 17 August 2006.

<sup>31</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>32</sup> *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 21 August 2006.

<sup>33</sup> IANS, 17 August 2006.

<sup>34</sup> IANS, 17 November 2006.

<sup>35</sup> Ibidem.

Then, on 7 December 2006 the landmark deal crossed the last hurdle when both chambers of the US Congress approved a compromise enabling bill with overwhelming majorities one after the other. In this marathon legislature this was the last step before the bill went to the president for his approval. If on the one hand House International Committee Republican chairman, Henry Hyde hailed the law as “a cornerstone of a new global Partnership between the world’s two largest democracies”, Edward Markey of the Democrat Party termed it on the other, as a “historic mistake which will come back to haunt the United States and the world”. He said forcefully: “The United States expects the rest of the world to listen to us (on Iran) while we selectively grant exceptions to countries that never signed NPT”. The chief sponsors of the bill said the legislation – a compromise between competing House and Senate versions – did include some restraints. “For one thing, it ensures that if India tests another nuclear device as in 1998, the president must terminate all export and re-export of US-origin nuclear materials to India”, they said in their report. “It also retains a Senate ban on enrichment reprocessing and heavy water production cooperation with India”.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, on 18 December 2006, the President signed the bill and said: “The bill will help America be safe by paving the way for India to join the global effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. This is an important achievement for the whole world. After 30 years outside the system, India will now operate its civilian nuclear energy program under internationally accepted guidelines, and the world is going to be safer as a result”.<sup>37</sup> Ed Markey again raised his voice of concern and said, “The bill that President has signed today may well become the death warrant to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime”.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, Manmohan Singh also voiced his concern on the certain aspect of the bill when he spoke to Bush the same day. “The deal is not an arms control measure and is not intended to inhibit our nuclear weapons programme. We will keep the option open on future testing if national interest demands we do so”,<sup>39</sup> said External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee in the parliament to assure many opposition members, noting that this was only an enabling legislation, the real negotiations would begin later on the 123 Agreement under the US Atomic Energy Act as also with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Mukherjee did not concede to the demand that the parliament should be consulted before the 123 Agreement was signed. It was a wise strategy to stop any kind of sabotage in the near future. He also brushed aside criticism that the deal did not recognise India as a nuclear weapons state, saying this status had never been sought.<sup>40</sup> In the same breath, the Indian government also advertised this agreement as making a permanent reconciliation with the United States. That, of course, was precisely why the leftist critics, who supported the government from outside and without whose support this government could not last, did not like it, fearing the loss of India’s non-alignment.<sup>41</sup>

But the fact of the matter is that there was and is deep, and justifiable, scepticism whether any 123 agreement can satisfactorily address India’s concern. Can US negotiations

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 9 December 2006.

<sup>37</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 19 December 2006.

<sup>38</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>39</sup> IANS, 19 December 2006.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>41</sup> *The Economist* (London), 22 July 2006.

lead to anything that goes against the provisions of the Hyde Act? There remained a lurking and widespread suspicion in India that the Manmohan Singh government was bent on somehow concluding the deal, by stealth, if necessary. A major scepticism came from the atomic scientist community in India which always smelled a rat as it saw a hidden agenda of the United States to curb India's nuclear sovereignty.<sup>42</sup> To them, a corollary objective was to curb India's nuclear weapons capability. In a semantic concession to the earlier Democratic mantra of "cap, roll-back, and eliminate", the objective now was to seek to "halt the increase in nuclear weapons arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination".<sup>43</sup> What they forgot was that without making any concessions, India could not run its atomic energy programme as most of the reactors will be shut down if they did not sign on the dotted lines. The choice was very stark: either remain isolated and face nuclear apartheid or make some concessions and move on with your programme. Sometime in history one has to take one step backward in order to take two steps forward in future. The Bush administration, which had invested a lot of its depleting political capital in the deal, was expected to lean heavily on India to sign a 123 Agreement, however unsatisfactory it might see from India's point of view. The United States, it seemed, would not let India walk away from the deal so easily. Hence the debate went on between the two very articulate but democratic states.

When the deal faced a lot of pressure from the junior partners, the Communists' outside support to the Indian government, the US lobby worked over time to bail out Manmohan Singh's government. At one point of time the government had to seek vote of confidence in the parliament, the big money played a big role to save the deal by saving Manmohan Singh's government. The new supporters were arranged from a Samajvadi Party (SP) and even the speaker of the parliament Som Nath Chatterji did not support his own Communist Party. It was never possible for the Left to accept a strategic alliance with the United States which was meat and bones of the new relationship that Bush and Manmohan wanted. "It is a concept in which India becomes the eastern fortress of the 'new Middle East', an expanded arc that stretches from the Nile to the Ganges and includes all the volatile regions of the Muslim world in which America has a deep vested interest because of energy", wrote M.J. Akbar, a noted Indian journalist.<sup>44</sup> In other words, India will be an undeclared base for the United States and American presence in India that would deter China's hegemony over South Asia as India alone will not be in a position to stop any future Chinese move. On the other hand, the defence came from another point of view when Uday Bhaskar, an eminent strategic analyst, said: "The anxiety about India getting sucked into US vortex is overstated because the 21st century is different from the Cold War experience. The US is no longer the superpower it once was and India is no longer the weak country it once was".<sup>45</sup> Similarly at IAEA meetings in Vienna in August and September 2008, the United States marshalled all its resources to win over the support of 45 members of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), including China and Pakistan, for a unanimous vote. The only

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<sup>42</sup> Rajiv Sikri, "Nuclear deal: The road ahead for India", Rediffmail.com, 21 December 2006.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>44</sup> M.J. Akbar, "Check the impossible to find the possible", *Covert* (New Delhi), 15–31 July 2008.

<sup>45</sup> *Outlook* (New Delhi), 3 September 2007.

superpower roadrolled all the opposition, mainly coming out from small countries like Ireland, New Zealand and Austria. After this, bill was passed smoothly both by the House of Representatives and the Senate with comfortable majority in September 2008. Finally, on October 8 President Bush gave his final approval by signing the bill. He kept his word and substantially stood by the pledges and assurances made in the course of the civilian nuclear deal, which he conceived and promoted with Manmohan Singh three years ago, even at the risk of angering the US lawmakers and non-proliferation hardliners. In other words, it meant he overruled the critics in acceding to India's rights for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel – as the critics feared that it would enable India to build more weapons. And he stood by the fuel assurance commitments which critics had tried to kill. On October 10 Indian foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee and US Secretary of State Rice duly signed the agreement. Ronen Sen, India's ambassador to the USA, stated, "This President (Bush) has exceeded our expectations on each and every issue. I firmly believe this President contributed in an extraordinary manner. He should be remembered in history as opening up a new chapter in our relationship".<sup>46</sup> Thus, a chapter of much wrangling came to an end and a new dawn emerged between India and the United States. Whether this will be a false dawn or a bright sunny day, time alone will reveal. Future normally remains a mystery and Indo-US nuclear deal is no exception to this general practice. Basically, the US-India nuclear deal is simply a recognition of reality. First, that India has nuclear weapons and is not going to give them up. Second, that India is going to be one of the big powers of the 21st century – and that it makes sense for the United States and the West as a whole to move beyond a futile effort to sanction the country into renouncing the bomb. Third, that the problem with the danger argument is that the NPT has hardly been an infallible barrier to nuclear proliferation. China, which has signed the treaty, has spread the technology to Pakistan and Pakistan has sold this technology further to Iran, Libya and North Korea. India, which has not signed the NPT, has never proliferated.

Historically, Bush to India is not quite what Nixon was to China, but the agreement marks a turning point. The long cold frostiness of Indo-US relations was an anomaly. The thaw began under Clinton. Bush had turned a thaw into an embrace that will serve the United States, India and democracy well in the coming decades. In a period with concerns over terrorism and potential clash of civilizations the emerging cooperation between the two countries has introduced a positive and hopeful perspective. The morality of democracy has its own logic and regard for human rights is fundamental to the human spirit. A new journey has commenced and obviously there will be some potholes and bumps during it. But the roadmap is very clear for the two largest democracies to make the whole globe democratic in the foreseeable future.

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<sup>46</sup> *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), 9 October 2008.



JOANNA BZDYL

## Beliefs of the Taiwanese Aborigines

The three most important groups which have made up the Taiwanese society are – looking at Taiwan from historical perspective – aborigines<sup>1</sup>, native Taiwanese, whose ancestors had been arriving to the island from the 17th till the 19th century, and, finally, the group which arrived comparatively recently – the emigrants of 1949.

The colonization of Taiwan dates back to the 17th–16th century B.C., during the next ages there were not only succeeding waves of migration from the continent to Taiwan, but also proto-Malayan people settled on this island.<sup>2</sup> Until the end of the 19th century, apart from Chinese and proto-Malayan population, the island was inhabited by a population that probably belonged to the Negritic race (such a population lives at present on Yava and Borneo). In Chinese historical records, aborigines were called Eastern Ti or Eastern Fan, which means “barbarian”. The Chinese from Fujian and Guandong provinces, that is, the Hakka people (Chin. Kejiaren 客家人) began to come to Taiwan in the 7th–8th centuries A.D. The next stages of migration of population from Fujian took place in the 13th century, when the Hakka people pushed the proto-Malayan population down to the foot of the mountains, then also the Minnan 閩南 people (*i.e.* Heluoren 河落人) began to arrive from Fujian.<sup>3</sup> Migrations also lasted intensively between the 17th and 19th century. The last large wave of emigration after World War II were fugitives from communist China. Ewa Zajdler claims in her book that: “The consequence of these migrations was gradual obtrusion of Austronesians into the mountains on the eastern part of island, as well as on the eastern coastal plains”.<sup>4</sup> All tribes speak Austronesian languages,<sup>5</sup> or, to be more specific, the so-called Formozan languages. There are about 26 languages: at least ten of them disappeared, next five are declining and several others are threatened by extinction.

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<sup>1</sup> In this article I will be using two terms interchangeably: the Taiwanese Aborigenes and indigenous people of Taiwan to define the Taiwanese indigenous population, such nomenclature being used by Western and Chinese scholars. Besides, the name “indigenous people” is also an official term approved during the fourth extraordinary session of the Second National Assembly, during the 32nd plenary assembly in July 1994, when the members of National Parliament of the Taiwan Republic sanctioned the term *yuan-chu-min* 原住民, as Chinese name for Taiwanese indigenous people, replacing expression *shanbao* 山胞 (the highlander) – the designation that the Aborigenes thought to be humiliating.

<sup>2</sup> E. Zajdler, *Niechińskie języki Tajwanu*, [Non-Chinese Languages of Taiwan], Warsaw: Dialog 2000, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>5</sup> Most linguists consider Taiwan a “cradle” of Austronesian languages.

Fourteen tribes recognized by the state are: Ami, Atayal, Bunun, Kavalan, Paiwan, Puyuma, Rukai, Sajsiya, Sakizaya, Yami (Da'o or Da-Wu), Thao, Truku, Tsou and Seediq/Sedek. Their population is about 460 000 people. The tribes which are not recognized by the government are: Babuza, Basay, Hoanya, Ketagalan, Luilang, Pazeh (Kaxabu), Popora, Qauqaut, Siraya, Taokas and Trobiawan.<sup>6</sup> These tribes do not constitute a homogeneous organization, differing from one another not only in language, origin and culture,<sup>7</sup> but also in the degree of Sinization. Some native traditions, such as periodical tribal festivals that are organized as thanksgiving for good harvest, accompanied by singing and dance, are still maintained, although the majority of tribes have given up their traditional clothes; tribal costumes are still used on Orchid Island. At present, the tribes took over many Chinese customs. The Pingpu became completely Sinized, although other tribes, thanks to endogamic marriages, managed to preserve their culture to some extent.

Beliefs and rites of the aborigines have many common characteristics with all ancient beliefs of the Far East. For example, the profession of sorcerers is common among all these tribes.<sup>8</sup> They were thought to be "mediators between tribes and the world of spirits, sometimes tribal commanders fulfilled this function. Men or women sorcerers practiced 'the black magic' and they could 'cast a spell' or as representatives of 'the white magic' – they were quacks."<sup>9</sup> Several characteristic features of culture have been common to all groups, i.e. animism, the lack of temples or shrines in tribal settlements (except for the *kuba* among Paywans), the lack of script, as well as the function performed by shaman-women, who cure diseases. Sorcerers and shaman-women still practise nowadays: a large number of them is present in the Bunun community from Sanmin in Kaohsiung, among the Puyuma from Nanwang in Taitung, as well as among the Amis from Tungchang in Hualien.<sup>10</sup>

All but one tribe (the Yami), were formerly "head-hunters". Religions of Taiwanese aborigines are probably related to Melanesian religions because of the widespread cult of skull in both cultures (in Melanesia called *mana*).<sup>11</sup>

This is how Professor Roman Sławiński describes autochthones of the island:

Most of Taiwanese aborigines are animists. Their belief is mainly faith in spirits: good and bad spirits of the deceased. The good spirit of a man who died of natural causes goes to the realm of good spirits; if a man found a violent death, then he becomes an evil spirit. The good ones protect their close relatives,

<sup>6</sup> <http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amis>.

<sup>7</sup> R.C. Fan in an article "Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan" stated that after some antropometric measurements and genetic research had been made in Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan: concrete differences were indicated among tribes, and more interesting differences have been discovered on the basis of socio-cultural research. (See: [www.indigenouspeople.net/taiwan.htm](http://www.indigenouspeople.net/taiwan.htm)).

<sup>8</sup> In South Korea a profession of a sorcerer, especially among women, is a highly estimated craft, it has survived there not as a tourist curiosity, but as a vivid tradition of the folk religion.

<sup>9</sup> Juan Chang-rue, *T'ai-wan t'u-chu-te-she-hui yü wen-hua* [Culture and Society of Taiwan Aborigenes], Taipei: Taiwan Province Museum, 1994, pp. 23, 521–523, quoted after R. Sławiński, *Historia Tajwanu* [The History of Taiwan], Warszawa: Elipsa, 2001, p. 24.

<sup>10</sup> M. Chen, "Disappearing Magicians: The Twilight of Taiwan's Aboriginal Shamans", *Sinorama Magazine*, 1999/8, p. 120.

<sup>11</sup> É. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. by Carol Cosman, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 144.

whereas demons stay in the world of the living and cause disasters and diseases. Among all tribes, a conviction prevailed that catastrophes or epidemics are a result of weakness of ancestors' spirits which did not manage to protect their tribe; so, in order to prevent this, it is necessary not only to make offerings to the spirits of one's own ancestors, but also to get a head of someone more powerful from another tribe and make an offering to the head during the solemn feast, all this in order to make the spirit that lives in the conquered head start protecting the conquerors' tribe. Because of that, not without reason, tribes of Taiwanese aborigines were called 'head-hunters'.<sup>12</sup>

Until now they have kept a cult of "very old trees". They worship them by tying to them red ribbons in order to assure a descendant, the best son or grandson.<sup>13</sup>

Further in the paper I will elaborate on the beliefs of several tribes officially recognized by the Republic of China, whose culture was thoroughly examined. Because these beliefs are not homogeneous, I have decided to divide the discussion into two parts. First, I will present tribes which belong to the *anito* group, which comprises the Atayal, Bunun, Saisiyat, Tsou and Yami. Secondly, I will introduce tribal beliefs from the *kawas* belief system of such tribes as the Ami and the Paiwan.<sup>14</sup> The names of both systems come from the designation of gods, spirits or supernatural spirits.<sup>15</sup> The *anito* system is more pantheistic: "spirits exist in all creatures and in nature where they obtain power to affect the good luck of community."<sup>16</sup> However, "in *kawas* beliefs, spirits can be incarnated in concrete forms of definite character, place and direction."<sup>17</sup>

The system of *anito* beliefs is to be found in the Atayal, the Bunun, the Saisiyat, the Tsou and the Yami) as well as the Siraya tribe.

Traditional tattoos on men's and women's faces have been the characteristic feature of the Atayal tribe (Chin. *Taiya* 泰雅) for a very long time. At present, the tribe consists of about 80 000 members, living in 16 administrative districts in Taiwan.

The tradition of tattooing one's face, which was forbidden in 1913 by the Japanese (occupying Taiwan at that time), was important for the Atayal not only for aesthetical reasons, but also to scare evil spirits away, though there are conceptions that tattoos could symbolise courage or serve to make a distinction between different tribes. For children between 5 and 15 years of age they are the symbol of initiation into adulthood and the pass to inherit the power after deceased ancestors.

Clothes of the tribe members are woven and decorated with beads motives. All the three groups of Atayal, that is: the Sekolek, the Tseole and the Sedek (the old classification), developed patriarchal structures. Several leaders, the so-called *gaga*, usually controlled matters connected with politics and intertribal economics. Long ago, besides the tattooing, among Atayal rituals was also head-hunting, as well as the burying of deceased under

<sup>12</sup> R. Sławiński, *Historia Tajwanu...*, p. 24.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>14</sup> [www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/](http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/).

<sup>15</sup> Other terms for gods worshiped by the Taiwanese indigenous people are: *rutux*, *hanito* and *habon*.

<sup>16</sup> [www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/](http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/).

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.

habitable buildings, similar to a dug-out. All these customs were given up almost 100 years ago, except for the tattooing, which was present among elderly people even after its prohibition (1913).

Atayals believe in spirits and unnamed supernatural powers which are called *utux*, and also in the spirits of the deceased.<sup>18</sup> In the Marlene Chen's article entitled "Disappearing Magicians: The Twilight of Taiwan's Aboriginal Shamans", whose main heroine is the only practising shaman of the Atayal – Labay Duoruo – we read that sorcerers in this tribe are treated as mediums, who mediate between the world of the living and that of the ancestors. Among Atayals, one can become a shaman out of one's own free will, although a disaster experienced by a future sorcerer can be evidence of her predestination. In order to become a sorcerer one should be accepted by a senior-sorcerer and receive from him/her lessons for about four years. On the day of transferring magic powers to a sorcerer there is a ritual consisting of sacrifice to the deceased sorcerers from this tribe and delivery of a piece of glutinous rice to a new shaman through a bamboo tube.<sup>19</sup> Later, the bamboo divination tube is used by the shaman in every kind of rituals. For example, during efforts of getting in touch with ancestral souls a shaman rotates the tube, its stop signifies that the spirit got in touch with the medium and answered the question.<sup>20</sup> People coming for a piece of advice to the shaman are first asked about their family relations. If the shaman is not able to conclude, by his/her own, the causes of disasters befalling the "patient" then the shaman "consults spirits, or asks the Creator of All Things to send him/her a dream".<sup>21</sup>

According to myths relating to the origin of tribe as well as the cults connected with cosmogony, Atayal ancestors are supposed to have come from a legendary rock, which was dropped into a lake by a flying bird. Till today the members of the tribe worship a rock which is situated near the Beigang lake.

Another story circulating among the Atayals might be an explanation of one of the most important customs thanks to which this tribe stands out among others - namely face tattooing by women before their marriage. The legend has it that the first parents and the only people in the world were sister and brother. Because the brother did not want to commit an incest, the sister who wanted to continue humankind painted her face with soot and she lured him into a dark cave.<sup>22</sup>

Because of its bellicoseness the Atayal for a long time threatened one of the least numerous tribes of indigenous people on Taiwan – the Saysiya (Chin. *Saixia* 赛夏). About 4,000 members of this tribe live in three administrative districts. Their language divides into two dialects: northern and southern. The northern Saysiya live in the mountain region of Hsinchu. A majority of Southern Saysiya live in the Miaoli upland. The Saysiya took over the Chinese culture and accepted the Chinese surnames as the first among all tribes: those surnames were literal translation of such Saysiya's totemic names as "the bee", "the spider" or "the crab". Those are therefore relicts of their former religiosity, because "these totemic decorations suggest that the totem is not just a name and an emblem. While the totem is a

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<sup>18</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>19</sup> Chen, "Disappearing Magicians...", p. 120.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>21</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>22</sup> Zajdler, *Niechińskie języki Tajwanu...*, p. 84.

collective label, it also has a religious character, as its use in religious ceremonies attests. Indeed, things are classified as sacred and profane in relation to the totem's religious character. It is the classic example of a sacred thing."<sup>23</sup>

The basic cultural unit of the Saysiya community is the totemic clan joined by kinship and the common tribal area.

Three or four households, having the same surname or a totem, make up a settlement and clan religious group. The custom of tattooing disappeared here long ago. Yet, in the region of Miaoli we can still observe an unusual ceremony – the Dwarves' ceremony, that is *Pas-daai*, which is held every two years in October. According to the legend, long ago the group of very low, dark-skinned dwarves had taught agriculture, singing and dances to the Saysiya, yet they annoyed and threatened women of this tribe. The Saysiya took a revenge on them: they invited these low men to a ceremony, and they pushed them down into a canyon as they were crossing a narrow footbridge. Therefore, the primary aim of the ceremony is to appease these dwarves' souls.<sup>24</sup> The legend about very low dark-skinned men correspond to tales, widespread among Austronesian nations (e.g. the legend about the Orang Pendek from Sumatra). After the recent discovery of the smallest man's, *Homo floresiensis*, remnants in a cave on Flores (an island eastwards from Bali) the meaning of these legends has a somewhat different dimension, especially as the so-called Hobbits (the colloquial name of the *Homo floresiensis*) are supposed to have coexisted with the *Homo sapiens*. Richard Roberts, geochronologist from the University of Wollongong in Australia, claims that the period of the two man's species coexistence lasted for at least 20,000 years.<sup>25</sup>

Very interesting and unusual is the Yami tribe (Chin. *Yamei* 雅美), they live on Lanyu island, i.e. Botel Tobago. Members of the tribe are Christians though with an admixture of traditional Yami beliefs.<sup>26</sup> Beliefs and culture of Yamis differ from all aboriginal tribes on Taiwan to a considerable extent. The Yami as the only tribe have never done "the head-hunting" and they have never distilled alcohol. Maybe their tribal organization contributed to this, as they had no leaders. In respect of material culture, they are also distinguished by the knowledge of goldsmithery. Yamis believe in permanent presence of spirits dwelling among people. They attribute all human failures to evil spirits. Just as they have not appointed secular leaders, they do not have sorcerers, either. However, they believe in the power of amulets. One of the most colourful and solemn holidays of this tribe is connected with launching a newly sculptured boat, which can hold about ten men.<sup>27</sup>

Nearly 45,000 of Bununs (Chin. *Bunong* 布農) live in 11 administrative units. Bununs live in mountain regions in the centre of Taiwan, in Hualien, Taitung and in some parts of Nantou and Kaohsiung. Six related groups can be distinguished: Taketodo, Takebaka, Takewatan, Takbanuath, Isibukun, and Takopulan. Patriarchal government with patrilocal place of residence are absolute among them.

<sup>23</sup> Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms*..., p. 96.

<sup>24</sup> *The Republic of China Yearbook 2002*, <http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

<sup>25</sup> H. Mayell, "Hobbit-Like Human Ancestor Found in Asia, National Geographic News", October 27 2004, [www.news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/10](http://www.news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/10).

<sup>26</sup> [http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/wh\\_316.html](http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/wh_316.html).

<sup>27</sup> *The Yearbook of Republic of China 2002*, <http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

Bununs practise extracting some teeth as a sign of tribal identification and adulthood. Emil Durkheim in his book *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* writes about the same custom among Australian tribes:

Conceivably, the common practice of pulling a young man's two front teeth when he reaches puberty may be to imitate the form of the totem. This is not established fact, but it is worth noting that the natives themselves sometimes explain the practice in this way. For example, among the Arunta, the extraction of teeth is practised only in the clan of rain and water. According to tradition, this operation is performed to make that part of the face resemble certain clearly etched black clouds that pass over announcing the coming rain, and so are considered part of the same family of things.<sup>28</sup>

Ceramic works of Bununs offer geometrical patterns. They have a strong musical tradition, which was partly used by members of the tribe to communicate on large distances. Thanks to the preserved tradition of literature passed on orally, we know that one of religious ceremonies of the tribe was a periodic sacrifice to the moon. Bununs also believe in existence of *hanido*, that is, a protective spirit which has a power over man's innate abilities. Among Bununs, like among other tribes, male and female sorcerers were treating diseases by means of charms.<sup>29</sup> Bununs can voluntarily choose practising the shamanistic art, or they can be instructed by another sorcerer in a dream.<sup>30</sup>

The Tsou tribe (Chin. *Zou* 鄒) consisting of about 6,000 people, lives in four administrative areas in Chiayi, Nantou and in Kaohsiung.<sup>31</sup> From one of legends of this tribe, known under the Chinese title as *Bulo jianli chuanshuo*, we learn about a deluge.<sup>32</sup> Among the Tsou, religious ceremonies for men are held in a hut called *kuba*: it serves also as a political centre. Meetings that have place in the *kuba* serve to strengthen the solidarity of a clan.

The initiation ceremony takes place in such huts; the heads of enemies of the tribe were also kept there once, as well as a box with tools to light a fire. *Hosa* was basic political unit for several small tribes or clans, which set up the hierarchy of power and distributed wealth. The Tsou people use one of three languages: Tsou, Kanakanavu or Saaroa. The spirits in which they believe are called the *hícu*, *ucu* and *i'ícu*, respectively. Yet unlike Atayals and Bununs, the Tsou have many names for different kinds of gods and spirits. Among all aboriginal languages, the Tsou language is the least common of Formosan languages, which suggests that in a very distant past it was separated from the common ancient language.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms...*, p. 95.

<sup>29</sup> *The Republic of China Yearbook 2002*, <http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

<sup>30</sup> Chen, "Disappearing Magicians...", p. 120.

<sup>31</sup> In 2001, the Executive Yuan in Taiwan officially approved the Shao tribe as the 9<sup>th</sup> tribe of indigenous people of Taiwan. The Shao is the smallest tribe on the island, it amounts to about 355–450 people, who live in Nantou. Because of the geographical location the tribe Shao was initially classified as the Tsou tribe. At present, there are many differences between these two tribes with regard to language, lifestyle and customs.

<sup>32</sup> Zajdler, *Niechińskie języki...*, p. 91.

<sup>33</sup> *The Republic of China Yearbook 2002*, <http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

The system of *kawas* beliefs comprises, apart from the Ami, Paiwan and Rukai, also the Ketagalan and the Pinuyuma tribe.

The largest of the indigenous tribes belonging to the *kawas* system of beliefs are Amis (Chin. *Amei* 阿美). *Ami* in the Puyuman language means “north”. Their true name is Pangcah (Chin. *Bangcha* 邦查) which in the aboriginal language means “people of the same descent”. They live mainly on lowlands, in Hualien valleys near Taitung. In 2000, their population amounted to 146 999 people. The tribe divides into five groups, depending on the geographical distribution, customs and language. The Ami community is matrilinear with matrilocal place of residence, because the oldest woman is the head of family. Men are appointed for periodical meetings of the tribal council. Among members of the tribe elder people enjoy great respect. Till today traditional songs and dance play an important part in the life of Ami community.<sup>34</sup>

The Ami have complex myths relating to cosmogony, which can be recited only by trained men. Their priesthood is passed from generation to generation.<sup>35</sup> They believe that the first parents of all humanity were the ancient couple of brother and sister. They believe in numerous gods (*kawas*), and their sorcerers (called *cikawasay*) practise divination out of dreams and fortune-telling with the use of a bamboo as well as birds. In the Ami society a person appointed for a sorcerer cannot choose a different lifestyle, or he/she will face a disease or death.<sup>36</sup>

A fine example of how the demand for sorcerers was falling in an Ami’s village is Chimei in Hualien, where shamans’ service was first of all treatment of diseases: in the 1960s, “before the widespread availability of Western medicine, nearly half of tribal members consulted shamans for illness. By the end of the 1960s, less than 2% were going to shamans, while the number seeking Western medicine rose from 40% to 70% (the others sought alternatives like natural treatments, mediums, and Chinese medicine)”.<sup>37</sup>

At present, a majority of Amis are Protestants or Catholics, but there is certain influence of old traditions or Chinese folk religion as well as Japanese Tenrikyo (Jap. *Tenrikyō* 天理教).

The Paiwan tribe (Chin. *Paiwan* 排灣) amounts to 77,000 people who live in 15 administrative districts. As far as a structure of family and kinship is concerned, both patri- and matrilinear relatives enjoy here an equal status. Among this tribe there is a well-known legend about the Creator Spirit that I will quote after E. Zajdler:

In very ancient times, sun-spirit dropped two red-white eggs on the mountain Chakapaugan and ordered the *baibu* (hundred steps) snake to take care of them. Soon, two divine creatures were born out of the eggs: he was called Paupaulun, she was called Charmugi. Their descendants became the ancestors of exquisite clans in the Paiwan tribe, while common people come from the *qingshe* snake, also called Li-Lai. Long time ago the sun-spirit went down on the Earth and again he gave birth to two eggs. Divine creatures were born out of

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<sup>34</sup> A good example is an old Ami song in Difang (Kuo Ying-nan 郭英男) and his wife Igay (Kuo Hsiu-chu 郭秀珠) interpretation, which was put into a composition *Return to Innocence* by Enigma (the album *The Cross of Changes*).

<sup>35</sup> *The Republic of China Yearbook 2002*, <http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

<sup>36</sup> Chen, “Disappearing Magicians...”, p. 120.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*.

them: a man – Namatawoo, and a woman – Namayutac. When they grew up, whatever he ordered to be born, she gave birth to it. He said: ‘give life to a cow’, she gave birth to a cow; he said: ‘give birth to a tree’, she gave birth to a tree. In this way animals, birds, insects, fish and all on the Earth came into being. That is why in ornaments Paiwan use the snake’s motive.<sup>38</sup>

Another legend says that the first human being came from some valuable pot which had broken. In connection with the belief passed on together with those legends the Paiwan not only use snakes’ picture as a decorative motive, but they also do not kill snakes and they are very cautious not to break dishes.<sup>39</sup>

One of the most important ceremonies in the Paiwan tribe from south Taiwan is the *malevege* holiday (celebrated every five years), during which the members of tribe ask their ancestors to go down from mountains and bless them, so during the next five years they could reap an abundant harvest.

Under a large influence of Paiwan culture and the Rukai tribe (Lukai 魯凱) is another tribe – the Puyuma (Beinan-zu 卑南族), which amounts to about 9,000 people, living in three administrative districts in Taitung.

Like in the Paiwan tribe, relatives from mother’s side and father’s side have the equal status, but leaders’ and sorcerers’ positions are passed on patrilineally. Being nearly related with Paiwans, the Puyuma society is also divided into classes – the ruling class and common men. Yet marriages between these two classes are not forbidden. The priests come from ancestors of the ruling clan, and are called the *karumangan*. After 1964, there remained only three such groups which are responsible for ceremony leadership during gatherings two times a year. The largest basic unit in a Puyuma settlement is called *samawan*. Because in the centre of this tribe’s beliefs is also the ancestor worship, in every *samawan* there is the *karumahan*, i.e. the altar of the ancestors’ worship as well as the *parakoang*, which means the house of meetings for men. New members are accepted after they are 15. *Samawans* are divided into *saja munan*. The latter consist of groups of families with a common ancestor and they carry the same name of their clan. The power of the leader of a tribe is symbolised by his place during worshipping ancestors, as well as in passing on the knowledge relating to the tribe, and it does not result in monopolisation of the ground as it used to be among the Paiwan and the Rukai.<sup>40</sup>

The Puyuma tribe was probably acquainted with folk astronomy. In neighbourhood of their village there was a stone rock over 3 metres high with two round wholes on the top: it may be connected with a lunar cult. One of the first pictures of the monolith was taken by the Japanese anthropologist Torii Ryuzo.<sup>41</sup>

For sorcerers from this tribe the indispensable object during rituals are small betel nuts, which a sorcerer usually carries with him in a bag embroidered with colourful beads. Every year, sorcerers prepare a new bag for storage of small nuts and different magic accessories. Bags “are not supposed to be touched by outsiders”.<sup>42</sup> The seat of a sorcerer can be

<sup>38</sup> Zajdler, *Niechińskie język...i*, p. 93.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>40</sup> *The Republic of China Yearbook 2002*, <http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

<sup>41</sup> [www.um.u-tokyo.ac.jp/](http://www.um.u-tokyo.ac.jp/).

recognised by the fact that there is the *asap* grass hanging in front of it, its aroma is believed to scare away ancestral spirits.<sup>42</sup> There is a conviction among the Taiwanese aborigines that Bunun and Puyuma sorcerers are able to change fate, yet Puyuma shamans are supposedly the most powerful among all tribal sorcerers. This is probably why “in 1997, as the Public Television bill languished in the Legislative Yuan, a Puyuma shaman was invited to the Legislative Yuan to try to help the forces of good; soon thereafter, the law passed without difficulty”.<sup>44</sup>

According to *The Republic of China Yearbook 2001*, in the tribes’ culture and their way of living changes are taking place, because the descendants of indigenous people of Taiwan are adapting to a rapid modernisation. Young men abandon cultivation of the soil, hunting and fishing, and they take up jobs in factories and as workers on building sites in the city instead. The use of Formosan languages depends on the area. For example, on the Orchid Island, the Yami language is still in use; yet on Taiwan, native speakers are less and less numerous, and young men do not know their ancestors’ language so fluently as Mandarin or Taiwanese. At present bilingual education is promoted, tales and legends are also published, as the tradition of oral record is insufficient. In 1993, the six-year research plan was launched to cover a wide range of history of the Taiwanese indigenous people, and it was led by the Commission of Historical Investigations of the Taiwan province.

In a little town of Machia (Pingtung) there is the Culture of Indigenous People of Taiwan Park. In this museum one can see traditional huts, objects of everyday use, clothes, as well as one can watch aboriginal customs, including everyday tribal dance performances.<sup>45</sup>

As we read in one of the amendments to the Constitution of the Republic, Chinese authorities make an effort to keep the legal protection of culture and language of aborigines: “The state should guarantee a legal protection of their status for the indigenous people population, living on the free area, as well as the right to participate in political life. It should also provide help and support in education, preservation of cultural heritage, in every social matter and entrepreneurship. The same help and support should be given to the population from Kinmen and Matsu areas”.<sup>46</sup>

Animistic and shamanist beliefs of the Taiwanese indigenous people had retreated mainly because of intensive endeavours of Christian missionaries, who on a large scale began their activity among the aboriginal population in the 1930s. In spite of the ban on the missionary activities, which was imposed by Japanese Empire, numerous indigenous people were converted to Christian faith. Nowadays, about 70% of the whole aboriginal population think of themselves as Christians, they are mainly Protestants (Presbyterians) and Catholics.<sup>47</sup> The missionaries of Western religions, such as the Catholic and the Protestant Church, have propagated their beliefs among natives, but they participate in preserving

<sup>42</sup> Chen, “Disappearing Magicians...”, p. 120.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>44</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>45</sup> *The Republic of China Yearbook 2001*, <http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

<sup>46</sup> *The Republic of China Yearbook 2002*, <http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

<sup>47</sup> Timothy L. Gall, ed., *Worldmark Encyclopedia of Culture & Daily Life: Vol. 3 – Asia & Oceania*, Cleveland, Eastword Publications Development (1998), p. 733–734, quoted after: <http://www.adherents.com/>.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 733–734, quoted after: <http://www.adherents.com/>.

the aboriginal identity and in promotion of their rights.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, the Taiwanese aborigines have not abandoned their religions completely and even if they consider themselves Christians, they still come to seek advice of their shamans. The above-mentioned Atayal shaman – Labay Duoruo – considers herself to be a Christian, she “practices her shaman’s art in a room which includes an image of Christ and a crucifix; she sees no conflict between her traditions and the new religion [i.e. Christianity]”.<sup>49</sup> It is similar to the syncretism currently present among Indians of South America.

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<sup>49</sup> Chen, *Disappearing Magicians...*, p. 120.

ADAM W. JELONEK

## The Chinese in Cambodia

Most expatriate Chinese, almost 20 million, live in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia (7,2 mln), Malaysia (5,2 mln), Thailand (5,8 mln), and Singapore (2 mln). The Chinese migrants traditionally do not exert much political power in their host countries. Although they normally form an ethnic minority, their influence is in the most cases much higher because of their economic power. On several occasions, this has led to tension and riots so that the history of the expatriate Chinese in Southeast Asia is rich in incidents of discrimination and persecution. However, the recent years have seen an increasing acceptance of the Chinese among the native indigenous with higher levels of assimilation into the host countries. The process of changes in the situation of the Chinese minority, its “ups” and “downs” might easily be observed in the case of Cambodia – one of the countries with possibly most turbulent history in the region.

