

Polish Academy of Sciences
Centre for Studies on Non-European Countries

**ACTA ASIATICA
VARSOVIENSIA
NO. 22**

■ OLGA BARBASIEWICZ, The Japanese Family System from the Meiji Restoration until the 21st Century ■ ŁUKASZ GACEK, Oil in Chinese Foreign Policy ■ OQAB JABALI, Palestinian Women's Political Participation ■ IRENA KAŁU Y SKA, Famous Women in the History of China ■ CHIH-YU SHIH, Anomaly as a Method: A Survey of Chinese Micro-Theories of Transition ■ ROMAN SŁAWI SKI, The Traditional Customs of the Taiwanese ■ STANISŁAW TOKARSKI, Globalization and Indian Media TV in Transition ■ KARIN TOMALA, China und die Europäische Union. Zur Entwicklung der Beziehungen. Von der Feindschaft zur strategischen Partnerschaft

ASKON

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ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA
NO. 22

ASKON Publishers
Warsaw 2009

Publication co-financed
by the State Committee for Scientific Research

Secretary
Dorota Dobrzyńska

English Text Consultant
Maria Bożenna Fedewicz

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Countries, Warsaw 2009

Printed in Poland

This edition prepared, set and published by

Wydawnictwo Naukowe ASKON Sp. z o.o.
Stawki 3/1, 00–193 Warszawa
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PL ISSN 0860–6102
ISBN 978–83–7452–045–4

ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA is abstracted in
The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities

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OLGA BARBASIEWICZ

The Japanese Family System from the Meiji Restoration until the 21st Century

In surveying anthropological theories it can be concluded that family is a group in which members struggle to control and protect resources.¹ However, some of the family theories have a structural emphasis without necessarily invoking a functional perspective.² One common variation is the family system theory. This theory is useful in observing family as a set of separate relationships that are connected in a similar way. This can be compared to the body organs or the computer components. Each part, being crucial in the system as a whole, has boundaries that are partially permeable but are also maintained to preserve the integrity of a system.³ When one part of this system is disrupted, the results may be unpredictable.

The main aim of this article is to show how the family sub-structure can be compared to “components of a computer”, or an “organ of the body”, as mentioned above. Even when a sub-structure changes, the system is still functional. However, the future results of this change remain unknown.

First of all we'll take a look at how the Japanese family system started to develop in the 19th century, when the Meiji restoration's reforms had started. From the beginning of the Meiji period, the family system became the most important problem in the government's policy.⁴ But the family system was not only a legal question, but also a problem in the field of economy, education, mentality, religion or the daily life. That was the particular problem for the Meiji government. Moreover, the expression “family system” was formed for the first time after the regulation of the “house with the privilege for the householder of controlling and commanding the family” provision in the civil law in the Meiji period. The definition of an ideal family system was derived from the old samurai family establishment by the governmental acknowledgment and seemed obvious at the time.

First, we should explain the meaning of the Japanese word *ie*. *Ie* means in the Japanese language “home”, the most important, after *kaisha* – the company-place for every Japanese person. But it is very difficult to translate the meaning of this term into Western languages.

¹ Peggie Dilworth-Anderson, Linda M. Burton, David M. Klein, “Contemporary and Emerging Theories in Studying Families”, in: *Sourcebook of Family Theory & Research*, Vern L. Bengtson (ed.), California: Thousand Oaks, 2005, p. 42.

² Ibidem.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ Kawashima Takeyoshi, *Ideogōji to shite no kazoku no seido* (The Family System as an Ideology), Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1957, p. 30.

Fukutake, author of a book *Japanese Rural Society*, and Hendry who has written *Marriage in Changing Japan*, suggested to use it in English in the same way as the “House of Windsor” concept. However, the most obvious difference is that in Japan the idea of *ie* does not denote a set of relationships of such exquisite exclusivity, but implies rather the basic organizing principles around which Japanese family has evolved.⁵ It is very important that after all reforms made in Japan, and all modernization which took place in this country, many aspects of the traditional life were influenced by them. In the Japanese language, not only the word *ie* can be translated into English *family*. Japanese took up in the 19th century a phrase *kazoku*, which has become the most proper word for *family*. That is why this English term does not reflect properly the idea of Japanese *ie*. The way to understand this term is to analyze basic principles of its structure. The first is embodying the notion of genealogical line extending from the past, through the present, and into the future. The second is connected with the practice of primogeniture and patrilinear descent which, at least formally, subordinates the status of women in Japanese society.⁶ Traditionally, *ie* was a corporate residential group, so not only the term describing the family structures. According to Befu, author of *Corporate Emphasis and Patterns of Descent in the Japanese Family*, the relation we can see in this term is one of expediency: “The two need not be conterminous, that is blood-line may be continued even after the family name and occupation have been changed and, conversely, the family name and occupation may be continued not only by the eldest son but by someone else”.⁷ In Japanese society it was common, which amused the Western societies, to make somebody from outside become a member of somebody’s *ie* by using the procedure of adoption. It was done because of fear of disappearance of the family line or profession.

We can also speak about individual subordination in the traditional practice of arranged marriages *miai*, which was to prevent the *ie* from disappearing.⁸ In pre-war Japan, the love marriages did not exist. Hendry defines this situation as a need of preserving the social standing of *ie* “by the choice of a suitable alliance” and of contributing to the economic well-being of the *ie*.⁹

The best image of *ie* can be found, even nowadays, in basic rules of naming. Therefore, we can easily recognize the distinction between those who were born inside of it and those who came to it from outside.

Terms of address and terms of reference¹⁰ are described as below:

Position	Familiar address (within the <i>ie</i>)	Polite address (outside the <i>ie</i>)	Humble reference (within the <i>ie</i>)
Grandfather	Jiichan	Ojiisan	Sofu
Grandmother	Bāchan	Obāsan	Sobo

⁵ See Michael Jeremy, Michael E. Robinson, *Ceremony and Symbolism in the Japanese Home*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989, p. 31.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ Quoted after: Jeremy, Robinson, *Ceremony and Symbolism...*, p. 31.

⁸ Ibid., p. 33.

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 38.

Father	Tōchan	Otōsan	Chichi
Mother	Kāchan	Okāsan	Haha
Elder son	Name	Chōnansan	Chōnan
Elder brother	Niichan Name	Oniisan	Ani
Second son	Name	Jinansan	Jinan
Younger brother	Name	Otōtosan	Otōto
Eldest sister	Nēchan Name	Onēchan	Ane
Elder daughter	Name	Chōjosan	Chōjo
Younger daughter	Name	Musumesan	Jijo
Younger sister	Name	Imōtosan	Imōto
Children	Name	Kodomosan	(boy) Otoko-no-ko (girl) Onna-no-ko
Grandchild	Name	Magosan	Mago
Young wife	Name	Oyomesan	Yome
Husband	Name	Shujunsan Dannasan	Danna

In traditional *ie* even three generations could live together under one roof. This situation is normal even in modern Japanese society. From the table above, we can see that the transition is usually gradual and effected without great disruption.¹¹ Father stays in between the *ie* and the outside world, and the place of his wife is traditionally inside the *ie*. The words used to denote wife in the Japanese language – *okusan* and *kanai* – contain the meaning “inside”. We can, of course, interpret this as a woman – the heart of a household, who keeps everything in order and is the one who makes the *ie* exist. Another important woof is that even the children are from the beginning drawn into the senior-junior relations, not only in the family, but in the whole Japanese society. A younger brother, especially during his childhood, would be calling his elder sister *onēchan*, to show the respect and relation between them. Moreover, older children are entitled to use the fist names of those who are younger.¹²

This way of naming in the *ie* provides some objective evidence of the way the family sees itself.¹³ The family and social status is implied by fixed terms, and shows how people set themselves in the society and home hierarchy. Each term implicates responsibility which the person referred to by this name has. This helps people believe that there is an order which will last forever.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 37.

¹² Ibid., p. 40.

¹³ Ibid., p. 42.

In considering family in the 20th and 21st centuries, we can see some changes in its organization, but the 1898 Civil Code, which contains the words such “house”, “family” or “head of the house”, seems to have been effective until the postwar revisions.¹⁴ When the country was led by shoguns from the Tokugawa clan, division of family properties was discouraged, especially for small land-holders.¹⁵ These restrictions were removed after the Meiji Restoration, and many families were able to live in independent households. Japanese family types based on the national census in 1920 are described as below:¹⁶

Type	Membership Structure	Urban (%)	Rural (%)	Total (%)
A	Single-individual household	9.06	5.24	5.97
B	Husband and wife	14.27	9.35	10.30
C	Husband or wife with child (ren)	5.74	5.36	5.44
D	Husband and wife with child (ren)	46.35	37.98	39.57
E	A core family or one of the four types above (A–D) plus collateral kin	6.46	4.78	5.01
F	Three or more generations in direct Descent	16.06	31.96	28.87
G	Type F plus collateral kin	2.06	5.33	4.84
	Total:	100.00	100.00	100.00

As we can see from this statistic, the highest percentage was represented by Type D family, not only in the rural families but also the urban ones. When we look at that, we can understand that even when in the 18th century there were no singles – showed as Type A family, they came to be as a product of industrialization.¹⁷ As a result, the average size of the former family was larger, and its membership structure was often more complex than that of the modern family.¹⁸ When we look into D Type and F Type family, we can see that they are the most frequently encountered.

The traditional and stereotypical Japanese family, which is three-generational and patrilineal, and in which marriage is a way of furthering the fortunes of the *ie* rather than of individual preference, changed because of the postwar social changes. Nevertheless, this did not mean the end of the *ie* system.¹⁹ The 1960s family was a nuclear one, because of the 1925–1950 generation’s siblings, which disintegrated the *ie* system, and last up till now with the number of nuclear families increasing very fast. The number of three-generation

¹⁴ Sano Chie, *Changing Values of the Japanese Family*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1958, p. 13.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Carroll Tessa, “Changing language, gender and family relations in Japan”, in: *The Changing Japanese Family*, Marcus Rebeck and Ayumi Takenaka (eds.), London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 111.

families can be said to be stable, but when we compare it to the number of nuclear families, we will see that it is very small. In more recent years, the number of single-person households has grown, from 13.2 per cent in the 1970s to 20.8 per cent in the 1980s and then 23.8 per cent in the 1990s, reaching 25.6 per cent in 2000.²⁰

We can also see that the three-generation family has changed. Nowadays it is usual that young couples are living near, but not with, their parents. The hitherto very important relation between daughter-in-law and mother-in-law is starting to disappear. The dual-family is rather a compromise between independence and the need to support elderly parents and may mean the grandparents are available to help out more with the childcare for working mothers.

The Japanese family face now many problems, which are connected with the society's modernization. From the 1990s we can meet with a problem of children called *otaku*. This movement of manga and anime products, associated with the activity of so-called *otaku*, seems to precede the corporate regulation, standardization and homogenization of the market. On the one hand, this "*otaku* movement" of anime images seems to spur or facilitate the emergence of official markets. Yet, on the other hand, *otaku* seem to remain somehow autonomous of the official markets and corporate regulation. The beginning of the *otaku* movement can be dated at the beginning of '90s, but the first symptoms were seen in the late 1980s, when the animated films such as *Ooritsu ūchūgun Oneamise no tsubasa* (*Wings of Honneamise*, 1987), *Toppu wo netae!* (*Gunbuster*, 1988) and *Fushigi na umi no Nadia* (*Nadia: the Secret of Blue Waters*, 1990) gained success. In November 1990, an accident caused by one-year child occurred. It's father told the police that it knew how to drive a car because of the computer games it saw.²¹ This was given by Volker Grassmuck as the first example of *otaku* problem in Japanese families.

But the phenomenon is not confined to dependence on computer games and comics. Some *otaku* hunt for photographs of music industry's synthetic starlets, some are fanatically into computer games, many are immersed in comic-books most of their waking day, others are plastic model maniacs, and yet others fancy hacking into car-telephone conversations.²² That is why we can say that *otaku* is not only a movement but it is a fashion, changing all the time. The magazines, computer-games and even the *Book of Otaku* are distributed. According to an estimation of the editor of *Do-Pe*, one of the *otaku*-magazines, there is a hard core of 350,000 of them around, but the true number is unknown.²³

In the early '90s *otaku* were usually boys in their teens and twenties, who were called children of the medias. But nowadays, at the beginning of the 21st century, we can meet so-called "Modern Boys and Mobile Girls". When we are using means of transport in Japan, we can see everywhere young boys and girls using their mobile phones, sending mails at an unprecedented speed. They can easily shift the way of writing from the so-called *romaji* – Roman letters – into *kanji*, the traditional Japanese script. The beginning of the technical

²⁰ Ibid., p. 112.

²¹ Grassmuck Volker, „I'm alone, but not lonely", *Japanese Otaku-Kids Colonize the Realm of Information and Media, A Tale of Sex and Crime from a Faraway Place*, <http://waste.informatik.hu-berlin.de/Grassmuck/Texts/otaku.e.html>, 2008.08.31.

²² Ibidem.

²³ Ibidem.

achievements is dated at the beginning of Meiji period, when Japan opened to the world and let into the country a lot of new technical achievements from all over the world. It was the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. The Japanese bought the entire train-set: clock-time, steam railroads, electric telegraphy, Western medical advances.²⁴ This caused development of the most industrial country in whole Asia.

The *otaku* movement is connected with being lonely in the society, because of spending time on playing computer games, watching TV, listening to the music. Okonogi Keigo, professor at the neuropsychiatric department of Keiō University, who coined the term in 1977 (*Moratorium ningen no jidai*, in *Chūō Kōron*, October 1977), says that consumer society has an infantilizing effect, but most of all he blames mass media for creating the “unreal state of existence”.²⁵

To address the *otaku* problem, it is useful to give some statements which were given in *Popeye* magazine and quoted as examples by Grassmuck Volker:

In the beginning *otaku* was used in a very negative sense and meant someone who doesn't look good, who has no girl friend, who is collecting silly things, and is generally out of the world. As a definition I would say that an *otaku* is a person who is into something useless. Idol-, *manga*- or whatever-*otaku* means he does not have anything else. But in that he really indulges. It's a silly way of spending time, from a normal business point of view. They play games with the same seriousness others use for business.²⁶

They are easily visible, because they don't care about the way they dress. They talk different, and look to the ground while talking face-to-face. They are not into physical activities, they are chubby or thin, but not fit, never tanned. They don't care for a good meal, they think they can spend their money on more important things.²⁷

With computers they get really involved. Computer game programmers live on potato-chips that they eat with chopsticks, and on coffee-milk. They have a different rhythm, are awake for 40 hours and then sleep for 12. Computer *otaku* are said to be able to make love with a girl on the screen. But I think many want a girl friend, but can't get one.²⁸

The *otaku* movement is strongly connected, as it was said above, with the industrial development of Japan. In this society even small children can easily operate the electronic products. We could see it while reading about the one-old-child who crushed the car. This way of thinking leads us to the computerized society, called by Gibson computer-*otaku*. Mostly, *otaku* avoid face-to-face communication, but excessively exercise communication via technical media. They do not need to communicate directly with others, this role being taken by the media. The loneliness is not well known to them because of the meetings organized by the fan groups, where all *otaku* have an opportunity to see each other.

²⁴ Gibson William, “Modern boys and mobile girls”, *The Observer*, Sunday, April 1, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2001/apr/01/sciencefictionfantasyandhorror.features>, 2008.08.31.

²⁵ Pfeifer, G. Volker, “I'm alone, but not lonely” ...

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ Ibidem.

On the other hand, *otaku* is viewed not only as a movement of teenagers who cause damages to nobody else but themselves. There are also crimes committed because of the influence of this subculture. Gibson gives an example of such crime in his article:

MIYAZAKI Tsutomo (27) was arrested for the suspected abduction and murder of four girls age four to seven and the attempted molestation of another girl. In his room in Tokyo were found piles of *manga* and a collection of 6000 videotapes, mostly dubbed from rental-stores, including child pornography and horror-videos. He was socially isolated, didn't dare approach women, was jobbing as a printing shop assistant, was crazy about video and comics, and drew comics himself - easy equation to identify him as an *otaku*.²⁹

But not only *otaku* is a problem of modern Japanese family. There is a term *kurisumasu keeki* (taken from the English phrase "Christmas cake"), which is used to describe women who are older than 24 years, like the cake which is not good after the Christmas Eve. But even if this term is still alive in Japanese society, there also is a new kind of young people (in their twenties and thirties), who don't want to start living on their own and are still dependent on their parents. Such a young man or woman is called *parasaito singuru*, and the term is taken too from the English "parasite single", and was created after the movie *Parasite Eve*, a Japanese horror flick in which extraterrestrial hatchlings feed off unsuspecting human hosts before bursting, "Alien"-style, through their bellies.³⁰

In *New York Times* Peggy Orenstein showed the *parasaito* problem very well in the "Parasites in Prêt-à-Porter" article.

On a Sunday afternoon, the Omotesando neighborhood in Tokyo swarms with women in their 20's and 30's. They spill out of stores with bags marked Gucci, Jil Sander, Issey Miyake, Comme des Garçons. They crowd cafes and snack on coffee and cake specials. They finger sleek tchotchkes on the shelves of home design stores, occasionally shouting, "Kawaaaaaiiii!" the compliment supreme, which means, essentially, "cuuuuuute!" As I cross the main thoroughfare, three women in their late 20's pass by, arms linked. They are actually singing "Girls Just Want to Have Fun".³¹

But *parasaito* are not only women. There is a large number of young people living still with their parents and spending earned money for their own pleasure. They don't want to leave their parents' houses and start to lead a life of an adult. *Parasaito* do not have to do any of the housework, do not have to worry about the utility bills, because their parents are taking care about it. The style and way of life is for those people very important, and it has to be very convenient and comfortable. Their average wage is about \$27,000 a year; they are Japan's leading consumers, since their entire income is disposable. Nowadays half of 30-year-old Japanese women are still unmarried, which makes the Japanese society very nervous about the situation. And even if this problem does not only involve women, they are the object of critical voices of politicians, economists and the media. Yet the

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ Orenstein Peggy, "Parasites in Prêt-à-Porter", *The New York Times*, July 1, 2001, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01E1DE1030F932A35754C0A9679C8B63>

³¹ Ibidem.

problem is deeper because of the traditional *ie* system, which does not allow women to have both family and career. “There’s a term in Japan called the *ie*,” Kashiwagi Chiho, a woman with whom Orenstine talked during one meeting says. “It’s like the household, but it means more than that. Even now, Japanese marriage isn’t between two individuals, but two *ies*. And that’s the reason I’m single now. If I were married, I’d be influenced by the idea of the *ie*, by the expectations I’d feel”.³²

Parasaito can be easily compared with Western societies’ singles. And the problem is strictly connected with the low birth rate and the resultant modern family structure.

The changing Japanese family caused many problems in this society. There is a number of common pressures and processes confronting family structures and resources.³³ The key drivers to family change are the economic and labor market. The changes are observed in both the structure and function of family.³⁴

While considering young people in the Japanese society we have to look into the problem of marriage and child rearing. The marriage age is still rising, and the proportion of unmarried men is rising even more rapidly.³⁵ Many young women are afraid of getting married, because of the problems with combining career and child rearing. As we can see, nowadays it is hard to define what is the *characteristic* of the Japanese family. But still in this society we can find the traditional *ie*, the term that is so typical of the Japanese family image.

³² Ibidem.

³³ Izuhara Misa, “Changing families and policy responses to an ageing Japanese society”, in: *The Changing Japanese Family...*, p. 162.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 163.

³⁵ Nasage Nobuko, “Japanese youth’s attitudes towards marriage and child rearing”, in: *The Changing Japanese...*, p. 39.

ŁUKASZ GACEK

Oil in Chinese Foreign Policy

Crude oil plays a very important role in Chinese reality. Beijing struggles with limited natural resources, therefore must seek them abroad. The resources policy to a large extent determinates Chinese activities in foreign relations. Despite the systematic growth of oil production, China still remains a major global importer. Proved oil reserves in China in 2007 – according to *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008* – amount to 15,5 thousand million barrels (2,1 thousand million tons) total. They are the biggest reserves in Asia-Pacific region, which cumulate only 3,3 percent of global oil resources. Out of this, one third goes to China (1,3 percent of global oil resources).¹

In long-term prognosis we can observe a systematic increase of crude oil and natural gas, and a simultaneous decrease of coal in China's energy balance.


Table 1: Projected energy demand in China

Year	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Total (billion tons of coal equivalent)	1,28	1,51	1,70	1,88	2,01
Coal (%)	67,0	62,7	57,1	53,2	47,8
Oil (%)	23,6	24,9	27,5	28,9	31,3
Gas (%)	2,5	4,8	7,4	9,4	12,0
Hydro (%)	6,9	7,7	8,0	8,5	8,9

Source: CNPC (2001), in: Keun-Wook Paik, *Geopolitics of Pipeline Development in Northeast Asia and Its Implications towards China Natural Gas Expansion*, An International Conference on China and the Far East: Future Energy Strategies and Security Scenarios, London, December 1, 2005, <http://www.westminsterenergy.org>.

¹ *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.

Until to the beginning of 1960s coal covered above 95 percent of total energy demand in China. An economic breakdown, an after-effect failure of the Great Leap Forward policy, brought about a decrease in the output of coal. Despite this, coal still remains the main source of energy, given the fact that until the mid-1980s the share of coal in energy balance was 75 percent. At the same time crude oil covered about 12 percent, timber and dry fertilizer 10 percent, water energy 2 percent, and natural gas 1 percent of China's demand for energy.²



Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.

Chinese reserves of crude oil stay on a definitely insufficient level when compared with the growing consumption during a few last decades. In the ten-year period between 1997 and 2007 consumption grew twice. In 1997, it was 4179 thousand barrels daily (196 million tons total), a decade later - 7855 thousand barrels daily (368 million tons total). The deep level production, as compared with the scale of consumption, cannot resolve this problem. It is to be stressed that in the analogical period of time the production of crude oil grew not much, from the level of 3211 thousand barrels daily (160,1 million tons total) to 3743 thousand barrels daily (186,7 million tons total).³ The biggest growth of production took place in the 1970s, which was connected with the earliest discovery of new extensive oil fields, especially in Heilongjiang province and the delta of Yellow River. From that time production each year was growing, although very slowly.

According to the prognosis in the report prepared by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, oil consumption in the coming decade will be increased. It would rise from 346,6 million tons in 2006 to 407 million tons in 2010 and 563 million tons in 2020. It means that oil demand would grow by annual average of 4,5 percent from 2007 to 2010 and 3,3 percent

² Andrzej Maryański, Andrzej Halimarski, *Geografia ekonomiczna Azji Wschodniej* (The Economic Geography of East Asia), Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1989, p. 66.

³ *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.

Table 2: Oil production in between 1949 and 1987 (million tons)

Year	Crude oil (million tons)
1949	0,12
1955	0,97
1957	1,46
1960	5,20
1962	5,75
1965	11,31
1967	13,88
1970	30,65
1975	77,06
1980	105,95
1981	101,22
1982	102,12
1983	106,07
1985	125,00
1987	134,00

Source: *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian* (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Zhubanshe, 1987, in: Andrzej Maryański, Andrzej Halimarski, *Geografia ekonomiczna Azji Wschodniej...*, p. 69.

from 2010 to 2020. These results show that China will consume 62,5 percent more oil in 2020 than in 2006.⁴

Today nearly half of domestic oil consumption is covered by import from abroad. In 2008, China obtained the record growth of oil output in three years to 190 million tons (the output rose 2,3 percent year on year), according to China's Petroleum and Chemical Association. Nevertheless the consumption rose faster, China imported 179 million tons of crude oil in 2008 (an increase of 9,6 percent in comparison with the previous year). It means that import accounted for 48 percent of total crude oil demand.⁵

In the near future China doesn't have plans to considerably increase domestic output. Annual production of coal to over 3,3 billion tons (an increase of about 30 percent in the output from the 2007 level), crude oil to 200 million tons (an increase of 7 percent) and double its natural gas output to 160 billion cubic meters by 2015 will not improve this disadvantageous situation.⁶ China must seek alternative ideas. In this context, Beijing's

⁴ "China's Oil Consumption to Hit 563M Tons in 2020", *Xinhua, China Daily*, April 8, 2008.


⁵ "China's Crude Oil Output Hit 190 mln Tons in 2008", *Xinhua, China Daily*, January 30, 2009.

⁶ "China Plans to Double Natural Gas Output by 2015", *Xinhua, Beijing Review*, January 8, 2009.


Table 3: The biggest oil producers

Country	Production (thousand barrels daily) – 1997	Country	Production (thousand barrels daily) – 2007
Saudi Arabia	9482	Saudi Arabia	10413
US	8269	Russia	9978
Russia	6227	US	6879
Iran	3776	Iran	4401
Mexico	3410	China	3743
Venezuela	3321	Mexico	3477
Norway	3280	Canada	3309
China	3211	United Arab Emirates	2915
United Kingdom	2702	Kuwait	2626
Canada	2588	Venezuela	2613

Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.



Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.




Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.


Table 4: The biggest oil consumers

Country	Consumption (thousand barrels daily) – 1997	Country	Consumption (thousand barrels daily) – 2007
US	18621	US	20698
Japan	5762	China	7855
China	4179	Japan	5051
Germany	2913	India	2748
Russia	2689	Russia	2699
South Korea	2373	Germany	2393
Italy	1969	South Korea	2371
Brazil	1968	Canada	2303
France	1948	Brazil	2192
Canada	1888	Saudi Arabia	2154

Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.



Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.



Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2008.

decision connected with allocation of 580 billion RMB (84,8 billion USD) in the power industry in 2009 is worth noting. It would accelerate the development of alternative sources of energy, especially nuclear power plants and wind farms. Currently the most important role is still played by coal plants. In three years China plans to build eight more nuclear power plants with 16 reactors whose total installed capacity would surpass 10 GW. The plan provides for raising the share of nuclear power in the national energy to 5 percent in the coming decade. In comparison, now there are only eleven nuclear reactors operational in the country, with the combined capacity of about 9 GW, covering not much more than 1 percent of China's energy needs.⁷

A very important problem arises, which is coexistence of mineral ores of better and worse quality. Resources with the lowest geological control are predominant in the proved fields of mineral reserves. Chinese authorities underline that there still is a good conjuncture for output and discovery of new resources, especially crude oil, natural gas, gold and coal.⁸ In this respect Beijing made a big step forward. In 2007, China made the biggest discovery of oil fields in the decades. They lay along the east coast in northern Bohai Bay. Estimations say that reserves can cover up to 1 billion tons. It is worth noting that plans of Chinese oil producers are to find 10 new oil fields with reserves of more than 100 million tons each by 2010.⁹

Changes on the fuel market in the early 1990s made the Chinese government initiate reforms in the country's oil sector. An after-effect of these activities in the second half of the 1990s was the establishment of three concerns: China's National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China's Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China's National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). CNPC plays the most important role in oil production among these companies. Only in 2002, this concern delivered 68,9 percent of the total output, while the other companies, Sinopec and CNOOC, 15,2 percent and 11,4 percent, respectively.¹⁰ Both Petrochina (company established within CNPC transformations made by the government) and Sinopec actually are among dominant companies in the world as for their market worth. According to the American annual ranking of the largest corporations, Fortune 500, Sinopec ranks the 9th position and CNPC - the 13th. The third Chinese oil company, CNOOC, ranks the 318th position.¹¹ China's National Energy Administration (NEA) copes with questions connected with legal regulations in the fuel sector. It cooperates within National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) amenable to the State Council.

The largest oil fields are located on land in northeast China and in the western region of Xinjiang province. About one seventh of the overall Chinese oil output is from offshore reserves. The first discoveries of small oil fields started to be exploited in 1907 in Shaanxi province. Thirty years later the total output considerably increased, when Yumen oil fields in Gansu province

⁷ "Nuke Power Capacity Set to Increase", *China Daily*, February 4, 2009.

⁸ "China's Policy on Mineral Resources (December 2003)", in: *White Papers of the Chinese Government (2002–2004)*, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2005, p. 347–348.

⁹ "China's Oil Consumption to Hit 563M Tons in 2020".

¹⁰ Kaoru Yamaguchi, Keii Cho, *Natural Gas in China*, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ), August 2003.

¹¹ <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009>

were discovered. The real turning-point in domestic fuel industry took place in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, when large oilfields in Xinjiang province, and later in Shengli and Daqing were discovered. Nearly 85 percent of the overall country oil production are located in northeast regions on the Chinese coast. Only one fourth of oil production is located in controlled by CNPC Daqing in Heilongjiang province. Exploitation of these oilfields began in 1963. Since then to the beginning of the 1990s about half crude oil was produced from there. Total output from Daqing oil fields was 801 thousand barrels per day in 2008.¹² The second largest oil fields are located in Shengli, in the north of Shandong province, near the Yellow River delta. Sinopec is very active there, with its daily output of 553 thousand barrels per day.¹³ The oil production in Shengli was initiated a year before Daqing started its activity. In February 2009, Sinopec stated plans of increasing oil and natural gas production in northwestern oil fields as much as 67 percent in 2020, compared with 2015, in response to growing energy needs of China. The plans envisage production of 15 million tons of oil equivalent in 2015 and as much as 25 million tons in 2020.¹⁴ Both Sinopec and CNPC play a key role in the Chinese refining sector. These concerns account for 50 percent and 35 percent of the capacity, respectively. Today China has 6,4 million barrels per day of crude oil refining capacity at 53 facilities (January 2009). The National Energy Administration's goal is to raise the refining capacity to 8,8 million barrels per day in three years.¹⁵ Large oil fields are also located offshore. Activities have focused especially on the Bohai Bay and Pearl River Delta and South China Sea. There the nation's third-biggest oil company CNOOC, with about 500 thousand barrels per day production, operates.

A very important problem for China is connected with difference of regions. The western and central regions with large mineral resources are developing much slower than their eastern counterparts. So, there appear new possibilities for mutual cooperation with foreign companies to explore Chinese oil and gas fields.¹⁶ Foreign companies can manage activities dealing with production in China, but according to Chinese law the country's concerns must have majority of shares in the business. It is worth noting that Chinese companies are very active abroad. For example, CNPC had expanded its oil and gas business to 29 countries by the end of 2008, where it had realized 75 cooperative projects. At that time the company had send engineering and technological services to 44 countries and regions. In addition, it exported materials and equipment to 69 countries and regions.¹⁷

The financial breakdown on global markets in 2008 led to a decrease in prices of mineral resources. Beijing profited from this situation and began filling tanks at its largest oil reserve. 10 tanks located in the northwest Xinjiang, operated by CNPC, have a total capacity of 6,3 million barrels. This reserve will eventually have an overall capacity of more than 50 million barrels of crude oil, mainly produced in Xinjiang or imported from Kazakhstan. Total investment in this project is 6,5 billion yuan (950 million USD). China's strategic oil reserves

¹² *Country Analysis Briefs. China*, China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis – Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, July 2009, <http://www.eia.doe.gov>

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ "Sinopec's target", *Shanghai Daily*, February 7, 2009.

¹⁵ *Country Analysis Briefs. China*, China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis – Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, July 2009, <http://www.eia.doe.gov>

¹⁶ See: "China's Policy on Mineral Resources...", p. 345–375.

¹⁷ "CNPC Expands Oil and Gas Business to 29 Countries", *Xinhua, China Daily*, January 25, 2009.

Table 5: Major Chinese Oil Fields by Production, January 2006

Field	Production (thousand barrels per day)
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)/Petrochina	
Daqing	929 268
Liaohe	256 991
Xinjiang	222 524
Changqing	162 422
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec)	
Shengli	535 531
Sinopec Star	78 567
Zhongyuan	67 092
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)	
Total offshore	519 108

Source: *Oil&Gas Journal*, Energy Information Administration, China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis – Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, August 2006, <http://www.eia.doe.gov>

are expected to reach 101,9 million barrels by the end of 2008 and rise to 145,9 million barrels in 2010, with 511,9 million barrels in a long perspective.¹⁸ In accordance with the country's economic strategy as defined in documents of 5-year plan (2000-2005), the construction of four strategic oil reserve facilities in the east coast region, in Zhenhai (mouth of the Yongjiang River, northeast Ningbo), Zhoushan (Zhejiang province), Huangdao (Shandong province) and Dalian, started in 2003. The first two started to operate in 2008.

Another interesting element of Beijing's oil policy indicates a desire to increase the number of supertankers to transport crude oil. China's aspirations, according to the government strategic planners, are that half of the oil imports should be delivered on its own tankers. The plans extend to building more than 90 supertankers. Chinese companies want to order up to 65 supertankers worth 7,1 billion USD by 2012. Newly built 65 tankers, together with the existing fleet of 25 supertankers, would have the capacity to deliver about half of projected imports by 2015. This would allow China to reduce the dependence on foreign suppliers. Now Chinese economy largely depends on deliveries from the Middle East and Africa. The major part of imported oil (about 90 percent) is provided by sea, but less than 20 percent of this on decks of state-owned tankers. Japan with its fleet consisting of over 100 supertankers stays a global leader in this area.¹⁹

¹⁸ "China Starts Filling Tanks at Largest Oil Reserve", AFP, December 26, 2008, <http://www.moneynews.com>

¹⁹ David Lague, "China Begins Building out its Supertanker Fleet", *International Herald Tribune*, May 16, 2007, <http://www.globalsecuritynews.com>

The priority of Chinese oil policy is obvious, it indicates creation of a wide mechanism of supply diversification. Beijing's activities in different regions of the globe show what priorities dominate in its foreign policy.

Table 6: China's Crude Oil Imports by Source

Country	China's Crude Oil Import (thousand barrels per day)
Saudi Arabia	725
Angola	596
Iran	425
Oman	291
Russia	232
Sudan	209
Venezuela	121
Kuwait	118
Kazakhstan	113
United Arab Emirates	91
Others	646

Source: *Country Analysis Briefs. China*, China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis – Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal, July 2009, <http://www.eia.doe.gov>

Half of crude oil imported by China comes from the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is dominating among foreign suppliers as the biggest producer and exporter of oil in the world. Bilateral trade volume between China and Saudi Arabia reached 41,8 billion USD in 2008, which made Saudi Arabia become Beijing's major trade partner in West Asia and Northern Africa.²⁰ Strong positions among oil exporters to China are also maintained by Iran, Oman, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Iraq. Among recent agreements in the region, one may note mainly those signed by China with Iran and Iraq. In January 2009, China's National Petroleum Corporation signed with Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) an agreement worth 1,76 billion USD to develop the North Azadegan oil field in a western province of Khuzestan in Iran. Estimated reserves of 6 billion barrels of oil give the opportunity to produce about 75 thousand barrels per day for 25 years.²¹ In reference to Iran-China oil cooperation, it must be underlined that in September 2009 Chinese companies started supplying petrol to Iran and now are providing up to a third of its imports. Iran remains one of the biggest oil producers in the world, but its refineries are in a bad condition.²²

²⁰ "Chinese, Saudi Arabian Leaders Pledge to Deepen Ties, Jointly Tackle Financial Crisis", *Xinhua*, February 11, 2009.

²¹ Xiao Wan, "CNPC to Develop Azadegan Oilfield", *China Daily*, January 16, 2009.

²² Javier Blas, Carola Hoyos, Daniel Dombey, "Chinese Companies Supply Iran with Petrol", *Financial Times*, September 23, 2009.

In 2008, CNPC signed a 22-year contract worth 3 billion USD with Iraq to help develop the Ahdab oil field located in the southeast of Baghdad. The contract was a renegotiated version of the agreement signed in 1997 between China and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This agreement was canceled in 2003 after the American intervention in Iraq.

The second significant direction of Chinese expansion points to African continent from where Beijing imported one third of overall crude oil. Among chief African oil exporters to China the most prominent is Angola, which strongly competes in this respect with Saudi Arabia. Thus Angola remains the most important trade partner of China in Africa. Two-way trade between these countries reached 25,3 billion USD in 2008. Beijing underlines its efforts in different aid programs to Angola and other countries in Africa. Among them there are resolutions accepted in November 2006 at the Beijing's Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), connected with reducing debts equivalent to 67,38 million yuan and Angola duty free favorable treatment of 466 categories of products.²³ There is a visible change in Beijing's strategy towards African continent. Trade volume between China and Africa reached 107 billion USD in 2008²⁴, while eight years earlier it was only 10 billion USD. It is to be remembered that oil occupies the first place in the trade offer of African states. China became a great player in the energy field in such countries as Angola, Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria. In return for oil and other mineral resources Beijing offers great variety of loans, investments in critical local infrastructure, providing engineering and also military equipment for African regimes in order to gain their sympathy.

In close neighborhood Russia plays an essential role in the Chinese energy system. This country mainly depends on European receivers. A huge problem for Moscow is the lack of suitable pipeline infrastructure in eastern regions of the country. It makes Moscow's entering Asian markets in a short time impossible. The biggest investments still are in realization phase. At the end of 2008 in Moscow, China's National Petroleum Corporation and Transneft, in the presence of the two countries' prime ministers Vladimir Putin and Wen Jiabao, signed an agreement concerning building 67-kilometer line from Skorowodino in Russia to Daqing. This is a part of a large investment of building 4-thousand-kilometer Siberia-Pacific pipeline, going from Tayshet, near Irkuck to Nachodka harbor, near Vladivostok on Sea of Japan. In Nachodka a fuel terminal will be built to service tankers. This pipeline could supply oil to the Far East countries, China, Japan, South Korea and also the United States. Two months later, in February 2009, during the visit of Russian vice premier Igor Siechin in Beijing, China and Russia signed a credit agreement about oil supply to China. Within the agreements was a "loan for oil": China's Development Bank gives Russian concerns Rosneft and Transneft loans of 10 and 15 billion USD, respectively, in exchange for long-term deliveries of oil to China. Russia is to send to China 300 million tons of oil in the twenty years.²⁵ In May 2009, China started building 900-kilometers-long pipeline, which connects Mohe city and Daqing. This project will make it possible to provide Russian oil to northern and eastern regions of China.

Beijing also is active in Central Asia and Latin America. In August 2007, China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement related to building pipelines which are to supply oil and gas from Caspian Sea. A year before the pipeline from oil fields in central Kazakhstan to Xinjiang was finished. On April 17, 2009, Beijing announced that CNPC would lend 5 billion USD to

²³ "Angola Becomes China's Largest African Trade Partner", *People's Daily*, January 20, 2009.

the Kazakh State oil company – KazMunaiGas. The loan would be used for joint purchase of a major oil developer in Kazakhstan, MangistauMunaiGas. Three months earlier KazMunaiGas agreed to buy 52 percent of MangistauMunaiGas.²⁶ A struggle for obtaining the access to Central Asian oil fields is a very important aspect of this game. Possibility to receive cheaper resources from Central Asia is an instrument of pressure on Russia.

The last decade brought a new opening in China-Latin America relations. In 2008, bilateral trade reached 143,4 billion USD (up 40 percent to the previous year).²⁷ In Latin America Venezuela is in the centre of Chinese interests. During the visit of Hugo Chavez in Beijing in the second half of 2008, China and Venezuela signed a dozen or so energy agreements. Now one twentieth of overall oil imported by China comes from Venezuela. A strong position is also maintained by Brazil. In May 2009, within loan for oil agreements, China's Development Bank agreed to give Brazilian state oil company Petrobras 10 billion USD loan in return for a guarantee of delivering 200 thousand barrels per day to China in ten years. Sinopec and Petrobras also signed a memorandum of understanding on oil exploration, refining and petrochemicals. It is worth noting that in 2007 Brazil made spectacular discoveries of new oil fields several hundred kilometers off the country's east coast, considerably strengthening its position on the global fuel market.

A similar situation can be found in Southeast Asia. This region is rich in mineral resources. During the last decade, between 1997 and 2006, resources imported from this region doubled from 3,3 billion USD to 7,4 billion USD.²⁸ China aspires to exploiting oil and gas fields below Southeast China Sea bed. Spratley Islands and Paracels Islands are also worth studying. These areas have a huge deposit of minerals, especially crude oil and natural gas. It should be emphasized that these islands are situated in a strategic area, in the centre of Southeast China Sea, the transport route extending from Malacca Strait to Taiwan Strait.

Major points of Beijing's plans are concentrated on Southeast Asia, including Burma. It is worth mentioning that in 2007 in this country the biggest antigovernment protest in the last two decades took place. It was organized by Buddhist monks and local intellectuals. In response to this, the authorities decided to use force against them. The United States and countries of the European Union strongly reacted, enforcing strict sanctions against the Burman government. A note concerning the sanctions was debated on the United Nations

²⁴ Two-way trade reached 106,84 billion USD (up 45 percent to previous year). China had a trade deficit of 5,16 billion USD with African countries in 2008. A year before it had a surplus of 940 million USD. China's export to Africa reached 50,84 billion USD (up 36,3 percent), and import from Africa hit 56 billion USD (up 54 percent). ["China-Africa Trade up 45% in 2008 to \$107 bln" *Xinhua, People's Daily*, February 10, 2009.]

²⁵ Catherine Belton, "China Lends Russia \$25bn for 25 Years of Oil", *Financial Times*, February 17, 2009.

²⁶ "China's Largest Oil Producer to Lend \$5 bln to Kazakhstan for Oil Assets", *Xinhua*, April 17, 2009.

²⁷ Four nations in Latin America and Caribbean bilateral trade volumes with China surpassing 10 billion USD. Among them were Brazil (48,5 billion USD), Mexico (17,56 billion USD), Chile (17,5 billion USD) and Argentina (14,4 billion USD). ["Growth Rate of China's Trade with Latin America and Caribbean Decreased in 2008", *People's Daily*, March 4, 2009.]

²⁸ Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morris, Bruce Vaughn, *China's "Soft Power" in Southeast Asia*, CRS Report for Congress, January 4, 2008, s. 12–13.

forum, but it did not get Chinese and Russian acceptance. Delegates of these two countries stated that the incidents in Burma did not threaten the international peace and stability. Beijing's view in this matter needs to be seen from a wider perspective, that concerning basic concepts of Chinese foreign policy. China propagates the policy of noninterference in internal affairs of other countries and of equal treating all countries in the international sphere, irrespective of their potentials. These watchwords are a response to the thesis about Chinese threat. But Chinese proposals remain an attractive model for developing countries. By means of this policy Beijing easily removed other players from the region of Southeast Asia. Burma is an example of its pragmatic strategy towards neighbor countries. In 2008, China began building oil and gas pipelines over 1200 miles long from Kyaukpyu Port on the Bay of Bengal through Burma, through Kunming (Yunan province), Guizhou province to Chingqing municipality in southeast China. The estimated cost of this energy project is 72 billion yuan (10,5 USD). The project includes railway, road, waterway construction and upgrading Kyaukpyu Port. China also secured a 30-year deal from the junta for natural gas tapped off the Burmese cost.²⁹ It is possible that China will use these pipelines in the future to import oil and gas from the Middle East and Africa. This will allow it to become independent in transport through Malacca Strait connecting Indian Ocean with Southeast China Sea. Lack of alternatives makes this route the way of transport of oil to East Asia countries. It is easy to imagine momentary delay of movement in the strait.

The Chinese strategy is to construct a web of mineral resources. Diversification favors building a new energy policy of not depending on only one source. The strategy connected with satisfying oil demand is the focus of Chinese activity on the global scale. Energy cooperation allows China to create a mechanism of dialogue with foreign countries and extends on many forms of cooperation with them. China offers a lot of help funds, wide scholarship programs, especially in Africa, which give the evidence to long-term Beijing's strategy. Only in African countries has China created 800 aid projects. Chinese companies invest in local industries important from the market perspective, e.g. mining industry, energy, financial sector, insurance, infrastructure or transport. An example of these activities was the declaration of the Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao during the economic conference Boao Forum for Asia on Hainan (April 18, 2009) of supporting infrastructural development in Southeast Asia by setting up a 10 billion USD by China.³⁰ Beijing adapts its policy to a specific case. Beijing's activities are criticized for creating changes on local markets and gradually subordinating local governments.

²⁹ "China, Burma Sign Oil Pipeline Agreement", *The Irrawaddy*, March 27, 2009, <http://www.irrawaddy.org>

³⁰ "China to Set up \$10 bln Fund to Boost Investment Cooperation with ASEAN", *Xinhua*, April 18, 2009.

OQAB JABALI

Palestinian Women's Political Participation

Indicators of women's political participation

Since the beginning of the 20th century the Palestinian woman has been involved in the struggle for political and social independence through different organizations, initiated by charities, which formed the spark for Palestinian women to integrate into life of the society. Later, as a result of political conditions in Palestine, this changed into political involvement in the form of sit-ins, demonstrations and petitions of protest. The first women's political activity was evidenced in 1893 in the city of Afula, where Palestinian women went in a demonstration to protest against the establishment of the first Jewish settlement. In the battle of Al Buraq in 1929, which constituted an important turning point in the lives of Palestinian women, nine women were shot dead by the British army. This urged them to step up the struggle to change the economic and political situation, especially after they found themselves responsible after the executions, arrests and imprisonments, and houses demolitions carried out by the British Mandate authorities. Women started to organize their efforts and mobilize all the available means to face the new circumstances. They held the first Palestinian women's conference in the city of Jerusalem in 1929, which led to the formation of the Executive Committee of the Assembly of Arab Women. In the same year, an Arab Women's Union in Jerusalem and another one in Nablus were created. Both unions, in addition to the Executive Committee of the Assembly of Arab Women, performed a lot of economic, social, cultural and national actions in the form of demonstrations and protests to the British High Commissioner, and sent messages to the Arab kings and rulers.¹

During the period between 1948 and 1967, active women's charitable institutions such as orphanages and senior centers helped relieve the bereaved families and prepare and equip women professionally. All women's struggles in that period culminated in the establishment of the General Union of Palestinian Women in 1965. It was a very popular female organization which engaged in social and political activities among women in the occupied territories. This shows that the political awareness of women's movement grew within the Palestinian national-oriented, community-based organizations.

The creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 formed a political alternative for the Palestinian national movement in which the feminist movement grew,

¹ Lima Shafiq, "Struggle of Women in the Occupied Territories for Social and Political Rights", *Arab Women Magazine*, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 1985, p. 114.

making it a partner of PLO with a similar strategy designed to politicize the masses and help them participate in the national struggle.

The result was that the first women's movement in the countryside was created in 1978, and by 1982 there were four groups of women representing the main Palestinian political parties at that time. Yet the activities of those organizations were restricted only to social services. It is to be noted that those women's groups, created by the need to provide social work, drew the attention of the political parties that used to mobilize women for political action. Gradually women's organizations started to adopt the features of the existing political parties until they came to be dominated by political action instead of the community interest, not to mention the fact that the parties did not give the Palestinian women's movement the right to appear and defend its own issues. This had a negative effect on the women's movement capabilities and dispersed its efforts. This ultimately led to the absence of feminist agenda that had informed the Palestinian women's movement.

With the advent of the *intifada* (Uprising) the women's movement returned to its usual services – in the absence of the state – to fill the shortages caused by the political circumstances. Consequently, the political actions shifted back to social action. Works of relief, child care services, educating women became again as important as the resistance to the occupation in the agenda of women's organizations of the political factions.

Statistics show that 7% of the Palestinians who were killed during the period between 1987 and 1997, were women, while only 9% of the injured were reported to be women in the same period. In 1996, among the Palestinian prisoners who remained in detention in Israeli jails there were forty women.²

However, in that period, the work of those organizations was marked by the absence of a unified strategy until 1990, three years after the uprising started. Then Bisan Center held a conference in Jerusalem entitled "The Intifada and Some Social Issues for Women", at which women of different political orientations tried to evaluate the achievements of women during the previous stages and to draw a plan for the future of the feminist movement. The conference was a turning point in the Palestinian women's movement because it coincided with the start of Madrid negotiations and moving towards the peace process, Gaza-Jericho agreement and the Palestinian National Authority coming to the country. A new phase in the life of not only women but also the entire Palestinian people began. With the formal centre of power and the accompanying political and societal changes, the stress on consolidating and establishing the foundations of civil society that ensures the participation of all women and men in the construction process increased. Hopes were pinned on expanding the possibility of women's participation through creating a democratic atmosphere that allows women to show their efficiency and merits and to express their needs and problems. But these hopes soon somewhat faded because the National Authority did not intend the integration of women in the process of development and construction on a large scale. Only a few leading women were allowed to work for the government. This had a negative impact on the community-based organizations which absorbed a large number of Palestinian women during the occupation before the coming of the Palestinian National Authority. Two aspects should be taken into consideration here:

² Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistics of Women and Men*, Gaza, 1998, p. 162–163.

1. the tragic loss suffered by these organizations as a result of the lack of women's expertise and competencies in almost all fields (negative factor);
2. these organizations had been active in creating and promoting alternative leaders of different orientations (positive factor).

The time when women's organizations sought to gain a relative independence from the organizations they had grown within was marked by the growing feminist awareness, especially after the previous division into the political factions with their different attitudes towards the peace process and in view of no clear program for those organizations in the face of the changes that had taken place, let alone the dominance imposed by the political parties. Consequently, they started to struggle against this domination and tried to reduce it to the minimum. This led to crystallization of new goals and development of new programs, since there was a conviction that the basis upon which the former women's organizations had been founded was no longer valid in light of the new variables.

Forms of the exercise of women's political rights

1. Elections

The participation of Palestinian women in the legislative elections held on January 20, 1996 is considered the most modern form of political participation; it can be seen as an indicator of an increased political activity and social status of Palestinian women. Such participation was expressed enthusiastically in the slogans of their organizations. It was highlighted by Women's Affairs Assembly slogan which said "Women's Participation Makes the Event" to confirm and demonstrate the need for women's participation in political decision-making process.³

The number of registered women for the elections was 495,839, compared with 517,396 male voters out of 1,013,235, i.e. 49% women versus 51% men up to December 27, 1995⁴, while the total number of female candidates for the Legislative Council was 25 women out of 672 candidates, that is 3.7%. Sixteen women were independent candidates, 4 represented Fatah, 2 Fida Party, 2 Palestinian People Party and 1 representing the Arab Liberation Front. Only 5 women won; they were:

1. Hanan Ashrawi, an independent candidate from Jerusalem, got 17,944 votes;
2. Dalal Salameh, a Fatah Movement candidate, Nablus, 20,749 votes;
3. Jamilah Saidam, a Fatah Movement candidate, Deir El-Balah, 8,511 votes;
4. Intisar Al-Wazeer, Fatah movement / Gaza, 40,875 votes;
5. Rawya Shawa, independent / Gaza, 18,295 votes.

Mrs. Samiha Khalil Alqubbaj was the first Arab woman to run for the presidency, but she did not succeed.⁵

The winning of these five women in the first Palestinian elections was looked at as a major achievement of the Palestinian women's movement although it was very low and not equal to

³ Nader Ezzat, "Women and Elections", *Journal of Mowaten Foundation*, Ramallah, Palestine, p. 14.

⁴ Islah Jad, "The Feminist Movement and the Palestinian Legislative Elections", *Journal of Palestinian Politics*, Vol. 10, 1996, p. 19-25.

⁵ The Central Committee of the Elections in Palestine, Gaza, 1996.

the amount of the sacrifices made by Palestinian women. Yet, it indicated the growing women's awareness of their importance and presence in the decision-making process and developing goals and visions compatible with the new changes the feminist movement was undergoing. The reasons for the low representation of women in those elections could be sought in the electoral system, the dominance of patriarchal attitudes in the Palestinian society, discrimination against women and the influence of customs and traditions.

The absence of both the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front could be noted; it affected the representation of women negatively, although it was expected that their participation might sustain and strengthen the presence of women, and thus increase their chances in the elections. It was reported that the Fida Party accounted for the largest proportion of women among the candidates, reaching 18% compared with 12.5% of the Arab Liberation Front, 6.7 % of the Palestinian People Party, and 5.2% of the Fatah movement, while the percentage of independent women candidates was 64% versus 75% for independent male candidates.⁶

2. Women's participation in political (official and non-official) organizations

A) Official institutions and organizations

I. Women in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Despite the problem experienced by PLO, especially after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the return of most Palestinian institutions and a large number of leading Palestinian people to the occupied territories, it is still possible to see the status of Palestinian women in PLO through the interpretation of many of the attitudes and behaviors used against Palestinian women today. The present cannot be separated from the past. The PLO applied, in its institutions, the same policy the parties that belong to it used. This resulted in a decrease in the percentage of women in high positions who were very close to the decision-making and an increase in the least influential positions or centers. The proportion of women in the Palestinian National Council, for example, was 7.5% out of 744 members in 1996; all the 16 members of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLOEC), the highest executive body in PLO, were men.⁷

II. Women as Ministers

Until 1997, there had been only two women ministers out of twenty five; they were Mrs. Intisar Al- Wazir (Minister of Social Affairs) and Professor Hanan Ashrawi (Minister of Higher Education). The two ministries are traditionally linked to women. Later on, Prof. Ashrawi resigned. On the other side, all deputy ministries were men.⁸ Zuhaira Kamal was chosen to represent the Palestinian government of November 2003 as Minister of Women's Affairs, while Mariam Saleh represented the 2006 government. Kholoud Daibes served as the Tourism Minister in the national unity government of the Palestinian National Authority and continues to serve under the current emergency government as both Tourism Minister and Minister of Women's Affairs while Amal Syam, a member of the Palestinian group Hamas, served as the Minister of Women's Affairs in the March 2007 cabinet of the Palestinian

⁶ The Central Committee of the Elections in Palestine, Gaza, 1996.

⁷ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, p. 179.

⁸ Ibid., p. 188.

National Authority. Lamis Al-Alami was chosen to be the Minister of Culture in 2007; she is the Minister of Education and Higher Education in the current cabinet of Salam Fayyad.

III. Women and local governance

The importance of the elections and women's representation in the Legislative Council is really a matter of concern for the feminist movement in Palestine. Yet, their representation in the local councils is more important as it provides them an opportunity to take part in planning and applying related policies and legislations. It allows them to approach the masses and serves women through:

1. accepting the presence of women in public life and creating a social dialogue based on the principle of participation from both sides, which helps in the formation of a community fabric that incorporates women on the basis of their competence and capabilities;
2. enabling these women to impose their vision concerning women's issues through the available legal channels.

It is known that the Israeli military granted the Palestinian women voting rights in local council elections in 1974, but did not grant them the right to nominate themselves as candidates in the elections for those councils. It should be noted that there had been no elections for municipal councils in the Gaza Strip; the last time such elections were held in the West Bank was in 1977.⁹

Now in the Palestinian National Authority there are fifteen women among the 3,053 members of the local government councils, i.e. only 0.5%. The domination of men in these boards derives its importance from the direct role these councils play in education, health and social services programs.¹⁰ Ms. Suheir Ahmad Khan is the first Palestinian woman who headed a council in Khirbet Qais in Salfit District.¹¹

IV. Women and diplomacy

There is only one Palestinian woman acting as an ambassador. Mrs. Leila Shahid was appointed in August 1993 the ambassador in France as a culmination of several important positions she had occupied. She was the first student to head the General Union of Palestinian Students – France branch – in the 1970s; in 1989, she was appointed by the Executive Committee of the PLO a representative of the Palestinian Authority in Ireland, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Finally, she ended as Commissioner General of Palestine in France.

Can women's political participation be considered as an example of quota?

Since its beginnings, the Palestinian national movement has applied the principle of "quota" in women's representation for the sake of increasing women's participation in the national action and political struggle. The reasons for using this method can be sought in the objective conditions experienced by this movement, which was marked by geographical dispersion and the inability to communicate among the Palestinians inside and outside Palestine. But the new political circumstances that affected the national movement and the emergence of the Palestinian National Authority invite us to reconsider the feasibility of

⁹ United Nations Program for Development, *The Challenges and Options for Women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, Cairo: Arab Women Publishing House, p. 103.