Ethnic Chinese are an integral part of the Cambodian society. The estimates of the size of the Chinese population vary from 300,000 to 340,000. Khmers and Chinese in Cambodia make a clear distinction between long-term Chinese residents of Cambodia and the more transient population of recently arrived immigrants from Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China, who have settled in Phnom Penh in relatively large numbers since the Paris Peace Agreements were signed in October 1991.<sup>1</sup> I have given only the brief attention to the newcomers giving way to a broader outline of the long-standing ethnic Chinese community in Cambodia from the historical perspective, analyzing its relationship with the Khmer state.

The definition of the Chinese community in Cambodia is unclear and its borders undemarcated. In the last comprehensive survey of Chinese minority, the anthropologist William Willmott defined a Chinese as “any individual who supports or participates in some or all of the Chinese associations available to him”.<sup>2</sup> This definition is linked to an individual’s self-perception rather than to the view adopted by the Cambodian statistics, which registered anyone who spoke the Chinese language or possessed the Chinese nationality as an ethnic Chinese.<sup>3</sup> However, both definitions are a little outmoded in the context of recent Cambodian history. The partial closure of Chinese social institutions under Lon Nol and the virtual ban on the Chinese language in the Democratic Kampuchea have totally changed the socio-political circumstances of their national identity.

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<sup>1</sup> Ann Maxwell Hill, “Chinese funerals and Chinese ethnicity in Chiang Mai, Thailand”, *Ethnology*, Vol. XXXI. Oct. 1992.

<sup>2</sup> William Willmott, *The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia*, London: Athlone Press, 1970, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 175.

Even now, membership of a Chinese association or use of the Chinese language is no longer a clear ethnological marker. Not all people who consider themselves Chinese will necessarily join a Chinese association. Moreover, not all members of Chinese associations necessarily define themselves as Chinese rather than Cambodian. This complexity of Chinese ethnic identity in Cambodia is unexpectedly simplified by the Khmer terms towards the Chinese. The Khmer term *cenchaw* (raw Chinese) refers to the Chinese who emigrated to Cambodia irrespective of the legal status or level of acculturation. The second- or third-generation Chinese in Cambodia, whose lineage is Chinese, are known as *cen* (Chinese), *koncen* (children of Chinese), or *koncawcen* (grandchildren of Chinese). *Konkat-cen* or simply *konkat* (“half-and-half”) is also widely used as a specific designator for Sino-Khmer. Although Khmers are conscious of the language and cultural divisions among the Chinese community, the Khmer terms for the five major Chinese dialect groups in Cambodia: *cen-kangtong* (Cantonese), *cen-hainan* (Hainanese), *cen-keh* (Hakka), *cen-hokkien* (Hokkien) and *cen-teciew* (Teochiu) are rarely used. Although the ethnic Chinese in Cambodia may refer to themselves by any of the above terms, they will also freely refer to themselves as *khmae-yeung* (we Khmers), where “Khmer” indicates not ethnic origin but attachment to the Khmer nation. It is a clear verbal distinction between the long-term Chinese residents of Cambodia, generally accepted as an integral part of the Cambodian social fabric and the recent immigrants (*cen-deykok*) from Mainland China, Taiwan and Singapore, generally regarded as foreigners. It might be considered as a kind of expression of political loyalty to the Cambodian state. Similarly, since the late 1960s, ethnic Chinese in Cambodia ceased to refer to themselves as *huaqiao* (Chinese living abroad), which carried connotations of temporary residence. Although the ethnic Chinese often use the term *zuguo* (ancestral land) to refer to China and not to Cambodia, it does not indicate that they owe their first allegiance to China, but simply reflects the importance of ancestor worship in traditional Chinese culture. In the political terms, it might imply a growing importance of loyalty to the Cambodian state and feeling of common historical and social fate with other ethnic groups, including the Khmers.

### The Chinese community in a historical perspective

While documentation on the growth of a Chinese community in Cambodia is scarce, stories of early Chinese immigration live on in a rich oral tradition, in Cambodian place names, and in Khmer folklore. The first Chinese appear in the Khmer myth of origin of the state.<sup>4</sup> The name “Weeping Chinese Village” (*phum cen-yum*) in the Kompong Speu province commemorates a historic entry-point for Chinese emigrating to Cambodia centuries ago. The hamlet of Sampoupun (“Fleet of Boats”) in Kandal province is remembered as a port for Chinese trade with the first Khmer state of Funan. Such stories point to the widespread acceptance of ethnic Chinese as a continuous feature of Cambodian historical, economic and cultural life.

Among the first recorded émigrés were Chinese sailors who swapped the poverty of life in southern China. “Chinese sailors often desert to these parts” wrote the emissary of Chinese court to the Khmer Empire Zhou Daguan in 1296–97. These settlers did not form an ethnically distinct community, but integrated into Cambodian society.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Kaol Pun, *History for Primary School*, Phnom Penh: Educational Printing Institute, 1994, p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> William Willmott, “The Chinese in Cambodia,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. VII, No. 1, (March 1966).

The fall of the Song dynasty in 1276 saw China's first wave of political refugees. Refusing to surrender to their new Mongol rulers, many Song loyalists fled to Indochina, where some of them attempted to raise a local army to recapture the lost territories of China.<sup>6</sup> Their flight was echoed some three hundred years later, when a Manchu invasion toppled the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and Ming loyalists fled southward. By this time, as a Ming dynasty archive notes, there was already a Chinese settlement in Cambodia in the shape of a “wooden city” in Lovek.<sup>7</sup> Many of these waves of refugees were scholar-officials. Educated in Confucian values, they were more inclined to preserve Chinese traditions than sailors and traders.<sup>8</sup> Over the next few centuries, the community expanded to include refugees from China's coastal provinces.

Recognizing the economic and cultural value of diverse ethnic groups, successive Cambodian monarchs maintained an “open-door” immigration policy. Many Chinese were appointed by Khmer monarchs as provincial governors, often to reward their loyalty to the throne. The immigrants were recognized as a separate economic community, subject to special taxation and privileged by the king's leasing of opium and gambling concessions. The *kram srok* (laws of the land) promulgated in 1693 established indirect rule by the Cambodian king over the Chinese, Vietnamese, Javanese-Malay and Japanese populations via a *chautea* (chief).<sup>9</sup>

Willmott has described the state policy towards Chinese in the 17th century as “assimilation”.<sup>10</sup> However, “assimilation” does not accurately describe the process by which the Chinese became integrated into Cambodian political and cultural life. Rather, the process was one of cultural tolerance and mutual exchange. The Chinese were still able to maintain a distinct cultural identity which was not perceived as a threat in political terms.

The situation changed significantly in the 19th century with the abolition of the world slave trade in 1814 and the rise of a substitute trade in Chinese “coolie” labor as well as with the progress of colonization of Southeast Asia by European powers. The first shipment of Chinese coolies under contract to foreign lands was made in 1844 to the French colony of the Islands of Bourbon.<sup>11</sup> The system of emigration was organized along regional lines. Whether traveling as contract labor or free men, voyagers from China would almost always arrive in Cambodia in groups speaking the same dialects. Most commonly, passage would be arranged through a *toukey* (sponsor) from their district. *Toukeys* took passengers on credit, and the indemnity was paid off as soon as the emigrant had made enough money in Cambodia. Émigrés were no longer castaways who had disappeared in the great barbarian yonder. Chinese living overseas were now seen as “Chinese subjects” and “Chinese merchant gentry”.<sup>12</sup> In 1860, the Qing government signed conventions with Britain and

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<sup>6</sup> Yen Ching-hwang, *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese in the Late Ch'ing Period (1851–1911)*, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 19; Ralph Crozier, *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth and Hero*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 11–17.

<sup>8</sup> Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution; with Specific Reference to Singapore and Malaya*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 2–3.

<sup>9</sup> William Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1967.

<sup>10</sup> William Willmott, *Chinese Society in Cambodia*, University of British Columbia, 1964, p. 109.

<sup>11</sup> Yen Ching-hwang, *Coolies and Mandarins*.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

France recognizing the rights of Chinese subjects to emigrate and assuring colonial contract labor its recognition and protection.<sup>13</sup> The Convention of 1860, signed just three years before the establishment of the French protectorate, opened the way for a new wave of Chinese emigration which changed the complexion of Chinese society in Cambodia.

The Chinese community was becoming still more and more complex and divided. Regional variations in social and religious traditions underpinned the different dialects, generating different group identities among the Chinese. Religious beliefs and ritual offerings were prime components of these subcultures. The majority of Chinese temples in Cambodia were built by dialect groups. From the turn of the century on, temples also became the locus of Chinese schools and social organizations in Cambodia. Moreover, Chinese in Cambodia were required by law to join the congregation representative of their dialect group. This administrative mechanism inevitably reinforced boundaries between dialect groups. Five congregations were established in Phnom Penh: Teochiu, Hainan, Hokkien, Hakka and Cantonese. Congregations arose elsewhere, according to the size of Chinese communities. Congregation leaders assigned by the French were responsible for policing and taxing their constituents and for ensuring the enrolment of all new immigrants.<sup>14</sup> Different dialect groups had cornered different economic niches. The Teochiu were prominent in business and trade; the Cantonese specialised as craftsmen and in the building industry; the Hainanese dominated the food and catering industry, the Hokkien followed careers in government, and the Hakka specialized in running coffee shops. Dialect-based associations, schools and temples survived the transition from colonial rule to independence in 1953. However, the adoption of Mandarin Chinese as the official language of the PRC in 1956 paved the way for the popularization of Mandarin teaching in Cambodia's Chinese schools and the following gradual unification of the community.<sup>15</sup>

From early Cambodian history until the beginning of the 20th century, virtually all Chinese emigrants to Cambodia were male, and most settled permanently in Cambodia, marrying Khmer women and establishing families. Inter-marriage was not only common, it also provided a crucial entry to Cambodian commerce and society. The entrenchment of colonial rule and its attendant use of Chinese contract labor saw an expansion of the Chinese population and the creation of a mobile, transient labor pool who would typically work in Cambodia for a few years before returning to China. Before the 1911 Revolution, Chinese law and custom prohibited women from following their husbands overseas.<sup>16</sup> After the change in this law in 1911, French legislators began to encourage the immigration of Chinese women. While many permanent settlers in Cambodia continued to marry Khmers as their forerunners had done, the overall proportion of mixed marriages gradually decreased and increasing numbers of Chinese children were born in Cambodia of two Chinese parents.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 39, 42, 99–100.

<sup>14</sup> William Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, p. 69.

<sup>15</sup> Thomas T., W. Tan, ed., *Chinese Dialect Groups: Traits and Trades*, Singapore: Opinion, 1990; Fong, Mak Lau, *The Dynamics of Chinese Dialect Groups in Early Malaya*, Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 1, 1995.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 211.

Under French rule, the need for cheap labor, the use of Chinese as economic middlemen, and the strict monitoring of Chinese traffic into and through French Indochina led to the emergence of rigid ethnic boundaries. Legislation on immigration, taxation, social organization and labor created notions of “in-groups” and “out-groups”. All Chinese arrivals were processed through a congregation system, designed to ensure maximum surveillance and ease of revenue collection. Effectively debarred from participation in Cambodian political life, the Chinese were increasingly cursed in French colonial reports as greedy traders or vice-ridden workers whose greatest pleasures in life were opium, gambling and extortion. Although the French reaped huge sums from the Chinese population in discriminatory poll taxes, many colonial officials complained that the Chinese were returning nothing to Cambodia, and remitting all their earnings home. In French eyes, Chinese were little more than a necessary evil whose thrift and industry would oil the wheels of colonial capital.

But the French administrators were not the only ones with a vested interest in reinforcing a separate identity among the overseas Chinese. By far the most important factor in shifting definitions of *émigrés* towards a consolidated “overseas Chinese” community was Chinese nationalism. This worked to refigure the status of overseas Chinese in the government calculus. While the late Qing government had an economic and prestige interest in the overseas Chinese, Sun Yatsen’s revolutionaries were the first to recognize their political capital.<sup>18</sup> The rise of nationalism channeled the long-standing emotional and psychological sentiments towards their homeland in China into political, economic and educational activities. Building on the basis of their social and cultural cohesion manifested in such institutions as Chinese opera, religion, health-care, food and education, ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia were increasingly encouraged to forge lines of political identity with China. Led by Sun Yatsen, Chinese nationalists encouraged the development of Chinese schools and cultural organizations in Southeast Asia. The new Nationality Law in China established the new principle of *jus sanguinis*.<sup>19</sup> Any person born of a Chinese father became a Chinese citizen, regardless of the place of birth, thus creating an “imagined community” of Chinese scattered across Southeast Asia.<sup>20</sup>

While Chinese governments and intellectuals encouraged the Chinese in Cambodia to cultivate national loyalty to China, the nationalist movement in Cambodia moved away from the generous vision of pre-colonial rulers, distilling myth and memory into a fiercely ethnocentric vision of nation. The newspaper *Nagaravatta* wrote in the 1930s of “we Khmers,” (*khmae-yeung*), “masters of the country” (*mcah srok*), “our country” (*srok yeung*), “Khmer race/nation” (*ciet khmae*), and depicted Vietnamese and Chinese as out-groups.

These visions were translated into reality with the end of colonial rule in Cambodia in 1953. With independence there came nation-building and the Chinese were seen in a new light as outsiders. However, while Cambodia’s ethnic Chinese under Sihanouk were not

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<sup>18</sup> C.F. Yong, *Chinese Leadership and Power in Colonial Singapore*, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992, p. 83.

<sup>19</sup> S. Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy 1949–1970*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> Wang Gungwu, “Among Non-Chinese”, *Daedalus*, Vol. CXX, No. 2, Spr. 1991 p. 223; Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1983, p. 133.

incorporated into displays of nationhood unless visits by Chinese dignitaries so required, and although discriminatory laws against Chinese were passed, including restrictions on business practices and Chinese schools, these restrictions were seldom rigorously enforced.

Citizenship was regulated by Kram 913-NS of 30 November 1954, which conferred the citizenship on both *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* bases. By this law children of at least one Cambodian citizen gained Cambodian citizenship, as did anyone born in Cambodia of parents also born in Cambodia, no matter what the nationality of the parents. Like future citizenship laws, Kram 913-NS failed to define nationality.

The naturalization law of 1954 was amended in 1959 to restrict naturalization to people fluent in Khmer who demonstrated “a sufficient assimilation to the customs, morals and traditions of Cambodia”, but failed to cast legal light on the term “nationality”. This vagueness had important ramifications for those laws conferring rights on the basis of nationality, such as the Civil Service Law of 1953. This law restricted admission to the Civil Service to those who could prove that they had Cambodian nationality. Since Cambodian nationality was not normally interpreted as equivalent to Cambodian citizenship, the net effect of this ruling was to ban ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese from participation in the Civil Service.<sup>21</sup> The new fiscal regime established soon after independence taxed Chinese at higher rates than under colonial rule. Seeing this as an omen that worse was yet to come, and lured by the promises of Mao Zedong’s unified China, a number of Chinese returned to the PRC in the mid-1950s.

Under its Constitution of 1956, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pledged to protect “the just rights and interests of Chinese residents abroad.” However, as history would later bear witness, the Chinese authorities applied this principle selectively, in line with wider strategic and ideological interests. During his visit to Cambodia in 1956, Zhou Enlai made a public bid to Chinese to respect the laws, customs, habits and religion of the Khmers, and to let them intermarry with the latter, become Cambodian citizens and, if they did so, to refrain from further involvement in overseas Chinese organizations. Despite this open plea, the Beijing leadership was also quick to exploit the presence of powerful ethnic Chinese in Cambodia.

Although the majority of Chinese in Cambodia were “capitalist” and thus stood to lose from a communist revolution inside Cambodia, many welcomed the establishment of close relations with the PRC and were active in forming Chinese associations, sports unions and schools. When Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi visited Cambodia in 1956 and 1963, Chinese were mobilized nationwide, through the Chinese associations, to travel to Phnom Penh to stage a mass welcoming ceremony. Ethnic Chinese were thus drafted in to give concrete expression to Sino-Cambodian friendship, as seen in Sihanouk’s mobilization of the Chinese community to construct Mao Tse Toung Boulevard in Phnom Penh.

However, Sino-Cambodian relations soured in the wake of China’s Cultural Revolution. In 1967, Sihanouk took firm measures to “end Chinese interference and to stop the Khmer Rouge’s communist subversion”. The General Association of Khmer Students and the Khmero-Chinese Friendship Association were dissolved. The three “pro-Chinese” deputies of these organisations (Hu Nim, Hou Yuon and Phouk Chhay) went into hiding, and So Nem,

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<sup>21</sup> J.E. De Bernadi, *Discrimination against the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia: The Legal and Customary Status of the Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia*, Cornell University, 1975, p. 30–34.

head of the Khmero-Chinese Friendship Association, was dismissed from the government. The government policy towards the Chinese minority was becoming increasingly determined by the international context and appeared as a direct function of the relations between Phnom Penh and Beijing, and it continued to be so for the coming decades.

### **The Chinese in the Cambodian economy and society**

Cambodia's earliest recorded tributary mission to China was in 225 AD, when the Khmer state of Funan sent a special emissary to China. This tributary relationship was maintained under different Chinese dynasties, the visits increasing in frequency and the gifts in their range, from elephants to sugar cane, rhinoceros and incense burners. As China and Cambodia entered their "golden" ages trade relations between the countries grew.

From the earliest Chinese immigration to Cambodia, Chinese and Khmer economic roles supplemented each other. A thirteenth-century observer, Zhou Daguan, noted how Chinese immigrants "take a wife in order to trade, for the trade in this country is completely in the hands of women". As in Champa, Siam and Java, trade between Chinese merchants and their non-Chinese partners seems to have provoked neither cultural tensions nor questions of identity. Although historical records are scarce, the Khmer language serves as a useful barometer of long-standing Chinese predominance in business. The Khmer "trade" vocabulary and numerals from twenty to ninety are all borrowed from Chinese.<sup>22</sup>

Business was not a domain of Khmer men, who traditionally eschewed commerce in favor of political careers, but Khmer women were active in the economy as market traders. This division of labor led to relative harmony in Khmer-Chinese relations, while intermarriage both facilitated the development of trade networks and furthered Chinese integration into Cambodian society. This pattern persisted as long as until the early 20th century.<sup>23</sup>

The growth of European consumer market, the development of road networks and the promotion of commercial growth under colonial rule enhanced opportunities for the Chinese to expand this traditional role. The French decision to allow Chinese women to immigrate to Cambodia in the early 20th century saw the decline of intermarriage and the rise of a separate Chinese community, most conspicuous in the cities.

Early colonial accounts list popular Chinese occupations such as petty trade, shopkeeping, and running food stalls. The flexibility and enterprise of Chinese traders allowed them to capture markets as demand arose. In addition to Chinese laborers and petty traders, several Chinese merchants of considerable wealth were given a monopoly over opium farms, gambling halls, and pig farms under an arrangement with the king and the ruling elite. Comparable to the arrangements in the contemporary Cambodia's economy where most successful businessmen receive state and military protection for their business in return for financial favors and political support, this system gave Chinese control over certain industries in return for their assistance with tax collection. Threatened by the close links between Chinese business and Khmer royal power, the French introduced financial reforms and a ban on gambling and private opium farming. These reforms succeeded in weakening the power of their Chinese rivals, allowed colonial monitoring of tax revenue and thereby opened the way for French investment.

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<sup>22</sup> Willmott, "The Chinese in Cambodia", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*...

<sup>23</sup> Ibidem.

However, the zeal of Chinese émigrés combined with that of the French investors ensured the continued prominence of the Chinese in the Cambodian economy. In colonial Cambodia, while the Vietnamese played the role of bureaucratic intermediaries as petty officials in the colonial government, the Chinese were used as economic intermediaries. It was Chinese trade in agricultural produce which provided peasants with the currency to pay French taxes.<sup>24</sup> The Chinese also collected taxes in the markets, fed prisoners, worked in the salt pits or served the fishery industry on the Great Lake (Tonle Sap) leased to them by the French. Some colonial governors and entrepreneurs cashed in on the coolie trade to stimulate the Cambodian economy.

Although the Chinese had certainly monopolized trade and commerce, many of them and the majority of Sino-Khmers in turn-of-the-century Cambodia were farmers, notably in Kandal, Kompong Thom, Takeo and Prey Veng. Indeed, the Chinese and Sino-Khmer pre-eminence in fruit and vegetable farming, and Khmer pre-eminence in rice farming was a traditional division of labor in the pre-colonial economy.<sup>25</sup> As part of their paternalistic policy which aimed both to protect the Khmer population and to stimulate entrepreneurial spirit among them, the French restricted the Chinese with prohibitions on landownership and certain occupations. French protectionism led finally to legislation in 1929 which mapped new boundaries between the Chinese and Khmer communities by banning the Chinese from farm work. It was no longer possible, in the bureaucratic calculus, to be a farmer and a Chinese. Ethnic Chinese who wanted to continue rice farming could do so, but only by becoming Khmer. This legal shift drove increasing numbers of the Chinese into commerce, trade and finance. While some Chinese remained in the countryside, merely switching livelihoods, others moved to the cities.

After Cambodia gained independence in 1953, new economic policies affected the Chinese community. In numerous Southeast Asian states, the Chinese were identified as “aliens” precisely because they had so long represented the political and economic interests of colonial regimes. Associated with a colonial economic order in the newly independent countries, the Chinese were subject to systematic discrimination. From the 1930s to the 1950s, Thailand, Malaysia Indonesia, the Philippines and South Vietnam sought to cripple Chinese enterprise with legislation treating Chinese firms as foreign businesses. Worried that post-colonial Cambodia might follow the policy of its nationalist neighbors, a number of Chinese fled Cambodia for China in 1954. Restrictions on employment for the Chinese in Cambodia, very similar to the old colonial ones, were reinforced with a 1957 law banning foreign nationals from some economic activities. The trades listed were all niches of the Vietnamese and Chinese, and widespread unemployment quickly followed.<sup>26</sup>

Pushed out of small-scale commerce, the Chinese shifted their investments to industry and manufacturing, then diversified to finance, shipping, import-export and insurance. Designed to replace Chinese economic activity with indigenous entrepreneurial flair and thus to reallocate resources from one ethnic group to another, these measures have underpinned the state policy towards the ethnic Chinese.

One of the greatest demographic changes under colonial rule was the growth in cities and the disproportionate expansion of the Vietnamese and Chinese urban populations.

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<sup>24</sup> François Ponchaud, “Social change in the vortex of revolution”, in Karl Jackson, ed., *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 153.

<sup>25</sup> David P. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p. 100.

<sup>26</sup> De Bernadi, *Discrimination against the Overseas Chinese...*, p. 34.

There had long been sizeable Chinese communities in Cambodian capitals: in 1540, there were 3,000 Chinese in Phnom Penh, and by the end of that century, a separate “Chinatown” had been erected in the new capital of Lovek. In the 1860s, King Norodom built a street of shop-houses in Phnom Penh and rented them out to Chinese traders. These were renovated when the French remodeled the capital in the early 1890s. Building on historic precedent, colonial town planners assigned Khmers, Chinese, Vietnamese and Europeans to separate districts. As the Chinese immigration grew, so did the Chinese quarter of Phnom Penh. By 1921, the Chinese, who numbered less than a tenth of the total population of Cambodia, constituted close to a third of the population of Phnom Penh.<sup>27</sup>

With the change in colonial policy allowing Chinese women to immigrate came an expansion of Chinese enclaves. Chinese schools were established to teach the increasing number of locally born and immigrant Chinese children. French colonial legislation allowed Chinese to open schools, and to teach Chinese. Between 1901 and 1938, ninety-five Chinese schools were established in Cambodia, including two middle schools and ninety-three primary schools. By 1938, over 4,000 students were enrolled at Chinese schools across Cambodia. The early 1960s saw a rapid increase of Chinese schools at village, district and provincial levels. By 1967, there were one hundred and seventy Chinese schools and the Chinese student population had grown to 25,665. In Phnom Penh alone there were 11,350 Chinese students at twenty-seven schools.<sup>28</sup> In the late 1960s, many Chinese schools taught no Khmer and offered no courses in Cambodian history, geography or culture. By the end of the Sihanouk era, many ethnic Chinese in Cambodia knew very little Khmer, while some knew none.<sup>29</sup>

Although French law made the Chinese the only foreigners free to establish a press in Cambodia, the Chinese in Cambodia relied on newspapers from Saigon and Tonkin for most of the colonial period. Cambodia’s first Chinese newspaper, the *Boyintai* (Broadcaster), opened in 1938 and folded in 1946. The Chinese press in Cambodia expanded after independence. By the 1960s, Chinese-language newspapers greatly outnumbered the Khmer- and French-language papers, and were the most widely distributed in Cambodia. Initially the majority of newspapers, including the largest of them, *Xin Bao*, represented the views of Kuomintang. However, by 1967, most of them had switched to a pro-Beijing line.<sup>30</sup> All of them tried to prove their Cambodian loyalty by giving top coverage to the activities of Sihanouk and Cambodian government. In addition to the local press, about 5,000 Chinese newspapers were still in the 1960s imported from Saigon and Tonkin daily.<sup>31</sup> In 1967, Sihanouk clamped down on pro-communist Cambodian publications, and singled out the Chinese newspaper *Soriya*. Importing PRC publications was prohibited and all pro-Chinese politics were expelled from the government. It was the important symbol of a significant shift in the Cambodian policy towards the Chinese community.

<sup>27</sup> Chandle, *A History of Cambodia...*, p. 80–115.

<sup>28</sup> Wolfgang Franke, “Some observations on Chinese schools in Cambodia”, in *Sino-Malaysiana: Selected Papers on Ming and Qing History and on the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, 1942–1988*, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya—Department of Publications, 1989.

<sup>29</sup> Mak Lau Fong, *The Dynamics of Chinese Dialect Groups...*

<sup>30</sup> Willmott, *Chinese Society in Cambodia...*, p. 487.

<sup>31</sup> Willmott, “The Chinese in Cambodia”, *Journal of Southeast Asian History...*

### Evolution of the policy towards the Chinese

The expansion of the US-Vietnam war into Cambodia saw the destruction of much of the ethnic Chinese community's socio-cultural landscape. Like Sihanouk, Lon Nol (1970–75) stressed the ethnic homogeneity of Cambodia, asserting that all ethnic groups in Cambodia belonged to the great Khmer race, except for the Chinese and Vietnamese. Within months after coming to power, Lon Nol's state-sponsored massacre of hundreds of ethnic Vietnamese had triggered condemnation overseas and panic among the Chinese community in Cambodia. Addressing these two audiences, Lon Nol made a broadcast to the nation on 18 March 1970 appealing to his "dearest Chinese brothers" to stay calm, and issued a circular instructing all public officials to prevent any actions that might harm the Chinese.<sup>32</sup> Officially devoted to ethnic harmony, Lon Nol shut down Chinese schools and newspapers, and charged both Chinese and Vietnamese with slowly causing the Khmers to lose their customs and morals and their way of thinking through attempts to spread communist propaganda.

Many of those Chinese schools beyond Lon Nol's jurisdiction, in "liberated zones," were bombed out of action, as were a number of Chinese temples, alongside the schools and temples of other ethnic groups. Chinese sports associations folded, and those Chinese newspapers that had started up again after Sihanouk's 1967 ban were once again closed. A school with teachers from the PRC was not shut down by the Lon Nol authorities, but had closed on its own initiative in reaction to the post-coup political turbulence and the heavy fighting in the area. Several Chinese schools and temples in Takeo, Kampot and Kompong Cham provinces were razed to the ground during the civil war started in 1970. For example the Chinese school at Chup in Kompong Cham was bombed in 1970 as a corollary target to the Vietcong base in the adjacent rubber factory.

However, Lon Nol conveniently forgot his nationalist and chauvinist "neo-Khmerist" ideology when it came to expanding his fighting power, and appealed to ethnic groups to join his Republican Army. While Chinese have started to sponsor Lon Nol's defense forces, and even joined the military effort of the Khmer Republic, a great number of Chinese in Cambodia were unsympathetic to Lon Nol. China had thrown its weight firmly behind Sihanouk and the *Front Uni National de Kampuchea* (FUNK), and many Chinese and Sino-Khmers followed suit. Whether out of allegiance to Sihanouk, commitment to Maoist ideals, or sentimental ties to China, many ethnic Chinese students from Phnom Penh and other provincial capitals moved to the liberated zones early on, while many Chinese in rural areas, responding to Sihanouk's call to take up arms, entered the forest and joined up with the Khmer Rouge-dominated and Sihanouk-led FUNK.

The Khmer Rouge appear to have adopted a relatively lax policy to the overseas Chinese in the liberated zones from 1970 to 1973. Chinese schools, closed in Lon Nol-held areas, were maintained under Khmer Rouge rule. Overseas Chinese associations were run in a number of liberated zones across Cambodia until as late as 1973. In stark contrast to later events, representatives of the Khmer Rouge political authorities frequently publicly praised the achievements of the overseas Chinese associations. However, the situation deteriorated in 1973 and 1974, with increased reports of forced assimilation leading to the flight of large numbers of Chinese. In 1974, there was a complete change in Khmer Rouge policy towards all ethnic groups, including the Chinese. It reflected a tightening of Khmer Rouge control overall,

<sup>32</sup> Henry Kamm, "Lon Nol assures Chinese in Cambodia", *New York Times* (20 May 1970).

and a shift towards the “ethnic” identity of the revolution. In 1973, broadcasts of communist Voice of Democratic Kampuchea stressed the value of “the multinational population of Cambodia” and contrasted the description of ethnic minorities in “liberated” and Lon Nol-held areas (Agence Khmer Information 1973). However, by the end of the year, the Khmer Rouge began to spread racist propaganda, preaching that “all Chinese are capitalists, who have sucked the Cambodian people’s blood.” The following year, one of the communist field commandants, So Phim, warned against the capacity of Chinese, who “could split our country’s political forces into three or four directions”.<sup>33</sup> His words foreshadowed a DK decree which ruled that “in Kampuchea there is one nation, and one language, the Khmer language. From now on the various nationalities do not exist any longer in Kampuchea”.<sup>34</sup>

From the establishment of the Democratic Kampuchea regime on 17 April 1975 to its collapse in December 1978, the ethnic Chinese population of Cambodia fell from an estimated 400,000 to 200,000. As has been well documented elsewhere, positions of former commercial advantage translated into instant and potentially fatal disadvantage in DK. Especially at risk were so called “new” people from the cities. Approximately two-thirds of ethnic Chinese in Cambodia were city-dwellers at the time of the Khmer Rouge takeover in 1975, and the Chinese thus faced proportionately lower chances of survival than any other ethnic group in Cambodia. These circumstances have led a number of scholars to conclude that Chinese were not persecuted on ethnic grounds, but on class grounds, as urbanites and capitalists. In 1982, Willmott concluded that “it was not ethnicity but class that counted against [the Chinese]” under DK, and that “the Chinese suffered no discrimination *qua* Chinese.” He supports this argument with the theory that “almost the entire Chinese population of Kampuchea was urban by the beginning of 1975”.<sup>35</sup> Australian scholar Ben Kiernan suggested that 225,000 Chinese died in the Pol Pot period and argued that their fate was dictated “by social, not ethnic considerations”.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Michael Vickery has concluded that “the Chinese were not especially disadvantaged under any regime”.<sup>37</sup> Yet some scholars, including Elizabeth Becker, have proposed a counter-thesis, arguing that Chinese were discriminated against *qua* Chinese.<sup>38</sup>

The Khmer Rouge revolution caused also significant changes in social, cultural and economic life of the community. Under the Democratic Kampuchea, “all marks of heterogeneity had to be abolished, and millions of people were relocated in an attempt to create a homogeneous mixture”.<sup>39</sup> While Khmers and non-Khmers alike had to conform to

<sup>33</sup> Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, London: Verso, 1985, p. 382.

<sup>34</sup> Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, p. 253.

<sup>35</sup> William Willmott, “The Chinese in Kampuchea”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. XII, No. 1, March 1981, p. 43–44.

<sup>36</sup> Ben Kiernan, “Kampuchea’s ethnic Chinese under Pol Pot: a case of systematic social discrimination”, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1986), p. 18–29; Ben Kiernan, “The survival of Cambodia’s ethnic minorities,” *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (1990).

<sup>37</sup> Michael Vickery, *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society*, London: Frances Pinter, 1986, p. 165.

<sup>38</sup> Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over...*, p. 254–255.

<sup>39</sup> Serge Thion, “Remodelling broken images: manipulation of identities towards and beyond the nation, an Asian perspective”, in R. Guidieri, ed., *Ethnicities and Nations: Processes of Interethnic Relations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988, p. 250.

one social ideal, non-Khmers were forced to conform to an ethnic ideal. In addition to dress, also language and skin color served as key measures of “Khmerness” under DK. Dark skin color was the symbol of the “pure Khmer”, peasant origin and the badge of the “old” people. “White faces” of Chinese had negative racial and social connotations.<sup>40</sup> To resist “Khmerization” was to threaten the founding principles of DK. In the eyes of some DK cadres, ethnic dissent was a crime equal to political dissent.

Like other ethnic groups, the Chinese were forced to “become Khmer” in housing, dress and food. Punishment for resisting assimilation ranged from warnings to re-education through hard labor and food deprivation to death. Most widely enforced of all was the ban on speaking Chinese. Generalizations about the Chinese race as a class were commonplace. Just as Lon Nol legitimized the liquidation of countless Vietnamese on the grounds that all ethnic Vietnamese were “communists/Vietcong,” many ethnic Chinese in DK were automatically branded “capitalists” by dint of their ethnicity. Chants against the “overseas Chinese exploiting class” and the “Chinese capitalists” were common.

In the biggest post-colonial wave of Chinese immigration, the regime of Democratic Kampuchea deployed thousands of advisers from the PRC, restoring airstrips, assisting in construction works and supervising rubber plantations. Some PRC advisers allegedly mouthed such slogans as “all overseas Chinese are evil” or “this is just capitalists getting their just desserts.” Such slogans were consistent with the treatment of overseas Chinese during China’s Cultural Revolution, which had branded overseas Chinese among the “Seven Black Elements” along with landlords, rich peasants, criminals, counter-revolutionaries, rightists and capitalists.<sup>41</sup>

Anyway, it is possible that there was no central policy of racial persecution of the Chinese in DK, and that their punishment was inspired by the racist zeal or personal animosities of individual cadres. Alternatively, there may have been a policy that was not universally enforced because of the leniency of individual cadres. There is some evidence to suggest that variation in treatment was regionally biased. In Kratie, liberated relatively early, the language ban was not rigorously enforced: in Preah Vihear, the Chinese language was banned but physical conditions were relatively easy. However, the wide variation of treatment across small areas, such as in pockets of Kandal and Battambang, complicates the picture and again points to individual interpretation of central policy – or the lack of it – as a key variable.

In addition to reprisals for violating the DK regime’s Khmerisation program, illness and fatigue also severely reduced or decimated several rural Chinese communities whose members were farmers used to strenuous work. A number of Chinese rural communities suffered a higher death toll than neighboring Khmer communities. It is nonetheless clear that some Chinese did die because of their failure to adapt to hard labour.

The worst excesses against Chinese under DK seem to have occurred in 1977–78. As the revolution began to purge its own ranks and the paranoia reached new heights, some Chinese were also tortured and executed in Tuol Sleng interrogation center for the political threat they were seen to represent to the survival of the Cambodian state. In a mirror image of trends

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<sup>40</sup> Becker, *When the War Was Over...*, p. 255.

<sup>41</sup> Michael Godley, “The sojourners: returned overseas Chinese in the PRC”, *Pacific Affairs* (Aut. 1989), p. 346.

elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Khmer Rouge were quick to apply their own “fifth column” theory to ethnic Chinese. An internal DK document singles out Cambodia’s ethnic Chinese as “counter-revolutionary” bases, stooges of the Kuomintang and CIA, who were plotting to overthrow the party in league with Taiwan, Vietnam and the Soviet Union.<sup>42</sup>

### **Demise and rise of the Chinese community in Cambodia**

The constitution of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) formally recognized the equality of all national minorities and their right to maintain their own culture, literature and language.<sup>43</sup> However, in line with geopolitical considerations and the foreign policy agenda of the PRK and its regional allies, Vietnam and Laos, the PRK vigorously repressed manifestations of Chineseness and encouraged anti-Chinese sentiment.