¹⁰ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, p. 171.

¹¹ *Al-Ayyam Daily Newspaper*, Ramallah, 15/8/1999.

the quota. Consequently, a number of questions arises. Should the quota be supported at the current stage as an expression of genuine participation? Should it be adopted for good or just temporarily? What are the consequences, positive or negative, it might have on Palestinian women's movement?

Some women leaders supported the idea of quota on the premise that discrimination against women still exists in the Palestinian society and derives its strength from cultural and religious dimensions (customs, traditions, etc). They viewed it as an opportunity to increase the chances of their presence in the local communities.

Women's participation in political life is weak in terms of the role they play in the decision-making process and formulation of the general civil law. Women are a minority according to various statistical and substantive criteria; they are also a political minority.¹²

B) Non-official institutions and organizations

I. Women's participation in the political factions and parties

Despite the participation of women in the early political parties and factions, they did not manage to increase their political impact and remained weak in comparison with men, in addition to their exclusion from the high decision-making positions in those parties. Some of the Palestinian parties overtly adopt an ideology which promotes the integration of women in political and public life, but the gap between theory and practice remains wide. The domination of the political factor in the history of the Palestinian people has made the leaders focus on the identification of objectives and strategies related to the issues of freedom, postponing other issues until achieving the political objective. However, despite the failure of the national project and the emergence of new political parties, experience has proved that women's affairs are not central to the parties. This explains the low activity of Palestinian women at the present stage, especially in the absence of a clear strategy of those parties concerning the status of women and the lack of clear visions that would determine their positions.

The data indicate an inverse relationship between the proportion of women and the level of power; the number of women in senior positions in the parties decreases. For example, women make up 5% of the members of the Central Committee of Fatah movement, compared to 4% of the members of the Revolutionary Council. In the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine women represent 10% of the Central Committee; 30 % in the Executive Office of Fida Party compared to 19% in the Central Committee. This is the highest proportion of women's participation in political parties, although the Fida Party is small compared with the other parties.

The rate of women's participation in the structure of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the West Bank is higher than that in Gaza; the proportion of women in the Central Command in the West Bank is 18%, while it is 13% in the Gaza Strip. It is 19.5% in the Central Committee in the West Bank and 16.5% in Gaza. Although the representation of women in the central committees, the most important decision-making bodies for the different parties, is higher in the left-wing parties, it has remained a small proportion compared with the total percentage of women's representation. Furthermore, the presence of women in such

¹² Hussien Abu Rumman, *Jordanian Women and the Election Law*, Jordan: New Jordan Center, p. 35.

committees has not led to the imposition of policies and programs which would adopt a feminist agenda in parallel with an agenda for national action. Women continue to adopt a national project, which accounts for the priorities in their activities.¹³

II. Women's participation in trade unions

Trade unions are modern institutions brought about by the civil society; they are an indicator of prosperity of the civil society itself because they affect the behavior and concepts of broad sectors of the society. All individuals can join them regardless of their sex, customs, religion or political affiliation; they are based on the will to work in public interest, and thus represent an important support to civil society until it establishes the values of pluralism and democracy. Yet, the Arab world does lack the infrastructure and the suitable conditions for trade unions to carry out their duties. This weakens not only the structure, coherence and effectiveness of its trade unions, but extends to the structure of civil society as a whole. Trade unions, as institutions of popular masses, can play a major role in evaluating community awareness about women's issues through its extension to large segments of the public.¹⁴

If we look at the Palestinian case, we find that the number of members of trade unions is 63,054 persons, 11.4% of the total workforce in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹⁵ This indicates a general decline in the number of workers (men and women) in the unions. Women account for only 7.6% of the total membership of trade unions, which shows the low participation of women in the workforce, with 14.9% of the labor market. Data show that there is an increase in the number of women entering the labor unions in the Gaza Strip, particularly in the villages, despite the lack of women's work and an insignificant increase of the labor force there. This may be due to the difference in the attitude towards women's work under difficult economic circumstances, on the one hand, and to the shortage of work opportunities for women and reliance on trade unions to provide them, on the other.

Reasons for the low participation of women in trade unions

1. The situation of the trade union movement in general; they undergo division and fragmentation, internal and organizational conflicts.
2. Women's doubt the ability of unions to serve their interests.
3. The objectives of trade union were set by the political factions despite the changed political circumstances. The rights of women have been ignored for the sake of political activity.
4. Women's absence in decision-making positions in trade unions and the male predominance there.
5. The supremacy of customs and traditions that prevent women from joining trade unions for familial considerations.
6. Community's attitudes towards women's participation in public sectors and their presence in public places.

It is worth mentioning that the Department of Women's Affairs in the General Federation of Trade Unions in Palestine has been created to take care of the issues and concerns of

¹³ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, p. 171–172.

¹⁴ Arab Organization for Human Rights in Britain, *Freedom of Expression and the Right of Political Participation*, London, August 2007.

¹⁵ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, p. 174–176.

women workers, enhance their participation in the trade union movement by raising their efficiency and skill and qualify women to lead the trade union movement. It can be a positive step, if the set purposes have been achieved and efforts are made to increase the participation of women and help them achieve a better position. This would mean a development policy which does not exclude their presence as real participants in society building.¹⁶

III. Women's participation in non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

The participation of Palestinian women in non-governmental organizations is the largest, the oldest and most versatile and effective, despite the decline in this participation in terms of both quantity and quality. Palestinian women have found a real outlet in these organizations that have arisen in the absence of the state institutions. They have given the Palestinian woman the opportunity to prove her existence as an active member in the community and a real participant in handling the issues and problems despite the various difficulties the Israeli occupation caused. NGOs used to be seen as institutions of a political nature, carrying the issue of national liberation as a priority.

During the *intifada*, women accounted for the work of these organizations, and often managed most of them because they had more freedom than men who were targeted by the occupation forces or because of men's absence due to detention or deportation, etc. Therefore, we can look at these institutions as a product of the political realities and an answer to an urgent need for social support. It goes without saying that at the stage when political action dominates women's issues do not become a top priority. Women were accepting jobs in the non-governmental organizations motivated by national and patriotic considerations. But gradually, with the decline of the Palestinian national project, and the stagnation of political parties, especially the leftist ones, women's interest in national action began to fade out and was replaced by a new sense of retreat, frustration and uselessness of any activity. A sense of shock caused by the sudden political changes made individuals and institutions seek an answer to a very urgent question: What is the point of what we do?

After the Oslo Agreement, women's organizations in particular, and the feminist movement in general, faced a confusing situation because they had to operate within the new agenda that differed from that previously settled, especially in light of the transition towards the state, i.e. the move to legislations and policies that do not adopt ideas about the national liberation. The feminist movement was then compelled to find its own identity and voice, under circumstances that distorted the historical role of these organizations. It did not form – despite its plurality and differences – a vision and clear strategic dimension of its future work under the new conditions imposed by agreements with Israel. The lack of a unified vision made it react in an opposite direction to the pre-Oslo era. Thus, it confined to itself and adopted work policies isolated from the social and political reality of the Palestinian society.

Women's organizations treated gender issues apart from the social and political context in which they operated. Consequently, they have lost much of their popularity, especially that which was gained during the uprising. They have raised issues of interest to women

¹⁶ Amenah Rimawi, "Arab Woman and Political Participation", *Journal of The Voice of Women*, Vol. 43, p. 23.

who were no longer associated with real work of these organizations. Gradually women's organizations have confined themselves to meeting the demands and interests of the donors and helping the community in the implementation of programs and activities that do not have anything to do with politics. The result is that these organizations have become isolated from the masses through avoiding the national liberation issues, which are still vivid in Palestinian reality, and therefore one cannot find organizations dealing with the issues of women in the camps, for example.

Active women have contented themselves with carrying banners that included the word „women” or „feminism”; they have chosen to stay calm under the law of the authority that overlooks them, and marginalizes any role they could play in the society. They have started to act in training and planning workshops and confined themselves within very narrow topics that are repeated on every occasion. The masses have always been far from all activities devoid of the element of aspiring to the national liberation. Despite all these activities, women remained far from decision-making positions in health, education, population policy and development sectors.

It is worth mentioning that 23% of the administrative staff of the NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are women.¹⁷ According to a study funded by the United Nations Development Program, there were about 174 organizations in the occupied territories in 1993, of which only 34 in the Gaza Strip. At the end of 2005, “there were at least 1,200 Palestinian NGOs operating in a geo-political space equivalent to the size of Washington DC and Delaware combined. According to the World Bank, 200 of these are foreign run, 400 are local and organized under the umbrella of the General Union of Charitable Organizations, 90 are organized under the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations’ Network (PNGO) and a couple hundred others are divided among 4 other NGO Unions”.¹⁸ One cannot ignore the role played by these institutions in the service of women's issues, especially in the absence of the breadwinner.¹⁹ Such a role was of a social nature, mainly in a form of temporary relief.

IV. Women's participation in public sector jobs

Not many women work in the leading positions, have direct impact on decision-making process, or influence the public opinion. For example, there are only two women working in the judiciary sector, Saud Dajani, and Salwa Sayegh; there is no female district attorney because men monopolize this position as well as that of the Attorney General.

It must be noted that despite the absence of explicit discrimination against women in the judicial system, there is almost a complete exclusion of them. The question is: “was it sufficient not to have an explicit discrimination against women in the law?” Experts maintain that more effective measures are required to guarantee women's right to participate because having women working in the judicial system does not, by itself, guarantee the protection of their rights and women must have the ability and willingness to strengthen their presence and their rights to work in the judicial system.

¹⁷ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, p. 173.

¹⁸ Uda Olabarria Walker, “NGOs and Palestine”. Left Turn. Retrieved, 28. 8. 2009, <http://www.leftturn.org/?q=node/471>

¹⁹ United Nations Program for Development, *The Challenges and Options for Women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, 2004, p. 109.

So far in the occupied Palestinian territories there are no women chief editors of daily or weekly newspapers; yet there have emerged chief editors of weekly or monthly magazines run by women organizations which focus on news reports that lack intellectual analysis.

Reasons of Palestinian women's apathy as regards political participation

A. Reasons related to the community

1. There is no doubt that the reluctance of Palestinian women from political participation is inseparable from the reluctance of the society as a whole, where the flabby political climate diffuses an atmosphere of frustration, apathy and futility, thereby generating a disbelief in influencing or getting involved in policy-making and decision-making processes. This is evident in the decline of the popularity of factions and parties, and their inability to renew themselves because of their members' inability to put forward alternative policies or solutions to the problems faced by the public, not to mention the internal problems faced by these parties, such as failure to exercise democratic methods, the hegemony of the party leaders in decision-making processes within it, which have led to a state of apparent unwillingness of the public to join and participate in these parties, on the one side, and the migration of their members, on the other. Therefore, women, as part of this society, also are affected by such a situation, since these parties, in addition to bureaucracy, do not pay enough attention to the concerns of women, whose needs and aspirations are not included in their programs.

2. The absence of a general tendency of the state to adopt policies and programs that would support women in the formal and informal policies. This has caused women to lose much of their prestige and has weakened their role and participation.

3. The existence of laws and legislations that allow discrimination against women.

4. Society's perception of women as its members of the second rate, and consequently, of their role as subordinate to that of men.

B. Reasons related to women themselves

1. Many women do not realize their ability for political action; they consider it a detracting element which cancels their femininity. This may be due to the way of socialization which supports this view, and emphasizes the primary function of a woman as a wife and mother.

2. Women's lack of interest in developing their political awareness through participating in political matters. They content themselves with practicing a role in the community far from decision-making process.

3. Lack of confidence among women, and lack of voters' support for women candidates. Women prefer to vote for men, on the premise that they are more appropriate for political action and holding responsibility.

4. Low level of education among women, which is reflected negatively in their lack of readiness for political as well as social participation.

C. Reasons related to the concept of political participation

There is no doubt that finding an inclusive definition of the concept of political participation is almost impossible; this has led to further confusion about this concept, sometimes enigmatic, and sometimes loose. It is known that most of the definitions focus on participating in elections, nominations and party membership. These are indicators that usually reflect the reluctance of women from participation. But with the reduced role of political parties and mass electoral apathy worldwide as a result of international developments, a new concept

has been introduced, i.e. popular participation, which focuses on the importance of NGOs and their role in development. Palestinian women, here, are a key element in these organizations, where women manage most of them. It must be emphasized that the lack of participation through voting and nominations does not hinder political participation through other channels, such as institutions of civil society or non-governmental organizations. However, during the *intifada* and after the many political changes that happened in Palestine women's influx into the civil work would suggest something different.

It should be noted that a large number of women who worked for long periods of time for parties or factions has moved to work in the field of non-governmental organizations. Thus, another political participation has begun to replace the old limited understanding of political participation as a result of many political, economic and social factors. Hence, there emerges a need to re-consider the former definition of political participation, and not to focus on voting and elections or membership of political parties. It is necessary to take into account the political participation of women in the informal areas, where many women preside and manage many societies and organizations, and participate in the training of their members to take the initiative and not to rely on formal institutions to solve their problems and discover the methods and techniques to overcome these problems.

The future of the political participation of Palestinian women

Is not easy to describe or even predict the future of political participation of Palestinian women without knowing the identity of the Palestinian Women's Movement, in terms of features and the nature of the determinants and aspirations that control it. But an accurate reading of the identity of the political realities of the Palestinian community helps predict that future. The Israeli occupation still constitutes the greatest dilemma for the Palestinian society; it controls the land and natural as well as human resources; and it even becomes more sophisticated as a result of the processes of peaceful settlement which coincides with the transition towards the state with all its complexities and difficulties. The feminist movement found itself within the historical mess when the National Program of the PLO was replaced with that of Oslo Agreement, creating a sharp division that led to the fragmentation of the Palestinian national cause and the collapse of consensus to resist the occupation. As a result, the feminist movement has lost much of support of the masses.

This has affected negatively the women's movement that suffered confusion between the two programs, the National program and the social program. The debate, often sterile, about the priorities of action posed by the political changes continued for a long time.²⁰

However, the orientations of donors and the status of Palestinian women under the new situation, i.e. the settlement peace process, have not given Palestinian women's organizations an opportunity to choose or even to wait. They have chosen the social program on the assumption that the process of change allows a room to negotiate about social rights – which were previously overlooked – within the emerging structures of the state.²¹ Hence, the women's movement is trying its best to influence the social policy and the legislations that

²⁰ Rima Nazzal, "Palestinian Women's Movement: Is it a fate?", *Royya Okhra Magazine*, Vol. 11, 1999, p. 19–21.

²¹ Quttab Eileen, Quttab & Reema Hammami, "New strategies in the work of the feminist movement", *Royya Okhra Magazine*, Vol. 11, 1999, p. 16.

support these policies. It has dealt, excessively, with gender issues and thus has become isolated from the major challenges posed by the occupation and democratization. It is also to be noted that the Palestinian Authority tends to contain important women leaders within its organs and institutions as supporters of its attitudes and policies. This has distorted the image of the feminist movement and marginalized women's issues and concerns.

Therefore, all endeavors to improve women's participation should begin now. Women should try their best to avoid the sense of satisfaction about little gains they achieve here or there. They should have a clear strategy that ensures a greater participation of women and seeks experienced members with high merits and qualifications that are ready to serve the purposes of the feminist movement in general.

Conclusions

1. Women of Palestine are part of a whole; they cannot be separated from the society in which they live in. What affects the community affects them too. Consequently, activating the role of Palestinian women entails activating the society which represents their real work environment.

2. The political circumstances gave the Palestinian women an opportunity to go to the public life by engaging in the national movement, but they did not make use of it. This delayed their access to the essential rights, including equality, freedom and non-discrimination.

3. Palestinian women's top priority, even before the Oslo Agreement, was centered on the national cause; they overlooked a lot of social demands. The result was that women remained in their place and reduced their chances to achieve a higher status in society.

4. The Palestinian *intifada* was a powerful factor that urged women to reconsider the role assigned to them in the community through improving the community's perception of them by activities imposed by the circumstances. Yet, women's organizations did not make sufficient advantage of this and consequently did not adopt a satisfactory strategy of reaching consensus about priority issues.

5. The orientation of women's institutions has changed, especially after the Madrid Conference and Oslo Agreement; they have indulged in cases isolated from the issues of women's liberation and rights.

6. The first Palestinian elections marked the first real form of women's political participation after the entry of the Palestinian National Authority. When five women became members of the Legislative Council, they paved the way for a greater representation of women in various social or political arenas.

7. Women participation in governmental positions, diplomacy and municipal councils does not meet the principle of equality, nor is it commensurate with the size of women's presence in the national authorities.

8. The debate about the legitimacy of women's quota is still hot; should it be adopted, or is it no longer compatible with the most recent phase, which rejects the old qualifications for nominations such as the history of struggle, and party affiliation? It is necessary to answer this question.

9. Despite the fact that political parties and factions have been adopting progressive attitudes and strategies about the status of Palestinian women, the status of women in these parties shows that there is a great difference between the theory and practice.

10. The participation of Palestinian women in the non-governmental organizations is the most widespread, and the most capable of achieving a good status for Palestinian women that would enable them to influence the public policy.

11. There is complete absence of women in public jobs which are directly related to the formation of public policy and decision-making processes.

12. Palestinian women's participation in decision-making processes and in high government positions is still weak and limited and hinders the integration of women in the development process and the possibility of influencing the policy-making or introducing amendments to the existing legislations.

13. The existing concepts and norms and, sometimes, the lack of women's awareness of their rights and potentials constitute an obstacle to women's access to senior positions of leadership in the legislative, judicial and other fields.

Recommendations

This paper has been an attempt to portray the political participation of Palestinian women. In order to support their participation, the researcher recommends the following:

1. There is a need to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of democratic life, until it becomes a way of living, by adopting the principle of political pluralism and strengthening the role of institutions as well as the rule of law.

2. Women should be treated as active members of the society and they are important in building and developing it. The whole community should overlook certain traditions and attitudes that encourage and provoke the conflict between the two genders in the Palestinian society.

3. There should be statistical data bases based on gender to give greater opportunities to conduct specialized researches on issues and problems related to Palestinian women, which would enable the community to develop policies of integrating women, effectively, in all areas.

4. The image of women should be improved in the media and school books, and the role of their struggle and their contribution to the public life must be highlighted.

5. The inherited norms and conceptions need to be adjusted by highlighting the positive and suppressing the negative ones.

6. Equality in employment opportunities should be maintained.

7. The community should raise women's awareness and develop their skills and abilities to increase their participation in public life through providing sufficient training in the fields of politics as well as moral and material support, in addition to training programs that enhance their skills.

8. People should respect the rule of gender equality in practicing political rights and participating in legislative institutions and councils.

9. The government should reconsider the curricula to include civic education which contributes to the development of awareness, deepening the concepts of democracy and human rights and strengthening civil society institutions.

IRENA KAŁUŻYŃSKA

Famous Women in the History of China

1. Introduction

Physiological differences between men and women and philosophical differences in the attitude to the both sexes have brought about great dissimilarities in their productive activities, social roles, and other aspects. China's long tradition of male dominance and patriarchal authority based on the patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence was deeply embedded in its culture and institutions. Chinese women were under heavy oppression, philosophically and legally, for thousands of years before the introduction of modern Western ideas of equality. In the "Foreword" to the publication *Women of China* one can read: "Women were overlooked as individuals, their voices were not heard and their wisdom was neglected. In the feudal society, which lasted several millennia, women experienced a bitter history of prolonged oppression by the regime, clan power, divine power and the authority of the husband".¹

The paper tries to give an insight into the system of values and preferences in the traditional patrilineal Chinese society, especially moral standards and expectations connected with women, their life roles and their social status. The investigation is mainly based upon the research material consisting of biographical notes of 999 famous Chinese women, born in various periods of the history of China. The division of the women in accordance to the time of their birth as connected with the rules of succeeding Chinese dynasties or historical periods goes as below:

- 30 women born under the Shang Dynasty (1766–1122) or legendary persons;
- 100 women born under the Zhou Dynasty (1122–256);
- 4 women born under the Qin Dynasty (221–206);
- 89 women born under the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.);
- 15 women born in the Three Kingdoms period (220–280);
- 36 women born under the Jin I Dynasty (265–420);
- 77 women born under the Sixteen Kingdoms and Southern and Northern Dynasties (304–581);
- 13 women born under the Sui Dynasty (581–618);
- 122 women born under the Tang Dynasty (618–907);

¹ All-China Women's Federation (ed.), *Women in China*, Beijing: China International Confederation, 2004, p. 4.

- 41 women born in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (907–979);
- 68 women born under the Song Dynasty (960–1279);
- 22 women born under the Liao Dynasty (916–1125) and Jin II Dynasty (1115–1234);
- 40 women born under the Yuan Dynasty (1260–1368);
- 138 women born under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1662);
- 204 women born under the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) to approximately 1880.

These famous Chinese women have been selected from two Chinese biographical dictionaries:

(1) *Zhongguo renming da cidian* 中國人名大辭典 (The Great Dictionary of Chinese Persons), edited by Zang Lihe 臧勵和, published in 1921 by Shangwu Yinshuguan in Shanghai (hereafter referred to as ZRD). ZRD contains biographical notes of about 40,000 persons living from the ancient times to the end of the Qing Dynasty (born approximately up to 1880). Among the persons recorded there have been found 900 famous women (2.25% of all the persons recorded).

(2) *Huaxia funü mingren cidian* 華夏婦女名人詞典 (Dictionary of Famous Chinese Women), published in 1988 by Huaxia Chubanshe in Beijing (hereafter referred to as “Dictionary”). The “Dictionary” contains biographical notes on about 3,400 famous women from the ancient times up to approximately 1970 (216 women born up to 1880).

2. The sex inequality and the status of women in the traditional Chinese society

The original social system in China, according to legends, was a matriarchal one, where people knew only their mothers. Therefore, in the beginning of Chinese civilization women probably had a high status in the matriarchal clan. However, the matriarchal system is almost not traceable in any historical documents, the only traces could be seen in the earliest family names, as the Chinese character for the term *xìng* 姓 “family name; surname; clan-name” and many of characters noting ancient *xìng*-names contain the radical *nǚ* 女 “woman”.² Some legends indicate the existence of a period called Nü Huang 女皇 “Woman Ruler”, and many tales about Nügua or Nüwa 女媧, the female creator of the world, can be found in almost all ancient records.³ On the other hand, many legends also show the servitude condition of women prior to the formation of the patriarchal society. Evidently, in historical times the women’s high status in society disappeared, and in the patriarchal society women had to submit to men’s rule. Women were generally taken to men by force, which can be seen in the form of the Chinese character used for notation of the word *qǔ* 娶 “to take a wife; to marry”, derived from the word *qǔ* 取 “to take; to get”. The written form reveals its original meaning of “taking a

² Ruofu Du, “Surnames in China”, *Journal of Chinese Linguistics*, Vol. 14, 1986, p. 317; Runsheng Li, *Zhengti, biaode, meicheng – xingming wenhua zashuo* (Standard Names, Names Revealing Virtue, Beautiful Appellations – Talks on Personal Names Culture), Beijing: Huawen Chubanshe, 1997, p. 8–9; Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, “The Origin of Chinese Clan Names”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, Vol. 19, 1954, p. 27–28; Tingdong Yuan, *Guren chengwei* (Appellations of Ancient People), Chengdu: Sichuan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1994, p. 1–2.

³ “Dictionary”, p. 22; *Hanyu Dacidian* (Great Dictionary of Chinese Language), Hanyu Dacidian Chubanshe, 1994, Vol. 4, p. 263; Kang-hu Kiang, *Chinese Civilization. An Introduction to Sinology*. Shanghai: Chung Hwa Book Co., LTD, 1935, p. 131; ZRD, p. 20.4.

captive”: a hand holding the left ear of a war prisoner, as left ears were lopped off as testimony of military exploits.⁴ Later on, women were sold and bought for concubines or maids as slaves. Such practices survived long after the establishment of the matrimonial system. Later there was a common custom among the nobles to marry girls of one family in a group: the elder girl would be the first wife and the others, her sisters and nieces, the concubines and maids. Such “marriage en suite” lasted until the Warring States Period (480–249), and many cases of such marriages are recorded in the histories of the feudal states.⁵

The progressive sex segregation and evident subjection of Chinese women followed the increasing development of the Chinese civilization and social philosophy, formulated by Confucius (551–479). The separation of sexes in China or elsewhere in the world did not start as an abstract ideology, but as a pragmatic custom of simple agricultural societies, where gendered occupations and customs kept men and women apart for many hours every day. Therefore, the sex segregation and distinct differentiation of male and female social roles were a fact of a daily life long before the emergence of a sophisticated rhetoric to justify it. The separation of sexes in China was also encouraged by marriage customs, especially by the principle of clan exogamy, restricting interactions, pursuant to the prohibition of incest, between men and women with the same surname. Under the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (770–249) this physical separation of the sexes started to be seen as a lofty moral principle and it began to transform into an abstract elite ideology.⁶

The reason for the sex inequality in Chinese philosophy should also be traced back to the root in the oldest classic, *Yijing* 易經 (Book of Changes), which was later reformulated by Confucius.⁷ From the single origin two opposite but complementary forces or principles were drawn: *yáng* 陽 or “the positive/active/light”, and *yīn* 陰 or “the negative/passive/dark”, and through deductive methods all the universal phenomena were then divided into two classes. The heaven, the sun, a man and almost all “good” objects and terms were classed as belonging to the *yáng* force, while the earth, the moon, a woman and, unfortunately, all objects and terms specified as bad or not worthy belonged to the *yīn* force. This fundamental dualistic outlook and the use of abstract binary pairs such as *yáng/yīn*, heaven/earth, positive/negative associated with the gender, as a template for social organization made hierarchy an integral part of the natural order, and led females into undesirable associations not only in terminology, but also in sociology. One can read: “A man is in preference to a woman; the reason is that the force is in preference to weakness. The heaven is in preference to the earth, and a ruler is in preference to a subject. The reason is the same 男先於女，剛柔之義也。天先乎地，君先於臣，其義一也”.⁸ One can also read: “The yin [to which a woman belongs] is lowly, and should not have the initiative; it

⁴ Kiang, *Chinese Civilization*..., p. 131; Hongyuan Wang, *Hanzi ziyuan rumen* (The Origins of Chinese Characters), Beijing: Sinolingua, 1993, p. 164.

⁵ Kiang, *Chinese Civilization*..., p. 132.

⁶ Bret Hinsch, “The Origins of Separation of the Sexes in China”, *Journal of American Oriental Society*, 123, 3, p. 597–598.

⁷ Kiang, *Chinese Civilization*..., p. 222–223; Yutang Lin, *My Country and My People*, London, Toronto: William Heinemann Ltd., 1936, p. 131.

⁸ *Liji* (Notes on Rites), Beijing: Shisanjing Zhushu, 1957, p. 1209.

proceeds to the yang in order to be completed. Therefore the Chuan [Zuozhuan]⁹ says: ‘the yang leads, the yin conforms; the man goes [ahead], the woman follows’.¹⁰ The differentiation of sexes was thus justified as consistent with the transcendental cosmology. Most Chinese philosophers were not free from the influence of this conception and considered women as a somewhat inferior sex.

The reason for the sex inequality may also be found in the requirements of the cult of ancestors, the earliest faith since the establishment of the clan system and the backbone of the Chinese ancient civilization. The cult is connected with the belief that all lives are granted by Heaven to which they return after death. Individual spirits remain conscious and watch the deeds of their offspring on Earth. The greatest filial obligation performed towards one’s forefathers in Heaven is to worship deceased ancestors as if they were still living. The needs of the spirits of the deceased ancestors could be solely met by male descendants, and those who had not provided for male posterity became lonely hungry ghosts doing harm to the living. It was quite logical that a woman couldn’t perform sacrifices to the ancestors, because she was only a temporary member of her own clan, as the residence pattern of marriage was patrilocal. Until the day of her marriage, she was a resident in her father’s house. After the marriage, she left her own family and undertook the responsibilities of her husband’s clan.