In PRK policy and propaganda, the surviving Chinese population in Cambodia was recast as a fifth-column for the PRC’s interests. Kiernan has suggested that anti-Chinese sentiment in the immediate aftermath of Pol Pot was a spontaneous reaction by the Khmer population who blamed Cambodian Chinese for the links of Pol Pot regime with Beijing.<sup>44</sup> But a majority of testimonies point to regime intervention, by PRK military and political cadres, acting to crystallize ethnic difference and cultivate the Chinese as a diversionary target.<sup>45</sup>

The Vietnamese troops had restricted the movement of Chinese around Cambodia, barring their entry to the towns. This regulation seemed primarily aimed at Chinese economic potential.<sup>46</sup> Most of the Chinese temples, schools, and villas in the cities were transformed into barracks for the Vietnamese troops. Several of the Chinese survivors decided to leave the country.<sup>47</sup>

Echoing the tactics of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea used ethnic Chinese as a political pawn against the People’s Republic of China. In punishment for the Beijing’s policy of support for the Democratic Kampuchea Phnom Penh regime exacted heavy penalties on Cambodia’s Chinese population. While encouraging the public ethnicity of such groups as the Chams, the new government enforced a near-universal ban on Chinese schools and cultural associations. Under the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, the Chinese in Phnom Penh were even denied the freedom to celebrate Chinese New Year, practice ancestor worship, or to honour Chinese shrines. The effect of this policy was wide-ranging: many Chinese did not feel free to speak Chinese or to use Chinese names. There was no public decree to prevent their doing so, but internal directives discriminated against one group of the Chinese, referred to as “Group 351”.

After the issue of circular #351 in 1983, the authorities conducted a nationwide registration of Chinese in their homes. In practical terms, the registration campaign often prescribed Chineseness on the basis of skin color or clarity of Khmer pronunciation.

<sup>42</sup> Ben Kiernan, “Kampuchea’s ethnic Chinese under Pol Pot: a case of systematic social discrimination”, p. 27–28.

<sup>43</sup> Vickery, *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics...*, p. 165.

<sup>44</sup> Ben Kiernan, “The survival of Cambodia’s ethnic minorities”, *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (1990)

<sup>45</sup> Stephen Heder, *Kampuchea, Occupation and Resistance*, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Monograph, 1980, p. 19.

<sup>46</sup> See: Heder, *Kampuchea, Occupation and Resistance...*

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem.

Fear of the repercussions of being labeled “351” led many Chinese to assume an overtly Khmer identity. Some of them tried to get falsified documents confirming their Khmer ethnic origin, others stopped speaking Chinese in public, while still others fled the country in panic.

Speaking Chinese was actively discouraged in some areas, while the prohibition on teaching Chinese was almost universally enforced. Restrictions on language had relaxed by the late 1980s, but by this time Chinese, banned since 1975, had fallen out of common usage. Underground Chinese associations and schools were principal strategies with which the Chinese resisted the threat of cultural annihilation. In the 1980s, Chinese-language education was seen almost as a criminal activity. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea as an act of repression also banned all Chinese from military service as a potential fifth column serving People’s Republic of China’s interests.

The establishment of the State of Cambodia in 1989 and later the restoration of Khmer monarchy led to a gradual relaxation of restrictions on the Chinese. From late 1990, the new government moved to revive Chinese education.<sup>48</sup> Shortly thereafter, National Assembly Chairman Chea Sim gave the green light for the formation of the first overseas Chinese association in Cambodia since 1975. He also appointed an eleven-member board of Chinese merchants to represent Cambodia’s Chinese community. In 1991, Chinese New Year festivities were officially allowed for the first time since 1975.<sup>49</sup>

Many experts pointed to the return to Cambodia of King Sihanouk in 1991 as the dividing line between the discrimination of the past and the cultural freedoms enjoyed by most Chinese today. Since this moment a significant renaissance of Chinese freedoms across the country might be observed. First of all, the government has allowed to re-establish the Association of Chinese Nationals in Cambodia with branches in every province. With some help of the diaspora the extensive program of rebuilding Chinese temples and schools started. There is a visible revival of language – not only among the Chinese but also in the Khmer population, as Chinese is once again becoming the language of business in Cambodia. In an important break with the isolationist past of the 1960s and early 1970s, an average ten percent of students at Chinese schools throughout Cambodia are now Khmer. It is also visible in the increase of intermarriage both between Chinese and Khmers and between the different Chinese dialect groups. It might confirm on the one hand the growth of integrity of Chinese but also the assimilationist tendency in the community.<sup>50</sup>

Beneath the tide of praise for the Royal Government of Cambodia’s policies towards ethnic Chinese there is in certain areas an undercurrent of uncertainty. There is still unsolved problem of Chinese communities’ property. A number of Chinese schools, temples and burial sites that weathered the 1970–75 war and Pol Pot’s revolution, taken over by government, remained unreturned to their rightful owners. Chinese communities in rural and urban areas are frequently obliged to buy back schools or temple buildings whose construction was financed by their associations within living memory.

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<sup>48</sup> Kawi Chongkithawon, “Relations with PRC said improved since accord”, *The Nation* 20 Nov. 1991, p. A8.

<sup>49</sup> Minority Rights Group, *The Chinese in South-East Asia: MRG International Report*, Jun. 1992, p. 30.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116.

This is an understandable legacy of over twenty years of military, party and state monopoly in land and buildings ownership. It is also a result of inaccurate stereotyping – stereotyping also heard from some international NGO and UN officials – which casts ethnic Chinese in Cambodia as universally wealthy and powerful. There is also a tendency to view the ethnic Chinese as a compact bloc, an amorphous mass somehow capable of looking after “its own” interests. This view is equally inaccurate, for it ignores the diverse dialect groups, economic interests and provincial identities of Chinese across Cambodia. Nevertheless the Royal Government has made a welcome break with the recent past in terms of its positive policies recognizing and encouraging Chinese cultural identity.

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Ethnic Chinese enjoy greater freedom of cultural expression under the Royal Government of Cambodia than under any of the regimes in power from 1970 to 1993. The new policy compares favorably not only with past practice in Cambodia, but also with the restrictions on Chinese cultural identity in many countries in the region. In allowing this florescence of Chinese social organization, the Royal Government of Cambodia has given important recognition to the fact that ethnic Chinese in Cambodia today have a local (Cambodian) national identity while retaining a partially or specifically Chinese cultural and ethnic identity. This is an important step away from the trend still present in the ethnic policies of some other countries in the region that casts ethnic Chinese as instruments of PRC’s or Taiwanese national interest.



IRENA KAŁUŻYŃSKA

## Different Categories of Names within Traditional Chinese Personal Names

### 1. Personal names

Personal names, the subject of anthroponomastic research, are words belonging to the vocabulary of every language and used to identify individual entities – individual persons (real or imaginary). Subdivisions and terms within personal names are numerous. The basic pattern is considered to be “given name” + “family name”, together called the personal name or the name. There are exceptions concerning the sequence and the elements of the basic pattern. The variations also concern the insertion of other names or terms. Sometimes one additional name is inserted, called the second or middle name, and, in some areas, it can be the patronymic (the name derived from the given name of the father), or the name of the tribe. In some societies the third name can also be used and as such is inserted after the second name.

In general, a human being receives some name shortly after birth, and this is called simply the name or the forename, in the U.S. and Canada – the first name or the given name. The original given name may be replaced by another one, and this is the regular practice among some societies. The name may be changed at some definite time, as at attaining the adulthood, or on the occasion of some achievements of the person named. The new name or names can also be used in specific situations instead of the original one, or treated as additional one or ones, used together with the original name. Some additional names (appellations, titles or eulogizing or derogatory terms added to a person’s name) could be known as surnames (also called bynames or to-names, the latter term being obsolete) or nicknames. Many of these names have become fixed and hereditary in individual families, and the use of family names has developed from them. In modern usage the term “surname” means “family name” (in the U.S. and Canada the term “last name” is frequently used), and the nicknames have informal character. Presently, other appellations have little practical function and are scarcely used, except insofar as some individuals, often temporarily, may be called by pet names or by nicknames, most of which are conventionally altered forms of original names. In earlier periods, however, appellations were widely applied and used, as they afforded good means of distinguishing people. In the European tradition the combination of a given name and an additional appellation functioned for many ages, because a family name is a relatively recent development. The Romans are considered the first Europeans regularly using family names, although some families among the Greeks identified themselves by the patronymic. The modern development of hereditary names or clan names began in the Middle Ages, with royal and noble families. The system of at least two names, i.e. a family name and a given

name, is more efficient in some aspects. The family name helps to identify children before they can obtain other names, and it usually remains fixed and certain through a person's (mainly man's) life, while given names can be changed.

Naming is the process of assigning a particular word or phrase to a particular object. The most important elements of the naming process in the case of personal names concern the name-givers, the person named, the time and circumstances of the name-giving, and the meaning and associations of the name. Since a newly born child possesses the minimal individuality, the first given name is inevitably given by others (a parent or parents, a member or members of the family or group). The name-givers are usually well-wishers of the newborn and the name in any society is rather a culture-oriented "good" one, whether chosen because of cultural or social conventions, fashion or simple practicality. Other names or appellations differ in their nature and manner of giving from names bestowed at birth. They may be bestowed by the person himself or his well-wishers, or by the community conceived as non-neutral in its feelings about the individual. Such names or appellations may be actually bestowed or may begin as singular descriptions, specifying any characteristics of the person.

A person named can be a male or a female. The gender, being the sexual identity as male or female, is one of important social factors most frequently evoking some naming differentiation. Gender roles were traditionally divided into strictly feminine and masculine ones, and they varied significantly from one society or culture to another. However, it is generally believed that "good" names for men and women should be different, according to their different physiological features and gender roles or simply because of the need of proper identification of the person named.

Other important factors typically evoking naming differentiation are the social and the professional status of the person. It may happen that unimportant persons could have no names typical of other members of the society. Therefore, the character of the name and sometimes the number of names referring to one person also reveal the person's status in the society.

Personal names of various types contain information that falls within the content of the broadly understood culture. They carry important cultural or social messages, e.g. on the system of values common to the entire society or a smaller group, on social aspirations and preferences, on the pursuit of prestige or higher status, on the formation of family and local identities, on the structure of families and societies, as well as on the circumstances in which the personal names emerged, e.g. on the political, cultural or social situation. Therefore, the different types of personal names characterise the time of bestowing and the people who either coined or selected them.

## **2. Chinese personal names**

Chinese personal names form a rather complex subsystem of the Chinese language. They are less distinct in form from the regular language than are personal names in most European or Western traditions. Most Chinese personal names retain lexical meaning of their constituents, thus they are to an extent semantically transparent, which may cause problems with their identification as proper names in some contexts. Further, in writing, as they are written down in characters, the product of the Chinese ideographic-phonetic writing system, no graphic device such as capitalization distinguishes them from other words. In the Chinese writing system, characters are strung together one after another without any indication of word

boundaries. This system was developed on the basis of the monosyllabic nature of the Archaic Chinese (AC) language, where words were predominantly monosyllabic, and in this system, generally speaking, each individual word was represented by a single symbol, i.e. Chinese character. However, in later phases of the language development, and especially in Modern Standard Chinese (MSC), these are monosyllabic morphemes (free, i.e. words, or bound) that are written in one character. Words consisting of more than one syllable are written with as many characters as there are syllables. Normally, each syllable can be considered to be a meaningful morpheme/word, having a lexical, grammatical or onomastic meaning, but occasionally some morphemes/words of obscure etymology or of foreign origin have more than one syllable. In some cases the characters are used purely for their phonetic value, i.e. they are employed for notation of syllables of identical or similar pronunciation as their phonetic (and consequently graphical) representations.

In Mainland China, the PRC, Han nationality personal names are romanized in *pīnyīn*, Chinese Phonetic Alphabet, usually without tone marks. In Taiwan and some other countries Chinese names are usually romanized according to the Wade-Giles' system. Surnames and given names are written as separate words. The first letters of the surname and given name are in *pīnyīn* written in capital letters, e.g. Jiang Guodao; in the Wade-Giles' system sometimes the first letters of all personal name's elements are written in capital letters, e.g. Chiang Kuo Tao, or only the first letters of the surname and given name are written in capital letters, and the given name's elements are separated with a dash, e.g. Chiang Kuo-tao.

The most common Chinese (Han nationality) personal naming convention is that a personal name consists of a surname and a given name, and the basic pattern is "family name" + "given name", i.e. the family name precedes the given name. This sequence of the elements of personal names arose during the Zhou Dynasty, and from the beginnings of our era it started to be a standard pattern of Chinese personal names. The reversal of the order of parts of personal names, which often happens in contemporary China, especially in informal situations, causes some confusion if the surname and the given name are not distinctive enough to be easily identified.

The form class (part of speech) of a surname and a given name as a whole is a noun. The form classes of their constituents may be different. Sometimes, because of the overlapping of form classes in the Chinese language, or other reasons, they are not clear or determined, and consequently the relations between the constituents of polysyllabic (mainly bisyllabic) names are unclear or ambiguous. Bisyllabic surnames and given names are in most cases compound words. A compound, as used here, is not only a combination of two or more free words bound together to form a new word, but the constituents of a compound are also bound morphemes other than affixes, i.e. roots or root words, since it is not always possible and practicable to exhibit the status of the constituents.<sup>1</sup> Some disyllabic names are not compounds but derivational constructions consisting of one root morpheme/word and an affix, because some bound morphemes in compounds have lost their meaning as root morphemes and acquired the status of affixes, which serve to mark the function of the words of which they form a part. The status of some terms occurring in names as the first or the end morphemes in a compound form is not sufficiently clear.

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<sup>1</sup> Yuen Ren Chao, *A Grammar of Spoken Chinese*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1968, p. 359.

Chinese given names are constructed of one or more (in most cases two) lexical items (morphemes or words). Since most of lexical items retain in a name their own lexical meanings, Chinese given names are sometimes considered lexical forms rather than onomastic ones. A combination of any two items usually represents a combination of their lexical meanings, or signifies a new derived meaning, sometimes noncompositional. Most of Chinese personal names are not random combinations; they usually have a certain underlying significance, reflecting the associative level of meaning, i.e. the reason or reasons why the particular lexical or onomastic items are used in the naming process. It is very difficult to find out the true significance of some names, and sometimes it is based on a guesswork.

In the Chinese culture the relationship between a name and the reality was predominantly regarded neither as formal nor ideal, but as real and very important. A person's name was considered intimately connected with the person's fate, thus the Chinese usually paid great attention to their form and meaning. Traditionally, given names were and are predominantly selected with attention to their semantic content, but also to the phonoaesthetic value of syllables, and to the numerological characteristics of strokes and other elements of Chinese characters used to write them down, all in relation to the person's birth time and personal elemental value. The Chinese believed that by means of appropriate naming the person's constitution can be improved and the fate can be changed. Considering names as not merely labels helpful in identification of people but as almost real facts made the Chinese express their culture-oriented desires by deliberately formatting their personal names, and by establishing various rules of their usage and protection.

The information concerning traditional Chinese rules of name-giving and name-protection can be found in various texts of a great importance for the Chinese civilization. The most important sources are considered three treatises on rites, i.e. *Zhouli* (Rites of Zhou), *Yili* (Rites and Ceremonies), and especially *Liji* (Notes on Rites), which achieved their final form under the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), and comprise the standards of behaviour of the ancient Chinese in every domain of life, name-giving and name-using included. Another important work is *Zuozhuan* (Zuo's Commentary), one of the ancient (the 5th century B.C.) commentaries on the *Chunqiu* (Annals of Springs and Autumns), the chronicle probably written by Confucius (551–479 B.C.). The commentary contains many valuable remarks on personal naming in the epoch. The work *Baihu tong* (Debate in the White Tiger Hall), written by Ban Gu (32–92 A.D.), contains reports on the debate at the imperial court in 79 on the subject of the correct interpretation of the various statements in the classical texts, among others those concerning personal names, their categories and domains of usage, cf. *Po Hu T'ung*. Much useful information can also be found in other historical or philosophical writings from the early and later epochs. A work on various aspects of Chinese personal naming, *Chinese Female Namings. Past and Present* by Irena Kałużyńska, was published in 2008.

### 2.1. Surnames (family names)

It is believed that Fuxi (2852–2736 B.C.), the first of the legendary Five Rulers, established the law of marriage and ordered the adoption of surnames.

In ancient China there were two kinds of surnames. The first kind was termed *xìng* 姓 “original surname, clan name, family name”, and according to the etymology denoted “born by woman”. The second kind was called *shì* 氏 “titled surname”, and denoted “the

seed or the root of a tree”.<sup>2</sup> *Xing*-surnames appeared as first ones, and the Chinese character for the term *xìng* and many of characters for ancient *xìng*-surnames contain the radical *nǚ* 女 “woman”, which seems to indicate the existence of a matriarchal society at the dawn of Chinese civilization, and the possibility that surnames could be transmitted matrilineally.<sup>3</sup> However, the problem of the matriarchy in China has not been sufficiently elucidated. Surnames written in characters with the “woman” radical are considered by some scholars as having originated as late as the Zhou Dynasty (1122–256 B.C.), and the handing down of family or clan names were nearly always patrilineal.<sup>4</sup> The oldest *xìng*-surnames, e.g.: Jiang 姜, Ji 姬, Yao 姚, were respectively considered the surnames of the legendary emperors, founders of the Chinese civilization: Shennong “Divine Farmer” (2736–2696), Huangdi “Yellow Emperor” (2697–2596), and Shun “Wise/Good” (2255–2204). In Zhou times the states were often granted to the feudal princes of the same *xìng*-surnames, e.g. the nobles in the states of Lu, Jin, Zheng, Wei, Yu, Guo, Sui, Wu, Yan and Ba shared the king’s surname Ji 姬, the nobles of the states of Qi, Shen, Lü and Xu 許 shared the same surname Jiang 姜, the nobles of the states Qin and Xu 徐 shared the same surname Ying 嬴. The nobles of Chen State had their surname Gui 媯, of Chu state – Mi 芈, of Song state – Zi 子, of Yue state – Si 姒. Such surnames are called *guóxìng* 國姓 “state surnames”, i.e. surnames worn by the rulers and nobles of the state.<sup>5</sup>

The females used the *xìng*-surnames as devices of the fundamental significance, because of the principle of the clan exogamy, and the males used the *shì*-surnames as devices denoting mainly their rank of nobility, official position or place of origin. However, all men of the aristocracy knew their *xìng*-surnames, even if they didn’t use them for their namings. *Baihu tong* reads:

Why has a man a clan-name [*xìng*]? To emphasize [the feelings of] affection, to enhance the love between his kindred, to differ from the beasts, and to distinguish the marriage [-groups]. Therefore, when in ordering the generations and distinguishing the species men are induced to love each other during their life and to mourn for each other in case of death, and they are forbidden to marry persons of the same clan-name, it is all to accentuate [the importance of] the human relationships. [...] What are the surnames [*shì*] for? To honour efficacious spiritual power and discourage cunning force. Sometimes one’s official position is taken as a surname, sometimes one’s profession. Hearing the surname one’s spiritual power can be known.<sup>6</sup>

*Xìng*-surnames were the most important devices as they indicated the origin of clans (grouping families of descendants of the same remote ancestor), and as they influenced

<sup>2</sup> Kang-hu Kiang, *Chinese Civilization. An Introduction to Sinology*, Shanghai: Chunghwa Book Co., Ltd., 1935, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Ruofu Du, “Surnames in China”, *Journal of Chinese Linguistics*, vol. 14, 1986, p. 317.

<sup>4</sup> Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, “The Origin of Chinese Clan Names”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, vol. 19, 1954, p. 27–28.

<sup>5</sup> Tingdong Yuan, *Guren chengwei* (Appellations of Ancient People), Chengdu: Sichuan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1994, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Po Hu T’ung. The Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall*, transl. by Tjan Tjoe Som, Leiden, 1952, p. 579–580.

possible marriages. The introduction of the principle of the clan exogamy is traditionally related to the legendary Yellow Emperor who established the firm patriarchal society and decided that people of the same *xìng*-surname, so-called *tóngxìng* 同姓, were not allowed to marry each other, or to the Prince of Zhou, Zhou Gong (the 11th century B.C.), who wanted to strengthen the solidarity among the different families.<sup>7</sup>

During the Zhou Dynasty the *xìng*-surnames were considered more important for the nobles than their given names, and their *shì*-surnames.<sup>8</sup> *Shì*-surnames were much more numerous and their number constantly increased. The most ancient *xìng*-surnames were very limited in number; there were altogether 22<sup>9</sup> or 26 of them.<sup>10</sup> However, *Baihu tong* reads: “Why are there one hundred clan-names [*xìng*]? Anciently the Sages by blowing the musical pitch-pipes fixed the clan-names, and thereby registered the [different kinds of] kindred. Man is born with the Five Constant [Virtues] in him. There are five principal tones [...] which, combining together five by five, make twenty five [tones], and further give birth to the four seasons. With the [four] different climates and [twenty-five] various tones the completion is obtained. Therefore there are one hundred clan-names”.<sup>11</sup> The term *bǎixìng* 百姓 “hundred clan names; hundred surnames” was thus a merely figurative expression, and originally denoted the members of aristocracy as the only persons having surnames in the early historical period of China. However, in later times the term started to denote “commoners”, as almost all Han Chinese had their surnames.<sup>12</sup>

In the 3rd century B.C., after the states of China had been unified by the ruler of the Qin Dynasty, the difference between these two kinds of surnames blurred. As a result, the two notions, *xìng* and *shì*, became synonymous, and in the MSC they both, as the word *xìngshì* 姓氏, mean “family name; surname”. However, the term *xìng* is also more commonly used by people as the general term for the family name, and the term *shì* started to be chiefly used to refer to a maiden surname of a married woman.

Chinese surnames are typically patrimonial, they were at the historical times transmitted mainly paternally. In the cases of uxorilocal (matrilocal) marriages, where a woman marries a man into her family, sometimes the surname of children was the combination of both their father's and mother's surname, *héxìng* 合姓 “joint surname”.<sup>13</sup>

The great clan structure of the Chinese society has resulted in a limited list of surnames. According to most Chinese scholars, there are about 6,000 Chinese surnames recorded in various kinds of documents of the past. However, some researchers claim that the total number of past and present surnames exceeds 8,000. In contemporary China there are about 3,000 surnames used, and less than 10% of them are commonly used. The most

<sup>7</sup> Wojtasiewicz, “The Origin of Chinese Clan Names...”, p. 27.

<sup>8</sup> Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>10</sup> Wojtasiewicz, “The Origin of Chinese Clan Names...”, p. 29.

<sup>11</sup> *Po Hu T'ung*, p. 579.

<sup>12</sup> Irena Kałużyńska, *Contemporary Chinese Place Names. Names of Administrative Divisions at County and City Level*, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang, 2002, p. 174.

<sup>13</sup> Margaret M.Y. Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”, *Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers' Association*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1981, p. 68.

common 300 surnames are used by 87% of Chinese.<sup>14</sup> The standard form of a surname is a monosyllabic word, written in one character, *dānxìng* 單姓 “monosyllabic surname”, although there are some surnames constructed of two or more syllables/morphemes/words/characters, *fùxìng* 復姓 “polysyllabic surnames”. Polysyllabic surnames are divided into *shuāngzì fùxìng* 雙字復姓 “bisyllabic surnames”, *sānzì fùxìng* 三字復姓 “three-syllable surnames”, etc. “Collection of Chinese Surnames”<sup>15</sup> records 5,730 surnames: 3,470 (60.6%) monosyllabic, 2,085 (36.4%) bisyllabic, 163 (2.8%) three-syllabic, 9 (0.15%) four-syllabic, 3 (0.05%) five-syllable surnames. However, among 2,077 surnames considered as presently used there are only 77 (3.75%) bisyllabic surnames and 1 (0.05%) three-syllable surname. Polysyllabic surnames, constructed of three or more syllables, are transliterations of non-Han names. The overwhelming majority of native Han surnames presently used are monosyllabic ones.

The semantic-etymological classifications of Chinese surnames distinguish those derived from: names of the dynasties, state names, ranks of nobility, official positions, occupations, styles or social given names, posthumous titles, nicknames, names of residences, events.<sup>16</sup> Some Chinese surnames have lost their lexical meaning, and they function as onymic units, without any particular semantic content. Many surnames are still meaningful, which sometimes influences the choice of given names, as surnames and given names may function together as conceptual units and form or include phrases or even sentences.

The surname was very important for Chinese females, because many of them had no other names or their other names were not used and recorded. A Chinese woman in ancient and imperial China was predominantly referred to by her original maiden surname (the surname of her father), sporadically by the surname of her husband, or, exclusively in the Zhou Dynasty period, by the *xìng*-surname worn by the rulers and nobles in the state of her origin (“state surname”). She was usually called by the maiden surname even after she was married, eventually with some additional terms, mainly terms of familial relationship, terms of rank or nobility titles. In present China, women generally retain their maiden surnames after marriage.

## 2.2. Given names

In China there was and there is no fixed and limited set of given names, which means that there is no category of words reserved specifically for personal names. Given names were and still are formed individually by more or less vivid process of onimization of words from the Chinese appellative lexicon or by the process of transonimization, i.e. the shift of other proper names. At the beginning of the Chinese civilization a Chinese had probably only one name, given by parents in the infancy and used throughout one’s life. With the differentiation of the levels of people’s life conditions, personal names started to be differentiated as to their form, meaning, importance and the domain of usage. Therefore, in the past a noble Chinese could have a number of names used in different situations. The most important of them was his original standard name, given in infancy,

<sup>14</sup> Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 14–20.

<sup>15</sup> Fuqing Yan, Shouzhi Fan, Yuzhu Yang, *Zhongguo xingshi huibian* (Collection of Chinese Surnames), Beijing: Renmin Youdian Chubanshe, 1984.

<sup>16</sup> Ruofu Du, “Surnames in China”, p. 318–320; Bin Zhu, Celia Millward, “Personal Names in Chinese”, *Names*, vol. 35, no. 1, 1987, p. 10.

and considered as a private and sacred one, not to be freely used by others. Small children often had childhood or pet names, mainly used by their close relatives. On attaining majority a Chinese was given a social name to use in public. A Chinese could also adopt or be given other names, appellations, nicknames and pseudonyms. Names marked different stages in persons' private and social life. Therefore, the more important a person was, the more given names the person had. In present day China, a Chinese usually has one official name, but he/she can have some other informal names, nicknames or pseudonyms. Small children often have pet names coined mainly on the basis of their official names.

In the past, the relationship between a person and his/her given name, his/her private original name in particular, was considered extremely important for his/her existence. Therefore, the Chinese regarded their names as an essential part of themselves and treated them with due respect. The relationship between a man and his given name was considered more crucial than that between the man and his surname. The great Chinese philosopher Mencius (372–289 B.C.) stated: “We avoid the name [*míng*], but do not avoid the surname [*xíng*]. The surname is common, the name is peculiar”.<sup>17</sup> The limited number of surnames in China caused that there was no necessity of the particular protection of the surname, which referred to so many individuals at a time. The special attention paid by Chinese to their given names led to the phenomenon of the personal name taboo.<sup>18</sup>

The personal name taboo appeared in China about the 10th century B.C. and was abolished by the Revolution of 1911. At the beginning it was restricted to the names of the dead, later on it began to include the names of the living. It became impossible to utter or write down the personal given names of a ruling sovereign, a notable or a person of higher rank, as well as one's parents or other ancestors. The Chinese resorted to different methods to prevent the taboo violation. The private given names of the notable persons were usually not used, the proper names or appellatives identical with those of the sacred names were substituted by others. It is evident that all restrictions caused by the taboo were more strictly obeyed as far as the emperor and the members of his family were concerned. Nevertheless, everyone breaching the taboo offended against the law of the state, and the rules of social behaviour.

### 2.2.1. Standard given names

The most important of Chinese given names were called *míng* 名 “name”, but also *dà míng* 大名 “great name”, *běnmíng* 本名 “original name”, *zhèng míng* 正名 “proper name”, *xùnmíng* 訓名 “standard name”, *pǔmíng* 譜名 “name registered in a genealogical book”.<sup>19</sup>

The generic term for all these names is *míng* “name”. At the beginning of the Chinese civilization the *míng* notion indicated designations of various objects. Every object had its

<sup>17</sup> James Legge, *The Chinese Classics: The Works of Mencius*, Hong Kong, 1960, p. 497–498.

<sup>18</sup> Irena Kałużyńska, “The Taboo and Chinese Geographical Names”, *Orientalia Varsoviensia*, vol. 3, 1990, p. 17–35.

<sup>19</sup> Denis Grafflin, “The Onomastics of Medieval South-China: Patterned Naming in the Lang-Yeh and Tai-Yüan Wang”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 103, 1983, p. 385; Futing Wang, Xinchuo Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian* (Thematical Dictionary on Ancient Knowledge), Hefei: Huangshan Shushe, 1991, p. 162–169; Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”, p. 70–71; Yuan, *Guren chengwei*, p. 44.

*míng*. In *Liji* there is a statement: “Yellow Emperor gave appropriate names [*míng*] to all objects”.<sup>20</sup> People, as the main subjects of the social life, in order to differentiate each other and to keep social relations among themselves, used names as their appellations, and they also called their appellations by the term *míng*. In the dictionary *Shuowen jiezi*, by Xu Shen (c.58–c.147), it is said: “ ‘*Míng*’ [name], means speaking of oneself. [The character for the term *míng*] is constructed out of [the elements] ‘*kǒu*’ [‘a mouth’] and ‘*xī*’ [‘an evening dusk’], ‘*xī*’ is of the same [meaning] as ‘*míng*’ [‘dark’], when it is dark, [people] cannot see each other, so they use their mouth to speak their names”.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the etymology of the word/character *míng* seems to be based upon the explanation that when it is dark, people cannot use their hands to indicate themselves, they have to use sounds to name themselves. In *Baihu tong* there is a statement explaining that a man must have a name (*míng*) “to reveal his emotions, and in the reverential service of others to present himself”.<sup>22</sup>

According to the ancient rules, *míng* was given 3 months after the birth of a child. In *Yili* one can read: “In the third month after a child’s birth, his father bestows the name [*míng*] on it. If a child dies, [father] mourns over it. If a child has not yet been named, [father] doesn’t mourn over it”,<sup>23</sup> and in *Liji* there is a statement: “At the end of the child’s third month, on an [auspicious] day selected for this purpose, they cut off its hair with the exception of tufts [...] [father] takes hold of the right hand of the child, makes it laugh, and gives it a name [*míng*]”.<sup>24</sup>

The explanation as to the time of the name bestowing can also be found in *Baihu tong*: “Why [is that a child is] given its name [*míng*] three months [after its birth]? The Way of Heaven is that in a season [of three months] the things have their transformation, while three months after its birth a child acquires its eyesight, is also able to smile, and to come into communication with the people [of the outer world]. So, with the beginning of its consciousness, it is given a name”.<sup>25</sup>

In *Baihu tong* one can also find the information as to the place of bestowing the name:

Three months after its birth a child receives from the father its name [*míng*] before the shrine of the first ancestor [...] it means that the name given should be [announced to all] the shrines in the ancestral temple. [...] Another opinion is: the name is given in the Small Apartment. The personal name is [only] an appellation of a young and unimportant [child], it is unpolished and indefinite, therefore [it is given] in a Small Apartment. [...] [Afterwards they] announce [the name] to the four frontiers. The announcement to the four frontiers is in order to nip in the bud and to prevent from the beginning [all possible disasters].<sup>26</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Liji* (Notes on Rites), Beijing: Shisanjing Zhushu, 1957, p. 1918.

<sup>21</sup> *Shuowen jiezi zhu* (Commentary to *Shuowen jiezi*), Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1981, p. 56.

<sup>22</sup> *Po Hu T’ung*..., p. 581.

<sup>23</sup> *Yili* (Ceremonial Rites), Beijing: Shisanjing Zhushu, 1957, p. 897.

<sup>24</sup> *Liji*, p. 1276–1277.

<sup>25</sup> *Po Hu T’ung*..., p. 582.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 582.

The name given in the third month after the child's birth was sometimes called *sānyuè zhī míng* 三月之名 “the third month name”.<sup>27</sup> In later times, however, the *míng* was often given one month after the childbirth on a ceremony called “full month”.<sup>28</sup>

The *míng*-name, as given mainly by one's parents or grandparents, was by Chinese considered especially valuable. It was treated as a private and a sacred one, and as having great importance for a person's life. People felt and manifested a kind of aversion from using it, especially that of persons whom they were bound to respect. Thus, this name was used mainly by the person himself or by the person's senior, and could not be freely used by other people. The special attention paid by Chinese to this name led to the phenomenon of the personal name taboo.

There are some other names, also called *míng*, but usually with some additional specific terms. On beginning the learning or first going to school the child could have another name given to him, and such a name was called *xué míng* 學名 “learning name”, *shū míng* 書名 “book name”, or *xiào míng* 校名 “school name”. This name was mainly used by his master and schoolfellows, but also by other people, in official relations as well as in private matters. On taking a degree, on entering official life, or on having official distinctions or rank conferred on him, a man often took another name, known as the *guān míng* 官名 “official name”. Sometimes the original name, given by parents, could be then treated as the childhood name, and those other names were considered the standard given name of a person. Therefore, in some cases it is difficult to ascertain what kind of *míng* is recorded in historical documents.

The standard given name usually consists of one syllable/morpheme/word/character or two such elements. Monosyllabic given names are called *dān míng* 單名 “monosyllabic names”, bisyllabic ones are called *shuāng míng* 雙名 or *jiān míng* 兼名 “double names”. Sometimes given names are constructed out of three elements, as *sān zì míng* 三字名 “three-syllable names”.

An important problem arises with female standard great names. In old documents women in principle were not referred to by their given names, but by other patterns of namings. Since in official documents female given names were scarcely recorded, it was often thought that in the past the Chinese women had not their standard given names at all. However, it is evident that many women (especially famous women of noble families) in old times had their standard given names, even if these names were not used or recorded.

### 2.2.2. Childhood names

In the old times the first name of a person, by the order of bestowing, could have been an unofficial childhood name, called *xiǎo míng* 小名 or *xiǎo zì* 小字 “small name; pet name”, also *rǔ míng* 乳名 or *nǎi míng* 奶名 “milk name”, *hái míng* 咳名 “infant name”, or *yòu míng* 幼名 “childhood name”.<sup>29</sup> The use of childhood names, considered informal and

<sup>27</sup> *Yili*, p. 100–101, commentaries.

<sup>28</sup> Rubie S. Watson, “The Named and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society”, *American Ethnologist*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1986, p. 620–621.

<sup>29</sup> Viviane Alleton, *Les Chinois et la passion des noms*, Paris: Aubier, 1993, p. 171–175; Wolfgang Bauer, *Der Chinesische Personenname*, Asiatische Forschungen, b. 4, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1959, p. 12; Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”, p. 69; Yuan, *Guren chengwei*, p. 85; Jianshun Xu, Xian Xin, *Mingming. Zhongguo xingming wenhua de aomiao* (Naming. Secrets of Chinese Culture of Personal Names), Beijing: Zhongguo Shudian, 1999, p. 451.

hypocoristic ones, started during the Han Dynasty, and flourished up to the Sui Dynasty (581–618).<sup>30</sup> The custom lasts till nowadays, because presently many Chinese children have their informal hypocoristic childhood names. The standard given name is then chosen somewhat earlier or later, as nowadays Chinese parents have a month to register the child.