As early as the time of folk songs, collected in *Shijing* 詩經 (Book of Poetry) also by Confucius, there was evidence of a sexual inequality, e.g. when a baby boy was born, he was laid on the bed and given jade to play with, and when a baby girl was born, she was laid on the floor and given a tile.¹¹ However, throughout the folk songs of the “Book of Poetry” there are no evident traces of the seclusion of women. Many verses depict a time when unmarried women felt no need to keep apart from men, and intimacy outside of marriage was not totally unacceptable. There was something of the freedom in the choice of mates and there were some examples of women running away with their lovers. Records pertaining to the Spring and Autumn Period (722–481) also include many examples of adulteries committed by women, divorces, and remarriages.

Confucian social philosophy stood for a society with emphasis on sexual differentiations, separation of men and women, on recognition of authority in a family as in a state, and on the division of labour into man’s duties outside and women’s duties inside the household. The sexual differentiation was just a part of a much larger project considered necessary for a social harmony. *Liji* says: “By establishing the distinction between male and female, the relations between husband and wife are regulated in conformity with the principles of morality and justice. Only when males and females are treated differently, can proper relations between husband and wife be established in conformity with the principles of morality and justice 而所以成男女之別而立夫婦之義也。男女有別，而後夫婦有義”。¹²

⁹ *Zuozhuan* (Zuo’s Commentary) is one of the ancient (5th century B.C.) commentaries on the *Chunqiu* (Annals of Spring and Autumns), a chronicle probably written by Confucius, and dealing with important events in the state of Lu in the period 722–479.

¹⁰ Po Hu T’ung, *The Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall*, transl. Tjan Tjoe Som, Leiden, 1952, p. 243.

¹¹ Lin, *My Country and My People...*, p. 131.

¹² *Liji...*, p. 2385; *The Book of Rites (Selections)*, A Chinese-English Bilingual Edition, Jinan: Shandong Friendship Press, 2000, p. 400–401.

According to this point of view, men and women ought to be separated and their functions different. One can read: “Man occupies his [rightful] place outside and woman occupies her [rightful] place inside 男子居外女子居内”¹³; “Man speaks not of inside affairs and woman speaks not of outside affairs 男不言内女不言外”¹⁴; “Man and woman do not share clothing. Inner affairs are not spoken outside. Outer affairs are not spoken inside 男女不通衣裳。内言不出 外言不入”¹⁵; “Men and women do not sit next to each other. They do not share clothes-horses and do not share towels and combs (...) Outside gossips do not enter through the door, words spoken inside do not go out through the door 男女不雜坐, 不同橈枷, 不同巾櫛(...) 外言不入於櫺, 内言不出於櫺”¹⁶. The distinction between *wài* 外 “outer; outside” and *nèi* 内 “inner; inside” had a major impact on gender relations in China. Women started to be generally associated with the inner-domestic space and men with the outer-public space. As the separation of sexes developed from common work roles into explicit moralized rules of behaviour, “inner” and “outer” became an important mechanism of the further separation. Although men and women performed many different tasks every day, the gendered labour had been simplified into two normative types: men grow grain outside and women produce cloth inside the house. Keeping men and women in their appropriate spaces provoked profound consequences, from the harmony within the family to the success of the dynasty, and to the proper functioning of natural phenomena in the world.¹⁷

In the best spirit of Confucianism the sexual differentiation was not considered a kind of subjection but the harmony of relationships, although the basic notions of woman’s inferiority were obvious there, like the tradition that men could remarry but women could not, or the rule that a husband’s mourning period for his wife was one year, whereas a wife’s mourning period for a husband was three years, and children’s mourning period for a mother was one year and for a father – three years.¹⁸ The most lasting contribution to the enhancement of the position of women of empress Wu, Wu Zetian 武則天 (625–705), the only woman in China’s history to occupy the imperial throne as the Son of Heaven (cf. 4.2), was her extension of the period of mourning for a mother from one year to three years, the same length as the period of mourning for a father.¹⁹

The time from the Warring States Period through the Western Han Dynasty (206–9) was the most important era in the Chinese gender differentiation history. Many cultural ideals, as the principles to be aimed at, originated at that time. People of that early period set down basic definitions of Chinese womanhood that were invested by later people with enormous authority and respect.

¹³ *Liji*..., p. 1272.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1240.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1241.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 82–83.

¹⁷ Hinsch, “The Origins of Separation of the Sexes in China”..., p. 602.

¹⁸ Lin, *My Country and My People*..., p. 133–134.

¹⁹ Wilt Idema, Beata Grant, *The Red Brush. Writing Women of Imperial China*, Cambridge (Massachusetts), London: Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 65.

3. Moral expectations and standards for “true” Chinese women

The Confucian moral expectations and standards for women crystallized into *sāncóng sīdé* 三從四德 “three submissions and four virtues”. According to *Liji*, “three submissions” of women were: “obedience to father and elder brothers before marriage, to husband after marriage, and to son after husband’s death 幼從父兄，嫁從夫，夫死從子”.²⁰ “Three submissions” meant three “live for” of women. The chief purpose of the female existence in old China was not to live for herself or even for the society, the chief purpose of a “true” or decent woman was to live selflessly for her parents, her husband and her children, to be a good daughter, wife and mother. It reads: “The Religion of Selflessness is the religion of the woman, especially, the gentlewoman or lady in China”.²¹ Therefore, the ideal woman in China, as woman’s obligations were concerned, was symbolized as a *shūnǚ* 淑女 “grateful daughter”, *liángqī* 良妻 “faithful wife”, and *xiànmǔ* 賢母 “kind mother”, and she was respected as an unselfish being, since she lived to serve her parents, her husband, and her children.²² However, it ought to be noticed that the obedience of a mother to her son was rarely carried on owing to the superior position of the mother (as a parent) in the Confucian scheme of relationships. In *Xiaojing* 孝經 (Classic of the Filial Piety), the book on filial obligations of unclear authorship, completed during the Han Dynasty, one can read: “In ancient times, the illustrious kings served their fathers with filial piety, and accordingly they served Heaven with intelligence and according to the climatic change of seasons; they served their mothers with filial piety, and accordingly they served Earth discreetly, distinguishing the advantages and disadvantages of different soils as to use them properly”.²³ Still, if a widow had a son who was still a child, she was expected to head the household only until he was old enough to overtake this duty. If an heir-apparent was too young or otherwise incapable of governing, his mother, the empress dowager, would serve as the head of the imperial government as regent for her son.²⁴ Females as additions to men were economically dependent on the family estate, and they did not have any shareholding rights in that estate. They did not own any immovable property nor had they rights to inherit it.

The required “four virtues” of women were: “woman’s [moral] character, woman’s [proper] speech, woman’s [modest] manners and woman’s [diligent] work 婦德，婦言，婦容，婦功”.²⁵ These were also the same four essentials in the conduct of women as laid down in *Nüjie* 女誡 (Precepts for Daughters), written by Ban Zhao 班昭 (49– ca. 118), a great woman-scholar, sister of the historian Ban Gu 班固 (32–92) of the Han Dynasty, and quoted in full in her biography in *Lienü zhuan* 烈女傳 (Biographies of Exemplary Women) of the *Hou Han shu* 後漢書 (History of the Later Han Dynasty). There is also another interesting statement there: “*Yin* and *yang* differ fundamentally, so behaviour of a man and a woman are different. Force is a virtue of *yang*, and submission is a use of *yin*. A man is respected for his strength, a woman is praised for her weakness 陰陽殊性，男女異行.

²⁰ *Liji*..., p. 1209.

²¹ Hung-ming Ku, *The Spirit of the Chinese People*, Peking: The Peking Daily News, 1915, p. 82.

²² Kiang, *Chinese Civilization*..., p. 224–225; Ku, *The Spirit of the Chinese People*..., p. 79.

²³ *The Classic of Filial Piety*. A Chinese-English Bilingual Edition. Jinan: Shandong Friendship Press, 1998 (first published 1993), p. 29.

²⁴ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 17.

²⁵ *Liji*..., p. 2387; Zhouli (Rites of Zhou), Beijing: Shisanjing Zhushu, 1957, p. 269.

陽以剛為德，陰以柔為用，男以強為貴，女以弱為美”。²⁶ According to further explanations, womanly character meant no extraordinary talents or intelligence, but modesty, cheerfulness, chastity, constancy, orderliness, blameless conduct and perfect manners. Womanly speech meant an accurate choice of words, without using a coarse or rough language, knowing when to speak and when to stop speaking. It was considered to be a refined and well-restrained conversation, without any special eloquence or brilliance, although some literary attainments were welcome, especially in noble families. Womanly manners or appearances meant not only a physical beauty or prettiness of a face, but, first of all, personal cleanliness and faultlessness in clothing. Womanly work meant no special skill or ability, but a great care and steadfastness at work, without wasting time on unimportant activities.²⁷ Ban Zhao was the great exponent of “three submissions and four virtues” of women, codified into something like a “feminine ethics”, quite distinct from that for men. “Precepts for Daughters”, later considered a moral tract for women in general and usually translated as “Precepts for Women”, marked the beginning of a tradition of moral tracts written by women for women, in which the subordination of women to men was presented as an accepted fact of life. Other preserved examples of the women-authored moral tracts include *Nü xiaojing* 女孝經 (Classic of Filial Piety for Women), by Lady Zheng, 鄭氏 (c. 730), and *Nü lunyu* 女論語 (Analects for Women) by Song Ruoxin 宋若莘 (?–820), dated from the 8th and 9th centuries.²⁸ These Tang Dynasty texts placed primary stress on the duties of married women as daughters-in-law. And, whereas Ban Zhao advocated a literary education for girls, these later texts did not raise the problem. In time of the Ming Dynasty, Xu Empress, Xu Huanghou 許皇后 (1362–1407), wrote the moral booklet entitled *Neixun* 內訓 (Household Instructions) in order to instruct the women of the Inner Palace how to nourish one’s virtuous nature and to be attentive to one’s speech and actions.²⁹

The moral standards for women could also be found in collections of biographies of Chinese women considered as exemplary ones. The earliest collection of such biographies is the already mentioned “Biographies of Exemplary Women” of the Han Dynasty. It presented sketches of wise mothers, chaste wives, filial daughters, eloquent concubines, and also some seductive favorites and depraved women, all of them classified under seven headings, being simultaneously the titles of the chapters. These are: *mǔ yí* 母儀 “maternal rectitude”, *xián míng* 賢明 “sagely intelligence”, *rén zhì* 仁智 “benevolent wisdom”, *zhēn shùn* 貞順 “purity and obedience”, *jiē yì* 節義 “chastity and righteousness”, *biàn tōng* 辯通 “skill in arguments”, *niè bì* 孽嬖 “depravity and lechery”. The work became the required reading for women as presenting both models to follow and examples to avoid. Collections of the biographies of exemplary women were later on continued as parts of 14 of 24 standard histories of China, becoming one of the main sources of information on Chinese females.

²⁶ Ye Fan (comp.), *Hou Han shu* (History of the Later Han Dynasty), Beijing: Tuanjie Chubanshe, 1996, p. 815.

²⁷ Fan, *Hou Han shu*..., p. 815–816.

²⁸ “Dictionary”, p. 353; Patricia Buckley Ebrey, “The Book of Filial Piety for Women Attributed to a Woman Née Zheng (ca. 730)”, in: *Under Confucian Eyes. Writings on Gender in Chinese History*, S. Mann, Yu-Yin Cheng (eds.), Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001, p. 47–48; Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 13; ZRD, p. 352.1; 1556.4.

²⁹ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 309.

The moral tracts for women and “Biographies of Exemplary Women” placed great emphasis on the subordination and seclusion of decent Chinese women. However, such texts were rather prescriptive than descriptive, and the discrepancy between norms and reality inescapably occurred.

The different ideal of womanhood involved a different training for daughters and sons. A girl from approximately the age of ten was being prepared for the responsibilities of wifehood and motherhood. *Liji* says: “After the age of ten, a girl is not to go out any more. Then, her tutoress should teach her how to be gentle in speech, decorous in appearance and meek and agreeable in manner. Besides, she should be taught to perform the household duties of the womenfolk, such as processing hemp and silk and weaving”.³⁰ The girl began to learn the manners of womanliness, and seclude herself within “the inner quarters”, the area located in the back part of the house that was reserved for the women of the household. She cultivated the charm of distance and mystery, and the more she was distant and secluded the more she was worth. The quality of modesty was considered the essence of all womanly qualities. The more a woman had this quality developed in her, the more she had of the womanliness or of the femininity, the more she was a perfect or ideal woman. The quality of modesty in the Chinese feminine ideal “makes or ought to make every true Chinese woman instinctively feel and know that it is wrong to show herself in public; that it is indecent, according to the Chinese idea, to go on platform and sing before a crowd in the hall”.³¹ The main occupations of women were housekeeping, cooking, weaving, and needlework. However, in the poorer classes women worked as men did on farms and later also in factories. In noble families some pictorial and musical skills were also often required. In scholars’ families the girls learned to read and to write. The content of this literary education was limited to some chosen masterpieces of literature, poetry, history and human wisdom of life. However, some aristocratic families in the 11th century were well known for the high level of literary accomplishments of their female members. At the same time, girls were almost excluded from all forms of higher education because it was increasingly provided outside the household in government schools and private academies. Neo-Confucianism, the philosophical school started in the Song Dynasty, with its emphasis on the orthodox concepts and proper ritual behaviour, meant the imposition of increasingly strict rules on women. The Neo-Confucianists placed a particularly high value on women’s chastity, always considered one of the main moral qualities of females, cf. “Women’s behaviour is based on chastity 婦人以貞為行者也”³², and they persistently condemned the remarriage of widows. Women themselves often internalized this stricter interpretation of the traditional norms and values, which resulted e.g. in the female custom of foot-binding in order to conform to a standard of the female beauty, widespread by the end of the Song Dynasty among elite families. The custom had the great influence on the further domestication of decent women. Some of the family rules of those times explicitly prescribed that daughters should be educated to read the moral tracts for women and collections of biographies of exemplary women, but forbidden from reading the classics and poetry, as it was improper for decent girls to have too much literary learning, which was subversive for their morality.

³⁰ *The Book of Rites...*, p. 131.

³¹ Ku, *The Spirit of the Chinese People...*, p. 99.

³² *Guliang zhuan*, Shisanjing Zhushu, Shanghai: Shiejie Shuju, 1935, p. 2432.

The famous statesman and historian Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086) in his *Shuyi* 書儀 (Family Rituals) had criticized the practice of instructing girls in writing poetry and playing music: “From the age of five girls should be taught simple embroidery. From the age of six they should learn by heart the ‘Classic of Filiality’ and the ‘Analects’. When they turn eight years of age, the ‘Classic of Filiality’ and the ‘Analects’ should be explained to them, together with the ‘Biographies of Exemplary Women’ and Precepts for Daughters’, and they should understand at least the main points. [...] Nowadays it happens that people teach their daughters poetry and popular music – but that is not the way it should be at all”.³³

There is a Chinese saying: “In women a lack of talent makes for virtue 女人無才就是德”.³⁴ The phrase is often quoted in various texts and can be considered as epitomizing Confucian and Neo-Confucian hostility and prejudice against women.

The moral standards for “true” women emphasized the inferiority of women as domestic subordinates and the double sex standard. They resulted in women’s self-abasement, in their deprivation of the social advantages of men, in their lesser education and knowledge. However, women’s position in China, despite all unfavourable treatment and many disadvantages, was quite important, not so much with regard to legal rights as rather to real influence. Although of little significance on the surface, the hidden power of numerous women was not so weak. Among the females of the research material, besides the models of good daughters, wives and mothers, there are many notable figures in other fields (in scholarship, literature, art, music, and even military skills). Most of the famous Chinese women were the members of well-educated elite families, which facilitated their learning and achievements. With the introduction of the Western type of public education in the 19th century many modern schools for girls were established. During the 20th century many women were crowned with noteworthy successes in political, social, scientific, medical, and artistic activities.

4. Social-professional groups of famous women in old China

Famous women in old China, i.e. the women recorded in various historical documents, and later on collected in two biographical dictionaries, ZRD and the “Dictionary”, can be divided on the basis of their “professional” or “daily life” activities into some social-professional groups. According to the research material, the main groups of 999 women living from the beginning of the Chinese civilization to the end of the 19th century are: exemplary mothers, wives (or private concubines) and daughters, generally called *liènnü* 列女 or *liènnü* 烈女 “outstanding women; paragons of chastity” (143 females; 14.3%); imperial court ladies, i.e. empresses, princesses, imperial consorts, imperial concubines, imperial maids, etc., that can be labelled as *gōngnǚ* 宮女 “palace ladies” (342; 34.25%); singsong girls and prostitutes, classified as *jì* 妓 “singsong girls; prostitutes” (95; 9.5%); women as Buddhist or Taoist nuns, recorded generally as *nūsēng* 女僧 “nuns” (21; 2.1%). Other women, living mainly in the last centuries of the same period, were recorded because of their outstanding achievements in various domains of intellectual or artistic activities,

³³ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush...*, p. 202.

³⁴ The phrase occurred for the first time in *Tingxun* 庭訓 (Instructions to My Sons), written by Jin Fu 靳輔 (1632–1692), as the citation of a saying by Chen Jiru 陳繼儒 (1558–1630) (Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush...*, p. 357).

generally called *cáinǔ* 才女 “gifted female scholars”, or as heroines of some historical or cultural events, usually labelled as *nǚyīngxióng* 女英雄 “heroines” (398; 39.85%).

4.1. Exemplary mothers, wives and daughters

The “three submissions” of women, i.e. submission to father and elder brothers before marriage, to husband after marriage, and to son after husband’s death, were considered the basis of the family and social order in China. The chief life purpose of a woman was to live for her parents, her husband and her children, to be a grateful daughter, a faithful wife and a kind mother, with life activities limited to a family or a household, as the “inner space” in the Chinese tradition. The “four virtues” required of women, i.e. woman’s moral character, woman’s proper speech, woman’s modest manners and woman’s diligent work, were also considered the basis for proper relations in a family. Therefore, in the history of China an enormous part of Chinese women was only treated as additions to males, i.e. as mothers, wives and daughters of men. The right of marriage and the right of being a mother were the greatest and the only inalienable rights of decent Chinese women, but they were practically deprived of the right to remarry after the husband’s death.

Many especially chaste, moral, wise, eloquent, brave mothers, wives and daughters can be found in the already mentioned collections of biographies of Chinese women considered as exemplary ones, *Lienǚ zhuan*. The collections contain biographies of about 700 exemplary women from the ancient times to the Qing Dynasty, and some of the biographies were later collected in the dictionaries of famous Chinese persons, constituting the research material.

The personhood of exemplary mothers, wives and daughters was strongly limited. Their status in the family and the society had the great influence on their personal names, as in most of cases they were identified not by their own personal names but after the personal names (surnames + given names or surnames with some additional terms) of their family members. In such cases their own given names were usually not mentioned, only maiden surnames. Most of these women were identified as “daughter of X” or “wife of Y”, or “mother of Z”. Almost all those X, Y, Z had their surnames and given names registered.³⁵

On the basis of the data, 143 women (14.3%), whose biographies were included in ZRD and the “Dictionary”, and who were living up to the end of the Qing Dynasty, were just exemplary mothers, wives and daughters. Other women, even if they were mothers, wives or daughters, were recorded because of their special talents in such domains as literature, painting, calligraphy or music. Therefore, among the exemplary women there are: filial daughters who devoted themselves to save their fathers and/or brothers; chaste and brave women who preferred to die in defence of their chastity than yield themselves to dishonour; economical and in no way avaricious, incorruptible wives; intelligent and moral wives giving their husbands advice in affairs of the state; widows preferring to die rather than remarry or marry after the death of their betrothed; women upholding the rites even when their lives were in danger; upright, benevolent, comprehending, stern mothers bringing up their children.

4.2. Palace ladies

The heart of the capital under every dynasty was the ruler’s palace, called later, in imperial times, Forbidden City, the household of the Son of Heaven. The palace was usually

³⁵ More detailed information concerning Chinese female naming can be found in: Irena Kałużyńska, *Chinese Female Namings. Past and Present*, Warsaw: AGADE, 2008.

made of two segregated sections: the outer court and the backcourt, later called the Inner Palace. The Inner Palace was the place that housed the ruler and his women, along with eunuchs watching over the latter. The number of palace ladies differed in the history of China, but could be counted in thousands. For the Zhou Dynasty it is recorded: "Big state [ruler] collected thousands of women, small state collected hundreds of women 大國拘女累千, 小國拘女累百".³⁶ As for the Qin Dynasty it is stated: "There were more than ten thousand of various women in the imperial harem 後宮列女萬餘人".³⁷ In the Han Dynasty times there were "about five, six thousand of selected women in imperial harem 後宮采女五六千人"³⁸, in the Tang Dynasty times there were "approximately forty thousand of palace ladies 大率宮女四萬人"³⁹. Under the Ming and Qing dynasties there were about one thousand of women in the Inner Palace.⁴⁰

The women's part of the imperial palace was hermetically separated from the outside world, and no men, apart from the emperor and his infant sons (eunuchs being not considered men), were allowed access to it, except under very extraordinary circumstances. The large and complex community of women was divided into several ranks. The head of the Inner Palace was the ruler/emperor's principal wife/the empress. According to *Liji*, the principal wife/empress, *hòu* 后, was traditionally assisted by 3 consorts of the first rank, *fūrén* 夫人, 9 concubines of the second rank, *pín* 嬪, 27 concubines of the third rank, *shìfū* 世婦, and 81 concubines of the fourth rank, *yùqī* 御妻.⁴¹ Each of consorts and concubines had in turn their own maids. The number of consorts and concubines, their ranks and titles varied under the succeeding dynasties and courts. The main system of imperial females' titles was established under the Western Han Dynasty, and was used (with some changes) by later dynasties until the end of the Qing Dynasty. The bureaucracy in the Inner Palace, consisting of women attendants of different ranks and privileges, supervised the everyday affairs of the Inner Palace.

In such a hermetic community, characterized by luxury and hierarchy, jealousy and envy flourished. Every palace woman's aim was to win the emperor's favour, but many died without even having seen him once. The surest way to win and keep the emperor's favour was to bear him a son. The emperor's favour not only meant the woman's prestige and power inside the Inner Palace, it also provided the opportunity to bestow honors and positions on her relatives. Women who no longer enjoyed the emperor's favour might be assigned to the staff of the empress dowager or locked away in a place that was never personally visited by the emperor. All women were expected to be filled with undying love for their lord and master, and, if necessary, to sacrifice their lives for him.

In many periods of the history of China female rulers governed the country. Some empress dowagers served as regents, and were really powerful. The Tang Dynasty witnessed

³⁶ *Mozi*, Zhuzijicheng, Vol. 4, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959, p. 22.

³⁷ Qian Sima, *Shiji* (Records of the Grand Historiographer), Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1973, p. 241 (*zhengyi* commentary).

³⁸ Fan, *Hou Han shu*..., p. 2055.

³⁹ Xu Liu (comp.), *Jiu Tang shu* (Old History of the Tang Dynasty), Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1975, p. 4754.

⁴⁰ Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 487.

⁴¹ *Liji*..., p. 2389.

the unique female emperor, Wu Zhao 武曌 (reigned 690–705), better known under her posthumous memorial title as Wu Zetian, the founder of her own dynasty of Zhou 周, (cf. 2).⁴² The female rulers exerted considerable influence in Chinese history. Some prohibitions of an interference in government affairs by empress dowagers occurred in the time of the Han Dynasty, but only under the Ming Dynasty, the decree, issued in 1368, stated: “Although the empresses and imperial concubines should serve as models of mothers in the empire, they are not permitted to take part in government affairs”.⁴³ In the result, there were no cases of regencies of empress dowagers throughout this dynasty.

The female members of the ruling families in China as everywhere in the world and throughout the history, had been often used to fix the political alliances with marriage ties. Rulers of the states bordering the Chinese empire often wanted imperial princesses from the Central Kingdom for wives. They insisted mainly on sisters and daughters of the reigning emperor for their brides, but the emperors often sent a lady from the Inner Palace instead, e.g.: Liu Xijun 劉細君 (also called Wusun Princess, Wusun Gongzhu 烏孫公主) of the Han Dynasty, dispatched by her uncle, the emperor, to become the consort of the aged king of the Wusun tribe.⁴⁴

Throughout the first millennium of imperial China the emperor’s harem constituted the most significant community of literate women in China. The Inner Palace had its own complicated administration fully staffed by women attendants. And what’s more important, every woman who shared the emperor’s bed might conceivably one day be called upon to rule the realm as the regent for an infant son. Many of the women from the imperial harem were selected to service from elite families and many of them had acquired some literary education at home. In this period the women of the Inner Palace appear to have played the leading roles on the female literary stage. Women who had established reputations as poets or scholars outside the Inner Palace were often invited to join the palace women, sometimes with the capacity of court poets and teachers. From the 11th century onwards the Inner Palace gradually lost its central role in the production of women’s writing, and elite women outside of the court started to dominate this domain of activity. However, the palace ladies still constituted the most numerous and famous group of Chinese females in imperial China. Among the females of the research material there are at least 342 palace ladies of various rank and talent (mainly empresses, imperial concubines, princesses), and they stand for about 35% of the women recorded. Most of the palace ladies are identified by the naming pattern consisting of their maiden surname with a term of rank, or their honorific or posthumous memorial titles. Many of them are recorded by the use of the pattern consisting of their maiden surname followed by the term *shì* 氏 “by birth”. Their private given names are scarcely recorded.

4.3. Concubines and singsong girls

The separation between men and decent women was the fact in the Chinese society, and in the course of time it became even more distinct. There was almost no opportunity for social intercourse between sexes, except by marriage. Laws and customs severely guarded this

⁴² “Dictionary”, p. 642; Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush...*, p. 65; ZRD, p. 593.2.

⁴³ Lien-sheng Yang, “Female Rulers in Imperial China”, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 23, 1960–1961, p. 52.

⁴⁴ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush...*, p. 91; ZRD, p. 819.1.

separation, mainly the seclusion of women, as there was the acceptance of sexual freedom for men. As a result, concubinage and prostitution came in as a relief for them, and such arrangements were lawful and quite fashionable in China, especially among the higher classes of the society. There is a Chinese proverb: "We select a wife for her virtue, a concubine for her beauty". A "true" or decent Chinese woman was loyal, obedient, and instinctively chaste, her sexual life was usually repressed. However, there was no sexual repression for men, especially those of the richer class. In China a man was allowed to have only one main wife, but he might have had so many concubines or handmaids as he could manage, it was called *yī qī duō qiè zhī* 一妻多妾制 "system of one wife and many concubines".⁴⁵

Concubinage was as old as China itself, and the problem behind it was as old as monogamy. When the marriage was somewhat unsatisfactory, the man could, with the public consent, take a concubine or go to visit singsong girls or prostitutes. Concubinage was also greatly encouraged by the insistence on male progeny. Some Chinese wives pleaded with their husbands to take concubines, when they themselves had failed to produce a son. The laws of the Ming Dynasty officially sanctioned the taking of concubines in the case of a man reaching forty years of age without any male progeny⁴⁶. The Chinese regarded marriage as a family affair, and when the marriage failed in any aspect, they accepted concubinage, which kept the family intact as a social unit. Concubines usually lived with the wife and served as her assistants and maids, their rights were duly protected and their children were treated by the law as those of the wife.