In *Song shi* it is said: “For a newborn a milk name [*rǔmíng*] is used to make the evidence [of his birth], for a grownup a standard name [*xùnmíng*] is used”.<sup>31</sup> The childhood names are especially distinctive, as they were usually bestowed just after the birth of a baby or during the first month of a baby’s life and considered informal ones, used mainly by one’s parents, grandparents, or other senior relatives, and sometimes neighbours or close friends. Usually a pet name was rarely used after one had grown up. However, the pet name clings to a person through life, as in fact all other names do after they are bestowed. Therefore, the childhood name could have been used in official matters as a “standard name”, if the person had no other names or considered it sufficiently good. The childhood names of some famous persons in the Chinese history are recorded in historical documents as their “standard name”, e.g.: the childhood name Xiu 秀 of the Guangwu Emperor (25–58) of the Han Dynasty is treated in historical documents as his “standard name”.<sup>32</sup> Sometimes an original name, which had been given by relatives before a child received a “school name”, could also be treated as a childhood name. Childhood names of some emperors and notable persons were considered as sacred as their “standard names”; they were tabooed, and couldn’t be freely uttered or written down. Calling somebody by his childhood name, if not in familial relations, was often considered as an offence.

Childhood names seem to have been highly important for women. Some scholars are of the opinion that in old China standard given names were usually considered simply useless for girls and women. Females had a narrow access to the outside world, and they were usually known by their name only by their family, relatives and intimates, so as a consequence, women usually had no standard names, only childhood names.<sup>33</sup>

### 2.2.3 Styles or social names

Another category of Chinese given names is called *zì* 字 “style”, “social name” or “courtesy name”<sup>34</sup>, or “marriage name”.<sup>35</sup> After the Sui and Tang (618–907) dynasties this kind of names was also called *biǎozì* 表字 “style revealing merits”.<sup>36</sup> Such a name was traditionally bestowed during the special ceremony to children at the age of about 15 (girls) or 20 (boys) to use it in public. The ceremony for boys was called capping ceremony or rite of capping, and for girls – hair-pinning ceremony or rite of hair-pinning. The custom of bestowing styles during the ceremonies marking the beginning of the adulthood started

<sup>30</sup> Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 85.

<sup>31</sup> Tuo Tuo, ed., *Song shi* (History of the Song Dynasty), Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1977, p. 2461.

<sup>32</sup> Xu, Xin, *Mingming. Zhongguo xingming wenhua de aomiao*, p. 453; *Zhongguo lishi mingren cidian* (Dictionary of Famous Historical Persons), Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1984, p. 633.

<sup>33</sup> Xu, Xin, *Mingming. Zhongguo xingming wenhua de aomiao*, p. 453.

<sup>34</sup> Grafflin, “The Onomastics of Medieval South-China: Patterned Naming in the Lang-Yeh and Tai-Yüan Wang”, p. 385; Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*, p. 163; Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”, p. 85; Zhu, Millward, “Personal Names in Chinese”, p. 18.

<sup>35</sup> Watson, “The Named and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society”, p. 624.

<sup>36</sup> Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 57.

sometime during the Shang-Yin Dynasty (1766–1122 B.C.), and slowly developed into a system, which became widespread during the Zhou Dynasty. In *Baihu tong* one can find the passages: “Why must a man have a style [*zì*]? To crown his spiritual power, to show his merits, and to honour the [new] adult. [...] In his youth he has his personal name [*míng*], at the capping he receives his style. [...] At fifteen [a woman is] versed in the arts of weaving, while her thoughts are careful and firm. Therefore, when she is promised in marriage, she receives a hairpin and her style”.<sup>37</sup>

When boys had been capped and girls hair-pinned, they were assigned an additional name, *zì*, as the sign of respect for their newly achieved adulthood and in order to maintain the honour of their standard given names, *míng*, they had received from their parents. One can read in *Yili*: “Capping [a boy] and giving him a style is performed to make the name [*míng*] honoured”.<sup>38</sup> After bestowing, the private original name, *míng*, was used by the person himself or by his seniors. His juniors, those of the same generation, or strangers, used the style. It was considered a breach of etiquette to address any seniors or strangers by their *míng*. The *míng* and *zì* were not totally independent, there was some sort of semantic relationship (homophony, synonymy, antonymy or metonymy) between the two names.<sup>39</sup>

The tradition of using style names has been fading since about 1911. The system of a separate *míng* “standard name” and *zì* “style” was finally obsolete, and in contemporary China the term *míngzì* 名字, being the composition of these two terms, means “given name”. However, according to some reports, *zì*, as a “marriage name”, given to men during the ceremony of marriage, is still in use in some Chinese peasant communities.<sup>40</sup>

### 2.3. Appellations

Prior to about 1949, some people, especially rulers, nobles and literati, apart from their surnames and given names, also had a kind of additional appellations, generally called *hào* 號. The earliest definition of the term is: “*hào* means ‘to call’”.<sup>41</sup> At the beginning the term denoted names of all objects in the world, afterwards it started to denote a definite kind of personal appellations. *Hào* is also a generic part of other terms denoting various appellations, specified by the appropriate specifics. The first broader explanations of the term can be found in commentaries to classical texts by the Han Dynasty scholars. In *Zhouli* one can find an explanation: “*Hào* is an appellation to honour one’s name [*míng*], and what’s more, it is laudatory”.<sup>42</sup> *Baihu tong* reads: “An appellation [*hào*] is the outward sign of an [achieved] merit. Therewith the [achievement of the] merit is expressed and the [possession of] spiritual power is manifested, in order to command the [multitude of] subjects”.<sup>43</sup> As the first *hào* are considered the appellations: *dì* 帝 “emperor”, *wáng* 王 “king”, and *huáng* 皇 “the august one”. *Baihu tong* explains: “What do [the words] *dì* and *wáng* signify? They are appellations *hào*. [...] When his spiritual power [harmoniously]

<sup>37</sup> *Po Hu T’ung*..., p. 588.

<sup>38</sup> *Yili*, p. 81.

<sup>39</sup> Yuan, *Guren chengwei*, p. 58–63.

<sup>40</sup> Watson, “The Named and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society”, p. 624.

<sup>41</sup> *Shuowen jiezi zhu*, p. 204.

<sup>42</sup> *Zhouli* (Rites of Zhou), Beijing: Shisanjing Zhushu, 1957, p. 913.

<sup>43</sup> *Po Hu T’ung*..., p. 230.

combines [that of] Heaven and Earth [the Sovereign] is called *dì* “Emperor”. When [his] spiritual power is the harmonious combination of consideration for others and sense of the right principles he is called *wáng* ‘King’. [...] What is the meaning of *huáng*? It is also an appellation. [...] It was the designation for the combination of what was beautiful and august in Heaven. [...] Thus it was that he was [called] *huáng* ‘the August One’”.<sup>44</sup>

Some appellations are also denoted by other terms using *míng* (instead of *hào*) as their generic, necessarily preceded by an appropriate specific. The appellations were used during the life of their bearers or after their death instead of standard personal names.

### 2.3.1. Assumed names

Assumed names were quite popular in old China, especially among the men of letters and some female professionals. They were called *hào* 號 or *biéhào* 別號, i.e. appellations, style names, another styles, assumed names, aliases. As such names were often self-assigned, they were also called *zìhào* 自號 “self appellation; self assumed names”.<sup>45</sup>

The first proper *hào*-appellations occurred in the Zhou Dynasty. It is said: “Later generations apart from a style [*zì*] and a name [*míng*] introduced another appellation [*hào*] to praise themselves”.<sup>46</sup> The *hào* was an additional name of an adult person, and it was used firstly to taboo the person’s given name, and secondarily to honour the bearer, so it could be treated as an alternative courtesy name. A person might have many various *hào*-appellations, which was quite common among famous men of letters of the Tang and later dynasties. Usually, the *hào* were coined of 2–4 words, and used instead of the standard given name, i.e. it followed the person’s surname. However, it could be used instead the whole personal name as a separate appellation, constructed out of 1 to even 28 words. The *hào* was often associated with the place where the person lived, or, sometimes, it might reflect the person’s aspirations, character, or other features. Nowadays, bearing a *hào* is no longer a common practice, although many artists still often employ artistic names, and writers use pen-names, which have some characteristics similar to those of the old *hào*.

### 2.3.2. Nicknames

A kind of names used quite extensively in old and present China is called *wàihào* 外號 “outside names”, *hùnhào* 譚號 or *hùnmíng* 譚名, *hùnhào* 渾號 or *hùnmíng* 渾名, *hùnhào* 混號 or *hùnmíng* 混名 “casual names”, and also *chuòhào* 綽號 “extra names”, *súhào* 俗號 “vulgar names”, *huámíng* 華名 “flowery names”, i.e. epithet names, sobriquets or nicknames.<sup>47</sup> These names are bestowed on individuals in addition to their given names and, according to the popular usage, are informal and unofficial. It is believed that in the beginning all the additional appellations were called just *hào*, or *biéhào*, and they were mainly laudatory ones. In the time of the Song Dynasty (960–1279) the kind of additional names including any elements of irony or humour, linked to teasing and joking, started to be treated as a separate category of appellations. It is stated: “People, frivolous as to the public

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 230, with some changes.

<sup>45</sup> Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”, p. 86; Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*, p. 162–169; Zhu, Millward, “Personal Names in Chinese”, p. 18.

<sup>46</sup> Yi Zhao, *Gaiyu congkao* (Selected Research of Gaiyu), Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1957, p. 838.

<sup>47</sup> Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”, p. 87; Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*, p. 162–169; Yuan, *Guren chengwei*, p. 463; Zhu, Millward, “Personal Names in Chinese”, p. 19.

morals, while describing each other, always make use of nicknames [*hùnhào*]<sup>48</sup>. Of course, not all persons bestowing or receiving nicknames are “frivolous”, but the statement reveals the jovial and informal atmosphere connected with such namings. Nickname appellations usually consist of a surname plus a descriptive term based on such characteristics as one’s physical features, temperament, intellectual abilities, habits, hobbies, and the like. Thus, the descriptive nickname element is attached to a surname to form an affectionate, derogatory, humorous or ironical appellation of a person. Nicknames of another type function independently, i.e. without surnames. They are meaningful, usually descriptive and affectionate ones. Normally, nickname appellations are not used in one’s presence, but they may be so employed between intimates or others if the name is not very insulting.

The first nickname appellations occurred in texts from the Han Dynasty, later they happened to be more and more common. One of the earliest examples is probably that of Wang Ao “Royal Grandmother”, the grandmother of Xuan Emperor (90–49 B.C.), as she usually rode a cart drawn by oxen, so she got the nickname appellation Huangniu Ao 黃牛媼 “Yellow Oxen Grandmother”.<sup>49</sup>

### 2.3.3. Clerical names

Chinese monks and nuns after the ceremony of ordination assumed their clerical names or religious names, called *fāmíng* 法名 or *fǎhào* 法號 “Buddhist name”, *jiè míng* 戒名 “monkhood or nunhood name”, *dàomíng* 道名 or *dàohào* 道號 “Taoist name”.<sup>50</sup>

In the case of Buddhist monks and nuns, clerical names were used without surnames, because monks and nuns left their families and had to abandon surnames as the devices indicating their familial relations. The first word/character of names of Buddhist monks was usually the same for all disciples of one master. After the Jin Dynasty (265–420) the first word/character of names was often *Shì* 釋, as the abbreviation of the Chinese name of Sakyamuni, Shijiamuni 釋迦穆尼. It was considered as the dummy surname for all Buddhist monks. Buddhist names usually consisted of two syllables/words, closely associated with Buddhist religion and culture.

Taoist names were usually used as a kind of assumed names, *hào*, following the surnames or used as separate appellations. Some names were self-assumed, e.g. Ge Hong (280–c.340) called himself Baopuzi 抱樸子 “The Master Who Embraces Simplicity”.<sup>51</sup> Taoist names could also be given by pupils to their master, e.g. Zhang Daoling (?–156) was called by his pupils Zhang Tianshi 張天師 “Heavenly Teacher Zhang”, or Zhengyi Tianshi 正一天師 “Pure Heavenly Teacher”.<sup>52</sup>

### 2.3.4. Posthumous memorial titles

In China rulers and notables, apart from the given names bestowed during their lifetime, were also granted certain names posthumously. After the death their standard names had to be tabooed, and the deceased were recorded and known by the posterity by their posthumous

<sup>48</sup> Zhao, *Gaiyu congkao*..., p. 840.

<sup>49</sup> Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 466.

<sup>50</sup> Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*..., p. 166.

<sup>51</sup> Wilt Idema, Beata Grant, *The Red Brush. Writing Women of Imperial China*, Cambridge (Massachusetts), London: Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 14.

<sup>52</sup> Runsheng Li, *Zhengti, biaode, meicheng – xingming wenhua zashuo* (Standard Names, Names Revealing Virtue, Beautiful Appellations – Talks on Personal Names Culture), Beijing: Huawen Chubanshe, 1997, p. 86.

names. The names of this kind were called *shì* 諡, *shì míng* 諡名 or *shì hào* 諡號 “posthumous names; posthumous memorial names; posthumous memorial titles”.<sup>53</sup> The time of introducing the system of honorary posthumous memorial names is not clear. According to some versions, it was the legendary Yellow Emperor who initiated the system. Other versions claim that the system was initiated in the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty by Ji Dan, known as Prince of Zhou or Ji Fa, known under his posthumous title Wu Wang 武王 “Militant King”, the founder of the Zhou Dynasty. The first person granted posthumous memorial title was probably their father, Ji Chang, known under his posthumous name Wen Wang 文王 “Civil King”.<sup>54</sup> It is generally accepted that the system was established during the Zhou Dynasty, stopped by the Qin Dynasty (221–206 B.C.), because the emperor proclaimed that it was disrespectful for the descendants to judge their elders, re-established during the Han Dynasty, and continued to the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912).

In *Baihu tong* one can find some information on posthumous names:

Who had a rank during his life ought to receive a posthumous name at death [...] a man's behaviour is not the same throughout his life, so that it is only by his end that his beginning may be known [...] one receives a great name when one's conduct was great; one receives a small name when one's conduct was petty. The conduct originates from oneself, the name originates from others [...] He who has attended to the good and transmitted [the Way of] the Sages is posthumously called *Yao* [堯 ‘high’]; he whose consideration for others and sageness are abundant and illustrious is posthumously called *Shun* [舜 “wise; good”]; he who is tender-hearted, liberal and loving towards the people is posthumously called *Wen* [文 “civil; refined”]; he who is strong, vigorous, principled and straightforward is posthumously called *Wu* [武 “militant; martial”].<sup>55</sup>

Posthumous memorial titles were conferred during the sacrifice of departure to rulers, high officials and later on to some eminent scholars or politicians. They were chosen by special masters of ceremony at the court, and considered according to the evaluation of the bearer's conduct and moral qualities in the lifetime. After the ceremony of interment, the deceased was called by his posthumous memorial name, e.g. the ruler of Qin State of the Zhou Dynasty, whose surname was Ying, given name Renhao, was posthumously granted the title Mu 穆 “reverent”, and he was then referred to in historical documents as Mu Gong 穆公 “Mu [Reverent] Prince”. From the 8th century B.C. onward, some high officials and scholars had their posthumous titles granted by relatives or friends, and such titles were called *sishi* 私諡 “private posthumous memorial titles”, e.g. the famous writer and poet Tao Yuanming (?–427) was granted by his friends the posthumous title Jingjie 靖節 “Peaceful and Moral”, and by the posterity was often called Jingjie Xiansheng 靖節先生 “Peaceful and Moral Master” or Tao Jingjie.<sup>56</sup>

Memorial titles could be commendatory, critical and compassionate ones, but predominantly they were exaggerated accounts of the person's past achievements expressed

<sup>53</sup> Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*, p. 166; Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”, p. 87.

<sup>54</sup> Kiang, *Chinese Civilization. An Introduction to Sinology*, p. 19.

<sup>55</sup> *Po Hu T'ung*..., p. 369–375 with some changes.

<sup>56</sup> Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*, p. 166.

in laudatory terms. Their composing was based upon strict regulations that resulted in the fixed list of words used as memorial names granted posthumously to rulers and some eminent persons. At a beginning, memorial titles were usually constructed out of one or two terms, but after the Tang Dynasty they started to be constructed of several terms in succession. As a result, the posthumous memorial names started to be scarcely used as appellations of rulers.<sup>57</sup>

In *Baihu tong* there are also some passages concerning female posthumous memorial titles:

Why does the woman who with the approval of the Son of Heaven has been taken as the principal wife by a Minister or a great officer not receive a posthumous title? [Because of her] lowly [position] [...] Why does not the Spouse [of a Feudal Lord] receive a posthumous name? She has no rank, and therefore she will have no posthumous name. Another opinion is: the Spouse [of a Feudal Lord] receives a posthumous name; she is the mother of the state, and takes care [of the affairs] within the women's doors, so that all the subjects are also affected [by her conduct]. Therefore a posthumous name is accorded to her, to make manifest her good or bad [behaviour] [...] In which place is the posthumous name given to the Principal Consort of the Son of Heaven? [It is given] in the Hall of Audience, which is the place where the affairs of the state are conducted. The Ministers gather [there], and select a posthumous name, which they announce to the ruler, who then confers it [upon the deceased]. "A wife regards her husband as her Heaven". Therefore, it is sufficient to announce [the chosen name] to the ruler [who is her husband and Heaven]. How do we know that [for the conferring of a posthumous name upon the Principal Consort of the Son of Heaven] they do not proceed to [the altar of Heaven in] the southern suburb? A wife has in principle no business outside [the women's rooms], why [should there be any necessity to proceed to] the southern suburb?<sup>58</sup>

It can be assumed that good wives of rulers or noblemen were sometimes called by the posthumous names, mostly not their own memorial names, but the memorial titles of their husbands. However, some famous women, mainly empresses and emperors' concubines, were also granted their own posthumous names. The only Chinese female emperor of the Tang Dynasty, Wu Zetian (624–705), is generally recorded under her surname Wu 武 followed by the posthumous memorial title, Zetian 則天 "Modelled on Heaven", sometimes translated as "She Who Modelled Herself on Heaven".<sup>59</sup>

### 2.3.5. Posthumous temple titles

In old China there was also another kind of posthumous names, called *miàohào* 廟號 "posthumous temple titles" or "temple names".<sup>60</sup> They were given to the rulers after their

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 168.

<sup>58</sup> *Po Hu T'ung*..., p. 373–374.

<sup>59</sup> Idema, Grant, *The Red Brush. Writing Women of Imperial China*, p. 65.

<sup>60</sup> Homer H. Dubs, "Chinese Imperial Designations", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 65, no.1, 1945, p. 30; Xiaoming He, *Xingming yu Zhongguo wenhua* (Personal Names and Chinese Culture), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2001, p. 50.

death, when their spirit tablets were established in the ancestral temple, and on the ancestral tablets in the grand temple it was the ruler's posthumous temple title that was written there. It is generally accepted that the custom of bestowing the temple titles started in the Shang-Yin Dynasty, although the origin of posthumous temple titles is not clear. Temple titles, unlike the elaborate posthumous memorial titles, were usually constructed with the use of an eulogizing term, chosen to reflect the circumstances of the ruler's reign, and such terms as *zǔ* 祖 “forefather; founder;” or *zōng* 宗 “ancestor”. In the Han Dynasty and later, the first emperor after the death was habitually called Taizu 太祖 “Grand Forefather”, or Gaozu 高祖 “High Forefather”, or Shizu 世祖 “Generation Forefather”. Other emperors were called Taizong 太宗 “Grand Ancestor”, or Gaozong 高宗 “High Ancestor”, or Shizong 世宗 “Generation Ancestor”. Beginning from the Tang Dynasty, because there were many emperors of the same dynasty, the eulogizing terms added to the two generic terms, *zǔ* or *zōng*, were more numerous and differentiated. The emperors up to the end of the Yuan Dynasty were recorded in historical texts mainly by their posthumous temple titles. Posthumous temple titles were not used for women.

### 2.3.6. Reign titles

Titles of different periods of reigns of Chinese rulers were called *niánhào* 年號 “reign titles; year titles”. The practice of dividing an emperor's reign into small periods was initiated under the Han Dynasty as an element of a new chronological system, dividing the reign of an emperor into small units, called periods or eras, and counting subsequent years in relation to these periods. It is accepted in Chinese historiography that the practice of dividing an emperor's reign into certain periods was adopted during the reign of Wen Emperor (180–157 B.C.), although presently another opinion prevails, claiming that this happened under Wu Emperor (141–87 B.C.), and the earlier periods were made retrospectively. The first known *niánhào* is *yuánfēng* “First Tribute”, for the period 110–104 B.C., the reign of Wu Emperor. It commemorates the tribute paid by the emperor to the sacred Tai Mountain.<sup>61</sup>

Titles of reign were usually composed of two morphemes/words, though sometimes they consist of three or four elements. Their meaning sometimes was simply descriptive, e.g. “Beginning Period”, but more often they had a commendatory meaning, e.g. “Great Peace”, or a commemorative meaning in honour to some important events, as the already mentioned “First Tribute”. In history of China there were altogether 706 reign titles containing 251 different morphemes/words/characters.

The periods of reign lasted from a month to dozens of years. It was under the Ming Dynasty at the end of 16th century that the whole reign of one ruler started to be counted as one period, and, as a result, the reign titles began to be used as the designations for the emperors. Thus, the emperors of the Ming and Qing dynasties were usually referred to by the title of their reign periods instead of their posthumous temple titles, e.g. emperor Shengzu [temple title] (1662–1723), is better known as the emperor Kangxi 康熙, after the title of his reign period. The female emperor Wu Zetian had her reign divided into 17 periods, but she is not called by any of her reign titles, but known under her posthumous name.

<sup>61</sup> Jiuying He, Shuangbao Hu, Meng Zhang, *Zhongguo Hanzi wenhua daguan* (Outlook on Culture of Chinese Characters), Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2002, p. 167.

### 2.3.7. Honorific titles

Chinese rulers and later on some notables were granted titles of respect, called *zūnhào* 尊號 or *huīhào* 徽號 “honorific titles; eulogizing titles”. The last term, with the lexical meaning “beautiful title”, is thought to be in use since the Tang Dynasty.<sup>62</sup> The first honorific titles were probably the first *hào* appellations: *dì* “Emperor”, *wáng* “King”, *huáng* “the August One”. However, some scholars claim that the first truly honorific one was the title *huángdì* 皇帝 “August Emperor”, later usually translated as “emperor”, granted to the king of the Qin state after his conquest of other states, and thus known in the history as Qin Huangdi 秦皇帝 “Qin August Emperor” or Qin Shi Huangdi 秦始皇帝 “The First August Emperor of Qin” (246–210 B.C.).<sup>63</sup>

The typical honorific titles for empresses are: *huánghòu* 皇后 “Empress”, *huángtāihòu* 皇太后 “Empress Mother; Empress Dowager”, *tàihuáng tàihòu* 太皇太后 “Empress Grandmother”.

The custom of elaborated honorific titles self-assigned by the emperors or granted to them by their grateful subjects is believed to be flourishing especially in the time of the Tang Dynasty and later. Many such titles were quite long, as constructed of several words, e.g. the honorific title of Xuanzong (712–756), the emperor of the Tang Dynasty, was: Kaiyuan Sheng Wen Shen Wu Huangdi 開元聖文神武皇帝 “Founder of the New Era, Sacred, Refined, Saint, Militant Emperor”.<sup>64</sup>

Elaborated honorific titles were also granted to famous empresses and concubines, e.g. the honorific titles of the concubine of the late Xianfeng emperor and mother of the Tongzhi emperor of the Qing Dynasty were: Shengmu Huangtaihou 聖母皇太后 “Sacred Mother Empress Dowager”, or Cixi Taihou 慈禧太后 “Merciful and Auspicious Empress”. Honorific titles could be joined with some other eulogizing terms, and formed into long strings of honorific terms, e.g. Ci Xi Duan You Kang Yi Zhao Yu Zhuang Cheng Shou Xian Gong Qin Chong Xi Huangtaihou 慈禧端佑康頤昭豫莊城壽獻恭欽崇熙皇太后 “Merciful and Auspicious, Upright, Blessed, Healthy, Nourishing, Bright, Happy, Solemn, Defending, Long-living, Devoted, Respectful, Severe, Reverent, Prosperous Empress Dowager”.<sup>65</sup>

### 2.3.8. Nobility titles

The appellations based on ranks of nobility conferred by rulers on their eminent subjects are called *fēnghào* 封號 “nobility titles”.<sup>66</sup> In feudal times rulers granted nobility to members of their families, friends or outstanding persons. The titles were: *wáng* 王 “king; prince”, *gōng* 公 “duke”, *hóu* 侯 “marquis”, *bó* 伯 “earl; count”, *zǐ* 子 “viscount”, *nán* 男 “baron”, also *jūn* 君 “lord”. Together with the title, the noble was granted an estate, the fiefdom, of the size accorded to the rank. During the Zhou Dynasty, the owners of the land were the rulers of the territory of their fiefs. After the Qin and Han dynasties, because of the political and administrative changes, the nobles had only the right of collecting taxes in their estates. Names of the fiefs (place names) and terms for ranks of nobility were joined together and formed the nobility titles, frequently used as the namings for the nobles, instead of their

<sup>62</sup> Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*..., p. 167; Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 374.

<sup>63</sup> Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*..., p. 167.

<sup>64</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 168.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 169.

personal names, e.g.: Cao Zhi (192–232), the member of the royal family and famous man of letters, was conferred as Chen Wang 陳王 “King of Chen”, and was called by this nobility title. After his death, the nobility title and the posthumous memorial title, En 恩 “Benevolent”, were jointly used as his naming, Chen En Wang 陳恩王 “Benevolent King of Chen”.<sup>67</sup>

A person could have been given only a rank of nobility, without any estate of land. In such a case, the nobility title was constructed of a commendatory term and a rank term, e.g.: the famous official and man of letters Liu Ji (1311–1375) was given the nobility title as Chengyi Bo 誠意伯 “Earl of Sincere Will”.<sup>68</sup>

The nobility titles were also conferred to women, especially to mothers, wives or concubines and daughters of emperors, nobles and high officials. During the Han Dynasty some emperors conferred on their mothers and wives of their brothers or friends typical nobility titles, e.g. wife of the elder brother of Gao Zu, the founder of the Han Dynasty, was called Yin'an Hou 陰安侯 “Yin'an [place name] Marquise [term of nobility rank]”.<sup>69</sup> Generally, with some changes during the ages, daughters of rulers and feudal lords were called *gōngzhǔ* 公主 or *jūnzǔ* 君主 “princesses”, sisters – *zhǎnggōngzhǔ* 長公主 “elder princesses”, aunts – *dàzhǎnggōngzhǔ* 大長公主 “grand elder princesses”. The term *fūrén* 夫人 “lady” (also “imperial consort”, “wife”) used for wives of noblemen also functioned as the female nobility title. Some scholars think that terms of rank, *wèihào* 位號, of females in the imperial harem were also their nobility titles.<sup>70</sup> The typical appellation of all such females from the Han to Song dynasties was constructed of the surname followed by the nobility title. During the Ming and Qing dynasties before the title a beautiful epithet was usually added, and only this epithet was called the “nobility title”. Therefore, during these dynasties palace ladies were called by appellations constructed of the nobility title followed by the rank title. The similar appellations seen in pre-Ming documents are treated as female posthumous titles.<sup>71</sup> The reason for such changes of namings of females from the Inner Palace could have been caused by long and complicated (for Chinese people) surnames of palace ladies of Mongolian or Manchurian origin.

### 2.3.9. Official title appellations

Chinese officials were divided according to the official ranking and titular honours. The typical namings of the officials were thus their surnames followed by the term of official rank (usually not in its full form but abbreviated to two syllables/words). Such namings are considered as *guānchēng* 官稱 or *xiánmíng* 銜名 “official title appellations”.<sup>72</sup> The famous poet and painter Wang Wei (701–760) held for some time the post of *shàngshū yòuchéng* 尚書右丞 “assistant official of the central administration”, and for this reason he was also called Wang Youcheng 王右丞. This official title appellation was used for the title of the collection of his works, i.e. *Wang Youcheng ji* 王右丞集 “Collection of Wang Youcheng [‘s writings]”.<sup>73</sup> No typical official title appellations have been found among the female names.

<sup>67</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>68</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>69</sup> Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 495.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 491–492.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 270–275.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 490.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 270–275.

### 2.3.10. Position and influence appellations

Some officials and men of letters in old China were called by another type of appellation, called *dìwàng chēng* 地望稱 “position and influence appellations”.<sup>74</sup> Such names were quite common from the Tang Dynasty onwards, especially during the Song and Ming dynasties, and were normally constructed of a surname followed by a place name. The place name could be the name of a place of origin of the person, e.g. the famous poet Meng Haoran (689–760) was born in Xiangyang 襄陽, so he was also called Meng Xiangyang 孟襄陽.<sup>75</sup> The place name could also be the name of a place where the most distinguished families sharing the same surname lived, and this type of appellations flourished during the Tang Dynasty, later on was scarcely used, e.g. the famous writer Han Yu (768–824) called himself Changli Hanshi 昌黎韓氏 “of Han family from Changli [place name]”, and by the others he was called Han Changli.<sup>76</sup> The place name in this kind of appellations could have been the name of the place where the official held his post, e.g. the famous writer and poet Tao Yuanming (?–427) held an official post in Pengze 陶彭澤, and was called Tao Pengze 陶彭澤.<sup>77</sup> The position and influence appellations could be treated as a subtype of the assumed appellations, i.e. those associated with the place where the person lived. No typical position and influence appellations have been found among the female names.

### 2.3.11. Studio appellations

Chinese male and female literati could have had another kind of appellations, called *shì míng* 室名 or *zhāishì míng* 齋室名, i.e. studio appellations.<sup>78</sup> “Studio” can indicate the whole house of the writer or the room where he worked. Its name was usually constructed of two parts, i.e. a specific part and a generic part, the latter consisting of a term denoting a kind of dwelling, e.g.: *zhāi* 齋 “studio”. The custom of studio names started about the end of the Han Dynasty and flourished during the Ming and Qing dynasties. It was common among the literati to call each other by the use of the name of their studio, instead of their personal names. Thus, studio appellations were formed by the shift of a particular studio name (the whole name or a part) in order to designate its owner. They could be used instead of the given names of the bearers, and in this case they followed the surnames. They could also serve as separate appellations, and as such they didn’t differ from so-called assumed appellations, *hào*, especially those associated with the place where the person lived. Su Shi (1036–1101), the famous writer of the Song Dynasty, established his studio in Dongpo, called it Dongpo ju 東坡居, literally “Eastern Hill Site”, and his studio appellation was Su Dongpo, his assumed appellation Dongpo Jushi 東坡居士 “Eastern Hill Hermit”.<sup>79</sup> The studio appellations were often used in titles of works, e.g.: the title of a collection of poems and essays by Su Shi (Su Dongpo) is *Dongpo qiji* “Eastern Hill Seven Collections”.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 276.

<sup>75</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 281.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 458–459; Wang, Zhang, *Guji zhishi fenlei cidian*..., p. 165.

<sup>79</sup> Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 460.

### 2.3.12. Adopted names – pseudonyms

Among Chinese appellations there is a kind of fictitious names, adopted by persons who want to hide their identity under names different from their original ones. Such names are generally called *jiǎmíng* 假名 “cover names; false names” or *huànmíng* 化名 “aliases; assumed names; pseudonyms”.<sup>80</sup> Many of them occurred because of political reasons, when some political figures had to hide their true names, for fear of governmental prosecution or societal ridicule of their actions or works. The first examples of the assuming false names are found in texts from the 5th century B.C. Chinese pseudonyms share many characteristic features with traditional Chinese assumed names, *hào*. However, *hào* assumed names were used firstly to taboo one’s given name, and secondarily to make an honour to the bearer, and not to hide one’s identity.

A great part of modern adopted names or pseudonyms consists of assumed names used by some writers instead of their real names, and such names are called *bímíng* 笔名 “pen names; pseudonyms”.<sup>81</sup> The term and the custom of assuming pen names appeared in the end of the 19th century under the influence of the Western culture. Another specific group of false names are those used by artisans and artists, especially actors and actresses, and called *yìmíng* 藝名 “artistic names; stage names”.<sup>82</sup> The term started to be used during the Qing Dynasty, earlier the term *hào* had been used.

Chinese pseudonyms can have the forms similar to typical Chinese personal names: they consist of an original or false surname of a person, followed by a false name. They also can be forms without surnames, as appellations consisting of two or more (usually three) syllables/morphemes/words.

## Conclusions

A typical Chinese (Han nationality) personal name consists of a surname followed by a standard given name. This pattern of naming started to be used in the very beginning of the Chinese civilization, although there were also other patterns of personal names, performing the function of identifying people according to their gender, status in family and society, and social or professional functions. Original standard given names were generally considered crucial for the fate and achievements of their bearers, and their usage was strictly limited. It caused the need of bestowing on people other names that could be used in official and informal social circumstances. The more important the status of a person, the more various categories of names the person was bestowed on. The paper has presented the history and rules of usage of a surname and 15 categories of given names and appellations occurring in the Chinese anthroponymy.

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<sup>80</sup> Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”, p. 86; Liyun Yin, *Zhongguoren de xingming yu mingming yishu* (Chinese Personal Names and the Art of Naming), Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Daxue Chubanshe, 1998, p. 185–186.

<sup>81</sup> He, *Xingming yu Zhongguo wenhua*..., p. 293–302; Sung, “Chinese Personal Naming”..., p. 87; Yin, *Zhongguoren de xingming yu mingming yishu*..., p. 211.

<sup>82</sup> He, *Xingming yu Zhongguo wenhua*..., p. 302–307; Yin, *Zhongguoren de xingming yu mingming yishu*..., p. 229.



PIOTR KOWNACKI

## India, China and Globalization Processes

### 1. Introductory remarks

The interdependencies among the phenomena taking place within the framework set out by Indian-Chinese economic partnership, Asian regional integration and globalization processes cannot be questioned. In deliberations on economic subjects, globalization issues are taken up in a multi-thread manner, but also in a biased and quite arbitrary way. Such deliberations most often reflect an approach related to perceiving the heart of the matter in the centre of the world economy, seen in the triad consisting of the economies of the United States, West Europe and Japan.

The intention of this paper is not to resolve disputes on the subject of economic globalization, its political, cultural and religious aspects. Instead, the aim is to show the relationship between the economic processes taking place in India and China and the economic processes expanding on the worldwide scale.

The global character of economic processes cannot be understood as a circumstance determining the development of both India and China, though one cannot refrain from watching and taking into consideration the worldwide economic trends in those countries. However, we should not forget the converse either – namely, that the essence of economic globalization should also be perceived as a result of processes taking place in India and China. The dynamic development of both the Indian and Chinese economy, expressed in the high level of production growth, the absorption capacity for foreign investments and the export offensive, has its effect on the world economy as well. Indeed, the dynamics of India's and China's development results in increase in demand for energetic raw materials on a scale unheard of up to now. The increase in demand for energy carriers connected with the Indian and Chinese needs raises the problem of providing increased supplies and the issue of the growing prices of such carriers in the world market. In this way, the enforcement of energetic provisions for economic development by India and China affects the whole world economy.

Hence the Indian and Chinese energetic demands are not triggered by signals sent by the world economy; it is rather Indian and Chinese demands for energy which emanate signals that the world economy must reckon with, both in the national and globalized sectors. This is the context for the issue of economic coexistence and the political character of bilateral relations between India and China, connected with the answer to the question if the requirements of energetic provisions for economic development can be met in the conditions of rivalry or in coexistence.

The actions undertaken by the governments of India and China, which are expressed in solutions aimed at extinguishing old conflicts and stabilizing solutions visible in arrangements for economic cooperation between borderland regions, doubtlessly support endeavours to avoid a situation where the objectively common energetic interest could be forfeited because of circumstances related to the past.

The literature of the problem has recorded Indian and Chinese problems in the categories characteristic of peripheries, seen in opposition to the centre of the world economy. We should not question or reject the justifiability of such a division and its reflection in the world economy in the past period, characterized by confrontation between the two world powers: the USSR and the USA, and the rivalry between the political systems of the two blocks. However, we should remember that since the time of the great geographic discoveries the world economy has always reflected the processes of formation and shifting of centres and peripheries, including active and marginalized peripheries. Hence we should also bear in mind and specially emphasize that in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century over half of the national income in the world was still produced in the Indian and Chinese economies. The discoverers' awareness of the significance of that fact underlay the foundations of the conquest and external subordination of India and China, as well as reduction of their economic potential and their degradation to the level of peripheries.

The humiliation of India and China with external subordination met much earlier with protest and counteraction, aimed at leading those countries out of that position. However, this could not mean returning to the archaisms of the past, but required adjustment to the new circumstances generated in the centre of the world economy. This was exemplified by the Japanese strategy of intensive industrialization modelled on the European one, but accompanied by preservation of Japan's own state identity and cultural identity.

However, implementation of a strategy modelled on the Japanese example was impossible in India and China, under the conditions of reduced statehood. Besides the degree of state sovereignty, the differences in the Indian and Chinese position as compared to the Japanese one consisted in the essential, diverse circumstances. The Indian and Chinese specifics reflected internal divisions inside a civilisation which did not favour national identification and strengthening of the awareness of belonging to a state community. The external subordination of India and China was to a large extent based on those divisions, and was maintained and solidified thanks to them. A challenge modelled on the Japanese one could thus prove ineffective. The only effective activities of the externally dominated Indian and Chinese states were their administrative actions.

We should remember that both the Indian and the Chinese milieus which contemplated modernization projects were also inspired by Soviet economic solutions, seen as effective in overcoming the archaisms of the past. However, recommendation of such a model could only remain in the sphere of plans – for it did not correspond to the sovereignty level of the state which would be implementing such a solution.

The issue of state sovereignty and elimination of the limitations following from external subordination turned out to be an initial objective. Its achievement as a result of the Indian emancipation of 1947 and the Chinese revolution of 1949 paved a feasible way to implementation of modernization projects. It was just the circumstances prevailing at that time which gave rise to the issue of choosing the direction of action in Indian and Chinese policies, related to answering the question if the implementation of modernization projects

will be connected with rivalry, cooperation or confrontation in the mutual relations between India and China.

## **2. Genesis of Indian-Chinese political and economic partnership**

The paving of the way to implementation of modernization projects by the Indian emancipation and the Chinese revolution was connected with emergence and consolidation of the state authority covering the area of the state and capable of ensuring the territorial integrity of the country. Then the issue of overcoming the peripheral position appeared in a quite new light in view of the new circumstances in the world economy, established and reinforced following World War II. Those circumstances were reflected in the confrontational character of economic relations between the USSR and the USA and in the rivalry between the political systems, marked by the division of the worldwide political scene into the Eastern and Western blocks. In the world divided in this way, it was not easy for India and China to find an appropriate and adequate position and option in the international politics, favouring implementation of their own modernization projects.

The approach of the Western world to economic problems of states that did not belong to either block was promoting the modernization theory and the whole set of conclusions and recommendations derived from that theory. In turn, the approach of the eastern world was promoting conclusions and recommendations derived from neo-Stalinist theory of stage revolution.

The differences between the approaches signalled above are significant and essential for the correct recognition of the world reality of that time, in which India and China were endeavouring to implement their own modernization projects. However, the mentioned approaches are characterized by certain convergence on the issue of understanding history, social progress and the direction of economic development. Indeed, both the modernization theory and the stage revolution theory are underpinned by the belief that history is a linear process which develops in line with the model promoted in those theories. On the other hand, the relations prevailing in a “highly developed” society are the image of the future which should be reached by societies of the regions remaining at a lower development level. According to theoretical interpretations, whether the final fulfilment of human history will be capitalism or socialism, the way which leads to achieving the goal must pass through common stages which cannot be omitted, as they are required by historical necessity and give a guarantee of success from the viewpoint of society and civilization.

The theoretical paradigms met with reception and response which were not always adequate to the recommendations contained in the theories. They raised controversies and encountered special resistance in India and China, which were striving to overcome their peripheral position in the world economy.

The deliberations derived from modernization theory indicated the dominant position of the Western block as an example of a highly developed society. The main recommendation of the modernization theory was that other countries should reach such level of development by copying the solutions applied in highly developed Western countries. In the post-war situation, a practical consequence of social and economic modernization understood in this way was the recommendation for promotion and reception of the Western investment policy in the countries of the economic peripheries.

The requirements advocated by the other side, which was promoting the stage revolution theory, amounted in practice to approval of the Soviet policy that recommended delaying the socialist revolution in the countries of the economic peripheries to an unspecified time in the future. According to the stage revolution theory, the society was not yet mature enough for the socialist revolution, and should focus on strengthening coalitions between local communist groups, nationalist groups and national bourgeoisie existing in a given area. The purported aim of such coalitions was to overcome insufficient development and backwardness in favour of capitalism and to achieve conditions facilitating the passage to socialism.

In the post-war situation, where the political space in the countries outside the two main blocks grew as a result of decolonization, the debates on the directions and principles of social and economic development went beyond the schemes imposed by both the Eastern and the Western blocks and the schemes themselves met with scepticism and protests.

In the states newly emerging in the economic peripheries as a result of decolonization the practical solutions undertaken in the course of emancipation and institutionalization of the political and economic system exceeded the framework set out by both the modernization theory and the stage revolution theory.

The capitalist social and economic modernization was discredited as resulting in regress and deepening the civilizational distance from the countries of the centre of the world economy, instead of reducing the distance to the standards of that centre, as it was allegedly to do. Drawing special attention and encouraging criticism of modernization was the attitude of the Indian state which – despite its correct relations with the highly-developed Western states and their relative benevolence towards it – had rejected recommendations following from the modernization theory.

Rejection of the stage evolution theory in China was even more important and meaningful. In its very essence, the Chinese revolution amounted to betraying the idea of stage revolution, which recommended maintenance of modernization transformations in a coalition with alleged nationalistic allies. According to the theory, the victorious communist group was to overcome the development barriers together with those allies and strive for the advancement of capitalism. However, the Chinese revolution represented a victory of the communist camp over the nationalistic one, which ruled out their coalition of any kind.

Both India and China, despite their different positions and barriers to be overcome, internal as well as external ones, chose a unique way of counteracting development deficiencies. They both assumed that adaptation of foreign investments and unsupervised integration with the world market did not constitute in themselves an effective measure for overcoming development delays and ensuring civilizational advance. Instead, they decided that it was indispensable to overcome asymmetric relations with the world economy and to concentrate on expanding the internal market. Such an undertaking was perceived as a way of coming out of the peripheral position and passing from dependence to interdependence in relations with the world economy, dominated by the economy of the centre. This was the context in which practical actions were considered in both the Indian and the Chinese policies.

The policy of the Indian government was not coupled with approval for unlimited freedom of capital flow and opening of the Indian economic space to external investment transfer as the only driving force of social and economic development. The peripheral status of the young independent Indian state and its economy was to be overcome not through the

freedom of capital flow and external investment transfer, but through five-year development plans set out by the state. The implementation of those plans was accompanied by increasing powers of the central government and a decisive importance of the investment stimulation by the state, which was aimed not only at economic effects, but also at political ones. They were also oriented at achieving institutional and territorial cohesion of the state and its integration to the rank of a compact political and economic body. After the secession of Pakistan, such an approach was to protect India from the threat of further breakdown.

The unique direction selected in the Indian economic policy followed also from the belief that the democratic political system of the state cannot be sustained in the conditions of unsupervised external investment stimulation, asymmetric to the internal demand connected with the endeavours to expand the local market. This was also confirmed by the conclusions following from the experience of highly-developed Western states with regard to democratization, which were taken into consideration in India. They concerned the mutual connection between the social aspect of economic solutions and the durability of democratization processes connected with that aspect. Indian authorities were also trying to avoid the effects seen at the same time in the countries of economic peripheries where the state either distanced itself from uncontrolled economic processes or was forced to refrain from getting involved in them. The consequences to be avoided were evident especially in the Latin-American reality, where the ineptness of the state in influencing the economy resulted in breakdowns in the functioning of the democratic institutions. The debate the “Centre – Peripheries” problem, taking place at that time in the Latin-American countries and carried over to the UN forum, influenced the perception of the entirety of world economic problems.

The issue of investment support for the Chinese economy aimed at overcoming its asymmetric relations with the world economy and expansion of the domestic market presented itself quite differently. The isolation imposed on China excluded participation of the country in the world economy on the principles which were available to India. Lack of access to international development centres, in particular the World Bank and in the International Monetary Fund, deprived the Chinese state of the possibility of acquiring capital funds and using them to undertake solutions analogous or close to the Indian ones.

We should mention here that the option of opening the Chinese economic space and admission of external participation of foreign investors was considered, and rejected as inadvisable certainly not without justification. In the situation where a decisive majority of the increasing population of China lived in seaside provinces, and the remaining part of the country lagged behind the development level prevailing there, investment transfer based on external private interests raised justified fears. Such a dichotomy could generate growing migration tendencies, which the state would be unable to control or stop. Investment transfer would solidify an infrastructure which was undesirable in view of the endeavours to expand the internal market. Private interest, directed at maximization of profit, could not be perceived as a lever for such expansion. Deepening internal divisions coupled with uncontrolled investment transfer raised also fears of secession tendencies. They had to be taken into consideration by the Chinese state, which was conflicted with its external surroundings and isolated politically and economically. The secession of Pakistan and division of India were perceived in China as a warning.

### **3. Rationalism and controversies in the India-China cooperation.**

Indian-Chinese collaboration in endeavours to overcome the peripheral position of the countries manifested in their rapprochement and undertaking an offensive at an international scale. A practical expression of that offensive was the issue of the neutralist option, brought up in the Indian and Chinese foreign politics after the end of the Korean military conflict.

In view of the fact that India resisted the expectations of the West and attempts to enforce an anti-communist declaration in international relations, which were marked with the confrontation between the two world powers, the USSR and the USA, and proclaimed neutralism as the interpretation of its foreign policy and the underlying principle of foreign relations, China's response was commensurate with the conditions, recognized as favourable ones. China found that emphasizing close relations with the Soviet Union and involvement in the Eastern block as its participant could not be favourable for endeavours to achieve its superior objective, i.e. to overcome isolation.

The new approach was to test the effectiveness of the possible neutralist option in the foreign policy, which was convergent with the Indian policy. This was to be facilitated by India's and China's rapprochement, following efforts of the Indian diplomacy which favoured Chinese ambitions. The diplomatic activeness of India as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and an arbitrator during the Korean military conflict contributed to ending that conflict and releasing China from the burden following from its participation in the conflict. This resulted not only in rapprochement between the countries, but also in their future cooperation, which found its expression in the Tibet treaty concluded by India and China in 1954. The preamble to that treaty declared five principles of peaceful coexistence between the states, termed *Pancha Shila* in Hindi. Repercussions of those principles went beyond Indian-Chinese relations. India and China presented *Pancha Shila* as a foundation of neutrality not limited to them alone, but also proposed to the already existing countries as well as countries striving for emancipation as an alternative to the membership in either the Eastern or the Western block.

The neutrality postulate raised during the partner-style cooperation between India and China met with response in the other countries. An approving acceptance of that postulate was expressed by the Asian-African Solidarity Conference held in Bandung in 1955. China's participation in that conference amounted to considering the effectiveness of possible neutrality as the means of coming out of the isolation. Chinese activity both during the preparations to the Bandung conference and in its course was aimed at presenting China in an international forum as a state not to be perceived from the perspective of the confrontation between the USSR and the USA and the rivalry between the two political systems. This was especially meaningful in view of the fact which emerged just after the conference but had been announced earlier, namely the establishment in 1955 of the Warsaw Treaty, a military pillar of the Eastern block. Not only did China refrain from aspiring for membership in that group, but even distanced itself from it in a critical way.

However, neutrality of the state entities in the political space outside the two main blocks was not implemented or sanctioned under the Indian-Chinese invention. It had to find approval of the world powers which would decide to play the role of its guarantors.

The Bandung conference did not help decrease the confrontational involvement of the USSR and the USA, which influenced the development of the situation in Asia, and especially

in the Indio-China region. Hence the Chinese test attempt to overcome isolation through neutrality was abandoned. In face of the confrontational character of the situation in the neighbouring region, China deemed a unilateral declaration of neutrality through a resolution or constitutional means pointless – for this would amount to remaining in isolation rather than overcoming it.

The change in China's foreign policy manifested itself not only in aspirations for the world power status, but also in effective endeavours to obtain such a status together with a global position. Starting from that moment, China's conflict with the USA progressed in parallel with the growing antagonism in China's relations with the USSR. In 1962, China triggered a military conflict with India related to mutual claims to the ownership of borderland regions, taken over by China at that time. However, the repercussions and the significance of the conflict between India and China exceeded bilateral relations between those states. There was a large consternation in the countries outside the blocks, up to that time in a considerable extent consolidated by Indian-Chinese collaboration.

The regress in Indian-Chinese relations practically compromised the movement initiated by the Bandung conference, and its continuation in the new circumstances did not give much hope for the effectiveness of neutrality, which was its original goal. Accordingly, abandoning the neutrality movement became inevitable.

It was replaced by the initiative of new consolidation – i.e. the establishment of a new forum in the form of the non-alignment movement. The movement was initiated by the leaders of India, United Arab Republic (Egypt at that time) and Yugoslavia – Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yosif Broz Tito – through convening the 1<sup>st</sup> Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Belgrad in September 1961.

China did not participate in the movement. The establishment of a new forum of political activation of states outside the two main blocks, already termed the Third World, was connected with endeavours to ensure credibility of the third option in international relations, threatened by China's conflict with the United States, with the Soviet Union, as well as with India, with which China had been promoting the third option just a short time earlier. The non-alignment movement even established a certain safeguard against excessive influence of China on its functioning, introducing the condition that the movement can be joined by already sovereign countries, with the status of a state entity. The aim was to prevent participation in the movement of anti-colonial, emancipation-oriented groups influenced, as well as politically and materially supported, by China, which could be used to introduce rifts in the movement.

However, replacement of the neutrality movement, based on the partner-like cooperation between India and China, with the non-alignment movement without participation of China did not ensure effective, full consolidation in the Third World's political space – for the effectiveness of its activation either through neutrality or through non-alignment became questionable. This was because the real problem facing the Third World countries was not the diplomatic aspect of activation with respect to the two world powers: the USSR and the USA, and the blocks supporting them, but the issue of the proper choice of the economic development path. In this context, the issue of India's or China's capability of mobilizing the Third World countries towards finding optimum economic solutions and ensuring relative benevolence of the external surroundings turned out to be more complicated. It would be a simplification to perceive the consolidating centre in either India or China. The

answer to the related question if it would be more favourable for the leadership of the Third World countries to be performed by India, untouched by isolation in international relations, or by China, striving to overcome this isolation, was simple only when considered superficially.

India, which based its development on central planning principles, emanated its model as a pattern to be implemented in the countries of economic peripheries. China, isolated and deprived of access to international development centres, was not only unable to promote such a development model, but also consciously deviated from that model itself, deciding that worldwide economic trends do not show central planning to be an adequate tool in institutional adjustment of the economy to the projected circumstances. During the so-called "cultural revolution", China wholly resigned from the still surviving relics of central economic planning and introduced the principle that each production entity should make use of its production capacities. At that time, for countries in the economic peripheries it was not yet quite clear which of the two countries will be proven right in the future: China, which was unwilling to immerse the economy in the central planning structures, or India, which continued the implementation of five-year economic plans set out by the state.

It is to be emphasized that the status of India at the international stage at that time was different from the status of small and medium-sized Third World states. The military confrontation in the Indio-China region, binding China, which supported one side of the Vietnam conflict, gave rise to the Western world's demand for at least Indian neutrality. India was even seen as a counterbalance for the suspected potential Chinese threat. Hence the Indian state economic activity, perceived in the Western world as incompatible and sometimes even inconsistent with the market requirements, not only escaped negative repercussions, but was tolerated because of the political demand. However, economic solutions modelled on Indian solutions which were undertaken in small and medium-sized Third World countries did not meet with such tolerance, as they were not supported by an analogous political demand.

The military confrontation in the Indio-China region, maintaining tension in the international situation, obscured the visibility of future trends in the world economy. In the common opinion, as long as it lasted it was hard to expect clarification of the issue whether the economic solutions applied up to that time were adequate or not, or confirmation of the correctness of either Indian or Chinese way of development. However, the ending of the military conflict in Vietnam revealed objective trends of the world economy, supported by the increasing offensive of neo-liberal circles. Yet this took place concurrently with China overcoming its isolation and taking up its due place in the UN and the Security Council as its permanent member. The expansion of international relations maintained by China multiplied its external economic relations.

The change in the international situation with the end of the military conflict in Vietnam was a far-reaching one. Both the USSR and the USA gave up confrontation and initiated détente in their mutual relations. The change in relations between the world powers and between the political blocks put Third World countries in face of circumstances they had not foreseen in time. Indeed, in 1972 the world powers signed an agreement on economic cooperation, with far-reaching assumptions. The agreement provided for participation of North-American investors in modernization of the Soviet economy, which demanded deviation from planning determined by decrees and central distribution, and gradual

introduction of market mechanisms. In the emergent situation, there was no point for Third World countries to orient themselves at India or China.

With the better relations between the world powers and prospects of their cooperation, the debate both on neutrality and non-alignment was abandoned, and the issue of a new international economic order was brought up instead. The conception of the new international economic order included regulating the problems of countries in the economic peripheries, immersed in development breakdowns and foreign debt, through involvement of the world powers which were expected to grant favourable concessions. Such involvement and concessions were also expected on the part of the states more advanced in development, regardless of their membership in the Eastern or Western blocks.

Endeavours towards establishing the new international economic order suggested the conclusion that the Indian development path was confirmed as convergent with the expectations of countries of the economic peripheries. However, such convergence was only illusive, like the conception of the new international economic order itself.

The economic cooperation between the USSR and the USA was doubtlessly related to the malfunctioning the Soviet economy, immersed in plans affected by decrees and enforced distribution, of which China had already freed itself. The planned economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States was also related to the excessive socialization of the US economy, progressing during the Vietnam War and condemned by neo-liberal circles. The foreseen participation of North-American investors in the Soviet economy was connected with their intention to free themselves of the social tax burden. Hence already at that time no expectations of concessions on the part of the world powers in favour of the new international economic order were justified. The condition of US economy ruled out the possibility of meeting such expectations – for by doing this the country would have burdened its economy to a degree much higher than that of the social burden, denounced by neo-liberal circles.

The USSR-USA economic cooperation was slowed down and stopped by the return to confrontational attitudes in their mutual relations, motivated by the criticism of the USSR's failure to observe human rights and freedom of foreign travel. However, this did not amount to continuation of over-socialized economy in the USA, since new spaces for the activity of private investors were opening.

China undertook actions towards opening the Chinese economic space to external investment transfer, and Deng Xiaoping decided to enforce a reform-oriented legislation, leading the country out of autarchy. The criticised non-observance of human rights in China did not block the foreign investment transfer and economic progress. This gives a clear answer to the question if the issue of human rights was the means to an end in the whole matter or the end itself.

The opening of the Chinese economic space paved the way for the currently progressing globalization processes. Even in amateur understanding, it was evident that such an opening will lead to investment and structural shifts in the world economy, giving rise to new centres and peripheries. The Indian adjustment reaction occurred in such a radically changed situation. The Indian government distanced itself from active participation in the non-alignment movement. The adjustment actions consisted in devaluation moves aimed at currency stabilization, and in expenditure reduction aimed at ensuring budget discipline. India liberalized regulations on import licenses, limited the scope of direct economic activity

of the state in favour of privatization processes, and introduced regulations promoting participation of foreign investments in the Indian economy.

#### 4. Final remarks

The opening of the Chinese economic space and the adjustment actions undertaken in India, which have opened the Indian economic space as well, constitute both a consequence and the driving force of the progressing globalization processes. Investors operating in the world market have found in both the Indian and the Chinese economy a more profitable area for their activity. Even the greatest companies from highly developed countries provide India and China with investments, technologies, licences, finances and consulting which contribute to the prospects of developing worldwide economic centres in those countries. Such a process has been taking place despite, or maybe just because of, the existence of surplus production capacities in almost all areas in highly developed countries. In spite of the high unemployment rate persisting in highly developed countries, the opening of both the Indian and the Chinese economic spaces has to a large extent determined the fact that no solutions aimed at utilization of local production capacities are searched for, and investment are directed to countries where social benefits are either negligible or quite unknown. And the cheap labour in India and China is not the only motivation here – another one is the absorption capacity of the local markets and the possibility of selling the output on the spot.

However, the high growth rate of production and economic potential in India and China requires adequate energetic support, which is an absolute prerequisite for sustaining the development. Ensuring such a support is the responsibility of both the Indian and the Chinese states, and the dependence of those countries on energy carriers increases along with their economic growth. These are circumstances in which the issue of the character of the cooperation between India and China, not wholly freed of bygone conflicts and the related antagonism, has become again an immensely important one.

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## China: Neue Zivilisationsidentität vor dem Hintergrund gesellschaftlichen Wandels

Der chinesische Diskurs über die Bedeutung der eigenen Zivilisation für die Entwicklung des Landes ist mit gängigem westlichen Verständnis und normativen Vorstellungen von Gesellschaft nicht zu verstehen. Unsere Welt ist viel zu kompliziert, um sie durch das Schlüsselloch der eigenen Subjektivität, der eigenen Wahrnehmung zu betrachten. Aus der Perspektive der chinesischen Zivilisation gibt es wesentliche Unterschiede zur abendländischen Kultur, die sich auf das Christentum beruft und in der der Mensch ein freies Wesen darstellt. Infolge eingeübter Verhaltensweisen betrachtet man dagegen in China den Menschen nicht als sein sich selbst bestimmendes Individuum, sondern sieht ihn im Verhältnis zur Gemeinschaft. Das spiegelt sich im chinesischen Verständnis von Humanismus (*renwenzhuyi*) oder der Menschenrechtsproblematik (*renquan wenti*) wider.

Doch der soziale Wandel hat in Teilen der chinesischen Gesellschaft den Wunsch nach einem neuen Wertekodex und damit nach einem neuen Identitätsmodell geweckt, nicht die Verwestlichung, aber der Wunsch nach mehr Autonomie als bisher. Dagegen formuliert die politische Elite erneut Sozialutopien, um das Vorhandene immer wieder zu verbessern, obgleich doch die chinesische Gesellschaft im Namen von Utopien ins Unglück gestürzt wurde. Zukunftsvorstellungen sind geprägt von den Vorstellungen über die Moderne, die man mit Hilfe der traditionellen Kultur verwirklichen möchte. Die Wiederentdeckung und Wiederbelebung der konfuzianischen Tradition soll einer neuen Identitätsfindung und der politisch-gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung der Harmonie dienen.

### **Kultur und Globalisierung**

Ganz allgemein geht es in dieser Studie um die Bedeutung der Kultur in Zeiten der Globalisierung, analysiert am Beispiel Chinas. Westliche Chinaanalysen gingen lange Zeit von eigenen Entwicklungsidealen und Modernisierungsvisionen aus, die durch die westliche Tradition geprägt sind und als universeller Maßstab gelten sollten. Heute wird man sich immer bewusst, dass so ein Maßstab nicht als analytisches Instrumentarium des chinesischen Modernisierungsprozesses geeignet ist. Die Theorieansätze, die dagegen zusammen mit dem Modernisierungswandel in China entstehen, stoßen deshalb nicht mehr auf eine vernichtende Ablehnung, sondern werden differenzierter betrachtet.

Im Zuge der Globalisierung, die im beschleunigten Tempo auch China nach der Öffnung des Landes und der Proklamierung der „Vier Modernisierungen“ Ende 1970er Jahre erreicht hat, können sich Chinesen freier als jemals zuvor in ihrer Geschichte fühlen. Der chinesische Staat und die chinesische Gesellschaft sind dabei sich zu wandeln, wobei neue

zivilisatorische Identitäten vor dem Hintergrund konfuzianischer Tradition entstehen. China ist angesichts der Wirtschaftserfolge auf dem Wege, wieder zu einer stolzen Nation zu werden, die Entwürdigung von einst zu überwinden und den Anspruch zu erheben, nicht nur die Entwicklungsmuster im Lande selbst zu bestimmen, sondern auch die globale Entwicklung mitzusteuern. Sowohl historische Erfahrungen wie auch das Bewusstsein der neuen Stärke Chinas, das, wie man meint, aus der eigenen Tradition erringen konnte, entstehen gegenseitig überlappende Elemente bei der Herausbildung eines neuen zivilisatorischen Bewusstseins sowohl der politischen Klasse wie auch der übergroßen Mehrheit der Chinesen.

Die Globalisierung hat China nicht erst mit dem Modernisierungsprogramm erreicht. Bereits seit den Opiumkriegen Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts wurde das „Reich der Mitte“ zu einem bedeutenden Teil des weltumspannenden Globalisierungsprozess. In der chinesischen Historiografie wird jedoch dieser Zeitraum bis zur Revolution 1911 negativ gewertet, weil China in diesem Prozess vor allem als ökonomisches Instrument der westlichen Mächte und Japan benutzt und dadurch eine eigene dynamische gesellschaftliche und Wirtschaftsentwicklung behindert wurde. Doch bereits in dieser Zeit begann China sich aus der selbst gewählten Isolation zu lösen. Das bisherige zivilisatorische Verständnis vom Mittelpunkt der Welt und Zentrum der Zivilisation unterlag einem Wandel, weil man sich gezwungen sah und deshalb Bereitschaft zeigte, „nützliche Dinge“ aus den entwickelten Industrieländern zu übernehmen, während man jedoch im Kern an der eigenen zivilisatorischen Identität festzuhalten versuchte. Dieser Prozess führte zur Kapitalentwicklung im Lande, zur Schaffung von Privatunternehmen und zur Herausbildung bürgerlicher Gruppen, die die Entwicklung eben nicht nur durch die koloniale Ausbeutung behinderten, sondern auch neue gesellschaftliche Orientierungen einleiteten. Doch festzuhalten gilt, dass bei allem gesellschaftlichen Wandel, den das „Reich der Mitte“ seit über 150 Jahren die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsetappen erlebt hat, nicht zu einem essenziellen Wandel des kulturellen Verständnisses über die eigene Zivilisation geführt hat.

### **Universalität und die Anforderungen des Nationalstaates**

Heute verweist man in China mit gewissem Stolz und Genugtuung darauf, dass erst mit dem Programm der Modernisierung, der Einführung der chinesischen Marktwirtschaft und Öffnung des Landes ein neues Wirtschaftssystem entsteht, die politische und soziale Struktur sich verändert und China als bedeutender globaler Partner sich zum ersten Mal in den Globalisierungsprozess als souveräner und selbstbewusster Staat einreihen kann. Diese gesellschaftlichen Wandlungen haben China nicht nur als Staat, sondern auch als Gesellschaft ein neues Antlitz verliehen.

Chinesen identifizieren sich heute wieder durch ihre Kultur und Geschichte, auch wenn diese Identität anders strukturiert ist als zu Zeiten der Kaiserdynastien, wo man China als Mittelpunkt des Kosmos wahrnahm. Bei der moralischen Erziehung zum Patriotismus, die zu einem neuen Identitätsbewusstsein des Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühls beitragen soll, greift die politische Elite wieder auf die eigenen Wurzeln (*xungen*), auf die glanzvolle chinesische Kultur und Geschichte mit ihren vielen Erfindungen und großen Helden zurück.

Für China bedeutet die Globalisierung keine Beliebigkeit, sondern sie könne sich nur in den Strukturen und den Anforderungen des Nationalstaates bewegen. Mit so einem Verständnis, so meint man, könnte man selbst einschreiten, wenn in Zeiten der Globalisierung

Gefahren für die Nation drohen sollten.<sup>1</sup> Danach ist es nicht die erwünschte Universalität, sondern die nationalen Belange, die im Vordergrund stehen, so wie es im Westen und auch in Japan, als sie erstarkten, der Fall war. Diese Entwicklung sei auf der Grundlage des „Nationalismus“ erfolgt. In China beruft man sich heute in der Debatte über die Rolle des Nationalismus in der Moderne auf den Vater der chinesischen Revolution, Sun Yatsen, der mit seinen drei Prinzipien vom Nationalismus (*minzu zhuyi*), Demokratie (Volksherrschaft *minquan zhuyi*) und Volkswohlstand (*minsheng zhuyi*) die Richtung für Chinas Modernisierung gewiesen hätte. Noch zwei weitere bedeutende Elemente kämen aktuell hinzu, wie immer wieder betont wird, nämlich die bedeutende Stellung der Familie (*jiazu zhuzi*) und der Sippe (*Zhongzu zhuzi*) in der Gesellschaft.<sup>2</sup>

Über die Globalisierung wird heute in China viel debattiert und auch veröffentlicht. In den zahlreichen Publikationen, die in der letzten Zeit erschienen sind, befassen sich die Autoren vor allem mit dem neuen Phänomen des kulturellen Einflusses auf den Modernisierungsprozess. Allgemein geht man von der Auffassung aus, so könnte man es generalisieren, dass die Globalisierung Chinas Kultur und Tradition in ihrer Essenz nicht nivellieren werde, sondern das Bewusstsein wachsen lässt, dass die positiven Werte den Globalisierungsprozess in China in die entsprechenden Bahnen lenken könnten, um einer Krise von Gesellschaft und Staat entgegenzuwirken.<sup>3</sup> Der Globalisierungsprozess, so die verbreitete Meinung, finde in einem souveränen Nationalstaat statt und verlaufe, wie betont, nicht als universaler Prozess, schon gar nicht als Amerikanisierung der Welt. Die Leitthese lautet, dass er besonders in China von bestimmten kulturspezifischen Merkmalen gekennzeichnet sei.<sup>4</sup>

Auf der anderen Seite wird jedoch in der Debatte nicht übersehen, dass die Tradition in Zeiten der Modernisierung einem zunehmenden Druck aus dem Westen unterliegt und eine neue Herausforderung bedeutet. So beunruhige einen großen Teil der Bevölkerung die sich verstärkende Expansion der amerikanischen Kultur und Verhaltensweisen. In diesem neuen Kulturkampf, der zweifelsohne auch schon in China begonnen hätte, werde eine große Gefahr gesehen. So wird die Globalisierung und die damit einhergehende Modernisierung auch als eine neue Art der Amerikanisierung befürchtet, wenn es auch nicht an Beobachtern fehlt, die die Auffassung vertreten, dass sich auch letzt endlich in China eher ein multikultureller Prozess entfaltet, da in allen Kulturen wertvolle Elemente vorhanden sind, die nicht aufgegeben werden können.<sup>5</sup>

### Von der Revolutionierung zur Modernisierung

Im Sinne einer Aufklärungsbewegung, wenn auch nicht mit der in der westlichen Tradition zu vergleichen, wird die 4. Mai-Bewegung als der Beginn der chinesischen Moderne gesehen, deren Kernstück die Demokratisierung beinhalten sollte, wie es Hu Shi forderte. Doch die

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<sup>1</sup> Su Guoxun, Zhang Lüping, Xia Guang, ed., *Quanqiuhua: Wenhua chongtu yu gongsheng* (Globalisierung: Kulturcrash und Symbiose), S. 490–492.

<sup>2</sup> Ebd., S. 518–521.

<sup>3</sup> Vergl. Yang Xuedong, ed., *Fengxian shehui yu zhixu zhongjian* (Risikogesellschaft und ein starkes, gesundes Ordnungssystem), Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, Beijing 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Heping, ed., *Quan qiu hua: quan qiu zhi li* (Globalisierung: globale politische Ordnung), Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, Beijing 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Ebd., S. 482–489.

konfuzianische Tradition der Loyalität gegenüber der politischen Autorität führte immer wieder zu Spannungen, in denen letztlich das Wohl der Nation im Sinne der Ideologie überwog.

Mit dem Reformprogramm Ende der 1970 Jahre begannen chinesische Wissenschaftler auch über Fragen der globalen Modernisierung nachzudenken, worüber man im Westen bereits seit geraumer Zeit Debatten führte. Verstanden wurde sie hier fast ausschließlich als Verwestlichung (*xihua*) der ganzen Welt. In China wurde dagegen bis zur Öffnung nach Außen von der Revolutionierung der Welt geträumt, die den Völkern die moderne Epoche des Kommunismus bringen sollte. Diese Periode wird auch als Revolutionierung (*geminghua*) bezeichnet, deren Ursprünge bereits im 19. Jahrhundert mit der Taipingrevolution, der Xinhai Revolution, dem antijapanischen Krieg begannen und China in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhundert zum großen Revolutionszentrum der Welt wurde mit seinen Besonderheiten, nach denen die Bauern die Hauptkraft der Revolution darstellten.<sup>6</sup> In den Diskursen unter den Geisteswissenschaftlern war man nach der Öffnungspolitik nun von den alten ideologischen Dogmen des Klassenkampfes abgegangen. Die Theorie wurde durch das Konzept der Steigerung der Produktivkräfte als Grundlage der Modernisierung ersetzt. Analysen westlicher Wissenschaftler wurden nicht mehr als bürgerlich oder gar imperialistisch verworfen, sondern es entstand ein eigenes Theoriegebäude zur Entwicklung Chinas, in dem westliche Theorieansätze zur Entwicklung Chinas, insbesondere für die Wirtschaft, übernommen worden waren.<sup>7</sup> Zum Hauptansatzpunkt dieser neuen Modernisierungstheorie wurde das Dogma, dass in China Entwicklung und somit auch Modernisierung mit chinesischen Merkmalen erfolgt. Chinesische Soziologen konzentrierten sich in ihrer Arbeit nun auf die Analyse, warum für Chinas Modernisierungskonzept die Besonderheiten, die sich aus der chinesischen Tradition und Geschichte ergeben, beachtet werden müssen.<sup>8</sup> Abgelehnt wird damit indirekt das westliche Konzept, nach denen die europäische Entwicklung als Kern für die Weltzivilisation zu betrachten sei.

### Von der Verwestlichung zur allgemeinen Modernisierung

Der Verlauf der chinesischen Modernisierung, so die verbreitete Meinung unter chinesischen Wissenschaftlern, zeige einen Wandel, der einmal global gesehen, von der „Verwestlichung“ zur Modernisierung gehe und dieser heute richtungsweisend für die moderne Welt geworden sei.<sup>9</sup> In China selbst wird diese Entwicklung als ein Übergang von der Revolutionierung zur Modernisierung mit verschiedenen Entwicklungsfehlern bewertet.<sup>10</sup>

Mit der Öffnung und Reformpolitik fand China nicht nur wieder Anschluss an den Globalisierungsprozess, sondern wurde zu einem wichtigen Faktor der Globalisierung. Doch dieser Prozess verläuft nicht als Einbahnstraße. Auf der einen Seite wurde das Land zum

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<sup>6</sup> Luo Caiqu, ed., *Xiandaihua xinlun. Shijie yu zhongguo de xiandaihua jincheng* (Neue Diskurse über die Modernisierung. Der Modernisierungsprozess in der Welt und in China), Shangwu yingshuguan, Beijing 2004, S. 494.

<sup>7</sup> Ebd., S. 427.

<sup>8</sup> Ebd., S. 409–410.

<sup>9</sup> Ebd., S. 417.

<sup>10</sup> Ebd., S. 517.

Nutznieser. Die Modernisierung wird gefördert, die Urbanisierung entwickelt sich in einem schnellen Tempo und Chinesen haben die große Chance, sei es über die Bildung, die Kooperation oder auch durch den Tourismus andere Kulturen kennen zu lernen.

Auf der anderen Seite wächst das Interesse an der chinesischen Kultur und Sprache in vielen Regionen der Welt.<sup>11</sup> So kann man die neue Kulturdiplomatie Chinas auch als einen Teil dieses Prozesses sehen, um global über die Kultur am globalen Modernisierungsprozess Einfluss zu gewinnen. Im Rahmen der neuen chinesischen Kulturdiplomatie werden im Ausland Konfuzius-Institute etabliert und Chinesisch als Fremdsprache im Internet angeboten. Seit 2002 gibt es Konfuzius-Institute im Ausland, die zum Erlernen der chinesischen Sprache und Kennenlernen der chinesischen Kultur errichtet werden. Inzwischen gibt es weltweit über 200 solcher Einrichtungen. Im Juli 2006 wurde die erste Konferenz der im Ausland inzwischen weit verbreiteten „Konfuzius-Institute“ organisiert. So wird berichtet, dass bereits über 2.500 Hochschulen in über 100 Ländern Chinesisch als Fremdsprache anbieten.<sup>12</sup> Damit wird versucht, wie bereits in den vergangenen Jahren, das Feld nicht den ausländischen Kulturströmungen zu überlassen, sondern die Kenntnisse über die eigene moderne Zivilisation als Teil der Globalisierung zu verbreiten. Chinesische Kulturprodukte sollten auf den Markt. Die Errichtung von Konfuziusinstituten in vielen Ländern der Welt dient dabei als Instrument zur Verbreitung chinesischer Ideengeschichte sowie aber auch der chinesischen Präsenz im Ausland. Die politische Elite fördert mit allen Mitteln nicht nur die Konfuziusforschung im Lande, sondern auch die Verbreitung der Lehre im Ausland.