The insistence on the segregation of the sexes and the seclusion of women of elite families greatly limited the possibilities for elite men to associate with educated females outside their own families. However, there were special female entertainers, i.e. singsong girls, usually publicly presented as artists or actresses, which filled the need for a female companionship during various festive gatherings. The Chinese term *jì* 妓, under which these females are categorized, has two somewhat different meanings. These are: "singing girl; female performer" and "prostitute".⁴⁷ According to L. C. Arlington, the original meaning of the term was "woman's trinkets", denoting something of small value, a mere trifle. The original meaning has become lost, and nowadays it simply refers to a prostitute. This term probably originated during the Han Dynasty, when Wu Emperor, Wu Di 武帝 (140–86 B.C.), established a women's camp for the unmarried troops.⁴⁸ The term "singsong girl" is explained in dictionaries as: "(in China) a female entertainer, informal: a prostitute".⁴⁹ The great majority of singsong girls were sold in early youth to brothel-keepers by poverty-stricken parents or relatives, and kidnappers. They were usually taught singing, dancing, playing musical instruments and sometimes reading. Some of them were very well educated, trained in all the skills of witty conversation, painting, poetry, music and dance, so they could be the professional companions of men, mainly elite men. These professional society ladies were of literary, musical, political, and emotional importance in China. The entertainment

⁴⁵ Yuan, *Guren chengwei*..., p. 134.

⁴⁶ Lin, *My Country and My People*..., p. 156.

⁴⁷ *Hanyu Dacidian*, Vol. 4, p. 95; R. H. Mathews, *Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 439.

⁴⁸ L. C. Arlington, "The Chinese Female Names", *Chinese Journal of Science & Arts*, Vol. I, 1923, p. 317.

they provided might extend to sexual services (as in the case of prostitutes) but not necessarily. Singsong girls waited upon banquets and acted as hostesses for the host, because in China wives never participated in men's feasts. The overwhelming majority of these female entertainers lived a miserable life, but for a few women this kind of activity provided an opportunity to pursue an independent life outside the strict confines of the family. Many valuable and deserving singsong girls became concubines of elite men.

In China there were also plenty of simple, uneducated prostitutes, providing only sexual services. The practice of prostitution is considered to have been initiated in the 7th century B.C. as an addition to the revenues of the land in order to take over the silver acquired by traders in return for their goods. If the traders found prostitutes alluring, their gains might eventually filter back to the governmental treasury.⁵⁰ According to Marco Polo, who visited China in the last decades of the 13th century, there were more than 20 thousand "public women" living in the suburbs of Dadu (present Beijing) alone.⁵¹

Not a few of singsong girls were closely connected with the political events of the Chinese nation, e.g. Chen Yuanyuan 陳圓圓, the beloved mistress of general Wu Sangui 吳三桂 (1612–1678). Her capture by Li Zicheng 李自成 (1606–1645) during the latter's conquest of Peking led Wu Sangui to enter Peking with the assistance of Manchu troops for her recovery, and thus directly contributed in the downfall of the Ming Dynasty and in the establishment of the Qing Dynasty.⁵² Many talented singsong girls were authors of poems and songs. Poems and songs written by some of them have been handed down and made the authors famous all over China. Therefore, the history of Chinese intellectual women could be sought partly in the lives of some accomplished singsong girls. Among the females of the research material there are recorded altogether 95 singsong girls, classified as *jě*, and they stand for 9.5% of the women recorded in the period up to the end of the Qing Dynasty. They are mainly presented as good artists and poets of the Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. Apart from the singsong girls and prostitutes, among the females of the research material there are also other female artists, e.g.: under the Jin I Dynasty there are recorded some erotic quatrains ascribed to two women recorded under their probably artistic names (so named but otherwise unknown courtesans) as Ziye 子夜 "Midnight"⁵³, and Taoye 桃葉 "Peach Leaf".⁵⁴ The second half of the Tang Dynasty period provided favourable conditions to prominence of literate singsong girls. The three best-known women poets of the Tang Dynasty – Li Ye 李冶⁵⁵, Xue Tao 薛濤⁵⁶ and Yu Xuanji 魚玄機⁵⁷ – were both courtesans and Taoist nuns, either simultaneously, or in

⁴⁹ Judy Pearsall (ed.), *The New Oxford Dictionary of English*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 1739.

⁵⁰ Florence Ayscough, *Chinese Women Yesterday & Today*, Shanghai: Modern Book Company, 1939, p. 93.

⁵¹ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 343.

⁵² "Dictionary", p. 620; Lin, *My Country and My People*..., p. 154; ZRD, p. 1092.4.

⁵³ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 174; ZRD, p. 21.1.

⁵⁴ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 174; ZRD, p. 809.2.

⁵⁵ "Dictionary", p. 357; Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 164, 175–182; ZRD, p. 391.4.

⁵⁶ "Dictionary", p. 1105; Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 164, 182–189; ZRD, p. 1672.2.

⁵⁷ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush*..., p. 164, 175, 189–195; ZRD, p. 1126.3.

succession, as both the nuns and courtesans lived outside the family, and could have access to the male society. Singsong girls made a very visible presence in urban China throughout the Song, Yuan and Ming dynasties, and some of them distinguished themselves by their writings, but as was the case for earlier periods, little of their work was preserved. During this period singsong girls were primarily noted as performers rather than writers. The last decades of the 16th and the first half of the 17th century witnessed an extraordinary flowering of the courtesan culture, and many of the best-known singsong girls established their reputations as poets. According to some estimates, under the Ming Dynasty singsong girls and prostitutes constituted about 13% of all female writers, and in the Qing Dynasty – about 1% of them.⁵⁸

In the long history of China singsong girls and prostitutes happened to be almost only women more freely known and recorded by their given names, occurring together with their surnames or as separate appellations. However, their given names in many cases can be considered their artistic or stage names, *yiming* 藝名, rather than their standard given names, bestowed on them by their parents or relatives.

4.4. Nuns

Buddhist nunneries developed in China from the 4th century onwards. Women followed the way of religion for a number of reasons. Many of them believed that a life of hardship undertaken in the name of Buddhism will grant them rebirth as a man, when they would finally be able to pursue their spirituality.⁵⁹ Sometimes poor parents promised to temples their superfluous children (of both sexes) or they dedicated their sick children as the price of their recovery. However, the women who entered the religious life often did it in defiance of their parents, as the Buddhist convent represented another alternative for women. It often offered refuge to those women who had no other place to go, and many of Buddhist nuns were in the convent as a place of the last resort. Girls who had run away from brothels often offered themselves to nunnery, and also old and exhausted prostitutes sought peace within temples' walls. Many rich widows also became nuns. There is a Chinese saying: "If a woman refuses to serve her husband and bring up children, let her enter a nunnery".⁶⁰

Most of nuns were illiterate, but for some the convent was a place where they could exercise many of their religious, administrative, educational and literary talents. Some nuns came from the elite backgrounds, but usually not from the highest circles. There are collections of biographies of eminent monks for almost every major Chinese dynasty, but almost the only work on nuns is *Biqiuni zhuan* 比丘尼傳 (Biographies of Bhiksunis), compiled in 516 by Baochang 寶唱, a monk at the court of the Liang Dynasty.⁶¹ The most conspicuous of the writing nuns having a biography in Baochang compilation was probably Miaoyin 妙音, living in the end of the 4th century.⁶² *Quan Tang shu* 全唐書

⁵⁸ Baoqian Zheng, "Huaxia funü renming yu funü diwei (Namings of Chinese Women and Women's Status)", *Yuwen jianshe* (Language Construction), Vol. 3, 1988, p. 20.

⁵⁹ Livia Kohn, *Monastic Life in Medieval Daoism. A Cross-Cultural Perspective*, Hawai'i: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003, p. 81.

⁶⁰ Wolfram Eberhard, *A Dictionary of Chinese Symbols*, transl. from the German by G. L. Campbell, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, p. 211.

⁶¹ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush...*, p. 153, 319.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 154; ZRD, p. 345.3.

(Complete Poems of the Tang Dynasty) contains works of one Buddhist nun and at least ten Taoist nuns. Many of nuns under the Song Dynasty belonged to the school of *chán* 禪 Buddhism, known by its Japanese term *zen*, and placing special emphasis on the experience of meditation. In some collections, like *Liandeng huiyao* 聯燈會要 (Outline of Linked Lamps), compiled in 1204, several biographical entries for female Chan masters are included.⁶³ The late Ming and early Qing dynasties were the periods of great religious fervor at all levels of the society, from emperors, empresses, elite officials and their families to ordinary men and women too humble to have left any records of their lives. The religious fervor took many forms. Some of nuns became eminent abbesses and religious leaders. Several collections of writings of *chán* Buddhist nuns of the end of the 17th century were preserved in an edition of Buddhist canon known as *Jiaxing Xuzang jing* 嘉興續藏經 (Jiaxing Extended Tripitaka), together with sermons, letters, and biographical notes.⁶⁴

Taoist nunneries developed in the wake of the Buddhist nunneries. Women who decided to pursue the Dao did it for the same reasons as men, and were treated quite equally, as there were no distinctions between male and female ranks, accomplishments or status. They were motivated by a deep desire of attaining the higher states of transcendence and salvation, or wished to escape an intolerable social or personal situation⁶⁵. Taoist convents enjoyed their period of greatest prosperity during the Tang Dynasty. As the imperial family of this dynasty claimed to descend from Laozi 老子, the patriarch of Taoism, a number of emperors favoured Taoist institutions with gifts and elevated status of Taoist masters. Under the Tang Dynasty some princesses who wanted to leave the household life chose to become Taoist nuns, and thus enhanced the prestige of the Taoist convents. More than ten imperial princesses became nuns in celebrated ordination ceremony. One of those aristocratic nuns was Yuzhen Princess, Yuzhen Gongzhu 玉真公主, author of texts on Taoist topics.⁶⁶

Not all Taoist nuns came from the elite social circles, many of them were born in poor peasant families. Some of the best known of the Taoist nun-poets were of a status hardly distinguishable from that of singsong girls. The only woman who is traditionally mentioned as the author of a text on longevity techniques, belonging to the Taoist canon, is Wei Huacun 魏華存 (252–?), also known as Wei Lady, Wei Furen 魏婦人.⁶⁷

Among the females of the research material there are 21 women recorded as *nǚsēng* 女僧 “nun”, and registered under their temple names. All of them are Buddhist nuns. Other 9 females played in their life also other roles (empresses, palace ladies, singsong girls), and being a nun was only an episode for them, it served a temporary purpose, e.g.: Xia Yunying 夏雲英, Ming Dynasty, 1394–1418, palace lady, poet, Buddhist nun, known under the clerical name Awoken Lotus, Wulian 悟蓮.⁶⁸

⁶³ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush...*, p. 320–323.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 457.

⁶⁵ Kohn, *Monastic Life in Medieval Daoism...*, p. 80–86.

⁶⁶ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush...*, p. 160; Kohn, p. 83; ZRD, p. 194.3.

⁶⁷ Idema & Grant, *The Red Brush...*, p. 160; ZRD, p. 1733.3.

⁶⁸ “Dictionary”, p. 839; ZRD, p. 747.2.

There are also 6 females recorded as *dàoshì dàoshi* 道士 “Taoist priest”. Being a Taoist nun was just a shorter or longer period of their life, e.g.: Yu Xuanji 鱼玄机, Tang, 844–868, courtesan, Taoist nun, talented poet.⁶⁹

4.5. Miscellaneous famous women

Some Chinese females, in spite of being mothers, wives, concubines or daughters of some mainly noble men, or even of being imperial palace ladies, were recorded in dictionaries of famous Chinese persons because of their achievements in various domains of professional activities. As seen in the research material, for the women born before 1880, the fields of activities were: literature, especially poetry, painting, calligraphy and music. The talented ladies (321 females) constitute 32.15% of the famous women of this period. 55 women (5.5%) are recorded as heroines of some historical events, and 22 females (2.2%) as mythological persons.

5. Conclusions

In China the gender stereotypes, as ideas based on physiological features and social roles of men and women, have had an important influence on various aspects of the family and social life. For more than 3000 years of the history of China women had held an inferior status in family and society, and they were mainly seen in the role of homemakers, dependent on their fathers, husbands or sons. In terms of female “professional” or “daily life” activities it is possible to distinguish some various social-professional groups of women, especially famous ones, i.e. the women recorded in various historical documents, and later on collected in two biographical dictionaries, ZRD and “Dictionary”. These are: exemplary mothers, wives and daughters; imperial court ladies; singsong girls and prostitutes; Buddhist or Taoist nuns. Other women were recorded because of their outstanding achievements in various domains of intellectual, artistic or political activities.

⁶⁹ ZRD, p. 1126.3.

CHIH-YU SHIH

Anomaly as a Method: A Survey of Chinese Micro-Theories of Transition

Whose transition studies?

There should be no dispute that China is in transition, but then, which country is not? The political science literature, which has limited its focus on transition to two aspects, namely democratization and liberalization, both embedded in individualism, can exclude North America and Western Europe from transition studies. Furthermore, China's transition is a transition from both socialism and underdevelopment at the same time, implying a mix of transition problems facing developing countries and former socialist countries. From that point of view, the common end of transition for either developing countries or former socialist countries is the establishment of capitalist political and economic institutions. The liberalistic teleology reduces the complexity of transition studies of China.

The teleology of transition to capitalism in general and China's turn to capitalism in particular prescribe for observers of China an academic agenda preoccupied with the conditions of establishing capitalism. The larger questions may include: "How different are China's practices from capitalism?" "How unique is China's route to capitalism?" "How strong are the socialist and cultural legacies that can hinder capitalist development?" and so forth. Specific investigations attend to whether or not civil society has risen in China, whether the Communist Party's centralized reign has given way to democratic participation, whether Chinese nationalism constitutes a new threat to international security, whether Chinese market practices have conformed to global norms of property rights, and so on.¹

Outside of the Western literature, there do exist completely different macro-approaches to China's transition. For example, there has been the urge to treat China as an epistemological

¹ For example, see Gordon White, *Riding the Tiger*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993; Edward Friedman, *National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1995; Zhao Suisheng, *Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law versus Democratization*, M. E. Sharpe, 2006, Victor Nee and Yang Cao, "Market Transition and the Firm: Institutional Change and Income Inequality in Urban China," *Management and Organizations Review* 1,1, 2004, p. 23-56; Andrew Nathan, *China's Transition*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997; Andrew Walder and Jean C. Oi (eds.), *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005; Chih-yu Shih, *Autonomy, Ethnicity and Poverty in Southwestern China: The State Turned Upside Down*, London: Palgrave, 2007.

metaphor in order to appreciate the multiple transitional paths toward the human future,² globalization as simultaneously a threat to China's political and economic security that calls for defense,³ Asianism as an alternative regrouping frame and transitional path that dissolves China's national statehood and/or resists the spirit of globalization,⁴ Confucianism as an interpretive device of modernization that undermines the rationale of market incentives,⁵ and socialism as a non-private financing mechanism that continues to organize and motivate adaptation aimed not at accumulation or consumption.⁶ Nevertheless, each of these approaches implies some teleology, albeit not toward capitalism, or at least alludes to an essentially different path composed of peculiar historical stages.⁷ These theories of historical stages have their roots in particular schools of thought or epistemic communities.

In other words, to identify the transition from the present stage to a future one requires a perspective coming from somewhere in the future. The meaning of the present stage can be narrated only after the future stage is first specified and then compared against it. Whatever this future stage prescribes for China, it is logically based upon an intellectual construction of experiences outside as well as ahead of China, hence however deep and complex a prescription, it is of the top-down type. Studies of transition in China have up to this point lacked bottom-up, past-oriented, and inside-out perspectives that would allow the formation of discourse for the masses, presumably driven by the force of transition to respond from their indigenous positions. To find what possible stories there could be if such perspectives, not intellectually intelligible from the transition point of view, were to be translated into transition narratives is the purpose of the following discussion.

The metaphor of transition contextualized

Typically, agents of transition conceive of transition as beginning from one historical stage that is passing into another which is arriving. Conceptually, however, it is often the next stage that is identified first so that the direction of historical evolution has a reference point from which all the previous stages and the present one are accordingly identified. Those thinkers, policy makers, and/or activists who conceive of themselves as agents of the coming historical stages are always the first to name the current stage as passing history.

Staging is such an intrinsic component in European historiography.⁸ Note that modernization theory as well as Marxism relies on some theme of staging to motivate,

² For example, Mizoguchi Yuzo, *China as Method (zhongguo zuowei fangfa)*, trans. Lin Yu-chong, Taipei: National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 1999.

³ For example, Vasily V. Makeeev (ed.), *China: Threats, Risks, Challenges to Development* (in Russian), Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2005.

⁴ For example, Takeshi Hamashita, "Tribute and Treaties: East Asian Treaty Ports Networks in the Era of Negotiation, 1834–1894," *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 1., No. 1, 2002.

⁵ Hwang Kwang-kuo, *Easternization: Socio-cultural impact on productivity*, Tokyo: Asian Productivity Organization, 1995.

⁶ For example, Shaoguang Wang, "Money and Autonomy: Patterns of Civil Society Finance and Their Implications," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 40, 4, Winter 2006, p. 3–29.

⁷ Kapyn Sanyl (ed.), *Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality and Post-Colonial Capitalism*, New Delhi: Routledge, 2007.

⁸ Dipesh Chakrabarth, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

justify and accomplish social transformation. Toward the end of the Cultural Revolution, when reform began in China, it was called “Four Modernizations.” In the early 1980s, the modernization theory had the upper hand in deciding that the next stage for China was market socialism. In fact, for all their stress on socialism, theorists at that time conceptualized the market orientation in China as “making-up the capitalist lesson,” a lesson without which entry into socialism was believed inconceivable.⁹

Marxism and modernization theory nevertheless paralleled each other before the fall of the socialist Soviet bloc. During the heyday of the Cold War, the modernization theory could not have convinced the Chinese of their next stage being the filling of the gap between them and the capitalist world. It is to be kept in mind that before 1980 Communist totalitarianism and central planning were considered a viable model as opposed to democratic capitalism.¹⁰ Ideological, political and military confrontation between the blocs prevented transition from becoming an issue at all. Transition was only a metaphor for developing countries, not for those belonging to the Soviet bloc. It was the breakdown of the Soviet bloc that generated the notion of transition,¹¹ which in turn designated the socialist stage as mistaken.

In so far as capitalism substituted socialism as the ethos of the time, the modernization theory could expand its application to the previously socialist country. In the academic world, the contemporary expression of the theory is institutionalism. Despite various analytical notions in new scholarship, such as the rational actor, transaction cost, incentive mechanisms, path dependency and so on, the basic task for institutionalism experts is to observe the steps of transition from socialism to its capitalist destiny. Actually, the transition to capitalism is not completely hostile to the Chinese society at large both because socialism has used to preach a similar process of historical staging and because the Chinese have for a long time taken for granted the superiority of Western civilization, which currently is manifested in capitalism. In retrospect, the Communist takeover in 1949 was only an interlude, as proved by the quick return of worship of the West in the three decades subsequent to the beginning of that transition. Besides, the thousand years of Chinese cyclical historiography provided no teleology that could make sense of the notion of transition. Capitalism was the only ready ideology when China transitioned away from socialism.

Once totalitarianism loses its analytical usefulness to academic observers in considering potential alternatives to capitalism, the issue at hand is how to effectively breed a civil society that is strong enough to resist penetration by the state. For such a civil society to mature, it has to acquire and accumulate resources outside of the state arena. The institutional transition that would allow such accumulation to take place points to property rights reform. Property rights provide a reference point whereby the mistaken stage of socialism could be designated as a passing historical stage that only hindered the institutionalization of private property rights. Consequently, underdevelopment in the

⁹ Henry Yuhuai HE, *Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People's Republic of China*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2001, p. 26.

¹⁰ See, for example, Franz Schurmann, *Ideology Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.

¹¹ Note, for example, the beginning of Post-communist and Transition Studies since 1984.

Third World and underdevelopment of property rights in the previous socialist world appear to belong to the same historical stage.

In other words, transition makes better sense after the free market, based upon the protection of private property rights, becomes destiny, allowing suspicion, indetermination and inertia, reflected by forces resistant to transition, to exert no more than transient influence. Which social forces act through what is viewed as processes necessary to move the transition forward is understandably contingent upon localized Chinese characteristics.

The fact that the issue of private property rights eventually becomes a key to reform suggests that the institutional theory of modernization and its root in capitalism have provided reformers a focus. This focus cannot be logically derived from the mistaken stage of premature socialism, nor can it be derived from China's underdevelopment because neither has achieved sufficient capitalist accumulation in order to appreciate private property rights. Without such a focus, reformers had no clear direction aside from their vague determination to depart from the current institutional arrangement, i.e. collective property rights.

Consequently, political struggles associated with factionalism and policy cycles unavoidably caused confusion about China's future for almost two decades.¹² Only after capitalism had won could reform have a future or could a meaningful transition begin. At the same time, only after capitalist private property rights started guiding the theory of historical staging could the reform faction establish stable leadership upon an ideologically justifiable cause. In short, the future stage must first be identified in order to label the present stage a passing stage of failure.

Therefore, transition is ultimately a metaphor, a conceptual maneuver, and a political consequence. It is at the same time a comparative metaphor of how one society has to model after another society that is portrayed as having already experienced a stage similar to that of the former society and therefore indicating its future direction. It is also a universalistic metaphor in so far as the experienced society is portrayed as the only possible model for the other one. The comparative, universalistic nature of the metaphor of historical staging determines that the metaphor has to come from somewhere outside China; transition that has a destiny is necessarily imported instead of being indigenous.

The metaphor of transition runs into a problem, as China's current stage is not just underdevelopment, but underdevelopment under socialism. There has been no historical experience of how socialism is to be transformed into capitalism. In the sense of socialist transition, sheer underdevelopment is not enough to guide China's transition. While transition from underdevelopment likewise requires the institutionalization of private property rights, there is less ideological enmity against private property than there was under socialism. For developing countries to emancipate productive forces, institutionalizing private property rights is just one of the many issues. However, in the Chinese transition from socialism, the issue of private property rights is the most critical one. Research on Chinese transition therefore tackles all aspects of the transition toward private property rights.¹³

¹² Lowell Dittmer and Yu-shan Wu, "Leadership Coalitions and Economic Transformation in Reform China: Revisiting the Political Business," in: *China's Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition*, Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu (eds.), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

¹³ This subject is equally popular among Sinophone authors, for example, see: Peter Ho, *Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights and Social Conflict in China*, Oxford:

The focus on private property rights in China studies suggests that the theory of transition has to be exclusively a capitalist theory, which is preoccupied with the transformation of socialism as its opposite. This focus omits the problem of underdevelopment as well as many other so-called barriers that hinder underdeveloped societies from taking capitalism seriously.¹⁴ In the case of China, these barriers also include the religious factor that Max Weber saw as lethal to capitalism.¹⁵ The metaphor of transition accordingly creates blind spots for the reform theorists who are unable to appreciate the perspectives of those presumable agents of transition in China who must additionally cope with both underdevelopment and China's Confucian legacy.

Agents of transition embedded in Chinese society cannot look at property rights from an established capitalist society's point of view. Their cognitive schemes draw either upon their experiences with socialism or upon lingering cultural legacies such as Confucianism, Taoism and others, in addition to underdevelopment that the theory of modernization originally prescribes. Combination of these non-capitalist conditions creates uncertainty to students of transition as to what specific response they would get from those they designate to be spontaneous agents of transition.

In the studies of transition, agents of transition care for their "interests." They do not usually have their own "purpose," or if they do, their purposes are really not theirs because the larger forces of transition have determined that they can only succeed or fail in the pursuit of interests in the market-oriented political economy. Once purposes that motivate agents of transition lose their relevance in making sense of reform, the studies of transition easily orient themselves toward general theorization and methodological individualism whereby individuals differ in terms of measurement on the same scale of market value.

From the point of view of transition studies, agents of transition can be peasants thrown back to a patron-client system of contract in spite of cognitive fixation within a moral, cultural environment, factory workers driven by a petty award system, rent-seeking cadres and officials looking for windfall profits, opportunistic businessmen taking advantage of the loopholes at the transition from socialist collectivism, and citizens evading as well as taking advantage of the state apparatus for private gains. The thrust of research is to find out how different property arrangements lead to different behavioral patterns. Typically, which property arrangement is better or the best is implied between the lines.

The metaphor of transition is thus both straightforward and strict about the ontological formation of a capitalist man who considers relatives, friends and colleagues a social capital, the political and legal participation a means of resistance to the state intervention in society, and the attraction of the nation state to the rest of the world a soft power.¹⁶

Oxford University Press, 2005; Chih-jou Jay Chen, *Transforming Rural China*, London: Taylor & Francis, 2007; Xiaobao Hu, *Problems in China's Transitional Economy: Property Rights and Transitional Models*, Singapore: World Scientific Pub. Co. Inc., 1998.

¹⁴ Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, New York: Basic Books, 2001. The title of the book seems to be ironic as the main thesis of most authors is that the existing culture should not matter if progressive transition is to take place.

¹⁵ See Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, New York: Free Press, 1951.

¹⁶ Ontological individualism is implicitly ubiquitous in the leading scholarship of China under transition. See, for example: Lin, Nan, *Social Capital and the Labor Market: Transforming Urban*

Accordingly, agents of transition are treated as ontological solipsists; their cultural and social indebtedness is external to their ontological beings. Once taught and familiar with the imposed destiny of market capitalism and liberal democracy, agents of transition lose those Confucian, collectivist, socialist or nationalist discourses that reflect their emotional responses as well as ulterior, alternative meanings of reform to themselves individually, making the theory of transition appear truer than it actually is.

Let us relax the ontological assumption that social relationships as well as market behavior are external to the formation of human beings. Entering the metaphor of transition or adapting to the forces of reform are now to be treated as an ontological choice of how one wants to be a human being. Conscious or not, this choice compels one to prioritize different forms of existence. Assuming the choice is in the hands of agents of transition, however limited such a choice is under the enormous pressure of capitalist lessons, the meaning of actual decisions would no longer be exclusively determined by the studies of transition. To look for the evidence of such freedom of choice is to trace those micro-transitions that still preserve a human ontology falling outside of the teleology of capitalist staging. If no such micro-transitions exist, then China's transition to capitalism becomes its destiny.

Micro-responses to transition

As a kind of logically deduced teleology embedded in market capitalism and liberal democracy, studies of transition are able to determine the conditions for transition to succeed. Presumably, failure to satisfy these conditions explains the failure to achieve the transition as well. Agents of transition are in no position to achieve transition otherwise since their destiny is not in their own hands, but is something they will eventually understand through learning in the process of adopting capitalism. Responses incompatible with the assumed transition toward the given capitalist destiny are not included in the transition agenda. To make up for this omission, the following discussion reports on 10 different responses from my previous field research experiences by induction. These responses do not exhaust all the alternatives available to agents of transition. They are not predetermined or anticipated from any theoretical point of view, although some of them can be viewed to be related to the modernization theory. Rather, they are examples of transition that fall short of any given teleology.

Quasi-transition¹⁷

This is a type of transition that begins with a hope to achieve full-fledged capitalism but stops with this goal unfulfilled. Homi Bhabha once described the embarrassment of one's

China, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007; Neil. J. Diamant, Stanley B. Lubman and Kevin J. O'Brien (eds.), *Engaging the Law in China: State, Society and Possibilities for Justice*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005; Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

¹⁷ For example, local female financial controllers working for global firms do not usually try to resolve the constant confrontation between the global controller of the firm and the local sales managers, as both are usually males. The female controllers are able to remain seemingly divided because neither side feels threatened by their exotic oriental images when demands of one side are not met due to the opposition of the other side. This capacity to tolerate inconsistency and negotiate on behalf of both sides testifies to a mode of existence that does not value a complete transition toward the global, liberal norm. See my report in: „Responding to Globalization: Taiwanese Professional

inability to move forward or backward as being trapped in a condition of “in-betweenness.”¹⁸ As China is stuck in between liberal norms and socialist norms, observers from Western Europe and North America will not easily embrace China as a member of their own ranks. Conservatives in China are even more critical of the losing battle against socialism. Even when the country appears to move progressively toward the liberal end, practices always suggest the apparent conforming behavior means something else. Socialist and liberal values are intermingling rather than the former being substituted by the latter. As a result, logically incompatible norms coexist and alternately exert influence depending on the moment, the issue at hand, the social relationship involved, as well as the personality, judgment and choices of the agents of transition.

Liberal norms came sharply into play against the backdrop of the Cultural Revolution, the extremeness of which backfired. Dialectical reform and transition started with tremendous speed. The speed, together with strangeness of transition from the perspective of socialist institutions, made agents of transition unlikely to be prepared for any transformation, to the effect that liberal values could not substitute for collectivism. Besides, the “traditional cultural heat” after the breakdown of the Cultural Revolution provided another alternative to liberalism, and as such a competitor to liberalism in its function of moving China away from socialism. As a result, in-betweenness is in itself a social form, as opposed to post-transition in the capitalist discourse.

Re-transition¹⁹

Even when transition has appeared effective for a period of time, there is still the chance that in the longer term a society will return to the original stage. Democratization is one such process. Democratic consolidation has become a popular agenda to resolve the embarrassment when countries announced to be democratic by observers return to authoritarian rule after a while. It is equally possible that transition takes place at an earlier time and re-transition brings back the pre-transition behavioral pattern at a later date. This means that a transition that at any one point dominates the agenda is only a part of a larger cycle. This cycle could include a one-time re-transition as well as many instances of the phenomenon.

Re-transition implies the likelihood that even liberalism in Western Europe and North America can be unstable if incidents such as 9/11 cause collective identity politics to prevail over individualist values. In reality, racism and religious politics have significantly affected electoral campaigns since then. Re-transition implicates the re-emergence of

Women’s Role in the Construction of China,” *International Conference on Gender and Development in Asia*, November 29, 1997, Hong Kong.

¹⁸ Homi Bhabha, “The World and the Home,” *Social Text* 31–32, 1993, p. 141–153.

¹⁹ For example, the ethnic Hui people in the countryside of Litong City, Ningxia Autonomous Region have a traditional life cycle whereas younger generations who work in the construction sector do not practice Islam. It is only when they are much older that they begin strict religious practice, such as going to the mosque on Friday, praying daily, following a religious diet, or beginning to save money for pilgrimages. There seems to be a tacit agreement between them and the state so that they are citizen participants in the modern political economy approved and/or promoted by the state and, in return, the state refrains from intervening in their religious life after retirement. See my field report in: “Between the Mosque and State,” *Religion, State and Society*, 28, 2, 2000.

subconscious needs presently tamed by liberal processes. This is especially true for those agents of transition who are under pressure or experiencing a crisis that destroys the promise of affluence or protection expected of capitalism.

Multi-transition²⁰

Transition creates new social conditions and, associated with them, multiple role conceptions that place agents of transition in the situation of role conflict. With liberal democracy and market capitalism as their ultimate goal, studies of transition usually pay little attention to those other motivations that are not directly detrimental to their particular concerns about liberalization. However, agents of transition facing role conflicts have to cope with different social expectations arising from their increasing involvement in transition. Professional ethics, modern parenthood, nation building, civic volunteerism, self-fulfillment as well as gender equality generate mutually incompatible self-expectations from time to time. Transition oriented toward liberalism in one aspect cannot predict the nature of transition oriented toward other values.

Liberalism assumes the existence of an integrated selfhood, which may not be accurate when agents of transition do not enjoy the privilege of trial and error they have had in the long haul of modern European history. The inability to integrate modern values challenges one's intellectual capacity. As the old system of meaning ceases to be of useful relevance, the lack of integrated selfhood makes the partial transition toward liberalism no more than an incident lacking any significant meaning. Multi-transition that undermines the foundation of transition is therefore deconstructive.

Neo-transition²¹

Quasi-transition is not the only type of transition that is incomplete. And re-transition is not the only type that is cyclical. After transition seemingly occurs for a while, it can take

²⁰ Professional women are the typical example here in so far as they will need to fulfill multiple roles which only modern societies require. As a result, professional women pursuing a career usually also concern themselves with children's education at home as well as parental participation in school. Their expected gender role is different than that of their coworkers or their spouses. Under socialism, women are, on the face of it, equal in the workplace despite other duties at home expected of them by the party-state. Traditionally, the role conflict between daughter, spouse and mother resides in their dependency on males, which integrates their multiple roles. However, in their transition from housewives to professional women, such integration is no longer achievable. Self-fulfillment in the liberal market and role obligations imposed by the state create incongruence. For a further discussion on this subject, see: Sue Ellen M. Charlton, Jana Everett, and Kathleen Staudt (eds.), *Women, the State and Development*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989. Also see: Karlin Jurczyk, "Time in Women's Everyday Lives: Between Self-determination and Conflicting Demands," *Time and Society*, 7, 2, 1989, p. 283–308; Pamela Odih, "Gendered Time in the Age of Deconstruction," *Time and Society*, 8, 1, 1999, p. 9–38.

²¹ For example, democratic elections in Chinese villages often legitimize the party leadership to the effect that the same party secretary could remain in control for decades; they are strengthened by the institutional devices supposedly keeping them in check. Similarly, at the village level, market success expands the political influence of those entrepreneurs who adopt an organizational design in which the democratically elected village council is reduced to a level much lower than business departments. See my field report in: *Collective Democracy: Political and Legal Reform of China*,

a direction away from the presumed liberalizing track. Liberalization may prevail in the early stages of transition. However, the later stages witness changes that neither return to the previous value system, nor embrace the endpoint of a liberal transition. Transition that responds to institutional rearrangement does not guarantee that there will be only one single direction. While the adoption of private property rights explains the demise of socialism, it does not dictate what the new behavioral pattern would be after socialism.

A neo-transition proceeds in no clear detectable direction to agents of transition. For example, traditional leaders or an authoritarian culture may consistently satisfy social needs better than liberal institutions. The calls for “socialism with the Chinese characteristics,” “scientific development,” and a “harmonious society” reveal the desire for good governance as well as moral leadership that has emerged in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Good governance means little government in both traditional Confucianism and Western conservatism, but in China today, as well as elsewhere, it means a strong government. Good governance is always desired when the society encounters economic slowdowns, external threats, social crises and natural disasters. Liberal democracy is not necessarily a desired prospect.

A-transition²²

Once the extant historical stage is defined and then jettisoned, it is possible that the new stage is unavailable. Transition will never mean anything if there is no accepted teleology that provides hope to agents of transition. Transition presupposes a destiny, without which transition is no longer transition even though socialism clearly loses steam. In these circumstances, daily happenings do not assist learning because there is no credible reference system to imbue them with meaning. Agents of transition that have no ultimate objective in view are purely opportunists depending on which particular reference system appears applicable in a particular situation. However, they will not show any consistency in their behavioral pattern. No macro-reference is available to provide a comparison with, or memories of, specific conditions.

A-transition reflects alienation from the past as well as disinterest in the future. The theory of transition would consider such people as failures worth no attention. Presumably social welfare programs should take care of them. However, the sheer existence of

Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1999. Also see the discussion in: Jong Wong, Rong Ma and Ma Yang (eds.), *China's Entrepreneurs*, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995; Kevin O'Brien, “Rightful Resistance,” *World Politics*, 49, 1, 1996, p. 31–55.

²² For example, ethnic Bai women in the neighborhood of Dali often return to their villages after high school education because they are reluctant to migrate to coastal areas in as large numbers as Hunan or Sichuan village women have done. In fact, compared with the coastal areas, Dali's economic well-being is not disadvantaged. There is no urgent need to migrate. On the other hand, the chance for those women to marry a college boy in the city is not competitive enough to be attractive. Eventually, they return to the village to marry a peasant of much less education and begin to feel self-pity. In ethnically autonomous Xishuangbanna, young monks learning Buddhism opt to run away from school but a village brigade takes them from the temple to put them back in school. Many are disinterested in both school and Buddhism. See my report in: *Negotiating Ethnicity in China: Citizenship as a Response to the State*, London: Routledge, 2002; also see: Mette Halskov Hansen, *Lessons in Being Chinese*, Seattle: University of Washington, 1999.

a-transition indicates that market capitalism, which rewards individual entrepreneurship, is not a sufficiently strong incentive for people to answer the call for transition. Although Chinese socialism which had historically motivated hundreds of thousands of people to sacrifice their lives and subvert their own values has declined in its ability to produce adherents, the Chinese people have yet to unanimously subscribe to capitalism.

Anti-transition²³

This type of transition treats transition as a strategy, a conspiracy or a game of survival. Agents of anti-transition consciously conceptualize transition as self-strengthening with the purpose of beating those who impose liberal values on China. For a long time since even before the Opium War in 1840, there has been the understanding that China must learn from the outside world in order to defeat it. Ironically, a transition that adopts Western technology, institutions and values purports to defeat the source of the new technology, institution and values. The goal of anti-transition is to acquire power for the nation of China to cleanse the sense of shame inflicted by Western imperialism. Even when liberal values are allowed to emancipate individuals from ideological restrictions, the rationale is nonetheless national self-strengthening and anti-imperialism.

Anti-transition usually relies additionally on patriotic education as well as ideological and moral indoctrination. While institutional rearrangements that protect property rights are strong incentives for agents of transition to watch market preference in order to quickly adapt, indoctrination continues to influence the preferences of agents of transition. Indoctrination injects into their minds the dedication to welfare and dignity of all Chinese so that they should remember the ultimate goal is not to achieve liberalism for all Chinese, but to achieve victory over imperialism. If it takes the liberalization of property rights to do it, then let China adopt the institution of private property.

Counter-transition²⁴

While similar to anti-transition in terms of the common wariness toward imperialist intrusion in China, counter-transition does not seek to defeat imperialism when engaging

²³ For example, a few villages in the northern China have effectively resisted the contract system that was once popular in the agricultural reforms beginning in 1979. However, they have been more prosperous than most other villages despite the fact that collective property continues to dominate the village's political economy. These villages manage to make a profit without dividing the land. Actually, they have made use of their land in clever ways under capable village leadership. Collectivism remains the spirit of village political economy. Equally importantly, liberalization is regarded as the ultimate enemy. See my discussion in *Collective Democracy*.

²⁴ For example, in Autonomous Western Hunan Prefecture, ethnic Miao villagers in Dehang compose tourist programs to cash in on Han visitors' expectation of exotic Miao images. Their purpose is to profit but gradually they insist on the authenticity of the images primarily designed for sightseers. This particular phenomenon reveals a widespread mentality in China whereby agents of transition acknowledge their backwardness but insist on their difference while trying to catch up. See my report in *Negotiating Ethnicity*. Similar situations exist in diplomacy, as Zhou Enlai, for example, was able to openly acknowledge China's cultural backwardness while asserting China's uniqueness in catching up. In short, the Chinese route to the common goal of modernization is allegedly uniquely Chinese, not liberal. See my discussion in: *Navigating Sovereignty: World Politics Lost in China*, London: Palgrave, 2003.

in reform and transition. Counter-transition does not oppose imperialist countries. In fact, in counter-transition, the ultimate goal of industrialization and modernization is highly desired except that agents of transition would not use liberalism to achieve modernization. On the contrary, e.g. collectivism could be a better ideological instrument to achieve transition of China. While the studies of transition do not have to distinguish liberalism as the objective and liberalism as an instrument, counter-transition clearly denies both.

For agents of counter-transition, resistance to liberalism, as opposed to liberal nations, is an equally important task. The confrontation between anti-transition and counter-transition could be politically deadly in that the former would expediently accept liberalism while the latter would oppose it vehemently, asking whether the Chinese who adopt liberal values and liberalize their state still adhere to anti-imperialism. Counter-transition is therefore sensitive to the need to avoid the Western method. Its goal is to counter the spirit of liberalism as the symbol of the West rather than to defeat those countries that physically represent the West.

Post-transition²⁵

Among the various forms of conscious resistance to liberal-oriented transition, there is another sentiment associated with the quick spread of postmodernism in China. Postmodernism, which is in many aspects contradictory to Marxism, is in line with Marxism in so far as they both reflect on and criticize liberal values while having their origin in the Western civilization. Post-transition is a force to adopt postmodernism so as to deconstruct the modernity with which the Chinese seem to have preoccupied themselves. The task for agents of post-transition is to reverse the values that modernity promotes and that it despises. For example, while becoming rich is a modern value, post-transition would question the value of being rich and even interpret it as equal to that of poverty. Self-fulfillment as a value, as another example, is replaced by selflessness.

In practice, agents of post-transition do not have to be familiar with the postmodern literature. As long as they seek to bypass the historical stage that liberals consider to be the highest stage of history, their aim for transition is post-transitional. Deconstruction under post-transition is different from a-transition, which is indifferent, because agents of post-transition have reservations about liberalism. They may embrace positive feelings toward traditional values, be they socialist or Confucian.

Non-transition²⁶

This is a type of transitional frame that helps other micro-level transitions remain hopeful. Non-transition refers to behavior that resists any transition. There is no adjustment called for except actions to protect the current value system. It may be true that non-transition

²⁵ A noticeable development in those areas designated as “poor” is the invention of an “ecological helping-the-poor” project in which poverty that has resulted from an inability to utilize natural resources is lauded as achievement. Cultural backwardness becomes cultural progressiveness overnight. Public financing is available to those villagers willing to invest in preserving or even restoring lost environmental conditions. See my report on the Western Hunan case in *Autonomy, Ethnicity and Poverty in Southwestern China*.

²⁶ Perhaps the best example of non-transition is the resistance of old, poor villagers refusing relocation which the helping-the-poor team considers the only way to alleviate their poverty. Some may have given consent to relocation, lauded to have created a change that “turned heaven and the

will eventually lose ground as younger generations one after another adopt some form of transition. However, the sheer existence of non-transition spreads the mood of resistance and is therefore conducive to anti-transition, counter-transition, post-transition or other forms of transition that are alerted by perceived imperialist intrusion. Philosophically, non-transition may be in line with relativism, which straightforwardly opposes the universal claims of liberalism.

Although non-transition is usually denounced by the reformers as overtly conservative, the latter overlook the fact that non-transition is nonetheless a platform only meaningful as a response to the pressure of transition, and hence is still a phenomenon of transition. Compared with counter-transition, anti-transition and post-transition, agents of non-transition are indeed outwardly and more strongly against liberalism. There is no pretense of accepting the liberal method, modernity or post-modernity as a way to legitimize one's resistance to imperialism.

Pseudo-transition²⁷

In this type of transition, the purpose has nothing to do with either transition as a process or liberalism as the next, highest stage of history. The motivation behind engaging in transition is the desire to become a member of the West, but winning recognition by the West is by no means relevant to liberalism. Transition has the goal of acquiring a Western identity. In other words, pseudo-transition involves politics of identity and is a disguise that Chinese use in order to win respect from the Western countries, although ultimately they remain inferior because of their subjection to recognition by the West. Pseudo-transition is about performance in the sense that technically all institutions that embody and reproduce

earth upside down," to avoid embarrassment, but simply return to the mountains after the team leaves. Politically, there were the famous left kings (*zuo wang*) who considered reform an outright national security threat to China. The left kings charged liberalization as a bourgeois strategy of peaceful evolution to undermine socialism. They would rather lose touch with the society at large than go along with it. Their resolute acceptance of political bankruptcy as their destiny is an irony to those celebrating the arrival of reform, manifesting a peculiar form of transition. Another example is autonomous Meigu County where ethnic Yi parents sarcastically enlist the pretext of Yi people being fresh from a slave stage, according to the official account, to exempt their children from schooling. The children then raise sheep in the mountains to hedge against hardship in the event of an unexpected family crisis. See my report in "How Ethnic Is Ethnic Education: The Issue of School Enrollment in Meigu's Yi Community", *Prospect Quarterly*, 2, 3, July 2001.

²⁷ For example, Madam Chiang Kai-shek was able to present China coming into democracy as a feminine dependent of masculine America. To appeal to the sympathies of the United States was the sole purpose; the adjustment made was for cosmetic purposes. See my discussion in: "The Eros of International Politics: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Question of State in China", *Comparative Civilizations Review*, 46, Spring 2002. Likewise, the purpose of democratization in Taiwan is to a large extent to win recognition by the United States so that Taiwan could be a part of an advanced world in order to legitimize the claim of independence from China. Such democratization stresses popular polling but ignores constitutional procedures. It practically substitutes moral leadership for limited government to the disadvantage of the protection of liberal values of any kind. Technical advancement in the electoral system is therefore cosmetic. See my discussion in: *Democracy Made in Taiwan: The "Success State" as a Political Theory*, Lanham: Lexington, 2007.




Fig. 1. Micro-Theories of Chinese Transition

liberalism in the West are like dramaturgical scripts. In actuality, the spirit of all these institutional arrangements finds no parallel in China.

Pseudo-transition is like a-transition in so far as both are psychoanalytical processes. For observers of pseudo-transition, its symptom is not permanent alienation created by the conditions of transition, but anxiety about the loss of a relationship under the solipsist philosophy of liberalism. Such anxiety is resolved by being accepted by the West, although ironically through the pretension that China could also be solipsist. Intellectually, performing liberalism for the West to see may contribute to real transition once liberal values are internalized through repeated practice, but since pseudo-transition is a personality and identity phenomenon, internalization is unlikely to take place.

Conclusion

If these examples of micro-transition continue for long enough to make the teleology of transition obsolete for agents of transition, they would represent anomalous cases. One does not have to wait for a sufficiently long time (one hundred years perhaps) to decide if they are genuine anomalies; there is an epistemological rationale to assume they actually are. First of all, there is no time duration that is long enough since the possibility of re-transition indicates that there is always the possibility of renaissance, return or cycling. Secondly, to assume that these anomalies are genuine anomalies is less risky, even if they are not, than to assume they are spurious but eventually they will become genuine. Acknowledging anomalies would not prevent the ultimate move toward liberalism or modernity. However, to mistake anomalies for deviant cases would call for some remedy which easily intervenes in the selection of life model by agents of transition.

Epistemologically, interpreting the case at hand as an anomaly could be a useful methodology to ameliorate the deterministic and teleological proclivity in the current literature on transition. In this way, agents of transition are more than agents. They acquire insights into micro-perspectives on transition that are not allowed in the teleology toward liberalism. Agents of transition could participate in transition research by articulating, consciously as well as subconsciously, how they have strategically practiced transition, making researchers of macro-transition equal partners in transition. Transition would no longer just consist of technical issues of how well one has done it, how far one is still from it, or how one should achieve it better or sooner. Instead, transition could become a philosophical issue of how one has faced it, responded to it, and reinterpreted the meaning of it.

ROMAN SŁAWIŃSKI

The Traditional Customs of the Taiwanese

The preservation of traditional customs of the Taiwanese seems to be an interesting issue to the sociologist and the ethnographer. The lion's share of customs found in Taiwan originated in China and were brought to the island by a Chinese population from neighboring provinces: Guangdong and Fujian. The Chinese began migrating there in large numbers only in the 17th century. This is obviously not to say that refugees or resettled people from the continent maintained their traditional ways unchanged as they had existed in Chinese coastal villages. The present state is the effect of many factors at play. First of all, interactions between immigrants from both mainland provinces who competed and even fought armed struggles for land to settle in Taiwan did eventually begin to form a common society that was distinctly Taiwanese. Their shared customs embraced many aspects of life such as rites involved in marriage, observance of taboos relating to pregnancy and childbirth, ways of naming children, rituals intended to secure the family's well-being in the new year, various holiday observances, etc. Even though those customs originated in China, today it is Taiwan which offers the best chance in the world to study them. Despite their distinct character that was created over four centuries, and despite processes of modernization and external influences: Dutch, Japanese, and American, traditional customs have nowhere been preserved better than in Taiwan. Mainland China has for more than half a century experienced destructive policies targeted at the Confucian family, the mainstay of traditional customs. By contrast, Taiwan, after half a century of Japanese domination on the island, restored all that the Japanese rule sought to eradicate. In particular, this applied to Chinese religious cults. The Japanese simply burned down wooden statues of Chinese deities, announcing cynically that as they went up in smoke, they ascended to heaven. Similarly, traditional Chinese dress, celebration of Chinese holidays, or even speaking Chinese in public places were banned.

In 1949, after the exodus of the military and the Kuomintang government to Taiwan, it was recognized as crucial to preserve Chinese culture which was being mauled on the continent. A Committee for the Reconstruction of Chinese Culture with the president of Taiwan did an enormous amount of work to this end. The Taiwanese, too, made great efforts to promote Confucian ethics, thwarted on the continent ever since the early 20th-century modernization movements as a hindrance to progress, to say nothing of the Maoist thoroughly nihilistic attitude toward traditional values. After an economic reform was instituted in 1978, extreme Maoism was rejected. But it was only at the end of the 20th century that it was realized that promoting a vision of an individual as a "chairman Mao's

non-rusting little screw” no longer appealed to anyone and, after half a century of fighting Confucianism, its values were again vindicated. This is, of course, a separate subject, very important and topical, also worth closer examination. At present, not only Taiwan and some South-East Asian countries emphasize the practical implications of “Asian values,” especially of the merits of contemporary Confucianism. Now also the country inhabited by a fifth of all humanity has seriously tackled the issue and seeks in contemporary Confucianism a panacea for many social ills.

* * *

After this laconic introduction, let us take a closer look at selected major expressions of traditional customs of the Taiwanese.

Family

Taiwanese families, as was once the case on the continent, can be divided into two types: small and large family. Small family, also called nuclear family, consists only of two spouses and their unmarried children. Large, or extended, family embraces more than a couple and their offspring: e.g., husband, wife, sons and daughters, daughters-in-law, grandchildren, brothers, uncles and aunts, parents-in-law with their children, etc.

A traditional family usually numbered 5–8 people. So-called great families, originally aristocracy which had already been deprived of power and hereditary fiefs when a centralized empire was built, survived as clans. With their patriarchal structure and their wealth, they were often very numerous and centered on the family’s, or more exactly the clan’s, temple. The hierarchy observed in clans, although it derived from Confucian ideas meant for the nobility rather than commoners, still became a model for “ordinary” families to follow. For this reason, they too adopted the naming system to reflect respective members’ status within the family. The provenance of this special nomenclature went back to the layout of a typical household in southern China, although in Taiwan it tended to be single rather than multi-story, with a living room-chapel on the upper floor as it was on the continent.

A traditional rural house in Taiwan resembled an inverted letter U in ground plan. This meant that at the far end of the single-story household was the main chamber, the living room, in which an altar to ancestors was located. Descriptions can be found of two-story continental households, but they would be e.g., in Yunnan, where the shrine was placed on the upper floor.¹ In Taiwan, traditional multi-story construction is exemplified by the temple to the Goddess of the Seas Mazu, located immediately next to the Su’ao fishing port. It has as many as three levels; the ground floor houses old statues of the goddess, on the next floor there is her immense nephrite statue funded by emigrants in Canada, and on the top floor a great golden figure donated by fishermen themselves. Usually, however, temples, like homes, are single-story, even if often located on hills.

The living room with its altar to ancestors was the venue for major family celebrations such as the naming of a child or newlyweds paying homage to the bridegroom’s ancestors; also here household members typically breathed their last. On religious festivals and

¹ Francis L.K. Hsu, *Under the Ancestors’ Shadow*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 30.

ancestors' birthdays, offerings were made here of pastries and fruits symbolizing ancient sacrifices of five animals, incense and candles were burned, with deep bows performed by those present. The room was called *tang* (which may mean living room, main room, or even a shrine or a temple). It is from this name that the chief male member of the family, father or grandfather, was titled *zaitang*, meaning literally "one present in the living room." On both sides of the living room there were master bedrooms, and further away rooms extending symmetrically toward the gateway, known collectively as *hulong*, occupied by other members of family, storage spaces, kitchens, granary, etc. Those side rooms also had their hierarchical nomenclature carried over to more distant family members. Those closest were and still are given appellations suffixed *-tang*. Thus, the wife of the head of the family is *lingtang*, or literally "one in charge of the living room." Rooms added to the center in an enfilade were called *fang* (room), and further still *shi* (studio), their occupants, more distant family members, being titled accordingly. For example, the eldest son was *dafang*, the second son, *erfang*, and so forth. The arrangement provided for titling a second wife – *xushi* (further studio) or a concubine – *ceshi* (side studio).

Such intra-family nomenclature perpetuated family hierarchy based on the idea of the Confucian virtue of *xiao*, which called for proper subordination of juniors to seniors, not just in terms of age but also the status in the family. The same hierarchy clearly defined inheritance rights. An illegitimate son acknowledged by his father, when given the title *yanzi* (from the nest), could only hope for at most a half of a legitimate descendant's inheritance. Other members, should the family disintegrate and its property be up for distribution, are treated equally, the property being divided by drawing sticks with elegant-sounding names for respective parts of the property. Yet such situations are rare as families try to maintain bonds with the "old home," sons being honor-bound to join in ceremonies in front of ancestors' name-plates at least once a year. Hence, great importance is attached to visiting parents and grandparents on the Chinese New Year's Day.

Naming customs

In continental China as in Taiwan, the family naming system has a common root in ancient China. Originally, there were two types of family names: those referred to as *xing* and those called *shi*. The former type applied to women and conveyed family relation, the latter to men and testified to combat merit for which it was awarded. Commoners only had given names. According to a Taiwanese ethnologist, the number of surnames kept growing from 30–40 in the Spring and Autumn Period, to reach 5,000 by the early 20th century, and 6,000 now.² The Taiwanese ethnologist Professor Juan Ch'ang-rue developed a typology of those surnames and divided them into as many as 38 categories according to their origin. It must be added that as aristocracy fell with the onset of a centralized empire in 221, all members of the nobility were given *shi* surnames which no longer symbolized a privilege for wartime service. Gradually, the *xing* and *shi* categories began to be used interchangeably. The 38 categories are surnames derived from the name of state, commandery, fief, district, pavilion, architectural structure, or settlement, from (feminine) names of *xing*, *ming*, *zi*,

² Juan Ch'ang-rue, *Taiwan de minsu* (Taiwanese Customs), Taipei: Jiaotongbu Guangguangjü Publishers, 1999, p. 45 et passim.

from the place in the hierarchy, from the clan name, clerical position, state title, from lucky and unlucky symbols, from trade or occupation, personal qualities, the degree of relation with the king, emperor, head of family, from the name of the state an ancestor had served, from the title, two-character names transcribed from the northern tribe of Xianbei, names derived from place names, from assignment to another name, for honorary title awarded, by transcription of Mongolian names from lands west of Hanguguan fortress, three-character names of ethnic groups from the North, emperor's family name awarded by himself (e.g., Coxinga was given the family name of the Ming emperor Zhu), from names of trees, areas of activity, places of residence (e.g., Dongmen, of Eastern Gate), from characteristic items in occupation, given after officials' further names (*hao*), or even from random hieroglyphics. (For example, the name Zhe was created in the following way: under emperor Xianfeng, the commander of the Huai Army named Gui, who did not have a surname, applied for it to his superior, the governor of the capital province Li Hongzhang. The latter was just reading a document and bade the applicant to point to a sign in it. Chosen at random was the particle *zhe* in the document, which now became the original surname of the man so honored.) Finally, eunuchs serving at the imperial court were given twin names: father's and mother's.

Apart from these categories, the Taiwanese ethnologist notes also names given to honor a beloved concubine, commemorate a dynasty (e.g., Vietnam's common Nguyen, derived from the Mongolian Yuan dynasty), or sometimes pejorative-sounding appellations in punishment. Further, among non-typical surnames are those changed because of their ugly form or because of the taboo forcing one to replace a name that is identical to that of the current ruler. Despite the wealth of types and special cases Professor Juan reports, Taiwan now has 1,694 surnames, although data for 1978 show that only ten surnames: Chen, Lin, Huang, Zhang, Li, Wang, Wu, Liu, Cai, and Yang, cover as much as 52.5% of the population of Taiwan.³

In devising given names, the largesse was and still is even greater than in surnames. On the mainland, I have chanced to meet a girl whose given name was Sanqian (Three Thousand). Asked about the origin of her name, she explained that her parents had named her thus for that was the amount in yuans of the penalty they had to pay for having her over and above the official reproductive plan which provided for a 2+1 model, meaning one child per couple.