### **Für und wider das traditionelle Wertesystem**

Schauen wir uns nun etwas genauer die Kontroverse in der Kulturdebatte an. Als Ende der 1970er Jahre China sich öffnete und die Intellektuellen begannen, über ihre Kultur und Geschichte zu debattieren, schien es, als ob nach 60 Jahren an die Ideen, die die 4. Mai-Bewegung verkündet hatte, wieder angeknüpft und diese weiterentwickelt wurden. Der Diskurs ging um das Gesellschaftsmodell im Lande und um die chinesische Moderne und welche Inhalte damit verbunden werden müssten.

In diesem Kontext kommen wir nicht umhin, an die Thesen Max Webers zu erinnern. Er war der Erste, der den Versuch unternahm, die andersartige Entwicklung aufgrund der in der chinesischen Zivilisation bestehenden Prioritäten zu erklären. Er stellte vor über 100 Jahren die These auf, dass die konfuzianische Ethik und das daraus entstandene ethische Regelsystem die Entwicklung des Kapitalismus im Lande hindere. Die These in seinen Studien über die Kultur bestimmenden Elemente führten ihn zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass der traditionelle chinesische Wertekodex als ethisches Regelwerk die Entstehung des Kapitalismus in China, wie er in Europa in Anlehnung an die protestantische Ethik sich entwickeln konnte, behindern würde.<sup>13</sup>

Als Ende der 1970er Jahre das Modernisierungsprogramm verkündet wurde und die offizielle Politik sich vom Klassenkampfdogma verabschiedet hatte, begannen Anfang der

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<sup>11</sup> Su Guoxun, Zhang Lüping, Xia Guang, ed., *Quanqiuhua: Wenhua chongtu yu gongsheng* (Globalisierung: Kulturcrash und Symbiose), S. 523.

<sup>12</sup> Xinhua, 20 Juni 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Bd. 1, Tübingen 1920.

1980er Jahre Intellektuelle wieder über den Entwicklungsweg zu debattieren, der China und seinen Menschen Stabilität und Wohlstand bringen könnte. Obwohl es unterschiedliche Schulen gab, knüpfte ein großer Teil an die Debatte während der Vierten Maibewegung an, nämlich mit der Tradition endlich zu brechen. In diesem „Kulturfieber“, so wurde der Ideenstreit bezeichnet, wurde über den Wert der chinesischen Kultur für die Modernisierung des Landes debattiert. Obwohl die Thesen Max Webers durch die Entwicklung der asiatischen Schwellenländer längst widerlegt worden waren, stützten sie sich auf seine Argumente.

Während des so genannten „Kulturfiebers“ gingen Intellektuelle in ihrer Bewertung der chinesischen Kultur so weit, dass sie sie vollkommen verwarfen und nur in einem Neuanfang nach westlichen Konzepten eine Chance für China sahen. Unter Neuanfang verstand man, die westliche, die blaue, die offene Kultur vollständig zu übernehmen.

Erst nach dem Scheitern der Studentenbewegung 1989 wurde diese Ideendebatte von konservativen Kräften vereinnahmt. Viele chinesische Intellektuelle waren anfangs irritiert und auch desorientiert, doch angesichts des ständigen Drucks der westlichen Menschenrechtsanklagen gegenüber China erwachte wieder das patriotische Selbstwertgefühl, nach dem man sich verpflichtet fühlt, die Nation in Zeiten der Krise zu verteidigen. So wurde anfangs auch der Konzeption von Huntington über den Kampf der Kulturen vehement widersprochen, weil damit indirekt das Gefahrenszenario, das von China kommen könnte, verbunden war.<sup>14</sup> Zweifelsohne bewirkten die neuen Faktoren eine Umorientierung der bisherigen Bewertung der eigenen Kultur, auf die man jetzt wieder stolz ist und sich mit ihr identifiziert.

Die letzten Jahrzehnte haben diese These infolge der Entwicklung der ostasiatischen Schwellenländer, vor allem jedoch Chinas, selbst widerlegt. Der Diskurs über die Grundfragen der Moderne ist mit der sich vertiefenden Globalisierung erneut entflammt. Doch diesmal nicht im Westen, sondern in Asien nicht nur als Antwort auf die ehemalige imperialistische Kolonialpolitik, sondern im Prozess der Selbstfindung und Selbstbehauptung. Die Gründung der „Commission for a new Asia“ 1993 in Kuala Lumpur, in der 13 asiatische Staaten, u.a. China, vereint waren, offenbarte das deutlich. In der Debatte ging es um die Schaffung alternativer Konzepte für eine Moderne auf der Grundlage von eigenen Werten zu schaffen. So wundert es nicht, dass mit kulturellen Erklärungsansätzen die Wirtschaftsleistungen in der Region sowohl von Wissenschaftlern als auch von Politikern beschrieben wurden. Dabei spielte die Debatte um die Bedeutung der „asiatischen Werte“ eine besondere Rolle. Die Tradition wurde nun nicht mehr verworfen, sondern als Element der Moderne in dieser Region gesehen. Huntingtons Publikation über die zukünftige Rolle der Zivilisationen<sup>15</sup>, in dem er auf die „Sinisierung“ asiatischer Wirtschaften verweist, fand in diesem Kontext große Aufmerksamkeit unter den neuen Dissidenten. Obgleich im Westen diese Rezeption äußerst kritisch beurteilt wurde, gab es auch Autoren, die versuchten, das spezifische Wirtschaftssystem kulturell zu erklären.<sup>16</sup> Dabei wurden solche

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<sup>14</sup> Nora Sausmikat, „Gibt es eine chinesische Moderne mit konfuzianischen Charakteristika?“, *Internationales Asienforum*, Nr. 3–4/ 2004, S. 332.

<sup>15</sup> Samuel Huntington, *Der Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert*, (The Clash of Civilizations) München, Wien 1996.

<sup>16</sup> Gordon Redding, *The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism*, New York 1990.

Werte in den Vordergrund gestellt, die auch von Anhängern des Konfuzianismus betont werden, wie Familienorientiertheit, die sich positiv auf die Unternehmenskultur auswirke, die Achtung von Autoritäten und Hierarchien, der allgegenwärtige Paternalismus und die hierarchische Personenbezogenheit.

### **Asiatische Werte und die konfuzianische Tradition**

Das Pendel war umgeschlagen. Im Westen begann man angesichts der Wirtschaftserfolge Chinas und der in den asiatischen Schwellenländern von den asiatischen Werten zu sprechen, die diese Entwicklung ermöglichten und einen positiven Beitrag zur Moderne leisten könnten. An Kritikern fehlte es natürlich auch nicht, die sich nicht der neuen Wirklichkeit zu öffnen vermochten. In einigen asiatischen Ländern dagegen wurde an diese akademische Debatte im Westen angeknüpft. Politiker und Wissenschaftler erklärten nun die Erfolgsgeschichte in die Moderne mit dem Konfuzianismus. Auch in China wurde die konfuzianische Tradition wieder entdeckt und zu einem Teil der Moderne erklärt. Als der Präsident von Singapore Lee Kuan Yew in die Debatte eingriff und hervorhob, dass doch nur eine geordnete Gesellschaft die Voraussetzungen für Wirtschaftswachstum sei und neue Modernisierungsimpulse geben könne<sup>17</sup>, fand das in China offenen Beifall.

### **Ist Loyalität ein Teil des Freiheitsbegriff**

Was Freiheit ausmacht, wird in den Kulturen unterschiedlich definiert. Heute werden wir uns immer mehr bewusst, dass die Kernfrage darin besteht, wie autonom der Bürger in seiner Freiheit wirklich ist und ob der individuelle Freiheitsdrang, man kann das auch Egoismus nennen, die Verantwortung unterminiert und die Gemeinschaft letzt endlich zerstört, wie in den Debatten die Kommunitaristen bezüglich der Handlungsziele der Liberalen argumentieren. Schon Emanuel Kant sprach in seiner Schrift „Grundlagen zur Metaphysik der Sitten“ von einem menschlichen Handeln, dass stets nach der Maxime erfolgen sollte, dass die Maxime des eigenen Willens jederzeit zugleich auch als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könnte. Hier geht es nicht um Konsumverweigerung, um irgend ein Einsiedleridentität, sondern um die Erkenntnis der Grenzen des Notwendigen und der Fähigkeit der Urteilskraft.

Als Deng Xiaoping das große Reformprogramm verkündete, wurde Reichwerden zum neuen Grundsatz erklärt, das Reichwerden in der neuen Zeit als etwas Ehrenhaftes gilt. Damit konnte der unter Mao Zedong gefesselte Unternehmergeist, in dem die Loyalität einen bedeutenden Platz einnimmt, sich wieder entfalten. Es ist heute nicht nur chinesische Unternehmergeist, sondern auch Fleiß und Wissen, die hoch geschätzt werden. Oft ist das Startkapital unter schwierigsten Bedingungen erarbeitet worden, doch Chinesen schrecken nicht vor solchen Anfangsschwierigkeiten zurück. Unter den neuen Bedingungen hat sich ein pragmatischer, eiserner Wille herausgebildet, für die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen auch unter Entbehrungen, wie es die Wanderarbeiter beweisen, hart zu arbeiten. In der westlichen Zivilisation entwickelte sich das Konzept der „äußeren Freiheit“, die ohne Beschränkung des Staates und ohne Restriktionen des Staates gelebt werden könne, heißt es in einem Essay über den Status des Individuums in der chinesischen Ethik.

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<sup>17</sup> Fareed Zakaria, „Culture is destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew“, *Foreign Affairs*, Nr 2, 1994.

Dagegen sucht man in der chinesischen Ethik die Selbstvollkommenheit durch die innere Freiheit, die Entwicklung des eigenen Ichs. Diese Freiheit wird nach traditionellem Verständnis als begrenzte Freiheit gesehen, die jedoch auch das Glück suche.<sup>18</sup>

Konfuzius ist heute in China in aller Munde. Forschungszentren sind im ganzen Lande entstanden, und die Buchhandlungen bieten zahlreiche Publikationen über die konfuzianische Ethik, aber auch Neuauflagen historischer Bücher an. Obgleich die Meinungen über die Rolle des traditionellen Tugendkatalogs als lebens- und anleitende Handlungslebensphilosophie sehr auseinander gehen, Chinas Politik und Gesellschaft befindet sich im Aufbruch mit zahlreichen Determinanten. Der Konfuzianismus ist gewiss nicht mehr das prägende Element chinesischer Verhaltensweisen und Denkstrukturen, doch gewisse Ausprägungsformen und Grundhaltungen sind bisher nicht verloren gegangen, wie das Denken in Zusammenhängen und das Handeln in Netzwerken. Von Bedeutung sind weiterhin die sozialen Beziehungen in der Familie sowie im Clan, wo Vertrauen, Loyalität zwischen den Familienmitgliedern als selbstverständlich gelten. Gegensätze werden so weit wie möglich vermieden, auch wenn sich die Einstellung zum absoluten Gehorsam gegenüber respektvollen Älteren und Autoritäten gewandelt hat. Auch die sozialen Beziehungen zu Freunden spielen beim sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Handeln immer noch eine große Rolle. Dieses persönliche Beziehungsgeflecht, als *guanxi* bezeichnet, beruht ebenfalls auf Vertrauen, dass man im Umgang mit Freunden erworben hat und dafür gegenseitige Unterstützung fordert. Das Beziehungskonzept prägt chinesisches Denken, wo es keine klaren linearen Vorstellungen gibt, sondern die Wechselbeziehungen von Ursache und Wirkung als Ganzheit gesehen werden. Es erklärt chinesische Wahrnehmungen, die versuchen, den Kompromiss zu suchen. So gibt es aus der Perspektive der chinesischen Zivilisation zweifelsohne große Unterschiede zur westlichen Kultur, die sich in ihrem Wertekatalog, wie bereits bemerkt, auf das Christentum beruft und in der der Mensch ein freies Wesen darstellt. Der Konfuzianismus dagegen gilt als Hauptströmung der chinesischen Kultur, die sich konkret im chinesischen Verständnis von Humanismus (*renwen zhuyi*) widerspiegelt und der einzelne Mensch mit der Gemeinschaft verbunden ist. Dieses ethische Verständnis von der Gemeinschaft, wie die Autoren in der Arbeit über die Bedeutung des Konfuzianismus für Asien und Afrika hervorhoben, sei nun weiterentwickelt worden.<sup>19</sup> Das große Verdienst von Konfuzius wird darin gesehen, dass er mit seinem Ideengebäude den besonderen Wertekatalog für China geschaffen habe.<sup>20</sup>

In diesem Zusammen sei an die kontroverse Publikation „Konflikt der Kulturen“ zu erinnern, mit der H. Huntington 1993 die Weltöffentlichkeit irritierte. Mit diesem konfliktogenen Ansatz wird der Versuch unternommen, die neue globale Situation und die vielfachen Rivalitäten, die sich entwickeln, vor dem Hintergrund der Kulturen zu analysieren. Nach dem Ende der Ost-Westkonfrontation endete auch die grundsätzliche Konfrontation und Rivalität der beiden vorhandenen Ideengebäude. Huntington prognostizierte deshalb,

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<sup>18</sup> Hsie Yi-Wei, *The Status of individual in Chinese ethics*, after K. Gawlikowski, „Problem praw człowieka z perspektywy azjatyckiej”, *Azja-Pacific*, 1998, S. 21–22.

<sup>19</sup> Liu Zongzhi, *Cai Dehong, Dangdai dongfang ruxue* (Die Bedeutung der konfuzianischen Klassiker für den heutigen Osten (Unter Osten werden die nichteuropäischen Kulturen in Asien und Afrika verstanden. K.T.)), Renmin chubanshe, Beijing 2003, S. 50–51.

<sup>20</sup> Ebd., S. 55.

dass ideologische Konflikte nun von kulturellen Konflikten abgelöst werden würden. Er sah in der Kultur und in der Religion Motoren, die für die Globalisierung zum Motor der Integration oder zum neuen Kampfmodell werden könnten. Im Westen fanden die Thesen kaum Zuspruch. Im „Osten“ dagegen, d.h. in einigen Ländern des Orients, in Südost- und Ostasien, entflammte dagegen eine heiße Debatte über die Rolle der eigenen Kultur in Zeiten der Modernisierung. Aufgegriffen wurde es unter dem Schild der „asiatischen Werte“. Politiker und Wissenschaftler versuchten die Erfolgsgeschichte vieler asiatischer Staaten aufgrund des konfuzianischen Wertekanons zu erklären.

Das Verhältnis des Westens zu Asien ist seit den 1990er Jahren, als die kontroverse Debatte über die Rolle „asiatischer Werte“ aufkam, angespannt. Intellektuelle und Politiker wie Tommy Koh, Kishore Mahbubani, Shintaro Ishihara, Lee Kuan Yew oder Mahathir Muhamad, um nur einige zu nennen, irritieren in dieser Debatte viele westliche Politiker und auch einige Wissenschaftler, wenn die Besonderheiten asiatischer Werte aufgezeigt werden, die sich vom westlichen Wertesystem wesentlich unterscheiden. In der kontroversen Debatte werden also die kulturellen Bedingtheiten als Grundlage unterschiedlicher politischer Entwicklungen gesehen.

Welche Bedingtheiten gelten danach in Asien? So wird bemerkt, dass 1. man Asien ganz allgemein eine positive Einstellung zur Macht und zu den Autoritäten, die diese Macht ausüben, habe. 2. Darüber hinaus gilt in der Gesellschaftsstruktur noch immer ein gewisses Hierarchiesystem. 3. Die Gemeinschaftsinteressen stehen über den individuellen Interessen stehen und deshalb ist die Gruppenidentität stark ausgeprägt. 4. Die Schaffung sozialer Harmonie gilt oberstes politisches und gesellschaftliches Regulativ. Offene Auseinandersetzungen sollten deshalb im Interesse des Ausgleichs stets zwischen den Seiten gemieden werden. 5. Die Universalität der Menschenrechte kann nur als theoretischer diskurs zu akzeptieren sein, da die konkrete Umsetzung nur entsprechend den Bedingtheiten der historischen und zivilisatorischen Entwicklung erfolgen könnte.<sup>21</sup>

Zweifelsohne dient die Beschäftigung mit der konfuzianischen Tradition auch als Instrument der Innenpolitik zur Stabilisierung der Gesellschaft, die sich nach über 30 Jahren Wirtschaftswachstum im Zustand gewisser Disharmonie befindet. Die gestartete Erziehungsbewegung zur „sozialistischen geistigen Zivilisation“ hat zum Ziel, in sich Elemente der Tradition zu vereinigen, um den Herausforderungen der chinesischen Moderne gewappnet zu sein.

Immer häufiger werden die „fünf Beziehungen“ (*wu jiang*), Anstand, gutes Benehmen, Hygiene, Selbstdisziplin und Moral, die „vier Schönheiten“ (*si mei*), korrektes Denken, höfliche Sprache, moralisches Verhalten und die Umwelt schonen, und die dreifache heiße Liebe“ (*san reai*) KPCh, Vaterland, Sozialismus formuliert. Verhaltensnormen, die im Dienst der Modernisierung stehen sollen.

Man spricht heute von der Notwendigkeit der Renaissance der chinesischen Nation. So wurde die Schaffung einer „sozialistischen Kultur“ mit chinesischer Prägung auf einer landesweiten Konferenz zur Reform des Kultursystems gefordert. Man könnte fast behaupten, dass es um konfuzianisch-sozialistische kulturelle Konzepte geht, doch wie diese konkret funktionieren sollen, ist schwer zu erraten. Mit anderen Worten, ohne sich

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<sup>21</sup> Tommy T.B. Koh, *The United States and East Asia: Conflict and Cooperation*, Singapore 1995, S. 99–100.

auf Wortspiele einzulassen, gehen alle Bemühungen dahin, die chinesische Kultur, und nicht die westliche, zur Hauptströmung der Entwicklung im Lande zu kreieren. So kann man lesen, dass die chinesische Kultur auch ein wichtiges Element der Wirtschaftsstrategie werden sollte, aber ebenfalls zur Herausbildung einer neuen nationalen Identität beitragen.<sup>22</sup>

Die propagandistische Funktionalisierung der Konfuziusdebatte ruft aber auch Widerstände hervor. Vor allem wird die einseitige Interpretation des Konfuzianismus als wirtschaftliche Modernisierungskraft kritisiert. Kritiker erblicken eine Gefahr darin, dass z.B. die Faktoren von Wissenschaft, Technik unterschlagen werden, die die verspätete Modernisierung in China so erfolgreich machte.<sup>23</sup>

### **Kulturelles Verständnis – Gradmesser der globalen Kooperation**

Die Wertunterschiede, die hier angemerkt wurden, bringen keine neue Erkenntnis in die Debatte, schon früher wurden diese Differenzen aufgelistet. Der Unterschied besteht jedoch darin, dass in einigen ostasiatischen Staaten heute dadurch das westliche Herrschaftsmodell für das eigene Land abgelehnt und der Grund für die Schaffung eines eigenen Herrschaftsmodells<sup>24</sup> kämpferisch präsentiert wird. Nach diesem Verständnis würden also westliche Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit einen Gegensatz zu den asiatischen Werten darstellen. Begründet wird es aufgrund des extrem ausgerichteten Individualismus, der nur Konflikte in die ethnisch und religiös differenzierten Gesellschaften tragen würden. Dagegen wird eine Vormundschaftsdemokratie befürwortet.

Als der Präsident von Singapur Lee Kuan Yew in die Debatte eingriff und hervorhob, dass doch nur eine geordnete Gesellschaft die Voraussetzungen für Wirtschaftswachstum sei und neue Modernisierungspulse geben könne, fand das in China jedoch indirekt Beifall, weil das der chinesischen Argumentation entspricht.

Im Westen wurde die Debatte über die asiatischen Werte, wie sie der Präsident von Singapur führte, durch eine Publikation in der Zeitschrift „Foreign Affairs“<sup>25</sup> public. Farred Zakaria hatte nämlich ein Interview mit Lee Kuan Yew veröffentlicht, dass in der westlichen Öffentlichkeit doch sehr irritierte. Die Vertreter „asiatischer Werte“ unterstrichen, dass das Herausstreichen von individuellen Rechten eigentlich nicht so vordergründig sei, da in asiatischen Staaten der Stabilität und dem Wohlstand der Gesellschaft Priorität zukomme und vor dem Schutz individueller Rechte ständen. Bestimmte Einschränkungen individueller Freiheiten, auch wenn die Gesellschaft sich weiter entwickelt hätte, werden danach als notwendig angesehen. So betonte Lee Kuan Yew, dass ein Teil des amerikanischen Systems einfach nicht zu akzeptieren sei: Waffen, Drogen, brutale Kriminalität. Das erfolge alles auf Kosten der Gesellschaft. In Asien bestehe das wichtigste Ziel darin, die Stabilität der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung aufrechtzuerhalten, so dass alle Menschen sich an einem

<sup>22</sup> Guangming Ribao, 30 Juni 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Huang Ping, „Rural Problems and uneven development in recent years“, Lau Kin Chi, Huang Ping, ed., *China reflected, Asian exchange*, Nr. 1–2, Hongkong 2002, S. 19, zitiert nach: Nora Sausmikat, „Gibt es eine chinesische Moderne mit konfuzianischen Charakteristika?“, *Internationales Asienforum*, Nr. 3–4/ 2004, S. 343.

<sup>24</sup> Clark D. Neher, „Asian Style Democracy“, *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 11, S. 961.

<sup>25</sup> Fareed Yakaria, „Culture is destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew“, *Foreign Affairs*, März-April 1994, S. 111.

Maximum von Freiheit erfreuen könnten. Für ihn bestehe ein Rechtsstaat dann, wenn Streitigkeiten, und Anarchie durch Übereinkommen und Schlichtung beseitigt werden. Eine gute Regierung müsse ständig dafür sorgen, bestimmte Grenzen zu setzen, auch in der Meinungsfreiheit, um eben ethnische Konflikte und größere Polarisierung in der Gesellschaft zu vermeiden.

Die kurze Darstellung des kontroversen Diskurses über die Bedeutung der asiatischen Werte ist notwendig, um aufzuzeigen, dass sich der Wandel nicht allein in einigen südasiatischen Ländern vollzieht, sondern in China unter dem Motto des Konfuzianismus vollzogen wird.

### **Kultur – neuer Identitätsstifter**

In der Konfuziusdebatte der letzten Jahre geht man nicht direkt auf die Debatte über die „asiatischen Werte“ ein. Doch das geheime Vorbild ist für viele Chinesen Singapore geworden. Bereits Deng Xiaoping hatte anfangs die Meinung vertreten, dass die Kultur einen hohen Stellenwert beim Aufbau einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft einnehmen müsse.

Historisch gesehen, sind nur wenige Jahre nach der Veröffentlichung der Publikation von H. Huntington vergangen, wo wir Zeugen sind, welche Rolle sowohl die Kultur als Ganzes oder auch die Religion als ein Element der Kultur in der heutigen globalen Welt spielen und bereits neue Konstellationen schaffen. Im 21. Jahrhundert wird der Rolle der Kultur als Identitätsstifter, auch wenn es weiterhin nicht an Kritikern fehlt beigegeben. In der Politik wie auch in der Wirtschaft steht man vor der entscheidenden Frage, inwieweit man bei der globalen Zusammenarbeit den kulturellen Besonderheiten und Bedingungen oder aber den rationalen ökonomischen Anforderungen Aufmerksamkeit schenken sollte. Hier geht es um das Werteprinzip „Vertrauen“. So muss die Frage neu beantwortet werden, ob man Partnern, die sich von anderen kulturellen Werten leiten lassen, Vertrauen schenken kann, auch wenn die ökonomische Situation uns in dem entsprechenden Augenblick dazu zwingt?

In China und in den konfuzianisch geprägten Gesellschaften, sei es nun in Japan, Singapur, Taiwan, Hongkong oder Macao, herrschten traditionell die Familienunternehmen vor, da die konfuzianische Ideologie auf das hierarchische System der Familie (*jiazu zhuzi*) und der Sippe (*zhongzu zhuzi*) basierte. Vertrauen gab es vor allem innerhalb der Familie, des Clans und unter Freunden. Fremden wurde nur selten Vertrauen und Loyalität entgegengebracht. Heute verändert sich dieser Verhaltenskodex langsam, ohne jedoch dabei den Kern solcher Verhaltensweisen aufzugeben. Vertrauen wird nicht nur auf der Grundlage interpersonaler Interaktion gewonnen, sondern auch mit Institutionen des Rechts, z.B. in der Zusammenarbeit mit Europa.<sup>26</sup>

Für die chinesische Entwicklung, so die offizielle Sprachregelung, seien solche traditionellen Vorstellungen weiterhin von Bedeutung, wie die von der „großen Gemeinschaft (*da tong*)“ oder auch vom „kleinen Wohlstand für das Volk (*xiao kang*)“ da mit solchen Visionen Vertrauen in der Gesellschaft, in der sich immer mehr Unzufriedenheit breit macht, geweckt werden können.

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<sup>26</sup> Su Guoxun, Zhang Lüping, Xia Guang, ed., *Quanqiu hua: Wenhua chongtu yu gongsheng* (Globalisierung: Kulturcrash und Symbiose), Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, Beijing 2006, S. 520–521.

Im 21. Jahrhundert ist aufgrund neuer Rivalitäten offenbar geworden, dass die kulturelle Wahrnehmung und das kulturelle Verständnis von Dingen heute zu einem wichtigen Gradmesser der Kooperation sowohl in der globalen Politik wie auch in der Wirtschaftszusammenarbeit geworden ist. Francis Fukujama, der Autor des Bestsellers „Ende der Geschichte“<sup>27</sup>, sieht heute die Welt auch mit anderen Augen. So sieht sich der einstige Visionär gezwungen einzugestehen, dass es infolge von traditionellen Wahrnehmungsmustern unterschiedliche Wege zur Modernisierung gebe. Der Westen, so Fukujama, sollte die Staaten, die ihre eigenen Wege in die Moderne gehen, nicht stören, wenn sie in ihrer Tradition ihre neue Identität mit ihren neuen Entwicklungskonzepten in Zeiten der Globalisierung suchen. Er geht sogar so weit, zu behaupten, dass die globalen ökonomischen Faktoren der einzelnen Gesellschaft nicht irgendein Modell aufzwingen sollten. Als negatives Beispiel wird die amerikanische Politik im Irak in den letzten vier Jahren angeführt.<sup>28</sup> Es ist zu begrüßen, dass in den Medien über solche neuen Reflexionen berichtet wird, steht doch sonst allgemein die Forderung von Demokratie und von Menschenrechten, die in nichtwestlichen Ländern eingeführt werden müssten, im Vordergrund der Kommentare.

### **Fortschritt und die chinesische Moderne**

Was Fortschritt ist, wird sehr kontrovers debattiert. An den unterschiedlichen Fortschrittskonzeptionen, die Gesellschaften geprägt haben, fehlte es bisher nicht.

Auch in China wurde der Begriff Fortschritt verwendet, von der fortschrittlichen Technik, die die westlichen Mächte nach dem Opiumkrieg nach China brachten und im Land die Grundlage für die Entwicklung des Kapitals legten bis zur Revolutionstheorie Mao Zedongs, in der der Fortschritt die Revolution und der Aufbau einer kommunistischen Gesellschaft bedeuteten. Das eigene System wurde, wie in anderen sozialistischen Ländern als das fortschrittlichste gesehen. Begründet wurde es wissenschaftlich. Als nach dem Zusammenbruch des sozialistischen Systems in Mittel- und Osteuropa man auch von diesem Fortschrittsgedanken Abschied nahm, hielt man in China in der ideologischen Rhetorik weiterhin daran fest, obgleich die Reformen und die freiere Wirtschaft 10 Jahre früher gestartet waren. In Europa siegte eine neue Fortschrittskonzeption, die des Liberalismus. Für die neue politische Elite in Osteuropa wurde die Maxime vom Ende der Geschichte zum wichtigsten politischen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsgrundsatz, wonach die Bruttosozialproduktion zum wichtigsten Maßstab für den Fortschritt wurde. Auch im chinesischen Modernisierungsprogramm strebt man nach Fortschritt, definiert als Wirtschaftsentwicklung, die dem Land und seinen Menschen Wohlstand und Gerechtigkeit bringen soll. Zum Wohlstand gehört heute die neue Technik und der Konsum, die neue Lebensinhalte heraufbeschwören, die Genforschung und die Eroberung des Kosmos, die angestrebte flächendeckende Infrastruktur, die zunehmende globale Mobilität und Vernetzung der Märkte. Doch die Schattenseiten dieser Fortschrittsentwicklung beunruhigen heute die politische Führung. Sie sieht sich gezwungen von allseitiger harmonischer Entwicklung des Landes zu sprechen, damit die Differenzen in der Gesellschaft nicht zu landesweiten Protesten führen, die die bisherige Entwicklung nach Grundsätzen der Ökonomisierung, eingebettet in sozialistische Fortschrittsrhetorik, in Frage stellt.

<sup>27</sup> Vergl. Francis Fukujama, *The End of History and the last Man*, New York, 1992.

<sup>28</sup> Francis Fukujama, „Zaufanie w globalnej gospodarce“, *Dziennik*, 25–26.08. 2007.

Auf der anderen Seite ist in China der neue Fortschrittsglaube besonders verbreitet, obgleich man weiß, dass die Zukunft im eigenen Lande, auch wenn die Visionen und Hoffnungen noch so groß sind, nicht voraussehbar ist und schon gar nicht in allen Konsequenzen gesteuert werden kann. Auch unter den Verlierern der neuen Entwicklungsstrategie gibt es Hoffnung. Wäre das, was man als Fortschritt interpretiert, absolut, wäre es einfacher mit den Entwicklungsperspektiven. Fortschritt kann nur ganzheitlich gesehen werden. In der Wahrnehmung der übergroßen Anzahl der Chinesen bedeutet die Modernisierung Fortschritt, die architektonische Umgestaltung der Städte Fortschritt, die Genforschung Fortschritt, um nur einige Bereiche zu nennen. Und es ist auch Fortschritt, wenn er nicht die Gefahren sozialer Ausgrenzung und Umweltzerstörungen in sich trägt.

### **Nationalismus – Nationale Würde und die chinesische Modernisierung**

Die chinesische Gesellschaft, auch wenn sie in ihren Identitätsmustern noch so gespalten ist, legt am Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts ein starkes, selbstbewusstes National- und Zivilisationsempfinden an den Tag. Es ist der neue Nationalstolz auf die Leistungen der eigenen Nation, der China zu Anerkennung und Machteinfluss verhelfen haben. Dieses Empfinden, Chinesen zu sein, hat infolge der Instrumentalisierung durch die politische Klasse zu einem gewissen Nationalismus im Lande geführt, der in der chinesischen Kultur als kultureller Ansatz immer von Bedeutung war und heute als „Patriotismus“ bezeichnet wird. Bei diesem Nationalismus stehen nicht die eigenen Interessen oder die der Gruppe im Vordergrund, sondern die der Gesellschaft als Ganzes, als Nation, traditionell auch gern als das Gemeinwohl oder Wohl des Volkes definiert. Chinas neues Selbstbewusstsein wird im Westen als Ausdruck nationalistischer Tendenzen wahrgenommen. Sie basieren heute vor allem auf die Erfolge, auf die man zurückschaut sowie aber auch noch immer auf antijapanische Ressentiment, wenn auch in der letzten Zeit einige Versuche unternommen werden, die Beziehungen zu entspannen. Die Patriots Alliance, eine supranationale Internetgruppe, organisiert seit Jahren die größten antijapanischen Demonstrationen. Nationalistische Trends sind aber auch gegenüber Taiwan, den USA und westlichen Missionären zu beobachten.<sup>29</sup>

Ein zweiter Aspekt, wenn es um das neue Zivilisationsbewusstsein und somit um die historische Identität eines großen Teils der chinesischen Gesellschaft geht, ist mit der Frage der Selbstbestimmung verbunden, die auch als nationale Würde definiert werden kann. Aufgrund historischer Erfahrungen mit den westlichen Kolonialmächten – ein wichtiges Element im Lehrplan zur Erziehung von Patriotismus – gehört die Frage der nationalen Würde, die mit der Modernisierungspolitik vollständig wieder erlangt wurde. Das Gefühl der einstigen zivilisatorischen Entwürdigung durch die westlichen Mächte und Japan ist spielt nur noch in der Instrumentalisierung als Element der historischen Erinnerung eine Rolle.

Ein dritter Aspekt ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Frage der territorialen Integrität. So ist die unter westlichen Chinaexperten verbreitete These, dass die Wahrung territorialer Einheit Teil des Gründungsmythos der VRCh sei<sup>30</sup>, doch eher anzuzweifeln, wenn es um

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<sup>29</sup> <http://chinadaily.com.cn/viewthread.php?tid=545185&extra=page%3D1>

<sup>30</sup> Interview mit Heike Holbig, Der Dissens unter den Exiltibetern wächst, in dnC 1/März/2008, S. 25.

den genannten Zeitpunkt geht. Wie wir aus der chinesischen Geschichte wissen, versteht sich die Zentralmacht seit der Qin-Dynastie als Verantwortungsträger für die Einheit des Reiches. Deshalb wurde jede Föderalismusdebatte verweigert, was in der Folge zu zahlreichen Konflikten führte.

Bei der Politik gegenüber Tibet nach den gewaltsamen Ausschreitungen im März 2008, die gerade im Vorfeld der Olympischen Spiele die Aufmerksamkeit der Welt auf sich zogen, geht es um nationale Kerninteressen, wie sie in der chinesischen Politik nicht erst seit heute wahrgenommen werden. Nationale Souveränität und territoriale Integrität sind oberstes Prinzip chinesischen Selbstverständnisses, geprägt durch die kulturelle Identität. Das betrifft nicht nur Tibet, sondern auch andere Regionen wie Xinjiang, das in der Mehrzahl von islamischen Uiguren bewohnt wird, das betraf zuvor Hongkong und Macau und heute Taiwan. Die sich gegen separatistische Bestrebungen in Tibet wendende und für die Unterstützung chinesischer Politik stattfindenden Sympathiekundgebungen von Millionen Chinesen im Ausland demonstrierten das ebenfalls deutlich.

Gegenüber den nicht-chinesischen ethnischen Gruppen und Völkern wird eine Politik der nationalen Einheit nach traditionellen Vorstellungen durchgesetzt. Das kaiserliche China verstand sich über zwei Jahrtausende als zivilisatorischer Mittelpunkt der Welt, dem die Aufgabe zukommt, die Barbaren, u.a. gehörten eben die Nomaden- und Jägergruppen und – völker dazu, zu zivilisieren.

Nach dem Niedergang der letzten Kaiserdynastie fand die Wiedereingliederung Tibets in den chinesischen Staatsverband, das Anstrengungen unternommen hatte, unabhängig zu werden, infolge des traditionellen nationalen Einheitsverständnisses, was die chinesische Nation ausmacht, unter Druck und Gewalt statt. Nach diesem Verständnis sind alle ethnischen Gruppen und Völker, die 1911 auf dem Territorium des chinesischen Kaiserreichs gelebt haben, Angehörige der chinesischen Nation. Damit gelten alle Nichtchinesen aber gleichfalls als Chinesen *Zhongguoren*. So gilt in China nach wie vor das Territorialprinzip als Grundlage für das Verständnis einer Nation. So sei in diesem Zusammenhang an die Worte des Vaters der chinesischen Republik Sun Yatsen zu erinnern, der die Mongolen, als sie ihre Unabhängigkeitserklärung veröffentlichten, was zur Gründung der Mongolei führte, ermahnte, sie sollten niemals vergessen, dass sie trotzdem Chinesen bleiben würden.