In Taiwan, this particular problem does not exist, but even with all the possible liberties in name-giving, certain interesting regularities and tendencies can be seen. It appears that the prevailing practice is to use ancestors' names as a sign of respect for them. In the past, there existed predefined lists of names for many generations in a given family to use. A child should be given names at least one of which was chosen from among those used by the ancestors. At the same time, there is a category of names that may be called "wishful." Names of this kind express parents' or grandparents' feelings toward a child and are intended to assure him/her happiness and success, or they draw attention to his/her beauty. Such whimsies may take on a surprising form. In order for a name called *xuming* to protect a child from evil powers and keep it out of harm's way, occasionally an ugly name is deliberately given. Little problem if it is used only in the child's early life, a "milk name," or

³ Ibid., p. 50–51.

ruming, often odious, just to scare away evil spirits and enable the child to grow properly. It is much worse when in adulthood he/she has to bear, say, a diminutive name as official, to become the laughingstock of all.

In addition, there are also quite peculiar examples whereby parents lose their names in favor of their children. Such is the case in Orchid Island, where a parent gives his own name to a child, thus losing it and becoming a mere “farther of son so-and-so.” Finally, we need to note the unquestionably Western-inspired manner catching on in Taiwan of listing, such as in books or articles, given name before surname, the reverse of the traditional Chinese order. The advantage of this usage is that in the inundation of Chinese English-language publications, it is easy to spot Taiwanese authors as distinct from continental writers, the former putting the given name(s) in front of their surname.

In Poland, the complex issue of Chinese given names and surnames is studied by Irena Kałużyńska,⁴ who is also the author of a book on Chinese geographical names.⁵

Childbirth and first birthday

Everything that bears on family life, no doubt under the influence of the Confucian model of social life, is of great importance and is celebrated accordingly. This naturally applies also to the birth of a child and its first anniversary. A traditional minimum number was three children, including of course the crucial male offspring to continue the family and to ensure proper care for the cult of ancestral spirits. In order to make that happen, a worship developed of Goddess of Fertility, *Zhusheng niangniang*, although the translation is not fully appropriate as she is expected not just to ensure the desired pregnancy, but also to watch constantly over the child's development until he/she comes of age at 16. Several other deities are worshiped for similar reasons. The Goddess of Fertility *Zhushen niangniang* is still the most venerated deity of this kind in Taiwan.

Pregnancy invites superstitions: a woman with child is not supposed to look at frightening sights, hear noise, watch puppet theater, look at a lunar eclipse, come close to a coffin with a corpse in it, step over a cattle rope, etc. – all to prevent any harm happening to the fetus. After delivery, various taboos apply, too, such as a ban on leaving home for a month. Such prohibitions imply a concern to save her the excessive toil in farming, in the south more a woman's than a man's responsibility. A formal administrative prohibition would probably have not worked, but a cultural taboo carried a powerful moral injunction to be obeyed so as not to lose one's face before neighbors.

The series of events involved in the birth of an offspring (pregnancy, delivery, successive monthly birthdays) provides opportunities for family meetings, presenting gifts befitting progeny, and thankful visits to a Buddhist or Taoist temple. The child reaching the age of one month involves the ceremony of hair clipping, with accompanying fortune-telling for the child's future. On the same day, the child is first carried outside for an obscure ancient ceremony of “calling on an old eagle” (*han chi xiao*). The person holding the baby shouts

⁴ Irena Kałużyńska, “Different categories of names within traditional Chinese personal names”, *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, No. 21, 2008.

⁵ Irena Kałużyńska, *Contemporary Chinese Place Names. Names of Administrative Divisions at County and City Level*, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang, 2002.

to the mythical old eagle wishes for the child's future. For boys, such wishes amount to hopes for future success in officialdom and for an ability to give the family another heir.

Celebration of the child's four months was an opportunity to offer thanksgiving to the Goddess of Fertility in a temple and for grandparents and other relatives to add to the layette. At length, the child's first birthday prompted a night of fortune-telling. The child's "choosing" one of 12 symbolic prizes was to foretell his/her future occupation. Now this long-lived custom has evolved to replace items such a lump of soil (for a farmer), garlic (sage), or a seal (official) with a more contemporary gear wheel (for an engineer), microphone (performer), or stethoscope (a physician, no doubt).

Initiation rite

It comes at the age of 16. Leaving the protection of the Goddess of Fertility is symbolized by a solemn removal from the child's neck of miniature pouches containing ashes from the sacrificial burner in which was incinerated scented sawdust in honor of the goddess and magical signs inscribed on yellow paper. Such pouches were replaced yearly while celebrating offerings in a Buddhist temple until the child reached adulthood. The ritual also involved a symbolic "donning of cap" for boys and "pinning the comb," or a new hair style for girls, invariably accompanied by bows in front of the home altar to ancestors. Traditionally, therefore, it tended to be a family occasion observed in the young person's home. At present, since August 26, 1990, the Taipei government has begun a collective celebration of initiation, which inevitably also includes the cult of ancestors performed as offerings made before tablets with clan names.⁶

Marriage rituals

Making a marriage echoes six ancient rites: inquiry in the chosen girl's family, query about her names, obtaining favorable forecast, presentation of wedding gifts, choice of the wedding date, and bringing the bride to the groom's home. It is to be noted, however, that even the traditional ways of concluding marriage (to say nothing of the modern style, similar to Western practice) evolved over time.

Thus the "inquiry" still should be performed by a matchmaker. Its purpose is to gather precise information as to the girl's intentions, and especially to obtain the eight cyclic signs relating to the future bride's hour, day, month, and year of birth, to be compared with the groom's. Once obtained, such information is taken to a temple to have the future couple's fortune told.

Then comes the betrothal, known by various names, the essential part of which is to develop the wedding contract, i.e., to specify the sum the groom's family will pay to compensate the bride's family for loss of a daughter, to set a favorable wedding date (the matchmaker's responsibility), and to agree on the number of appropriate gifts such as red silk, bird-pattern embroidered brocade, a gold bracelet, wedding ring, earrings, pork and mutton, festive cakes, ceremonial candles, incense, firecrackers, alcoholic drinks, lotus and pomegranate flowers, etc.

⁶ Juan Ch'ang-rue, *Tradycyjne zwyczaje Tajwańczyków* (The Traditional Customs of the Taiwanese), tr. from the Chinese by R. Sławiński – forthcoming.

The groom's family prepares the wedding contract and gifts, which they deliver to the bride's parents. Indispensable parts of a wedding process include the making of a contract, i.e., exchange of the wedding documents by the two parties, exchange of gifts (which may involve return of some of the gifts received from the groom), and an offering before an ancestral altar.

With the wedding contract concluded, both families set the date for the bride to move to the groom's house, the date, needless to say, being a lucky day.

The wedding ceremony proper is held when the bride is received, veiled, from her family home and carried in a palanquin, accompanied by six persons from her family, to the groom's house. Before the procession can start, the bride is present at a reception called *jiemeizhuo* (table of elder and younger sisters), which gathers her entire family to show her how much they regret her departure. Despite that, the bride's family fire petards and lock the gate as a sign that the daughter is not supposed to come back, while she sheds tears about her past happy years in the family home. All along the way, drums beat and petards crack, loudly contributing to the commotion. At the happy hour, the palanquin is carried through the gate, and the groom thrice strikes at the palanquin with a fan and kicks it with his foot the same number of times, a sign that he is going to be the husband. Then a boy brings two oranges, asking the bride to step off the palanquin – the oranges signifying a happy, harmonious life in marriage. Present by a special invitation, a "lucky woman" helps the bride descend from the palanquin, after which she makes her way to the main room there to bow, with her husband, to Heaven and Earth and to the ancestors, and to exchange mutual bows. The ceremony complete, there follows a feast by candlelight at a "wedding wine table" in the bedchamber, and an evening reception for guests. But this is not all. What remains is the ceremony of becoming daughter-in law (on the third day after the wedding) held in the husband's family circle, in which the young wife is symbolically introduced to the kitchen, i.e., to domestic duties, and the ceremony of becoming son-in-law, a visit to his in-laws' home, at the high point of which he is "asked to sire an offspring."

Many details on the marriage ceremony may be found in J. Pimpaneau's book.⁷ The problem is that this valuable book is based on excerpts from classical texts, while today the rituals are constantly being simplified, and moreover, many brides now prefer to replace the traditional red robe and the palanquin with a white wedding dress and a picture session at a photography studio. Nonetheless, Taiwan is the place where it is still possible to watch a traditional wedding ceremony. Another valuable publication, this time concerning continental Chinese, is a *Zhongguo minsu cidian* (Dictionary of Chinese Folk Customs), which contains a great number of entries on traditional customs, including those of ethnic minorities in China.⁸ A note is also due to the terminologically useful illustrated dictionary of Chinese culture issued by Longman publishers.⁹

⁷ See: Jacques Pimpaneau, *Chine: Culture et traditions*, Editions Philippe Picquier, 1990.

⁸ *Zhongguo minsu cidian* (Dictionary of Chinese Folk Customs), Zheng Zhuanyan, Zhang Jian (eds.), Hubei: Hubei Cishu Publishers, 1987.

⁹ *Longman Visual Dictionary of Chinese Culture*, first ed., Hong Kong 1997.

Funerals

The passage of the spirits of the deceased from the world of the living to the netherworld calls for a complex ritual, not only due to the cherished virtue of sonly obedience, but also to prevent the spirits from returning among the living. In a traditional household, when a person is terminally ill, he/she is moved to the main room with an altar to ancestors. There he/she realizes his/her end is nigh, voices his/her choice of burial, distributes his/her wealth, gives the family last precious advice, and disposes of the remaining money. The family perform ritual ablutions with water from a stream, dress him/her in robes and sprinkle with water, a symbolic “water cover,” or *shuibei*, and break the bowl which he/she used for nourishment. Instead, he/she is given what is called a “meal for the legs,” which is a bowl with a boiled egg and a pair of sticks placed on his/her legs, and sacrificial “banknotes” and candles are burned for the deceased. After a feast called *cisheng*, or “farewell to life,” composed of 12 dishes, a rope is attached to the deceased’s sleeve, the other end held by relatives, while a Taoist exorcist cuts bits of it, one for each participant to burn. This ritual severs the last links with the dead person, so that he/she might not disturb them. In the coffin sacrificial banknotes are placed, and, among the nobility, special coins at a denomination of 120 *wen* which the deceased purportedly drops out of his/her sleeve as the last monies. A temporary tablet is made bearing the dead person’s name, which will be used for the funeral.

It is not until a lucky day that the coffin is brought outside the house and nailed shut in four corners, obituaries are purchased from a Taoist, the family thrice circle the casket, the coffin is covered with a special screen, and finally the burial is performed. The family celebrates sacrifices to the Earth God Houtu, as the master of ceremonies takes the tablet saying “holy master” (*shen zhu*) and marks in red the dot over the sign *zhu* (主), to indicate that the soul is just entering the dead person’s tablet.

The funeral should properly be followed by seven funeral banquets on seven consecutive days, with odd-numbered wakes the more solemn. People believe that the deceased does not know until the first wake that he/she is dead. An exorcism is celebrated in a room decorated with images of principal Buddhist deities and paintings representing 18 hells. During the third funeral banquet, with the daughters of the deceased present, his/her achievements and merits are recounted (*zuo gongde*). The fifth banquet is hosted by the grandchildren. At the seventh, a paper model of the deceased’s house is burned so that it might serve the ghost as a home in the netherworld. Not until the first anniversary of the unhappy moment, after sacrifices before the ancestors’ tablets, are the white mourning robes removed, putting an end to the grievous rituals.¹⁰

New Year’s celebrations

The feast of “Spring Festival” (*Chunjie*) lasts from day one to five of the first month in the agricultural (lunar) calendar. The first day of the first month is a beginning in three ways: of the year, of the season, and of the month.

After visiting a Buddhist temple on the morning of the first day, the family’s ancestors are offered New Year wishes of long life and well-being. Gifts to young people, and in

¹⁰ Juan Ch’ang-rue, *Tradycyjne zwyczaje Tajwańczyków...*

companies to employees, of a red envelope with “lucky money” is a way of thanking them for their wishes on the New Year’s Day and encouraging them to try harder. It is taboo to do any work, even cleaning, on that day to assure real rest; a ban is also known on cursing. No prohibition applies to visiting friends. The next day’s program includes a visit to a young wife’s parents in their home. Customary law grants her a right to such visits at least once a year. On the third day, rats make their marriages and should not be disturbed; it is advisable instead to sleep in after the New Year’s merrymaking. Day four is a return of the Stove God, who reported in the Heavens on the conduct of household members on 24th day of the 12th month. Therefore the kitchen is by now decorated with his newly painted portraits. Day five is the birthday of the God of Wealth, Caishen, opening new credit in shops.

The Lantern Festival, known by various names, including *Yuanxiaojie*, *Dengjie*, or *Yuanqi* (New Beginning), falls on the 15th day of the first lunar month. It is sometimes considered a Minor New Year as it closes the joyful period of New Year festivities, family visits, start of a new business year, etc. The New Beginning is linked with the birthday of the ruler of three spheres: heavenly, earthly, and aquatic, personified by the Great Emperor of Three Palaces (*Sanguan dadì*), one for each of the three spheres of nature. His responsibility is to grant good fortune, therefore celebrations begin by cultivating his worship. Immediately following is a ritual of family unity symbolized by common preparation and enjoyment of *yuanxiao* dumplings made of glutinous rice and filled with varied, but usually very sweet stuffing, and eaten to satiety.¹¹ Finally, New Year’s mirth is manifested in the streets decorated by Buddhist and Taoist temples with a myriad of colored lanterns. Not limited to luminous red cylindrical forms, they can take the shapes of illuminated figures of animals and characters in classical operas, complemented by balloon lanterns hovering against a night sky. In the park around the Sun Yat-sen Auditorium, tourists can watch a specially arranged display of highly varied, imaginative, impressively large New Year’s lanterns. Their list is topped by long, illuminated dragons, each carried by several boys. In the past, they represented the Chinese emperor. His empress was symbolized by a peacock-like Phoenix, which, perhaps driven by a desire to be distinct from the mainland, is particularly esteemed in Taiwan. The general gaiety mounts to a pitch during the invariable dance of lions “fighting” in a pair for a pearl. The performance calls for perfectly coordinated movements of two young people dancing under a cover resembling a lion, the show reaching its peak when the dancers proceed to do risky jumps on high stools. The traditional lion dance (*nong shi*) was meant not only to entertain the audience, but, more to the point, scare away evil demons, specters which, having suffered sudden death, must roam around the world, harassing people in the process.

The pipes, trumpets, and drums are just the start of the show. They will crescendo with increasingly loud firecrackers, up to a climactic “shooting” them at a semi-nude daredevil ready to balance on high amid booming explosions and clouds of acrid smoke.

Tomb-Sweeping Festival

The feast known in Chinese as *qinmingjie* resembles our All Souls’ Day. As an ancient, highly developed cult of ancestors, it is a major holiday in the calendar. Two

¹¹ Ibidem.

ceremonies are indispensable: *guazhi* (the laying of papers), or *yazhi* (the pressing of papers), and *peimu* (sprinkling the grave). Pebbles or pieces of brick are used to press down square slips of yellow paper arranged on the grave, or alternately they can be five-color papers in red, yellow, blue, white, and black, a set of Buddhist colors. This ritual marks the bows made before an ancestral burial site. Among the Hakka, or the Chinese from Guangdong province who once settled in Taiwan, the ceremony is enriched with a blood sacrifice: slips of paper are smeared with the blood of a rooster. Then the grave is circled with 12 sacrificial banknotes. The *peimu* (sprinkling the grave) ceremony is not just about cleaning the grave, but also restoring the red-painted inscriptions and making a sacrifice to ancestors in burning sacrificial banknotes with silver in them, offering to the Earth God sacrificial produce symbolizing sacrificial animals or 12 real products including garlic, squid, sugar beets, taro, bamboo shoots, etc. Fruit is also offered. If the burial is new, an added offering is of symbolic “five animals.” After appropriately arranging the offerings, it is proper first to honor the Earth God, who patronizes the graves, and only then to light up incense and pay respects to those buried. After bows are made, sacrificial banknotes with gold must be burned, intended for the Earth God, their ashes to be sprinkled with vodka, with a final firing of petards. In our age, the ritual has been greatly simplified, with the feast of the dead as a joyful occasion.¹²

***Duanwu jie*, the feast of Qu Yuan**

It comes on the fifth day of the fifth month, as spring turns to summer. At the time of the Sui and Tang dynasties, the cult of the Five Lords of Waters (*Shuixian zunwang*), – one of whom was the ancient patriot poet Qu Yuan, who chose death in the depth of a river rather than to betray his homeland, the Chu state – was celebrated on that day; now it has ludic elements added to it, such as boat races or a guessing game called *doucao*, in which plant names are to be guessed. Under the Ming and Qing dynasties, *duanwu jie* was recognized as a state holiday. In Taiwan, it is customary on that day for large numbers of people to bathe in mountain streams, and to pick and dry various herbs and maple and rice leaves to be used later as a mix to add to purifying baths. A special diet is observed during the holiday. Besides the holiday sweet rice rolled in leaves, called *zongzi*, the food includes peaches, eggplant, and legumes with yellow wine added.

Houses are decorated with greenery and banyan twigs to drive away “evil powers.” A similar purpose of “avoiding evil” (*bixie*) was previously served by a custom to tie around children’s wrists five-colored chenille and to hang around their necks small pouches with fragrance and an amulet which was Taoist exorcist-inscribed hieroglyphics, *wu shi fu*, meaning “sign of the time [*duan* feast] of *wu*.” In the houses’ interiors still very popular images of Zhongkui devouring little devils seen as bats, and paintings showing the Taoist master Zhang Tianshi are hung. The feast is one of three (next to the preeminent end of the year and the feast of Mid-Autumn) customary deadlines for payment of debts, and an opportunity to give to friends rolled rice-leaves, *zongzi*, which are also an indispensable offering to ancestors.

¹² Ibidem.

***Qixi*, or the Meeting of Cowherd and Weaver Girl, and *Zhongyuan*, or mid-year Full Moon**

It is a highly romantic feast invoking a legend about a once-a-year meeting between a cowherd and a weaver girl on the Heavenly River, that is, the appearance of the stars we call Altair and Vega over the Milky Way. This is thought to happen on the seventh day of the seventh lunar month and on that day a skills festival for young people is held called *qixi*. Girls' skills are tested as they are required to thread a needle by moonlight. Sources mention many other customs associated with that date. What we do not know exactly is whether they have survived to our time. One of those seems to be the cult of the Goddess of the Bed. It originates in a legend about a woman making sacrifices before a bed in which her lover died in the ecstasy of love. To avoid scandal, she buried him under the bed and continued to make sacrifices there to her beloved. That day, too, ashes should be collected from the censer before the figures of the Seven Maidens, childcare deities, for children to fare well. The day also is a birthday of the Great She-Bear, Ursa Major. The Master of the Great She-Bear (*Douxin ye*) was one of natural deities, and the first star in the constellation (*Kuidouxing*) would affect the drawing from a golden bowl of the names of candidates at imperial clerical examinations. At any rate, it was an opportunity for feasting and theatrical performances. It is therefore a festival of men of letters, which probably disappeared with imperial examinations, even though the practice of examinations before each promotion remained. Also remaining in Taiwan is one of five chambers of parliament: Examination Yuan. Certainly defunct is the custom of killing a dog on this day in sacrifice to the Master of the Great She-Bear.¹³

Mid-Autumn Festival

The 15th day of the eighth lunar month is the birthday of the Moon Goddess, the legendary wife of the Sun Lord. In China, the Moon Goddess is Chang'e, a personification of beauty, goodness of heart, and all the admirable feminine qualities. According to Chinese mythology, Chang'e found herself on the Moon as a swallow, after she took immortality medicine she stole from the cruel Archer Hou Yi, who was only concerned with his own immortality, little caring for his plague-ridden people. An indispensable part of the Mid-Autumn Festival are "moon cookies" (*yuebing*), traditionally associated with a Chinese rebellion against the Mongolian rule. Its start was signaled by images of the Sun and the Moon (later the sign of the Ming dynasty which rose in the rebellion) or round cakes concealing slips of paper ordering surprise killing of the invaders on the night of the 15th day of the eighth month. In Taipei, the day is marked by sacrifices in the Neihu Common Sun Temple (Neihu Taiyang Gongmiao) and on temporary altars outside homes, or altars are set up in yards where offerings are made with fresh flowers, fruits, "moon cookies", incense and "gold banknotes" are burned, and crackers are fired to honor the Moon. On the mainland, the holiday has survived as an open-air feast with imperative glances at the Moon. The likable Moon Goddess, the wife of the Sun Lord, is honored in a ludic atmosphere, prompting acquaintances and merrymaking.

¹³ Ibidem.

In the past, the date also celebrated the birthday of the Earth God, when sticks would be planted in fields with “sacrificial banknotes” for him to grant good crops the following year. In Taiwan, there are still little shrines, often minute in size, devoted to this deity.

Chongyang, or the feast of the Double Nine

This is a feast of ancient origin, known at the time of the first emperor of the Han dynasty in the 2nd century B.C., and devoted to elderly people, who enjoyed special respect under the Confucian virtue of sonly duty. To cultivate the Confucian tradition, in 1974 Taiwan declared the ninth day of the ninth month the Day of the Elderly, and on the mainland we now also see a resurgence of Confucian values, which seem to fill in the ideological void left behind by Maoism and are meant to prevent various negative attitudes in the newly enriched society. Tradition makes people taste *chongyang gao* cookies to bring good luck, and drink *jujiu* chrysanthemum wine, no doubt a longevity drink, or, as a last resort, chrysanthemum tea. The feast includes an equally ancient tradition of mountain hiking and flying kites. As the proverb has it, “In the ninth month on its day nine, there is never a sky but with kites flying fine.”

Winter Solstice (Dongzhi) and New Year’s Eve (Chuci)

Winter solstice on December 22 or 23 occasions a holiday named *Dongzhi* (winter solstice) or *Dongjie* (winter festival), which is just as ancient as that mentioned above. Signifying a “return” of the Sun, already by the 7th century it had become almost equal to New Year’s Day. A characteristic custom on the day is to make an offering in the family temple of white and red balls of rice. The balls (*tangyuan*) are eaten in soup during a formal dinner, and moreover, they are pasted to doors in the belief that they will magically “redeem poverty.”

Finally, on the last day of the 12th month comes the *Chuxi* festival marking a “change of year,” *guonian*, genealogically linked with ripe rice, similar to the harvest festival once celebrated by Taiwanese aborigines, and for the Taiwanese of Chinese origin signifying the end of the year, which also calls for thanksgiving for good crops. It is also an opportunity to get rid of useless junk, to clean the house, put up spring banners with wishes and primitive New Year’s pictures, and make cakes and dishes associated with longevity (*changniancai*) and with well-being (typically fish, as its name, *yu*, sounds similar to a desired “surplus”). Children (and employees) expect to receive “red bundles” with pocket money (or a bonus), adults “keep watch” until midnight when petards are fired for the New Year.

Conclusion

The available literature and personal observation during several visits to Taiwan suggest the following conclusions.

1. Preservation of traditional folk customs in Taiwan is still far better than on the Chinese mainland. This is most likely due to the island’s deep, prolonged isolation from external influences, as well as government efforts to preserve cultural heritage. The same is true of traditional syncretic folk beliefs which have been best preserved in Taiwan. There may be a synergy at play: traditional religions like Taoism, Confucianism, and *chan* Buddhism were superimposed on earlier animist beliefs that shaped many folk customs, jointly

contributing to the millenarian vitality of both. Maintenance of tradition is seen not only in the growing numbers of temples, mainly Taoist and Buddhist, and government-sponsored Confucian shrines. Daily experience also supplies examples of “sacrificial banknotes” being burned in the streets for deities and ancestors. All this testifies to a great religious zeal and attachment to tradition, in spite of all the economic modernization. This does not rule out the appearance of new syncretic beliefs borrowing from Buddhism and Christianity and addressing social needs as in nursing homes, soup kitchens, or other charities.¹⁴

2. It is therefore worth reexamining the present state of preservation of Taiwanese customs by comparing the existing literature with recent field research results. To begin with, it would be worthwhile to popularize the findings by those Taiwanese ethnologists who wish to update the description of their country’s folklore, like Professor Juan Ch’ang-rue. It is satisfying to see the increasing use in Taiwan of Dutch sources and of historical accounts by missionaries, translated into Chinese from Latin, which may be used as a reference point for contemporary research.

3. It seems that to obtain a broader picture, it is worth studying the role of external influences (Dutch, Japanese, American, and continental) on the Chinese society which left a mark despite postwar policy to eliminate foreign influence on the Taiwanese society.

4. It is of a special importance to study the state of preservation of Taiwanese aborigines’ customs. Despite government efforts to maintain their culture as part of Taiwan’s original cultural heritage, their assimilation with the Chinese community is rapid and inevitable as it offers them the benefits of modern civilization. The inevitability of the process is best illustrated by the total assimilation of aborigines jointly described as the Pingpu tribes who inhabit eastern Taiwan and are now difficult to distinguish from the remaining population of the region. An outstanding example of research interest are the ethnological and linguistic works by Professor Juan Ch’ang-rue and his students coming from different Taiwanese tribes.

5. It would also seem worthwhile to examine closely the impact of tradition on the resistance of Oriental societies to economic crises. It may be true that the greater the preservation of tradition, as seen e.g. in Confucian honesty in business especially among countrymen, the easier it was to overcome the Asian crisis of 1997. Obviously, the size of an economy should also be considered: the large Chinese economy probably found it easier to survive the slump. In this case, too, investigation requires extended immediate contact with the territory under study. Such research may offer clues in forecasting recovery of respective countries from the present economic downturn.

¹⁴ See: Joanna Bzdyl, Roman Sławiński, “New Religious Movements in Taiwan”, *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, No. 17, 2004, p. 19–29.

STANISŁAW TOKARSKI

Globalization and Indian Media TV in Transition

Collecting orbital junk

The first decade of the new century has been unexpectedly good for TV in India. That was true especially for Dish TV channels as they have recorded a higher viewership than that of its competitors. One of the private companies appearing on the market, Dish TV started its service in 2002. Its success has been exemplary. Today, its subscriber base exceeded 5 million, and company default channel, 9 Active, recorded higher viewership than that of channels like CNN, News X or UTVI.

“The company is therefore”, writes Anil Saraf, “already selling space on this channel and its latest clients include that of Kingfisher Airlines and the BJP. This is the latest orientation of TV expansion in India. Dish TV has a pan-Indian network and a high presence in the cable-dry areas of the country. Starting in remote areas is actually an advantage. It brings TV everywhere and betters the statistics. Since the launch of Tata Sky, Dish has added 3,7 million subscribers when Tata Sky added 3 million. The progress is limited by high competition, at the time of squeeze, such measures have been taken as emerging bound with attracting shareholders. The certain innovations have been necessary, of the 220 million of households in India 125 have a TV set”.¹

The impact of TV on the pace of the Indian transition has been analyzed, measured, assessed. “At the end of second millennium”, wrote P.C. Chatterjee, “Indian media have been the most influential factors of change”.² Indian movies, omnipresent newspapers and computer services constructed the new world order. “The electronic landscapes”, wrote D. Morley and Robin K. in their book *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries*³, “have challenged the cultural boundaries, made new spaces of identity”.

Among the invaders changing the traditional regions of the Indian subcontinent and questioning its five-thousand-year history, when the waves of Aria tribes, Arab, Turkish and Mogul warriors, and in modern ages French, Portugal, and British merchants transformed the ancient cultural landscapes of hundreds villages into huge metropolises,

¹ Anil Saraf, “Prime Time”, *Business India*, April 2009, p. 73.

² P. C. Chatterjee, *Broadcasting in India*, New Delhi: Sage, 1991, p. 5.