So bedeutet nach dem chinesischen Rechtsverständnis der Einmarsch von Soldaten der chinesischen Volksarmee 1950 in dieses Gebiet keine Besetzung, keine Okkupation, sondern die volle Eingliederung Tibets, das mit Hilfe der britischen Kolonialmacht seit den Opiumkriegen immer mehr zu separatistischen Einzelgängen bereit war. Die aktuellen Forderungen des Dalai Lamas, Tibet volle Autonomie zu zuerkennen, die chinesische Einwanderung aufzuhalten und die Umwelt zu schonen, käme den Forderungen gleich, die bereits nach dem Niedergang der Dynastie 1911 gestellt worden waren.

### **Menschenrechte: Werte, Ideologien und Lebensweisen**

Im Zuge des gesellschaftlichen Wandels zeigen viele Chinesen, darunter auch junge kritisch denkende Menschen, vor allem jedoch Intellektuelle, wenig Verständnis für die westliche Menschenrechtskritik gegenüber China. Sie schenken nicht nur der offiziellen Propaganda Glauben, dass die Menschenrechtskritik nur ein Instrument des Westens sei, Chinas Aufstieg in der Weltpolitik zu behindern, sondern sie sehen die chinesische Entwicklung immer noch durch das Prisma ihres anerzogenen Familien- und Gemein-

schaftssinn sowie des Verständnisses von Nation. Vor diesem Hintergrund entwickelt sich in China vielfältige Individualität, was jedoch nicht gleichzusetzen ist mit der absoluten Autonomie des Individuums, wie es in der westlichen Kultur verstanden wird. Heißt doch ein grundlegendes Ziel der chinesischen Modernisierungspolitik, die Verwirklichung der vollen Menschenrechte, mit der China entsprechend seiner Bedingungen einen eigenen Weg findet, die Menschenrechte zu entwickeln. Es wäre also leichtfertig anzunehmen, dass in China mit einer anderen politisch-kulturellen Ideengeschichte der westliche Ideen- und Technologietransfer im Globalisierungsprozess genüge, um in kurzer Zeit westliche Entwicklungsprozesse auszulösen. Beim chinesischen Diskurs um die Menschenrechte geht es um Werte, Ideologien und Lebensweisen nach einiger Wahrnehmung, z.T. schon selbst erwählten, und nicht um das Kopieren eines westlichen Modernisierungsmodells. Auch diesem Kontext kommt der Frage der chinesischen Kultur eine immer größere Bedeutung zu. Das Ziel besteht nicht in der Demokratisierung des Systems nach westlichem Standard, sondern darin, das politische System effizienter mit Hilfe traditioneller und westlicher Werte zu einem neuen chinesischen Modell zu gestalten.

### **Bedeutung der chinesischen Kultur für die Modernisierung**

Eines der wichtigsten Elemente der chinesischen Kultur für die Modernisierungsziele bleibt die Brückenfunktion, die die Einheit der Nation auch in Zeiten der Industrialisierung und der Entstehung einer Informationsgesellschaft garantiert.

Unmittelbar nach dem 16. Parteitag der KPCh im Herbst 2002 begann die neue politische Führung die Bedeutung der chinesischen Kultur für die Modernisierung als entwicklungspolitischen Schwerpunkt zu akzentuieren.

Welche Bedeutung dabei dem Konfuzianismus für die Entwicklung der chinesischen Gesellschaft im 21. Jahrhundert hat, darüber streiten sich die Schulen, wobei die offizielle Debatte versucht, es politisch zu instrumentalisieren. So vertreten die einen die Meinung, dass der Konfuzianismus ohne Paradigmenwechsel keine Lösungsansätze für die Modernisierungsprobleme in China anbiete, behaupten andere das Gegenteil und sehen ihn als universalen Heilsweg für eine globale Ethik an. Skeptiker und Kritiker, wie der Philosoph Fang Hao, befürchten, dass mit der Debatte über den Konfuzianismus aus dem alten Autoritarismus ein neuer Autoritarismus und Kollektivismus begründet werden soll.<sup>31</sup> Seiner Meinung nach stehe diese Art von Nostalgie im Widerspruch zu den Entwicklungstendenzen des 21. Jahrhunderts. Deshalb meldet er auch seine Zweifel über den viel gepriesenen positiven Einfluss an, den der Konfuzianismus auf die Modernisierung in China ausgeübt hätte. Doch vollkommen ablehnen möchte er die traditionelle Kultur doch nicht. So muss er eingestehen, dass er noch immer eine bedeutende Rolle in der chinesischen Gesellschaft spiele. Doch das, was er fordert, ist ein „rationales Verhalten des modernen Konfuzianismus“.<sup>32</sup>

Die Diskurse sind nicht neu, sondern werden seit den Opiumkriegen Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts in heftigen Kontroversen geführt, welchen Weg China beschreiten müsse, um sich zu modernisieren. So einig man sich über das Ziel war, China seine verlorene Größe

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<sup>31</sup> Fang Hao, „The Rationality of Modern Confucianism and the Nostalgia for Confucian Orthodoxy“, *Social Sciences*, Spring 2001, S. 109.

<sup>32</sup> Ebd., S. 110.

wiederzugeben, so zerstritten war man über die Mittel und Wege. Man bekundete großes Interesse an technischen Zukunftsvisionen. Fasziniert von den Naturwissenschaften, die der Westen in der Technik und im Militär demonstrierte, strebte ein Teil der chinesischen Elite danach, eben nur das „Nützliche“, das Technische, aus dem Westen zu übernehmen.<sup>33</sup>

Nach Beginn der Reformen Ende der 1970er Jahre stritten chinesische Intellektuelle erneut über ihre Kultur. Mit der Fernsehserie „Heshang“ wollten die Modernisten die Rückständigkeit der chinesischen Zivilisation nachzeichnen und sie hielten die Traditionalisten für weltfremde Idealisten.<sup>34</sup> Im 21. Jahrhundert sind es wieder die Traditionalisten, die eine Rückbesinnung auf die eigene Kultur fordern.<sup>35</sup> Ging es in den Diskursen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts um die Errichtung eines marktwirtschaftlichen demokratischen Systems oder um Sozialismus und Entwicklungsdiktatur, so steht man heute der Marktwirtschaft nach asiatischen Vorstellungen, positiv gegenüber. Tu Weiming, der bekannteste Vertreter der konservativen Ideenschule, sieht in autokratischen Herrschaftssystemen keine Barriere zur Entwicklung demokratischer Systeme in Asien. Und die Rhetorik über das konfuzianische Moralsystem sei seiner Meinung nach eher eine Ersatzideologie zur Abwehr westlicher Ideen, die man versucht der übrigen Welt aufzuzwingen.<sup>36</sup>

Für die Modernisierung Chinas hat sich besonders das „kulturelle China“, auch „greater China“ genannt, engagiert. Es sind die auf allen Kontinenten lebenden Millionen Auslandchinesen, wie aber auch die Chinesen aus Hongkong, Macao oder Taiwan, die sich in ihrem zivilisatorischen Selbstbewusstsein vor dem Hintergrund der chinesischen Tradition und Kultur als Chinesen identifizieren.

Heute wird in der Abgrenzung zum Fremden, zum Nichtchinesischen der Konfuzianismus neu erforscht und erhält entsprechend den Anforderungen der globalisierten Moderne eine neue Bewertung. Angesichts der zahlreichen Widersprüche, die die Modernisierung mit sich gebracht hat, angefangen von der sozialen und regionalen ungleichen Entwicklung bis zur ausufernden Bereicherung durch Vetternwirtschaft und Korruption, werden solche traditionellen Werte wie Loyalität, Redlichkeit und Gemeinsinn als wichtige Bausteine für die Zielaufgaben der Reformpolitik gefordert.<sup>37</sup> China ist bestrebt, an einigen traditionellen Besonderheiten bewusst weiter festzuhalten, wie dem Stellenwert der Bildung und der Erziehung zum Humanismus, heißt es in einer Arbeit über die Globalisierung und den Stellenwert der Tradition.<sup>38</sup> Wobei man chinesisches Verständnis von Humanismus nicht mit dem in der westlichen Kultur gleichsetzen kann. Humanismus bedeutet Menschenliebe in der Gemeinschaft und für die Gemeinschaft. Doch gleichzeitig wird darauf verwiesen,

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<sup>33</sup> Sun Hongyun, Wang Jingwei, „Liang Qichao, geming, lunzhan de zhengzhi xue beijing“ (Hintergrund der Debatte zwischen Wang Jingwei und Liang Qichao über die „Revolution“), *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 5/2004, S. 69–73.

<sup>34</sup> Hu Sheng, Liu Danian, *The 1911 Revolution. A Retrospective after 70 years*, Beijing 1983, S. 52

<sup>35</sup> Wang Xuedian, „Historiography in China in the last fifty years“, *Social Sciences in China*, Autumn 2004, S. 69.

<sup>36</sup> Tu Weiming, „Rodzina, naród i świat: etyka globalna jako współczesne wyzwanie konfucjanizmu“, in Karin Tomala, ed., *Chiny. Przemiany państwa i społeczeństwa w okresie reform 1978–2000*, Warszawa 2001, S. 101.

<sup>37</sup> Guoxun, Lüping, Guang, eds., *Quanqiuhua: Wenhua...*, S. 536.

<sup>38</sup> Ebd., S. 509.

dass bei aller Bedeutung, die traditionelle Werte für die Modernisierung hätten, es kein Zurück mehr in die Vergangenheit gebe.<sup>39</sup>

### Pragmatismus und Tradition

Die chinesische Modernisierung verläuft nach pragmatischen Mustern. Dieser Pragmatismus spiegelt sich auch im Diskurs über die Rolle Tradition für die chinesische Moderne wider. Wichtig ist bei allen Debatten, die geführt werden, darauf zu achten, den pragmatischen Nutzen aus dem Ideenwerk der Tradition zu ziehen. Obgleich in China die Tradition bis heute ihren Stellenwert im Bewusstsein der chinesischen Gesellschaft nicht verloren hat, gab es seit der 4. Maibewegung 1919 die Antitraditionalisten, die die Tradition als Hemmschuh für die Entwicklung Chinas glaubten. Auch heute kann die Tradition keine Anleitung für die Herausforderung der Moderne bedeuten. Die Herausforderung besteht darin, zu untersuchen, zu analysieren und zu erkennen, was aus der eigenen und der westlichen Tradition einer ganzheitlichen Entwicklung, in der der Mensch im Mittelpunkt stehen sollte, übernommen werden könnte.<sup>40</sup>

Das viel gepriesene Prinzip, das Beste aus der Weisheit der konfuzianischen Ideengeschichte zu übernehmen, und die Ideen den neuen Umständen anzupassen, ist zur neuen Ideologie der Machtelite geworden. Denn bei der neuen Debatte über die Rolle der chinesischen Kultur geht es zweifelsohne auch um die Schaffung einer neuen identitätsstiftenden Ideologie, da die Dogmen über Sozialismus und Kommunismus keine Brückenfunktion mehr zwischen der Gesellschaft und der politischen Führung herstellen.

Wie bekannt, hat die Lehre des Konfuzianismus in der chinesischen Ideengeschichte verschiedene Zeitabschnitte durchgemacht, da sie sich den Bedingungen anpasste. In der Han-Dynastie wurde der Konfuzianismus im 2. Jahrhundert vor Christi zur Staats- und Lebensphilosophie erhoben. Zeitweise wurde er vom Daoismus und Buddhismus zurückgedrängt, doch im 10. Jahrhundert erlebt er seine Renaissance. Mit dem Ende des Kaiserreiches 1912 hörte der Konfuzianismus auf, Staatsdoktrin zu sein. In den 1980er Jahren erfuhr der Konfuzianismus in Taiwan, Südkorea, Singapur und Japan eine Wiederbelebung mit dem Entstehen der neuen konfuzianischen Schule, die ein eigenes Werte-, Demokratie- und Menschenrechtsverständnis schuf, dass sich dem westlichen etwas annäherte. In den über zwei Jahrtausenden unterlag der Wertekodex verschiedenen Interpretationen, doch stets galt er als Legitimation des Herrschaftsanspruchs und als Grundlage aller Werte für die Gemeinschaft.

In diesem Zusammenhang sind die Ausführungen des Philosophen Wang Deyou von der Peking University interessant. Er spricht von einer 4. Etappe dieses pragmatischen Ideenkonstrukts, das Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts seinen Anfang nahm, „als der Konfuzianismus sich wieder dem Volke zuwandte“. <sup>41</sup> Welche Interpretationen möglich sind, zeigen die weiteren Ausführungen. So stellt er fest, dass jedoch erst mit dem Sieg der

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<sup>39</sup> Ebd., S. 511.

<sup>40</sup> Ebd., S. 542.

<sup>41</sup> Wang Deyou, *Spoleczna wartość konfucjanizmu w XXI wieku*, Vortrag auf der internationalen Konferenz in Warszawa, organisiert von Wyższa Szkoła Społeczna i Ekonomiczna (Hochschule für Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft) unter dem Titel: „Chiny w globalnym świecie” (China in der globalen Welt), in Warszawa am 29.01.2007.

Volksrevolution 1949 der Konfuzianismus zum Ideenwerk geworden sei, der sich vollkommen in den Dienst des Volkes gestellt habe, obwohl, und das muss in diesem Kontext betont werden, es doch gerade der Konfuzianismus war, der in dieser Zeit ideologisch bekämpft und als schädliches Ideenkonstrukt des Feudalismus in China betrachtet wurde. Wang verweist zwar auf die „Proletarische Kulturrevolution“, während der der antikonfuzianische Kampf seinen Höhepunkt erreichte. Doch dieser Kampf diene anderen Zwecken, so der Autor, nämlich die gegnerische politische Fraktion in der Partei auszuschalten. Ende der 1970er Jahre, nach dem das große Reformprogramm von der Partei verkündet worden sei, sei das konfuzianische Ideengut in die Gesellschaft zurückgekehrt. Seit dieser Zeit spiele der Konfuzianismus als Wertesystem wieder eine bedeutende Rolle.<sup>42</sup>

Das ist die offizielle Interpretation der Rolle der chinesischen Kultur im Modernisierungsprozess, die jedoch wenig Aufschluss gibt über die historischen und ideellen Erfahrungen Chinas unter Mao Zedong, wo alle Anstrengungen mit Hilfe von Erziehungskampagnen unternommen worden waren, um das konfuzianische Wertesystem als feudale Ideologie aus den Köpfen der Menschen auszurotten, obgleich doch das politische totalitäre Herrschaftssystem der Ein- und Unterordnung nach konfuzianischem Muster zur Perfektion geführt wurde und statt Wohlstand für alle nur die aufgezwungenen „Tugenden“ galten, um den Sozialismus aufzubauen.

Die aktuelle offizielle Interpretation des Konfuzianismus zeigt nicht die vielen Widersprüche auf, die es bei der über ein langes Jahrhundert geführten Auseinandersetzung über diese Ideologie in China gibt. So sei daran erinnert, dass in der der 4. Mai-Bewegung 1919 die Diskurse unter den Intellektuellen zu der Erkenntnis führten, dass die Entwicklungsbarrieren und somit die wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Zurückgebliebenheit des Landes auf die feindliche Einstellung des Kaiserhofes gegenüber politischen Reformen zurückzuführen sei infolge des im Bewusstsein tief verwurzelten Konfuzianismus, der als allumspannendes Moralsystem politischen und gesellschaftlichen Handelns der geistigen Elite galt. Das zentrale Spannungsproblem zivilisatorischer Identität bestand in der tradierten Wahrnehmung, dass angesichts nationaler Verantwortung, Pragmatismus und Loyalität stets Priorität besaß.

Aus politischen Gründen wurden seit der Han-Dynastie die moralischen Konzeptionen, die mit den Begriffen Loyalität (*Zhong*) und kindlicher Ehrfurcht (*Xiao*) verbunden sind, durch die herrschende Elite, insbesondere durch das Mandarinat, in den Vordergrund ethischer Verpflichtungen gestellt. Zweifelsohne gehören beide Wertkonzeptionen zu den wichtigsten Elementen konfuzianischer Ethik.

Die Ausübung von Loyalität als moralisches Verhaltensmuster hat zum Ziel, Gesellschaft und Staat zu stabilisieren, während die kindliche Ehrfurcht als Grundlage für eine hierarchische, stabile Familienstruktur gesehen wird. Beide Verhaltenskodexe haben die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Strukturen des traditionellen Chinas pragmatisch geprägt und in der praktischen Befolgung sich gegenseitig ergänzt. Auf diese beiden moralischen Wertkonzepte wurde stets großes Gewicht gelegt, um die Machtbefugnisse entsprechend manipulieren zu können. Loyalität wurde stets als politisches Konzept zur Stärkung des Staates, also des Vaterlandes begriffen. Das Schicksal des Landes erhielt dadurch bei allen Handlungszielen und Handlungsweisen erste Priorität. So sind unter dem Begriff Loyalität

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<sup>42</sup> Ebenda.

auch solche Wertbegriffe enthalten, wie Ehrerbietung vor der Autorität und ihren Entscheidungen, Aufrichtigkeit gegenüber der Autorität, Hingabe und Pflichterfüllung für die Autorität. Loyalität wird aber in diesem Sinne auch Befehlsverweigerung zum Nutzen des Ganzen verstanden. Trotz zahlreicher Veränderungen haben diese Konzeptionen in der sich modernisierenden Gesellschaft nicht an Bedeutung verloren. Sie wurden zu neuen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Doktrinen erhoben, um die gesellschaftliche Stabilität zu wahren.<sup>43</sup>

Die tradierte ethische Verpflichtung der Intelligenz, der politischen Autorität kritisch zu begegnen, wird durch das Loyalitätsdogma bis auf den heutigen Tag erschwert. Der Einfluss der traditionellen chinesischen Ethik, Staat und Nation zu dienen, prägt auch heute noch das Verhalten.

### **Konfuzianische Moderne oder der neue Konfuzianismus?**

In den zahlreichen Forschungsprojekten ist Konfuzius als großer universaler Denker und Lehrer wieder auferstanden. Aus seinem Ideengebäude sollen die wertvollsten Ideen übernommen und vermittelt werden, doch im neuen Gewande, so dass die den Anforderungen der Modernisierung entsprechen. Die gesellschaftliche Bedeutung des Konfuzianismus liege darin, dass er sowohl in China als auch in den Nachbarstaaten weiterhin geschätzt werde.<sup>44</sup> Im heutigen China wird der Konfuzianismus zwar nicht als Leitkultur der Entwicklung betrachtet, doch er wird als kostbares kulturelles Erbe der Nation gesehen, das kritisch verarbeitet werden müsse. Euphorisch wird auf den Einfluss des Modernisierungsprozesses verwiesen, der, wie man hofft, sich in den kommenden Jahren als eine nicht sichtbare kulturelle und geistige Kraft verstärken werde, die nicht formal, doch bereits real vorhanden sei. Der kulturelle Einfluss und die geistige Kraft, die aus ihm entspringe, wird immer wieder betont, sei die Sorge um den anderen Menschen. Das erfordere Selbstbeschränkung und die Einhaltung von Normen, wobei der Schutz der Gemeinschaft Priorität besitze.<sup>45</sup> Offensichtlich wird, wie mit Hilfe der neuen Ideologie versucht wird, sich vom westlichen „universalen“ Wertesystem abzugrenzen.

Diese neue Konfuziuseuphorie könnte man auch anders begründen, wie es offiziell im Jahre 2004 verkündet wurde, nämlich in Zukunft alle Anstrengungen zu unternehmen, um eine harmonische Gesellschaft zu schaffen, die in Wohlstand leben kann. Die Relationen haben sich in den Reformjahren verändert, so dass auf dem 16. Parteitag der KPCh im November 2002 angesichts der „unübersehbaren Schwierigkeiten in der wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung des Landes“ man sich gezwungen sah, eine neue Entwicklungsmaxime aufzustellen. Sie heißt „Der Mensch ist Maßstab“. Nach diesem Leitbild, so auf der Tagung des X. Nationalen Volkskongresses, soll nun eine „fünffache einheitliche Planung“ umgesetzt werden, die Entwicklung des Landes, der verschiedenen Regionen, der Wirtschaft und der Gesellschaft, der harmonischen Entwicklung von Menschen und Natur und der Entwicklung im Landes selbst und der Öffnung nach Außen.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Lee Cheuk-Yin, „Die Dichotomie zwischen Loyalität und kindlicher Ehrfurcht im Konfuzianismus“, in Silke Krieger, Rolf Trauzettel, ed., Mainz 1990, S. 134.

<sup>44</sup> Deyou, *Spoleczna wartosc konfucjanizmu...*

<sup>45</sup> Ebenda.

<sup>46</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, 7. März 2004.

Diese Ideen gehören gewiss zum traditionellen Bewusstsein der Chinesen, die ihre Hoffnungen trotz der Risikofaktoren, die die Entwicklung begleiten, auf eine bessere Zeit in Harmonie, die die neue Entwicklungsphase begleiten, nicht aufgeben möchten. Gewiss die äußere Form des Konfuzianismus hat sich verändert, bestimmte Rituale und Verhaltensweisen passen nicht mehr in die neue Zeit. Doch Konfuziusanbeter, wie Wang, sind fest davon überzeugt, wie er betont, dass der innere Geist des Konfuzianismus mit seinen Werten über die Menschlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit, mit seinen Geboten, den Charakter ständig zu vervollkommen, lange in der Welt existieren werde.<sup>47</sup>

Zweifelsohne gibt es im Konfuzianismus viele Erkenntnisse über den Menschen und die Gemeinschaft, auch beinhaltet er wichtige Gebote, die für das Bestehen der Menschheit und der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung von Bedeutung sind. In China sind wahrlich konfuzianische Werte gefragt, damit die Modernisierung sich nach moralischen Grundsätzen richten kann, die rhetorisch eingefordert werden. Die eigennützige Bereicherung galt in der Tradition als etwas Negatives, wofür man sich schämen sollte. Doch in der Reformzeit steht die Kategorie Bereicherung ganz oben. Dieses Spannungsverhältnis prägt die neue Identität und somit die konfuzianische Moderne.

Auch im Ausland lebende Chinesen unterstützen die Orientierung auf den neuen Konfuzianismus. Zu den bedeutenden Vertretern einer neo-konfuzianisch ausgerichteten Moderne gehört, wie bereits betont, Tu Weiming, der zwar auch die Mängel des Konfuzianismus kritisch beleuchtet, doch in ihm den Ursprung chinesischem Verständnisses von der Welt und die Wurzel chinesischer Identität sieht, sei es im Lande oder im Ausland.<sup>48</sup> Diese Schule sieht sich als geistiger Nachfolger der Begründer des Konfuzianismus und der Neo-Konfuzianer im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert. Sie streben danach, den Konfuzianismus wieder zu beleben und ihm seine Würde wieder zu geben. Sie befürworten die Schaffung einer konfuzianischen Moderne als Alternative zur westlich definierten Moderne, da der konfuzianischen Tradition keine manichäischen Weltbilder zugrunde liegen, die eine radikale und kompromisslose Gegenüberstellung von Gut und Böse hervorbrächten.

Das sind Visionen, doch die Wirklichkeit gestaltet sich anders. Mit der neuen Wirtschaftsdevise, die Deng Xiaoping mit seiner Katzen- und Mäuseparabel verkündete, sind neue Götter entstanden. Obgleich man sich auf den Konfuzianismus beruft, sind diese Abneigungen der Konfuzianer gegen das Reichwerden der Händler und Geldverleiher, deren Gerissenheit, andere auszubeuten, eben zu dem Reichtum führte, vergessen. Ihnen genüge, so hieß der traditionelle Vorwurf, das gelochte Viereck einer Münze anzubeten. Geld habe sogar den Teufel zum Diener gemacht, denn alles wurde nur nach Geld bemessen. Das was der Mensch heute braucht, ist kein gelochtes Viereck.<sup>49</sup> Der kategorische Imperativ

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<sup>47</sup> Deyou, *Spoleczna wartość konfucjanizmu...*

<sup>48</sup> Vergl. Tu Weiming, „Rodzina, naród i świat: etyka globalna jako współczesne wyzwanie konfucjanizmu”, in Karin Tomala, ed., *Chiny. Przemiany państwa i społeczeństwa...*, S. 93–105.

<sup>49</sup> Hu Jichuang, *Zhongguo jingji sixiangshi* (Geschichte des chinesischen wirtschaftlichen Denkens), Shanghai 1978, 2. Auflage, zitiert nach. Oskar Weggel, „Auf der Suche nach dem wirtschaftlichen Urgestein“, in Doris Fischer, Achim Jassmeier, Christian Theisen (Hrsg.), *Privatwirtschaft und Wirtschaftsentwicklung in China*, Hamburg 2006, Institut für Asienkunde, S. 40

bestand ein in der Kultivierung der eigenen Person, der Persönlichkeit. An diese Grundidee anknüpfend gibt es immer mehr Stimmen, die fordern, dass die Modernisierung des Landes mit der Humanisierung des Menschen einhergehen sollte.<sup>50</sup>

### **„Die neue Klassik“ und „nationales Lernen“ (guoxue)**

Chinas Wirtschaftsentwicklung ist einmalig in der Welt. Nur innerhalb von 30 Jahren konnte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt vervierfacht werden, obgleich in diesem Zeitraum die Bevölkerungsgröße um fast 400 Mio. Menschen zunahm. Wo liegt der Schlüssel dieses Erfolgs? Diese Antwort wird gewiss unterschiedlich ausfallen. Doch eines ist sicher, dass man einen der entscheidenden Gründe in der chinesischen Zivilisation, die heute zu den ältesten Kulturen gehört, und sich seit über 4000 Jahre als Identitätsmuster der Chinesen entwickelt hat, suchen muss, denn China und die Chinesen definieren sich auch heute noch in gewisser Weise durch ihre Kultur.

Auf der Suche nach neuer Identität befinden sich Politik und Gesellschaft im stetigen Wandel, der in unterschiedlichen Prozessen verläuft. Heute begnügt man sich nicht nur mit Strategien, die das weitere Wirtschaftswachstum stimulieren, sondern in die Entwicklungsstrategie ist die Rückbesinnung auf die eigene Kultur, das kulturelle Erbe aufgenommen worden. Diese Strategie löste kontroverse Diskurse aus, die nicht nur in der neuen pragmatischen politischen Leitlinie ihre Widerspiegelung finden, sondern auch konkrete Bezüge im gesellschaftlichen Leben berühren.

Was bedeuten die Begriffe „neue Klassik“ oder „nationales Lernen“? Ihrem Inhalt nach ist damit nicht nur eine Rückbesinnung auf das kulturelle und historische Bewusstsein verbunden, sondern konkrete gesellschaftliche Lebens- und Handlungsweisen, die diesen Trend symbolisieren. „Guoxue“, heißt so viel wie nationales Lernen. Es ist nicht einfach, den Begriff „nationales Lernen“ mit einem Wort, das auch den Inhalt wiedergibt, zu übersetzen. Es beinhaltet das kulturelle und historische Gedächtnis, die zivilisatorische Identität, die sehr differenziert in neuen Formen überliefert werden soll. Es bedeutet, dass man mit Hilfe von Elementen aus der eigenen Kultur sich Fähigkeiten aneignet, Großes zu vollbringen. So wird „nationales Lernen“ in vielen Schulen, aber auch an Hochschulen und in Privatinstituten als Fach angeboten. Unterrichts – und Forschungsgegenstand sind die traditionellen Überlieferungen über Philosophie, Kunst, Malerei, Medizin oder die traditionelle Küche. Diese Bewegung kam bereits nach der Vierten Maibewegung als Gegenbewegung gegen die antitraditionelle Bewegung auf.

Es geht wieder um Symbole, um die fünf Urbilder aus dem Reich der Tiere, der Pflanzen, der Farben, der Zahlen und des menschlichen Zusammenlebens. Wichtige Symbole sind im 12er Tierkreis zu finden, unter den Pflanzen steht Bambus ganz oben, ist ein wichtiges Symbol für Glück, Treue und Beständigkeit. Bei den Zahlen ist es die magische Fünf. So gibt es nach chinesischem Verständnis fünf Himmelsrichtungen, einschließlich der Mitte, 5 Elemente, 5 Planeten, 5 Farben, 5 Geschmacksrichtungen, fünf Gerüche und nicht zuletzt 5 Leitgedanken für die politische Führung. Die Fünf ist die magische Glückzahl. Vier dagegen ist eine Unglückzahl, da sie so wie Sterben lautet, (*si*). So gibt es in vielen Gebäuden keinen

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<sup>50</sup> Guo Qijia, *A History of Chinese Educational Thought*, Foreign Language Press, Beijing 2006, S. 589–590.

vierten Stock und im Flugzeug keine vierte Reihe. So unterschiedlich die Symbolik auch sein mag, beschrieben wird sie heute wieder in vielen Veröffentlichungen.

Auch der traditionelle Kalender ist wieder mehr zu einem Teil des gesellschaftlichen Bewusstseins geworden, nach dem die Feste und Gedenktage in traditioneller Form begangen werden. Doch heute sind diese Bräuche immer mehr mit modernem Konsumverhalten vermischt. So findet am 1. Tag des 1. Mondmonats das Neujahrsfest statt, am 2. des 2. Mondmonats das Frühlingsdrachenfest, am 3. des 3. Mondmonats das Qingmingfest (im Sinne von Allerseelen), der 4. Tag des 4. Mondmonats bedeutet nichts, weil die Vier mit ihrem Gleichklang von Tod suspekt gesehen wird. Am 5. Tag des 5. Mondmonats das Drachenbootfest, am 6. Tag des 6. Mondmonats das Fest des himmlischen Segens, am 7. des 7. Mondmonats das Fest des Wiedersehens, am 8. Tag des 8. Mondmonats nichts, weil zweimal vier, am 9. Tag des 9. Mondmonats das Chrysanthemenfest.

China ist heute nicht mehr grau und trostlos, sondern viele bunte Farben prägen das Strassenbild. Bei den Farben krönt Rot, als Farbe des Glücks, Rot bedeutet Sommer, Mittagszeit, Feuer, Herz, Freude. Mit Rot wehrt man die bösen Geister ab wie an Festtagen. So sind auch in der verbotenen Stadt die Wände rot angemalt. Schwarz bedeutet das Unberechenbare, doch wenn es um die Mode und verhaltene öffentliche Eleganz geht, da ist das schwarze Kostüm und der schwarze westliche Anzug ebenfalls wie in westlichen Regionen voll im Trend.

Für den Chinabeobachter und Chinainteressierten ist gewiss auch von Interesse, dass in letzter Zeit immer neue und unterschiedlich eingerichtete Internet-Caffees, Karaoke-Bars, Disko-Clubs wie Pilze aus der Erde wachsen, sondern auch die unterschiedlichsten Teestuben oder Restaurants entstehen, die nach traditionellen Rezepten auserlesene Speisen und Getränke anbieten entweder aus „der kaiserlichen Küche“ oder nach der Zusammensetzung von entsprechenden Elementen aus der chinesischen traditionellen Medizin oder beides mit einander verbinden. Die traditionelle Heil- und Gesundheitsphilosophie findet erneut viele Anhänger. So wird in einem Restaurant, der „Stube des kaiserlichen Wohls“ in Beijing, den anspruchsvollen Gästen ein Entengericht, das mit Würmern gespickt ist, angeboten als Mahl der Ästhetik mit entsprechenden Farben und Formen wie auch als eine Speise, die einer konkreten Gesundheitsförderung dient und das in einer anspruchsvollen Ambiente, die man gern „die neue chinesische Klassik“ nennt.

Wir beobachten eine Rückbesinnung auf die Zeit, als China noch Kulturstifter in Asien war. Zurückgegriffen wird im ästhetischen Alltagsleben auf Symbole wie den Bambuszweig, der wie man glaubt, chinesische Mentalität widerspiegeln, weil eben Bambus nicht so leicht zu zerbrechen sei, auch wenn der Zweig herunterhängt, strebt er wie sich Chinesen in ihrem pragmatischen Verständnis sehen, immer wieder in die Höhe.

### **Marxismus und Maoismus oder die „fünf Segnungen“**

Im Westen ist die Ansicht weit verbreitet, dass China ein kommunistisches Land sei, in dem die Politik von der Kommunistischen Partei des Landes, nach marxistischen Lehren autoritär bestimmt werde und kein Raum für Entfaltung in der Gesellschaft bestehe. Das sind Trugbilder, die wenig mit dem heutigen China zu tun haben. Nicht der Marxismus, schon gar nicht die maoistische Ideologie charakterisiert die chinesische Gesellschaft, sondern die chinesische Kultur, die als große Zivilisation der Menschheit verstanden wird.

Doch die Entwicklung der letzten Jahre zeigt neue Tendenzen, insbesondere seit dem 16. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas 2002.

Die politische Klasse sieht sich herausgefordert, weitere bisherige strategische Dogmen zu revidieren, da sie in der Praxis schon längst nach neuen, vor allem nach dem Effizienzverständnis praktiziert werden. Nachdem man vor Jahren bereits vom Kernelement des Marxismus-Leninismus, dem Klassenkampf, Abschied genommen hatte, wurde jetzt ein weiterer bedeutender Punkt revidiert, nämlich die Theorie, dass das öffentliche oder auch staatliche Eigentum die Grundlage der Wirtschaft darstelle. Da das staatliche Eigentum infolge der Modernisierungsprozesses immer mehr an Bedeutung verloren hat, erfolgte nun die theoretische Aufarbeitung für die Praxis. Staatliches Eigentum und Privateigentum wurden in ihren Rechten und in seiner Bedeutung für die Wirtschaftsentwicklung rechtlich gleichgesetzt. Damit konnte auch der Anspruch der Partei begründet werden, sich in eine Volkspartei zu verwandeln und Unternehmer privater erfolgreicher Firmen in die Reihen der Partei aufzunehmen.

Die Partei als führende politische Gruppe in China ist heterogener geworden. Die internen Konflikte spielen sich zwischen Gewinnern und Verlierern der Reformen, aber auch zwischen konservativen Traditionalisten und liberalen und offener eingestellten Mitgliedern ab. Neben den zahlreichen sozialen Problemen, die die Politik und die Gesellschaft beunruhigen, beobachten wir ein neues Phänomen, nämlich die Suche nach einer neuen politischen Identität zur Legitimation der Machtverhältnisse, wobei man sich auf traditionelle Elemente beruft. Hat doch China mehrmals in der Vergangenheit seine Sinnwurzeln in der glorreichen Zivilisation gesucht. Bei dieser Sinnsuche kommt den Gesellschaftswissenschaften heute eine besondere Rolle zu. Obgleich es nicht an dogmatischen und konservativen Interpretationen fehlt, sind diese jedoch nicht mehr nur das Stimmrohr der politischen Propaganda, sondern in ihren Analysen vielfältiger und offener als Tummelplatz für unterschiedliche Ideen und Konzepte geworden. Loyalität und das Bewusstsein, seine Grenzen zu erkennen, spielt natürlich nach wie vor eine Rolle, auch wenn es mehr kritische Analysen gibt. Heute möchte man nicht nur die Klassiker zitieren, sondern auch das Passende für die chinesische Moderne anbieten. Das Passende wird vor dem Hintergrund der eigenen Wünsche, Hoffnungen oder der Möglichkeiten der Karriere, je nach Umständen entsprechend gut ausgelotet. Die Sinnsuche findet nicht, wie oft in westlichen Analysen glaubhaft gemacht werden soll, in einem ideologischen Vakuum statt, sondern in einem Raum, wo die Tradition in Modernisierungsideen eingebunden ist. Als wichtige Werte der eigenen Tradition stehen heute solche Ideen im Vordergrund, wie das Verständnis von der ganzheitlichen Entwicklung des Kosmoses. Danach führen Ungleichheiten zu Widersprüchen und erneut zur ganzheitlichen Betrachtung. Zu einem politischen Slogan ist die Tugend von der Vermenschlichung der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen (*renqinghua*) geworden, alles eingebettet im Pragmatismus (*shili zhuyi*)<sup>51</sup>. Man könnte es auch anders bezeichnen, als ein Instrument, nach dem die Menschen greifen, weil es sie bewegt. Es ist das uralte Suchen nach menschlichem Glück, das in den Zivilisationen, wie bekannt, unterschiedlich wahrgenommen wird.

Traditionelle Symbole, die vor allem Glücksverheißung versprechen, überschwemmen die Gesellschaft in vielen Formen, und nicht nur zum Frühlingsfest. So ist auf dem

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<sup>51</sup> Ebd., S. 538.

chinesischen Büchermarkt eine Flut von Publikationen erschienen, in denen die Segnungen, die Menschenleben benötigen, in traditionellen Bildern und Maximen dargestellt werden. In diesem Zusammenhang sei auf die populäre Reihe unter der Bezeichnung *Designs of Chinese Blessings*, in Chinesisch- und Englisch herausgegeben, aufmerksam zu machen. Herausgegeben im klassischen Stil behandeln die einzelnen Bände die fünf traditionellen Glücksverheißungen (*wu fu*), nach denen sich ein Mensch ein langes, gesundes, glückliches und wohlhabendes Leben sehnt. In den fünf Glücksverheißungen werden universale Hoffnungen, die mit dem Menschsein verbunden sind, zum Ausdruck gebracht, jedoch in China standen sie stets als Teil der traditionellen Kultur im Mittelpunkt des Lebens. Es gehört zur chinesischen Identität, nach den fünf konkreten Glücksformen zu streben, wobei die Menschen sich bis heute an solchen Symbolen erfreuen, sei es die Schildkröte, die ein langes Leben symbolisiert, der Phönix, der Glück, Gelingen und Reichtum darstellt, die fünf Söhne, denen es gelang, ein gutes kaiserliches Examen abzulegen, um eine erfolgreiche Karriere zu starten. In den fünf Glücksverheißungen geht es um unterschiedliche Glücksformen im Leben eines Menschen: ein Glück bringendes Schicksal, großes Einkommen und eine gute Karriere, ein langes Leben, ein zufriedenes, glückliches Leben und Gesundheit. Doch alle Glücksformen bedingen sich gegenseitig, um das große Glück zu erzielen. Das bedeutet, wenn einem das Schicksal hold ist, findet man die große Erfüllung und Zufriedenheit im Leben, um die man sich jedoch stets bemühen muss. Den Reichtum, die großen Einkommen, die man sich wünschte, hingen früher, wie man meinte, mit der Gnade des Himmels zusammen, durch die man in eine gute Position gelangen konnte.<sup>52</sup> Doch man erinnert, dass das nicht im Selbstlauf geschah, sondern durch stetiges Bemühen und Lernen und Prüfungen ablegen erfolgte, in denen nachzuweisen war, dass man sich mit dem Erlernten als Mensch vervollkommenet.

So gibt es im Band über den Reichtum (*cai*) vor allem Zeichnungen und klassische Texte über das Ablegen von Prüfungen, den Unterricht, den der große Meister Konfuzius seinen Schülern erteilte oder den Berichten, die die Minister den Kaisern zum Wohlergehen des Landes vorlegten. Mit anderen Worten wird auf die Notwendigkeit von Bildung verwiesen, mit Hilfe der man in gute Positionen und damit zu Reichtum gelangen kann. In der chinesischen Tradition spielte die Bildung und die Erziehung als Grundlage nationaler Identität stets eine große Rolle. Nach traditionellen Vorstellungen ging man davon aus, dass es bei der Erziehung nicht um den Erwerb von Wissen gehen sollte, sondern vor allem darum, den Menschen als Glied in der Gesellschaft zu vervollkommen. Es geht um die Kultivierung der eigenen Person, der Persönlichkeit. Deshalb, so die Argumentation von Guo Qijai in seinem Buch über die Bedeutung des traditionellen Erziehungssystems, auch die Modernisierung des Landes sich von der traditionellen Maxime leiten lassen, dass erst die "Humanisierung des Menschen" ihn befähigt, unter moralischen Aspekten des sich Selbstvervollkommens ein wichtiges Glied in der Gesellschaft zu werden.<sup>53</sup> Bei dieser Sinnsuche spielt die Bildungstradition eine große Rolle. Heute beruft man sich auf den Stellenwert, den Erziehung und Bildung in der chinesischen Kultur bedeutete und für die

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<sup>52</sup> Huang Quanxin, *Zhonghua wu fu guxiang tudian* (Zeichnungen von traditionellen chinesischen Glücksverheißungen), 5 Bände fu (Glück), lu (Einkommen), shou (langes Leben), xi (Freude), cai (Reichtum), Verlag Sinolingua, Beijing 2003.

<sup>53</sup> Qijia, *A History of Chinese Educational Thought...*, S. 589–590.

Modernisierung bedeuten sollte. Doch das traditionelle Erziehungssystem, in dem das Zitieren von Meistern, das Auswendiglernen von Maximen und der ständige Prüfungsdruck die Grundlage bilden, ist nicht gefragt. Gefragt sind Innovation und Kreativität. Das sind dringende Herausforderungen, die vor Wissenschaft, Forschung und Ausbildung stehen. Es zwingt die Schüler jedoch, alle Anstrengungen zu unternehmen, um gut zu sein, d.h. sich zu vervollkommen. So suchen Eltern für ihre Kinder gute Schulen und Kindergärten, scheuen nicht Investitionen in die Bildung, da dadurch die Grundlagen für eine gute Karriere gelegt werden können. Doch erwartet wird eine Art Revanche, die Kindesliebe heißt.

### **Ausblick**

Zwei Jahrtausend lang galt der Konfuzianismus, der auch als die Hauptströmung der chinesischen Kultur verstanden werden kann, als ethische Richtlinie gesellschaftlichen Handels und zivilisatorischer Identität. Im Zuge der Modernisierung findet eine Rückbesinnung auf die eigene Tradition statt, in der die traditionelle Kultur als Brücke für die Herausforderung im 21. Jahrhundert, aber auch als eine Quelle der neuen Identität dienen soll. Traditionelle Elemente werden als Teil der chinesischen Moderne, die die neue Identität ausmachen soll, aufgenommen. Doch Konfuzius Lehre ist für viele Chinesen in ihrem neuen Leben viel zu anstrengend, verkündet er doch, moralischen Gesetzen zu folgen, die heute nicht in die chinesische Wirklichkeit passen und nur der Bezeichnung nach noch traditionelle Namen tragen.

In diesem Zusammenhang sollten wir uns daran erinnern, dass der westliche Begriff Ethik aus dem Griechischen kommt und so viel wie das Gewissen bedeutet. Moral dagegen wird aus dem Lateinischen abgeleitet und bedeutet so viel wie die Praxis nach dem Gewissen. Die Praxis mit dem Gewissen unterliegt pragmatischen Überlegungen.

Ethik und Moral haben sich im Laufe der Zeiten überall verändert, auch wenn man sich gern darauf beruft. Damit werden viele Fragen aufgeworfen, wie sich China auf seinem Weg in die Moderne weiterentwickeln wird, die heute noch nicht beantwortet werden können. In den Vorstellungen der traditionellen chinesischen Wahrnehmungen von der Welt, verlief die menschliche Geschichte zwischen Ordnung und Unordnung, zwischen „gerechten Herrschern“ und „tyrannischen Herrschern“. Der gerechte Herrscher hatte erkannt, wie der rechte Weg, auf dem man schreiten sollte, aussehe und deshalb in der Lage war, den Menschen den rechten Weg zu weisen. Der Glaube an den gerechten Herrscher ist verloren gegangen. Die politische Elite in China ist sich dessen bewusst und unternimmt immer wieder neue Anstrengungen, um sich, auch mit traditionellen Normen von Stabilität und Wohlstand zu legitimisieren.



BARTOSZ WRÓBLEWSKI

## The Internal Situation of Jordan in the Light of John Bagot Glubb's Correspondence with General Gerald Templer

(the letter of 2 February 1956 and the telegram of 11 January 1956)

At the turn of 1955 and 1956, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan unexpectedly became the center of conflicts destabilising the Arab world. In 1955, a pro-Western military pact had been established. The alliance was signed by Turkey, Pakistan, Great Britain and the Iraq as the only Arab country. The pact was called the Bagdad Pact since its permanent headquarters were to be located in the capital city of the Iraq. Great Britain tried to induce Jordan to join the pact as well. It seemed realistic. The Jordan monarchy had so far always been pro-British. Moreover, the Jordanian Army, which was called the Arab Legion, was fully dependent on British subsidies. A British military officer, John Bagot Glubb, was the Legion's commander-in-chief while several tens of other United Kingdom's officers served in this army.

In December 1955, the British chief of staff General Gerald Templer visited Amman. Both military staff and King Hussein Ibn Talal were in favour of the idea of joining the Pact. However, this was strongly opposed by the civilian population. In particular, the Palestinians living in big cities of the Hashimite monarchy actively protested against the plans to join the Bagdad Pact. Mass demonstrations against Jordan's entering the Pact were staged in December of 1955 and January of 1956. The riots made the Jordanian authorities temporarily surrender the plan to join the alliance.

The present author took an opportunity to review documents related to the activities pursued then by the British authorities as well as letters written at that time by J. B. Glubb, the Arab Legion's commander-in-chief. Some of those documents were made available only in 2007 – wholly or partially. They are thus practically unknown to the academic readership. In what follows I am going to present two of the documents concerning the second wave of the riots that took place in Jordan in January of 1956. Both documents were authored by J. B. Glubb. They are part of a set of War Office documents, belonging to a file referenced as WO 216/893. As mentioned, this file was made available for researchers only in 2007. A short telegram sent on 11 January 1956 by the Commander-in-Chief to the Jordanian Embassy in London is the first of these documents. J. B. Glubb describes in it the internal situation in Jordan. He assesses the situation and explains the causes of the civilian disturbances that took place then. The telegram was delivered to General Templer. The second document is a longish letter written by General J. B. Glubb to General G. Templer. This letter is dated as of 2 February 1956. Glubb offers in this letter a more holistic evaluation of the described events and outlines their potential political consequences.

Some of its paragraphs might be seen as very interesting; they contain details only rarely discussed in the literature of the subject.

Below, first the contents of the telegram and next the contents of the letter of 2 February 1956 are reproduced and then interpreted. The telegram serves in particular to sketch the discussed events and introduce the style of reasoning typical of General Glubb. What is to be analyzed in depth, however, is the contents of the letter.

The Royal Jordan Embassy, London

Melville from Glubb (.)

FOLLOWING FOR GENERAL TEMPLER PERSONALLY(.)

1(.) INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION MUCH BETTER TODAY (.) HOPE SITUATION WILL BE NORMAL BY 14<sup>th</sup> JANUARY (.) TROUBLES DUE TO TWO CAUSES (.) A(.) SCHOOL MASTERS HIGH PROPORTION OF WHOM ARE COMMUNIST OR BELLOW TRAVELLERS (.) EVERY DEMONSTRATION STARTED BY SCHOOLBOYS OR GIRLS IN MANY CASES LED BY THEIR TEACHERS (.) MANY JUNIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ALSO AFFECTED BY COMMUNISM (.) WHEN SCHOOL CHILDREN AND MINOR OFFICIALS START DEMONSTRATIONS ROUGH ELEMENTS OF CITY POPULATION JOIN IN B(.) REFUGEES ALL OVER COUNTRY HAVE RIOTED AND LOOTED (.) WE HAVE HALF MILLION REFUGEES MANY OF THEM DEEPLY EMBITTERED AND DESPERATE (.) THEY DON'T CARE IF COUNTRY IS WRECKED OR TAKEN BY JEWS (.) SAY THEY COULD NOT BE WORSE OFF (.)

2(.) MAJORITY RESPECTABLE CITY DWELLERS OPPOSED TO DISTURBANCE (.)

3(.) NOTABLE FEATURE IS NO WEAPONS USED (.) CITY CROWDS THROGGED STREETS SHOUTED SLOGANS (.) SCHOOL CHILDREN THREW STONES (.) REFUGEES TOUGH RIOTERS BUT STILL HARDLY ANY WEAPONS USED (.) VERY FEW CASUALTIES EITHER SIDE (.)

4(.) ARAB LEGION ALL ON INTERNAL SECURITY (.) FRONTIERS PRACTICALLY OPEN (.) ISRAEL APPEARS QUIET (.) MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SAUDI ARABIA REPORTED (.)

5(.) OVER HUNDRED COMMUNISTS ARRESTED SO FAR AND PUT IN CONCENTRATION CAMP (.) ARAB LEGION IN EXCELLENT FETTL (.) THEY DO NOT ENJOY INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES (.) PREFER FIGHT JEWS (.) ALL HAVE SHOWN EXCELLENT DISCIPLINE COMBINED WITH FIRMNESS IN DISPERSING CROWDS (.) THEY HAVE HAD TO OPEN FIRE OCCASIONALLY BUT ALWAYS UNDER STRICT SELF CONTROL (.) MORALE STILL SEEMS TO BE EXCELLENT.

TOP SECRET

2nd February, 1956

Thank you very much for your two letters. I am sorry I have not answered earlier.

I am sorry about the Canadian and Australian Staff Colleges. We need such vacancies very badly as you will see later in this letter. Is there any hope for Pakistan? Meanwhile we realize that Camberley can only give us two foreign armies who have vacancies, surrender them at the last moment. Would it be possible in future years to give us the vacancies of any foreigners who scratch?

Now a word about Jordan. In the first round of disturbances before Christmas, we got ourselves into a mess. The Government delegated no authority to the army, and in fact new Governments resigned twice in one week, and during two days we had no Government. Admittedly the Arab Legion itself was also not very efficient. We had spent all our efforts on training for a shooting war, and not on internal security. We had no understanding with the Government, no plan and no equipment.

However, in the fortnight's interval we remedied our previous omissions, and when rioting recommenced early in January, we fairly easily got control, and have retained it firmly.

However, we are still not happy. We (the army) thought that the suppression of the second lot of riots was our ideal opportunity to close down political parties and known subversive organizations, and have a firm Government on the lines of the present administration in Iraq. This we have failed to do. The new Government consist largely of the old type of politician, most of them not above suspicion of taking money from the Saudis or Egyptians.

During the disturbances the Arab Legion behaved extremely well. We tried to avoid British officers appearing too much in the suppression of civil disturbances, especially as the Egyptians and Communist made as much propaganda as they could to the effect that the Arab Legion was a "colonial" army and that the British were suppressing a national uprising. (The "Daily Herald" said the same!).

As a result, the Arab officers played a leading role in putting down the troubles. This has both increased their prestige and also made them think hard about the future of their country. Since the army has assumed control a number of Arab officers have come to me and expressed indignation that corrupt politicians can make a lot of money and reduce the country to chaos, and then merely tell the army to restore order. Whereupon another corrupt cabinet takes office and the process is repeated. As one officer said to me only last night, "The only body of Government servants which does not take bribes is the officers of the Army".

Of course, being British, one has always regarded with horror any idea of the army going into politics, but I now see how it happens. The army is the only decent, honest, practically minded body in the country, and it resents pulling chestnuts out of the fire for corrupt politicians.

The thing I have been saying to our Arab officers is that if we start going politics we shall destroy the efficiency of the army. To begin with, one cannot do two things at once. If we give too much attention to the internal situation, we shall lose touch with the military situation. Secondly, we are terribly short of officers, particularly on the battalion commander and company commander level. We cannot afford to spare officers to keep an eye on political developments. They reply that they agree, but on the other hand if there is a Communist revolution we lose the army and the country.

The Arab Legion as a whole is strongly united, loyal and determined, but fed up with the politicians. The Arab Legion is strongly Royalist, anti-Communist, Anti-Egyptian/Saudi, and pro-Bagdad Pact.

Now all this has done something firstly to widen the views and increase the prestige of the Arab officers and secondly has placed the British officers in an embarrassing position. The Egyptians and Communists realize this weakness,

and never cease to emphasize that the Arab Legion is a British not an Arab army. Politically it would help all concerned if the British officers could become training teams and give up command.

Militarily, however, this is extremely awkward because the Arab officers have not had time to grow up enough. There is also always the danger that they may fall out among themselves when the plums of higher appointments have to be divided.

Throughout the Army there are about fifty British, officers in technical and staff jobs who are for the moment irreplaceable. The technical ones might stay in any case, but the staff ones hold key positions.

All these movements are still in embryo, and the future is difficult to foresee. If the present Government can be kept straight and urged to firm measures, all may go well. If the present Government begins to twist or to take money from the Saudis, the Army will start getting cross. We might play it still, in collaboration with the King, by sacking this lot and getting the King to choose a new Government himself, not letting his ministers be chosen by the Prime Minister. If such a Government also were to twist we should be getting a situation when the Arab officers will want a clean-up.

This would present us with a tricky situation, because there are a lot of British officers senior to these Arab officers. The British officers do not understand and cannot intervene in the situation, but the Arab officers are under their command.

If this were to occur, and I hope that it is an extremely remote possibility, we might have to pull out our senior British officers and leave the young Arabs to carry on. To endeavour to suppress them would be fatal. We could probably keep on our training teams and technical officer under them. (I omit mention of myself. Logically at such a stage I should go too, but meanwhile the Arab officers are consulting me as to the future of the Arab Legion).

As I said above, the officers are pro-King, anti-Communist and pro-Bagdad Pact, so that, by helping them, we might get everything we want. The chief problem might well be how to maintain the purely military efficiency of the Arab Legion, when the best young officers start taking too much interest in politics.

Meanwhile with things in this state, we are threatened by war with Israel in March or April. I will keep you in touch with future developments.

I should perhaps emphasize that I am rather thinking aloud about the future. There is no need to take any action now. A great deal depends on whether the present Government can keep straight, or a better be found to replace it.

I have given a copy of this letter to the Ambassador.

Yours sincerely,  
(J.B. Glubb)

General Sir Gerald Templer, GCB, GCMG, KBE, DSO,  
Chief of the Imperial General Staff,  
The War Office,  
London, S.W.1.

Added in handwriting:

I hope I have not conveyed the impression that our officers want to go into politics. I don't think they do. They are very keen soldiers.

The first of the presented documents is a short telegram which was apparently dispatched by the Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Legion to the Jordanian Embassy in London but in reality it was also meant to reach the top military authorities of Great Britain. The telegram is divided into two parts. In the first of them J. B. Glubb provides information about the situation in Jordan and offers an analysis of causes that led to the unrest in the country. In the second part he focuses more on the Arab Legion and ventures his personal evaluation of the Legion's conduct during the riots as well as describing the mood prevailing in the military units. The telegram is interesting in as much as it constitutes a record of the very first reactions of the Legion's Commander to that situation. Owing to this, we may gain an insight into his emotional reactions and the manner in which he evaluated the course of action almost simultaneously with the events that occurred then.

On 11 January 1956, J. B. Glubb reports that the Arab Legion is successfully dealing with the protesters. He believes that the riots will be suppressed and supposes that by 14 January the situation will be fully normalized. According to the Legion's Commander, those disturbances were triggered by the spread of the communists' influence in the Jordanian cities. He points at teachers, who supposedly encouraged their students to take part in the demonstrations, as a source of the communist propaganda. However, the communists' initiative was supported by thousands of protesters the majority of whom were refugees from Palestine. J. B. Glubb does not hesitate to stress that the unrest was extremely violent and that the Palestinians, who took part in it, were desperate and motivated by an intense dislike of the monarchy and its institutions.

At this point it is important that the term „communists” – as used by J. B. Glubb – is commented upon. The Legion's Commander repeats this word like a mantra. This fact has to be considered taking into account the historical moment at which the analysed telegram was written. The telegram is a product of „cold war”. Hence that particular term used in it by J. B. Glubb was to create an appropriate ideological context for his message. He wanted to present the organisers of the riots to his supervisors as enemies who constituted an element of a more serious threat. In reality, however, the Jordanian intellectual elites who were leading the riots only exceptionally had views close to communism. In their majority, those people were ideological supporters of pan-Arabism who were hostile to the influence exerted by Great Britain. Their stance had nothing to do with communism as an ideology. An alliance with the USSR was, however, a completely different issue. Indeed, many individuals who were anti-Western and favoured pan-Arabism were also supportive of the idea of forging an alliance with Moscow. Therefore, Glubb's opinions would sound much more realistic, if we replaced the term „communists” with a notion such as „promoters of co-operation with the USSR”. In the circumstances it must be remembered that the Legion's Commander employs a specific – cold war – language, which occasionally even results in his distorting historical facts.

In the second part of his telegram, Glubb emphasises that despite the violent character of the riots, the army did not have to resort to the regular use of weapons when dispersing the crowds. In the closing paragraph of the telegram he, nonetheless, admits that occasionally the army would open fire at the civilians. However, he also maintains that there were only very few casualties. In spite of those reassuring words, he adds simultaneously that the whole Arab Legion had been involved in the action aimed at the putting down of the protests and that the state borders were practically left unprotected

by the army. This, according to Glubb, theoretically provided an excellent opportunity for Israel to launch an attack against Jordan. However, the border remained peaceful during that period. It is quite characteristic that in the context Glubb draws attention to a course of action that could be potentially taken by Saudi Arabia, too. His remarks show clearly the hostility existing then between the Saudis and the Hashimites.

Concluding, Glubb reassures his supervisors that the Legion continues to be fully disciplined and manages to maintain morale. In spite of this, he stresses that the soldiers did not particularly like the role of policemen repressing civilians. In the same passage of his telegram he also informs the addressees that communists (meaning leaders of the protests) were arrested. Glubb explains that they were sent to a concentration camp. To make things clear, he uses in this passage a technical term in a manner typical of the period before WW II, which means that what he has in mind is a camp for the temporarily detained. It is important not to misunderstand that remark. On the other hand, it should be highlighted since it testifies to the fact that J. B. Glubb remained to a considerable degree a man anchored in concepts valid before 1939. He might even not have been aware what disastrous associations could be evoked by some of the terms he employed in their out-dated meaning when composing his messages.

The letter addressed by J. B. Glubb directly to General Templer, dated as of 2 February 1956 is a much longer document. Nevertheless, it is worth analysing this letter bearing in mind the initial information included in the just analysed telegram that he sent to London in January the same year. This is because in his letter to General Templer Glubb elaborates on and explicates quite a few of the ideas that he previously only signalled in that telegram.

He is keen to devote his letter to issues pertaining to Jordan. This is why I will only cursorily analyse the first paragraph of the letter. J. B. Glubb mentions in it a meeting of the military staff including officers representing Canadian and Australian forces. As might be gathered from the context, a proposal that he voiced during that meeting, entailing an idea to form a joint task force to be sent then to Jordan, was rejected. It could also be inferred from the context that what he had in mind were troops which might be used in case the unrest spreads across Jordan. It is difficult to guess whether such troops were to be used to pacify the rioters or to protect the territorial integrity of the Jordanian state. Since both J. B. Glubb and Gerald Templer took part in the military staff meetings to which he refers, both of them knew the details of the talks. As a result, however, this passage is full of understatements. Nevertheless it is noteworthy that Glubb surmises it to be necessary to designate some forces to be pulled out of the British or Pakistani army and to turn them into military units that could be ready to be used at any moment to intervene in Jordan.

Subsequently, J. B. Glubb focuses on the most crucial issue, which is the internal situation in Jordan, emphasizing the mood prevailing in the officer corps of the Arab Legion. First of all, he reminds Templer that during the previous wave of the unrest, which took place in December of 1955, the Jordanian army did not prove to be particularly effective in the role of the police forces or, rather, in the role of special purpose units trained to deal with street protests. The Jordan's political system plunged then in deep crisis as well. Ultimately, within two weeks the Legion managed to prepare itself technically and organisationally to perform the required tasks. This, according to Glubb, enabled the army to suppress the January demonstrations much more efficiently than it would otherwise have been the case.

The main issues touched upon by J. B. Glubb in the analysed letter, are, however, related to the internal situation in the Jordanian army. As a matter of fact, the following part of the letter contains a series of remarks pertaining to one basic question, that is, the probability of the army's taking over in the country and dispensing with the rule by the civilian elites.

A few of the passages in the letter could be evaluated as particularly relevant and broadening the knowledge that historians have of those events and their circumstances. Nevertheless, it needs to be remembered that these passages express personal views of the Legion's Commander on the situation as he interprets it. All in all, this text quite broadly depicts the tension that was built in the milieu of the Jordan's army officers over January and February of 1956. Also, it must be stressed that J. B. Glubb was not a typical army officer, which is well evidenced by the quoted letter. He does not write in a simple and matter-of-fact manner that would be expected of a military man but in a quite easy manner presents his views on issues that are of his interest. He is repeatedly drawn to a few issues that he considers from various angles.

The issue of the army taking over control in the country is a major one. Glubb claims that the army wanted to use an opportunity created by the repressions against the second wave of the riots to reach for power. It considered establishing in Jordan a political regime similar to that in the Iraq. In the second part of his letter Glubb explains that by „army” he means the officer corps. He maintains that he is constantly visited by the Arab officers of the Legion who are critical of the corrupt civilian elites and hint at a need to get rid of the authorities then governing the country.

Glubb states that there occurred a major shift in the consciousness of the officers. They came to the conclusion that the political elites ruling Jordan in that period might lead this country on the verge of catastrophe. According to those officers, the political class consists of corrupt individuals who are often rumoured to take bribes from enemies of the Hashimite monarchy, that is, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The conduct of the elites breeds violent protests. In the circumstances, the Arab Legion might turn out to be the only force able to guarantee stability of the state. In Glubb's opinion, the Arab officers rejected in their mass the role of guardians to maintain order in the interest of the harmful elites and demanded that the elites be removed.

Although the author of the letter claimed that an idea of a military coup d'état was completely alien to the mode of thinking typical of the British officers, he himself in fact seemed to defend this kind of solution. He tried to explain it to his supervisor that in the Jordanian context the idea of the army's taking over was worth considering.

In practice, on the third page of his letter, J. B. Glubb outlines two options to introduce changes in the Jordanian state. The King might remove the governing elite and appoint a cabinet on his own – in this case the cabinet would presumably be of technical rather than political nature. In reality, this would mean the monarch's dictatorship. If this step were not to relieve the tension, the Arab officers might initiate a purge of the civilian elites and reach for power directly.

The Legion's Commander stresses that that mode of thinking, prevailing in the milieu of the young Arab officers, should not be opposed too strongly. He claims that those who favour such radical solutions are the officers who are in general dedicated royalists of pro-Western orientation, typically the supporters of the Bagdad Pact. He suggests that this group actually fits British scenarios. Although temporarily he tries to moderate their

propensity to act, Glubb believes that in the near future, this particular officer milieu might prove to be very useful from the vantage point of the plans designed by the British army.

Another issue which is considered by Glubb in the analysed letter is an impact exercised by the Egyptian and communist propaganda in Jordan. Admittedly, in the analysed letter he does not write in so many words about the communists, in a more realistic manner indicating rather the role of Middle Eastern centres of anti-Western and anti-Hashimite propaganda, that is, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Glubb points out that the propaganda emphasizes the role played by the British in the Legion. As a result, the putting down of the popular riots in January of 1956 is pictured as a colonial exercise, that is, it is interpreted in terms of a suppression of the national movement in Jordan by the British officers-colonisers. What is more, similar overtones appeared in the British press. To counteract that propaganda, the military command during the pacification was entrusted primarily with the Arab officers.

This issue is also related to the third of the major concerns expressed by Glubb, that is the role of the British officers in case a military coup d'état should be executed. This is a complex problem since the British officers are, according to J. B. Glubb, indispensable in the Legion from the military point of view. At the same time this particular group may not – for political reasons – legitimise further political activities pursued by the Legion. Already the suppression of the civilian unrest required a removal of the British officers from the front line of the struggle. If a coup d'état were to occur, the British definitely must not be in command.

Moreover, Glubb is convinced that the British officers do not understand in their mass what the situation in Jordan is and therefore cannot remain in command in a situation of internal conflict there, let alone the fact that such a solution would have been definitely inappropriate, taking into consideration the anti-British moods prevailing then in the Arab world. Meanwhile a group of fifty British officers is in command both in the military units and in the headquarters of the Jordanian army.

In the circumstances, General Glubb hints that in case the Jordanian army should go into politics, the British military commanders ought to resign, while their roles should be taken over by the Arab officers. Glubb realises that in such a situation he himself would not have remained in command of the Legion any longer either but would have to give up his post. He outlines such a scenario in the analysed letter to G. Templer, writing that a military coup d'état in Jordan in the future is possible and, simultaneously, claiming that this is exactly why one has to reckon with a necessity to forgo the command of the Legion by the British officers. The withdrawal of the British from the command (as opposed to technical) military posts is presented by him openly as a necessary premiss for a realistic consideration of the coup d'état.

Glubb stresses that he himself tried to calm down the Arab officers. He drew their attention to a discrepancy that arises between military tasks with which the Legion was entrusted and the army's potential involvement in politics. If the Arab Legion reached for political power, the majority of the officers who at that time still continued to receive military training would have to assume political and administrative duties. This would naturally have a pernicious influence on the military efficiency and effectiveness of the formation.

On the other hand, Glubb does not completely forgo his hope that the tension he describes could be resolved spontaneously. Possibly no action would have to be taken.

Still, he emphasises the significance of the rapid shift in the mood prevailing in the Arab officer corps, which used to be apolitical.

In conclusion, it must be stated that the analysed letter contains information shedding light on that very interesting moment in the history of Jordan, revealing the specificity of the final period of the British dominance in the Middle East.

Firstly, J. B. Glubb claims that in the period of the unrest taking place in January of 1956, in the milieu of the Arab officers of the Legion there set in a mood of resentment against the civilian governing elites. In the circumstances, quite openly their support for a coup d'état to be executed by the Legion was voiced. Glubb goes even as far as to hint that he himself was being persuaded to participate in this sort of action.

Secondly, it is important to see that despite numerous doubts, in sum, while writing his letter to General G. Templer, J. B. Glubb justifies the stance taken by the Arab officers of the Legion. In the context created by the cold war he even suggests that it would be in the interest of the scenarios envisaged by the West if the army took over in Jordan. According to him, it could accelerate the process of Jordan's accession to the Bagdad Pact. He stresses that he does not intend to punish the officers who demanded the execution of coup d'état. On the contrary, he believes that they should be recognised as the main allies for the future.

Thirdly, one may conclude from the analysis of Glubb's letter that he himself pointed out the necessity to withdraw the British officers from most prominent military command posts in the Legion if this formation was to play a political role which would be compatible with the interest of the British commandership. These remarks are interesting especially when one considers the fact that Glubb was to lose his post as soon as March of 1956 and that he was completely taken by surprise by that course of events.



## BOOK REVIEWS

**Andrzej Kapiszewski, *The Changing Middle East: Selected Issues in Politics and Society in the Gulf*, Kraków, 2006, 267 pp.**

The Middle East is a region where constant political, religious and social tensions result in a difficult, often dramatic situation. This predicament is especially visible on the example of Arab countries where religious resurgence and democratization are the two most important developments taking place during the past three decades. One may notice that in some areas movements of religious revival coincide with and sometimes reinforce the formation of more democratic systems. Moreover, there are also, according to Kapiszewski, profound social changes that accompany these religious movements and political transformations. First, in the Arab world the nation-state identity plays increasingly important role despite the common religion, language and glorious heritage. Second, because of the high fertility rate the Arab societies become younger. This in turn results in both the growing local unemployment and the increasing immigration in search for work and better future. Third, the Arab populations become better educated, the emancipation of women is under way and the awareness of the real causes of problems facing the Arab countries puts pressure on governments to implement more efficient economic, political and social reforms.

*The Changing Middle East: Selected Issues in Politics and Society in the Gulf* is a collection of articles by Andrzej Kapiszewski that have already been published in Polish and foreign scholarly journals. The book consists of two parts. The first presents papers addressing the issue of democracy and democratization processes in the Middle East.

In the opening article entitled "George W. Bush's *promotion of democracy* agenda in the Middle East" Kapiszewski presented and assessed the President's "democratization drive" in the region. Two subsequent papers discuss the impact of modern "democratizing" reforms in the monarchies of the Gulf. In "Elections and parliamentary activity in the GCC states. Broadening political participation in the Gulf monarchies," the author analyzed the elections and parliamentary activity in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In "Saudi Arabia: Steps toward democratization or reconfiguration of authoritarianism?" he focused on the uneasy and complex process of introducing political reforms in one of the most conservative monarchies in the world, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where political parties and trade unions are prohibited, public demonstration are forbidden and basic civil rights of women are very limited and freedom of expression is severely restricted. The last two articles, i.e., "The Iraqi elections and their consequences. Power-sharing, a key to the country's political future," and "Iran's new revolution? President Ahmadinejad and the power struggle in Teheran," address a number of socio-political problems related to the elections in Iraq (January 30, 2005) and Iran (June 24, 2005).

As for this first part of the book, our attention would definitely focus on the opening article analyzing George W. Bush's "promotion of democracy" agenda in the region. Kapiszewski pointed out there the fact that for a long time "the democracy deficit in many parts of the world was not considered a pressing issue as long as pro-American stability in the vital region for U.S. security was not jeopardized." However, the situation changed dramatically with the events of September 11, 2001. The American administration decided to reorient its policy towards the Middle East, that is, to launch a war to prevent Islamic terrorism and engage in a process of spreading democracy. The military intervention in Afghanistan and then an enormously large and costly invasion and occupation of Iraq has not resulted in democratic boom in the region and definitely weakened the United Nations' "credibility as a pro-democratic actor." The actions of George W. Bush met with a strong criticism not only in the Middle East but also in the United States and Europe. Kapiszewski is aware that the critics "blame his [Bush's] policy of propagating the idea of freedom and democracy for, paradoxically, making it possible for anti-Western, non-democratic, radical Islamic forces to seize the power in various countries of the region." However, the author believed that "despite numerous mistakes he has committed in his policy, when advancing democracy in the Middle East President Bush did act rationally," and that it would be possible to "evaluate his foreign policy only from a longer time perspective."

The second part of the book deals with the selected socio-political problems in the Gulf states. In two articles, namely "Arab vs. Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries," and "Population and workforce in Oman", Kapiszewski discussed the tensions resulting from the competition between the native and migrant workers on rich Arab states' job markets. In the third paper, entitled "Non-indigenous citizens and 'stateless' residents in the Gulf monarchies. The Kuwaiti *bidun*" the author addressed the issue of citizenship policies in the GCC states as "instrumental in preserving the rule of existing regimes as well as in establishing a superior-subordinate relationship between citizens of these states and long-term residents."

As Kapiszewski pointed out in his paper "Arab vs. Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries," a difficult economic situation of many Arab and South East Asian countries in the last few decades had made labor emigration an attractive option for its citizens. The Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, i.e., the members of the 1981-established the Gulf Cooperation Council have become "the largest markets for Arab and Asian job seekers." Since the discovery of large resources of oil in the Gulf states, because of the lack of local workforce there, the process of employing expatriate labor force has become an important factor having "a very significant impact on the economy, politics and the social structure of the GCC states." This can be seen e.g. in the rapid population growth. According to the author, "the population in the current GCC states has grown more than eight times during the 50 years; to be exact from 4 million in 1950 to 40 million in 2006, which marks one of the highest rates of the population growth in the world." Such an increase, however, was primarily the result of the influx of foreign workers. The new situation has become quite disadvantageous for the nationals. As the unemployment among nationals began to grow, the GCC governments had to introduce various labor market strategies involving both the creation of sufficient employment opportunities for nationals and the significant limitation of the dependence on the expatriate labor. A number of measures have been proposed to realize this new policy: some professions

have been reserved for nationals, the employment quotas for nationals and expatriates have been introduced in certain professions and the efforts have been made to improve the education and professional training for the nationals. While analyzing the results of the implementation of such measures and strategies Kapiszewski also formulated some predictions for the future. In his view, in the years to come the demand for foreign workers in the GCC countries would depend on several factors, such as “the number of young nationals entering the job market, the effect of the nationalization of labor markets (mainly due to government regulations), the capacity of economy to create new jobs, the employment qualifications of the national labor in relation to the requirements of the job market and the willingness of the nationals to take low-prestige jobs as well as political and security considerations.” Definitely, emphasized Kapiszewski, the most important factor would be “the overall state of economy”, resulting from the favorable developments concerning the policy of oil prices.

In the last few years the Middle East with its socio-political predicament became the focus of interdisciplinary research engaging scholars of various fields. As for the complex issue of socio-political transformations, including the process of “democratization” of out-dated political systems in the region, it still remains an unexplored area of academic ventures.

There is no doubt that Kapiszewski’s *The Changing Middle East: Selected Issues in Politics and Society in the Gulf*, a collection of articles based on an extensive interdisciplinary (sociological, political, economic and cultural) research, is a sound contribution to the ongoing debate on the important processes of socio-political, often dramatic and painful but overall positive, changes in the Middle East.

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