³ D. Morley, K. Robin, *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries*, New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 6.

the satellite broadcast has been the most effective factor of transition. Considering the unique and new situation of the transition, S. Sahay, the correspondent of *Hindustan Times*⁴, gave it a name – “invasion from the sky”. A huge industry by itself, that Indian small screen has thousands of programs in all the states of India.

The small screen has produced numerous experts of their own kind, well-known actors, cameramen, journalists, some even attaining national fame. It strongly influenced Indian audience. According to P. Krishnan and E. Dighe, TV soap serials are extremely popular with housewives as well as working women.⁵ There are TV channels producing information in twenty vernacular languages, not to mention several English channels. Approximately half of all Indian households own a television, which is remarkable for a country where one third of the population has been underpaid and several hundred million people are starving.

It must be acknowledged that television entertainment in India is one of the cheapest in the world. Considering this, some researchers like A. Singhai and E. Rogers proclaimed the new era. In their book entitled *India's Informative Revolution*⁶ they emphasized the impact of modern media on globalization of India. The critics talked about uncontrolled flows of images from the sky perceived as “collecting the orbital junk”, being a by-product of such fascinations.⁷ Declaration of TV revolution in India of the 1980s could be considered nonsense then, but the facts cannot be denied. The first TV station was started in India in 1959 with Indian government using a UNESCO grant to build a small transmitter in New Delhi. The station soon began to broadcast short programs promoting education, health and family planning. Numerous changes took place in the next 30 years. In 1961, one program was transmitted to 41 households. In 1989, the number of transmission centres reached 300, sufficient to cover over 75% of India's population. The program enriched its offers with addition of news and entertainment in 1965. Since 1990 hours of transmitting have increased to almost 12 hours per day. Although the network itself merely consisted of one channel, except of large metropolis areas, where another program was sometimes available, by the end of 1990 television was clearly the most popular medium of information, entertainment, and education in India.

In the beginning

The history of globalization in Asia has been strongly connected with the progress of multimedial net of communication. TV in India has been in existence for not more than four decades. It has grown slowly, for first 17 years the production was mainly in black and white. In the beginning, the Indian TV was owned by the state. In 1955, the Congress policy makers launched the decision disallowing any foreign investment in the printed media. This attitude was followed by the belief that private TV is a luxury, and decolonized India can do without it. This rule was followed for more or less 45 years. The program was kept away from commercial advertising, for the first time aired in 1975. Then the number of TV subscribers has grown to 71 million.⁸

⁴ See: S. Sahay, “Invasion from the sky”, *Hindustan Times*, 4.11.1993.

⁵ See: P. Krishnan, A. Dighe, *Affirmation and Denial. Construction of Indian Femininity on Indian Television*, Delhi and London: Sage, 1991, p. 33.

⁶ A. Singhai, E. Rogers, *India's Informative Revolution*, New Delhi: Sage, 1986.

⁷ See: Pratap Rughani, “Collecting Orbital Junk”, *Himal South Asia*, June 1996, p. 12–17.

⁸ See: Ananda Mitra, *Indian TV and Popular Culture*, New Delhi: Sage, 1993, p. 98.

Named DD (Doordarshan), the first National Television Network of India started on December 15, 1959, in New Delhi. After a gap of about 13 years, the second television station was established in Mumbai (Maharashtra) in 1972 and by 1975 there were five more television stations at Srinagar (Kashmir), Amritsar (Punjab), Calcutta (West Bengal), Madras (Tamil Nadu) and Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh). In the beginning they were oriented mostly on educational issues and political news. The real comprehensive Indian small screen programming started in the early 1980s. At that time there was only one national channel Doordarshan, which was government-owned. The name of the channel shows the double background of this campaign.

In India, *darshan* is a category of sacred dimension. For millennia it has been associated with the meditation at the presence and under the guidance of Indian gurus. In Sanskrit *darshan* means “a holy view” connected with the blessings as a consequence of it. Associated with the English word “door”, it implies a promise of a “home guru” - a godlike guest of some exotic Western origin, together with news and business, parliamentary information, or weather forecast carrying home horoscope, good advice, and distraction. The patriotic orientation of the whole message has been conveyed by the motto “Be Indian, see Indian”.

But the very word “doordarshan” shows that the battle with the invaders from the sky is very difficult. Electronic images of holy men advertise a new style of life, the values of consumerism imported from the West. “Darshan is a part of religion. Its roots have been associated with fundamental categories of classical Indian philosophy and at the same time a part of religious folklore. For ages connected with guru it has been shown as one of the most important factors of «yogic» meditation. Seen in this perspective, in Sanskrit *darshan* means ‘a sacred view’ (of guru) with the blessing as a consequence of it. Associated with the English word ‘the door’ it proclaims a promise of ‘home guru’. But the coming of godlike guest of some exotic Western origin may be disastrous. Carrying horoscopes, good advice of modernization, information and distraction of new kind, may be disastrous for villagers in remote hamlets unprepared for such confrontations. Selling images of the ‘other world’ brings a danger”.⁹

For these reasons, during the first decades of independence the electronic flow of images was controlled by the state. But the magic character of TV performance¹⁰ brought the transition. It happened in the 1980s when colour TV was introduced by the state-owned DD and timed with the 1982 Asian Games which India hosted. The installment of terrestrial transmitters on pan-Indian scale was the result. Then came the time for satellite TV. The central government launched a set of economic and social reforms. Under the rules of government headed by Narasimha Rao it was allowed to engage foreigners in limited private TV investments. That step opened the door to globalization of the Indian TV.

The real change came in the early '90s with the satellite TV. Following the example of some foreign programmers like CNN the Star TV and a little later several domestic channels such as Zee TV and Sun TV came into Indian homes. Dissatisfied with the evident lack of autonomy and credibility of Hindu-centric broadcast, the Indian audience often shifted to

⁹ S. Tokarski, “Doordarshan and Maya”, *Hemispheres*, 14, 1993, p. 125.

¹⁰ See: Sevanti Ninian, *Through the Magic Window: TV and Change in India*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1996.

the newcomers. The majority of the people who turned to the satellite programs was a part of the middle-class dissatisfied elite. That was a main reason of the “satellite boom” in slowly globalized India. At first unauthorized, popularity of satellite TV in India caused a change of legal policy towards cable TV networks. It is worth noting that at the beginning of 1991, most of 3,500 cable operators in India were illegal and most of them broadcast mainly American and British programs.

Prior to this, Indian viewers had to be satisfied with DD’s chosen fare which was dull, non-commercial in nature, directed only towards education and socio-economic development. Entertainment programs were few and not very attractive. And when the few soap bestsellers like *Hum Log* (1984), and mythological dramas: *Ramayana* (1987–88) and *Mahabharata* (1988–89) were televised, millions of viewers stayed glued to their chairs before their TV sets. This could be noticed everywhere: for the first time the traffic in Indian metropolises was much easier during transmissions of *Mahabharata* on TV. Paradoxically, the ancient Indian epics in TV were a part of modernizing trend. That phenomenon has been analyzed by several eminent Indian researchers, for example by Mitra Ananda in his book *Television and Popular Culture in India. Study of Mahabharata*.¹¹

Other reasons for the satellite boom in India were American activities in the Middle East. When urban Indians learned that it was possible to watch the Gulf War on television, they rushed out and bought dishes for their homes. As a consequence of this trend the small investors tried their luck as entrepreneurs and started offering the signal to their neighbors by flinging cable over treetops and verandas.¹²

The state-controlled DD responded to this satellite TV invasion by launching an entertainment, starting a commercially oriented channel and introducing entertainment programs on its terrestrial network. This step was very effective in villages. It inspired the purchase of sets in remote regions where cable TV was not available.

But it did not work in urban areas. In spite of many improvements, the national network was criticized. In fact, DD had not much to offer. At that time, the content and quality of its program was perceived both by “traditionalists” and “westerners” as dull, boring and untrustworthy. To put it simply, the government control of television was a matter of public complaints for one reason: it made Doordarshan views the offshoot of political machinery.

The satellite boom

The initial success of satellite broadcasting, opening to the global space, had a tremendous effect: more foreign programmers and Indian entrepreneurs constructed their own programs. The Indians waited for the news from the Gulf area and expected a new kind of entertainment programs. For these reasons, the number of investors grew quickly at the beginning of the ’90s. From two channels prior to 1991, the Indian audience was given a choice of 50 channels by 1996. The producers emerging from the film industry, some from advertising area and some from journalism, made a breakthrough in TV business.

That trend was continued at the late ’90s. More and more people tried to set up their networks. In 1995–96 an estimated number of 60,000 cable operators were existing in India.

¹¹ Ananda Mitra, *Television and Popular Culture in India. Study of Mahabharata*, New Delhi: Sage, 1993.

¹² See: www.contentwriter.in/.../advertising-marketing/indian-television.htm (16 December 2009).

Some of them had subscriber bases as low as 50 to as high as in thousands. The offer was planned to be cheap. As the new TV dealers were not anxious to make heavy investments, most of the networks could relay just 6 to 14 channels. Small cable operators were unhappy to risk. For that reason TV business drew the attention of American and European cable networks, as well as large Indian business groups capable of delivering more than 30 channels. These multi-system operators (MSOs) started buying up local networks. This phenomenon led to resistance from smaller cable operators who joined forces and started functioning as MSOs. It is worth noting, though, that the number of registered cable operators in the country fell dramatically to 30,000.¹³

It was obvious that the system needed reforms. Some steps were made in 1991. Under the new policies of the Indian government, the new approach was adopted slowly. In 1994, India liberated its local markets, opening the way to cable television. As a result five new channels belonging to the Hong Kong based STAR TV came into Indian offer. It gave Indians a possibility to observe the events in the Gulf and offered access to other world happenings. Regional TV markets channels also acquired a multitude of Hindi channels, some international and a few English channels, among them HBO and History Channel. By 2001–2003, Nickelodeon, Cartoon Network, VH1, and Disney appeared on the Indian market to compete with the nationalized set of TV services.

The challenge of media perceived by spokesmen of change created a dilemma. Is there a choice between the Indian and a foreign way? With the rapid growth of satellite transmissions in Asia, predictions of the demise of the national sovereignty of information and entertainment seemed to be true. Indian traditionalists proclaimed an alert, “the invasion from the skies”. Facing some fundamental difficulties in the age of globalization, the nationalized Doordarshan was fighting back with its programming strategy. It repeated best hits, the megaserial of *Mahabharata*, it launched a series of family oriented show-talks. The pressures for decentralization created Bengali, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and other local broadcasts. These changes gave the Doordarshan the new look as a multi-channel network run by talented producers. To fight with international competition some legal and political steps were taken. The crucial question of limiting the power of transnational satellite broadcasters was a matter of parliamentary debates of the late 1990s.

But the trap of “sending the wrong signals”¹⁴ was greater than ever. To win the Indian audience, the traditionalist lobby launched the slogan “be Indian, see Indian”.¹⁵ The idea attracted some Indian businessmen. Among them was Subhas Chandra. His project of Zee TV was based on the idea of a commercial Hindi Channel on AsiaSat 1. The Indian language program of telefilms and film songs was targeting at Indian mass audience. In 1994, 60 million households had access to the Zee. Then the Zee network started Music Asia, a channel based exclusively on Indian dance and music. Paradoxically, this Hindu-oriented project appeared foreign in deeper analysis. In spite of Indian design, the whole stuff based on consumerist pattern was more Western in style than CNN or BBC and its ads followed Western models, promoted Western values and Western way of life under regional cover.

¹³ See: *ibidem*.

¹⁴ See: Sanjeev Verma, “Sending the Wrong Signals”, *Business India*, 2.06.1997.

¹⁵ See: Anand Pratap, “Challenge or Threat”, *The Time*, 21.10.1991, p. 5.

In spite of it, the rapid growth of popularity of Zee TV turned out to be a model. More than a dozen of Indian businessmen followed the example. Transnational JAIN TV (Joint American Indian Network) has been broadcasting programs only in Indian languages since 1994. Mumbai based ATN (Asia Television Network) offers 24-hour entertainment program, music, adverts, home shopping. Another Indian television channel is ASIANET. Started in 1992, in the Malayalam language, it is directed to South India and Malayali emigrants in the Arabic Gulf. Regional language programs supported by advertising revenues have become increasingly popular in the Tamil and Telugu versions. Being “very Indian” in design and cover, they may be more Western in its hidden message than English broadcasts in India. They may often advertise foreign ways of life and promote Western values.

The TV audience

The traditional background of Indian TV deserves to be better known by Western researchers. It is to be sought in performing arts of ancient Asia. Although their riches are legendary, as it was the case with Shaolin monastery, appreciation of every kind of inspiration is very difficult. In ancient India these arts were closely connected with ancient roots of Asian religions, mythologies and sacred theatre, philosophic and mystical systems and traditional cultural patterns. In general, as H. Nakamura¹⁶ maintains, even now they cannot be easily understood outside their cultural context.

For millennia the performing arts of India have been the powerful means of communication. They integrated into a single allegory representing and spreading truths of their times. The Indians feel their meaning. In a typical Hindu village folk festivals traditional structures appear in very complex, transformed patterns but everybody knows where combined elements of music, dance, military choreography, dramatic structure come from. In contrast to Western tradition separating these components, the Indian folk theatre loves fusion. This is based on Indian common feeling inspired by philosophic traditions: the reality is one, it cannot be divided.

Inheriting this ancient past as a traditional communication channel, contemporary Indian media integrated them into single allegory of representing and spreading truths of their times. Indira Gandhi used the Indian TV as a way to win the political campaigns. Where there was no TV she sent the wandering theatres. And she won the elections.

Her father Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister in the very beginning of independent India, used TV for his task of reintegration the new pan-Indian awareness. Some, like Shashi Tharoor (see his book *Nehru, the Invention of India*¹⁷), even believe he invented it building the entirely new pan-Indian identity on the foundation of democratic constitution integrated gradually with traditional patterns. He called this process *The Discovery of India*, as he also entitled his book.

“Upon Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination”, writes S. Tharoor, “Nehru became the keeper of the national flame, the most visible embodiment of India’s struggle for freedom. Incorruptible, visionary, ecumenical, a politician above politics, Nehru’s statue was so

¹⁶ H. Nakamura, *The Way of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Japan, Tybet*, Honolulu: East West Center, 1966, p. 21.

¹⁷ See: Shashi Tharoor, *Nehru, the Invention of India*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003, p. XI.

great that the country he led seemed inconceivable without him. A moody, idealist intellectual who felt an almost mystical empathy with the toiling peasant masses, an aristocrat accustomed to privileges who had passionate socialist convictions, an anglicized product of Harrow and Cambridge who spent ten years in British jails, an agnostic radical who became an unlikely protege of the saintly Mahatma Gandhi – was India”.¹⁸

How his line of building up the national, pan-Indian identity was continued is described by S. S. Gill in his work *The Dynasty: A Political Biography of the Premier Ruling Family of Modern India*.¹⁹ Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, and her son Rajiv Gandhi consequently used the Indian media as the instrument of government impact strengthening the bonds of federalism. On the other hand, the TV proclaimed everywhere the gospel of democracy, slowly substituting the hierarchical Indian patterns of society.

“The success of Nehru”, writes Sunil Khilnami in his book *The Idea of India*²⁰, “has been connected with situating the nation in the heart of Indian society. The state became a part of imagination of every Indian citizen. Transformed from something very distant and foreign it came into everyday life taking responsibility for everything”.

This process has been fully analyzed in the book of M.J. Akhbar *Nehru. The Making of India*²¹ and in Pratap B. Mehta’s work *The Burden of Democracy*.²² The latter writes: “Creation of India as a sovereign, independent republic was in the most important sense the commencement of a bold experiment of giving to two hundred million, largely unlettered and unpropertied people the right to choose their own government /.../. Certainly, no body of European social thinking, at the time, would have counseled such a course; there was no instance from the past that could be the basis of confidence that this experiment would work. No political formation that could provide an instructive example of how to make democracy work in such seemingly unpropitious circumstances: unbounded poverty, illiteracy, the absence of the middle class, immense and deeply entrenched social cleavages. Indeed, if history and social theory were taken as any guide, the presumption would have been quite the reverse. Democracy in India is a phenomenon that, by most accounts, should not have existed”.

In such circumstances the Indian media played the important part in the process of democratization. Patriotic films about Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter Indira have won many awards. That tradition may be continued in the third millennium. From an Italian company comes an offer to help produce a miniseries that would be based loosely on the life of Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born leader of India’s ruling Congress Party who is the widow of the former prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi.²³

About six hundred programs are broadcast everyday in hundred languages. Besides many pan-Indian and regional radio transmissions, there are more than 30 channels of cable TV. The television market in India concentrated mainly on the affluent middle and

¹⁸ Ibid., p. VIII.

¹⁹ S. S. Gill, *The Dynasty: A Political Biography of the Premier Ruling Family of Modern India*, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2002, part 1–3.

²⁰ Sunil Khilnami, *The Idea of India*, New Delhi: Penguin, 2002, p. 41.

²¹ M. J. Akhbar, *Nehru. The Making of India*, New Delhi: Roli Books, 2002.

²² Pratap Bhanu Mehta, *The Burden of Democracy*, Delhi: Penguin India, 2003, p. 2.

²³ www.indiaresource.org/.../2007/1009.html (12 December 2009)

upper social class estimated as 25 percent of India's population. Members of the upscale segment exhibit a distinctly urban life style. They sometimes have MBA degrees, they own video cassette recorders, send the children to private schools, live in dual-income households. Their style of life reminds in many respects that of their middle class counterparts in America and in Europe.

Another part of TV viewers live in Indian villages. At the beginnings of the 1960s, they were totally unprepared for the "invasion from the sky". For them, cable TV became initially a cheap substitute of movie going. Film consumption in domestic private sphere in a society with strong cultural distinctions, based upon socio-economic stratifications and religious demands, was hailed with enthusiasm. For illiterate, or badly educated villagers it was like an information bomb, undermining the foundations of their tradition more effectively than ages and waves of repeated invasions of Arabs and Moguls. It affected the ancient beliefs and ways of life more thoroughly than the "British Raj" – the system of colonial rules.

At the end of the second millennium "news from the sky" were present everywhere, even in Indian slums. The effect was disastrous. It has been shown in the article entitled "Collecting Orbital Junk".²⁴ "Zabunissa Sheikh", writes the journalist, "is a mother of three in Bombay Coluba slum. Her husband's alcohol habit eats into the family income, but with the cleaning job, children contributions and by hawking prawns in the market, she makes 650 rupees a month. All costs, for food, clothing, keeping the children at school, everything – are taking care with this money. Her narrow one-room house has no running water, and the family visits a community toilet nearby. Life is a grind, but there, in one corner of her room, a black and white television set blinks to life and is quickly tuned to one or more 30 channels. Zabunissa's household is addicted to satellite television. The cable connection charge is 110 rupees a month".

The cheapest offer has no Indian background. "Mother and children, and the father when he is at home and sober, watch the BBC World's Food and Drink (with the latest on the season's Bordeaux wines), The Clothes Show's couture fashion tips, reruns of American soaps like *The Bold and Beautiful*, and several channels of 24 hour Hollywood movies and film song compilations".²⁵

Several decades of the satellite boom meant more than centuries of colonization. From the snowy valleys of Kashmir to the beaches of tropical Kerala national and transnational television channels reach such a growing number of India's people as never before. After ten years of cable TV presence the Indian subcontinent was not the same. The new reality of the box in the corner has become a new social force. Slowly but surely, it deprives the natives of India of its cultural identity.

"No country, no industry, no state owned network", writes Sevanti Ninian in her book entitled *Through the Magic Window: TV and Change in India*²⁶, "has more radically changed over a short period of three years on account of single technological innovation, the way that India, the media industry here, and Doordarshan have. All three have been affected substantially by the invasion, if you will, of a country and society, by foreign satellite channels".

²⁴ See: Raghani, "Collecting Orbital Junk"..., p. 12–18.

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ Ninian, *Through the Magic Window*..., p. 30.

The critics of unprecedented liberalization of TV policies remind the public of moderate strategy of Rajiv Gandhi. In the initial phase from 1984 to 1990 small unauthorized cable networks spread through the tourist hotels, then apartment blocs and finally into individual households. When the state-controlled TV and Doordarshan India showed one Hindi feature film per week, those cable TV networks showed video production, offering a constant supply of cinematographic entertainment for a mode connection with monthly fee. Cable TV, initially, became a cheap substitution of movie going.

In the shadow of Bollywood

The increasing presence of electronic media in global modernity has been one of the reasons of the growing popularity of Indian movies. Arjun Appadurai discusses this trend in connection with some spectacular activities of transnational film festivals of Hollywood promoting the notions of penetration of cultures with Oscar Awards, for example for such bestsellers like *Salaam Bombay*.²⁷ According to this Indian scholar, that kind of success has been born together with the expanding role of virtual space, in the process of construction the transnational identities in local contexts. This is the result of new trends of the global era, the commercialization of film production owned progressively by international corporations, multimedial and multicultural in character.

In such circumstances, the impact of Bollywood industry on cable TV was important. The biggest film industry in the world contributed a lot to Indian TV, to mention only such hits like *Ashok* with Rukh Khan playing the Indian emperor, and two mega productions *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana* made for Indian TV in several versions. Some of the Bollywood productions for TV can also be seen in Western networks, in America and Europe. Bollywood has grown increasingly popular in the United States over the last five years. Among the others, *Kabhi Alvida Naa Kehna* (Never Say Goodbye) brought \$1.4 million income in US theaters as a part of the San Francisco International South Asian Film Festival.

The success of some Indian mega productions in Central Europe rises the question: are they critical enough in social respect. This has been connected with the old Indian debate and campaign for “Indianization” of Indian media under the traditional banner. In spite of hidden consumerism, they may be the clue to understanding the new identity of India in political, social and economic transition emerging in the new millennium. In fact, the multidimensional Indian hi-tech has built the bridges between the East and the West, integrating India with the world.

The relations of Bollywood film industry and contemporary Indian TV have been analyzed in such works as S.T. Ganti’s *Bollywood. A Guidebook to Popular Hindi Cinema*.²⁸ The Polish book *Poeci Bollywoodu* (The Poets of Bollywood) published in 2008 by Janusz Krzyżowski and Surender Bhutani²⁹ deals with musical dimension of it. The authors have compiled the data about the most famous Indian artists producing film songs. The traditional background of singing poets wandering all over India is perceived there as the foundation

²⁷ A. Appadurai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 287.

²⁸ S. T. Ganti, *Bollywood. A Guidebook to Popular Hindi Cinema*, London: Routledge, 2004.

²⁹ Janusz Krzyżowski and Surender Bhutani, *Poeci Bollywood*, Weco Travels, 2008.

for the cult of film stars. At the time of Bollywood boom musical poems were used independently for advertising and artistic purposes.

The famous Indian film making centre soon found some competitors. In opposition to the Hindi cinema "the Parallel Cinema" has been born. Situated in the West Bengal it concentrates on social problems and artistic creativity. But most outstanding political and social problems have been addressed in Tamil films. They are produced in Kollywood, the name coined from Kodambattikam, a district of old Madras, and Bollywood, in the city renamed as Chennai. The impact of Kollywood on Indian mass awareness has been dealt by S. Velayutham in his comprehensive work *Tamil Cinema. The Cultural Politics of India* and Gvasanthi's book *Caste, and Cine Stars. The World of Tamil Politics*.³⁰

Contemporary Indian TV

Today, television in India is a huge industry and has thousands of programs in all the states of India. The small screen has produced many outstanding craftsmen of their own kind. Some of them have even been attaining the international fame. Several Indian TV stars went to Hollywood. Although in this country 77% of the population lives on less than Rs.20 per day, half of all Indian households own a TV set. This paradox has been analyzed by A. Mukherjee in his comprehensive work entitled *Audio-visual Politics and International Trade. The Case of India*.³¹ At the threshold of the new millennium, the central government launched a series of economic and social reforms. Under the new policies the government allowed private and foreign broadcasters to engage in limited operations in India. Subsequent changes have been introduced by cable television. India has over 130 million homes with television sets, of which nearly 71 million have access to cable TV.

Most of the Indian TV channels are exemplary mixture, merging tradition with modernity. The same can be said about cable TV as a whole. Among the cable TV channels there are ones specialized in sacred theatre, and others proclaiming the legendary tales mixed with modern view of life. The others available in Delhi, Bangalore and Varanasi mix sacred and profane way of life as it is in great metropolises. To assess their role in the construction of the new pan-Indian identity many Indian scholars emphasize the role of cross-cultural encounters in the media.

New identities. Western or Eastern entertainment patterns

The quest for the new identity seems to be a priority among the topics directly or indirectly explored by the Indian media. With modernization of India the global goes local. A good example can be the famous film *Indian Cabaret* made by Mira Nair as a kind of ethnodrama in 1984. It tells a story of dislocation (A. Appadurai calls it deterritorialization³²) of some women coming from Tamil village to dance in modern night club in Mumbai suburb.

³⁰ Gvasanthi, *Cut-out, Caste, and Cine Stars. The World of Tamil Politics*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2006.

³¹ Arpita Mukherjee, *Audio-visual Politics and International Trade. The Case of India*, Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 2003.

³² Appadurai, *Modernity at Large...*, p. 94.

Seen in this perspective Mumbai has been the symbol of modern times. But there are other leading patterns proclaimed as the milestones of dislocation. Researchers of leading patterns for the time of transition have pointed up the impact of cricket in this respect. Ashis Nandy has written a book *The Tao of Cricket*³³ to analyze the role of its ideology in integrating India. In his work *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimension of Globalization*³⁴, Arjun Appadurai shows in extensive description the multimedial role of this sport seen as a milestone of the new Indian identity. The foundations of this phenomenon brought to India at the times of the British Raj have been analyzed by E. Docker in his book *History of Indian Cricket*. One of well-known film scenarios of Bollywood narrates the story of a famous cricket player coming back to his village to win the match played with gangsters, the stake being the land in depts. Many Indian periodicals, such as Marathi *Kriket-Bharati* or Hindi *Kriket-kriket*, deal with this sport called often the new Indian religion. The Indian TV uses cricket transmissions as the most attractive offer.

This subject of new identities transformed by Indian media has been dealt by many Indian and Western scholars. Among them there was Professor Divya C. McMillin from the University of Washington, who in the paper discussed in 1999 on Annual Convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (New Orleans, August 4–7, 1999) tried to examine the status of state-owned and private television networks in India. In order to understand the strategies employed by these networks to propagate a certain identity and to compete with each other for the largest share of audience-consumers, the scholar made many interviews with the spokesmen of the networks which revealed that constructions of audience and their identity varied remarkably in local perspective.

This indicates that, in the long term, the availability of region and language-specific programming could contribute to the construction of decentralized, sub-national viewing communities, each with its own definitions of community identity. Consequences of such discoveries are of great importance. It is worth emphasizing that the media have considerable impact on the Indian transition. With the growing fame of Bollywood Indian films have attracted plenty of attention in the West. Indian TV is not well-known in EU and US, although the Indian television business is quickly growing. It is estimated as \$3.4 billion in revenue in 2005, according to Pricewaterhouse Coopers. India follows the Western examples of TV business. The current number of television households is about the same as in the United States, though for India that amounts to only about half of the country's households, compared with 98 percent in the United States. Advertising spending on Indian television increased by 21 percent a year, on average, from 1995 to 2005, when it reached \$1.6 billion.³⁵

Big changes in Indian television came when cable operators used satellite dishes, illegal but tolerated at the time, to give subscribers access to news on CNN. Then in 1995, the country's highest court declared the government's monopoly over broadcasting unconstitutional. As a consequence, foreign media companies can fully own entertainment networks in India. In spite of this, the transition goes slowly, the public broadcaster DD

³³ A. Nandy, *The Tao of Cricket. On Games of Destiny and Destiny of Games*, New Delhi: Viking, 1989.

³⁴ Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*..., p. 144–168.

³⁵ www.indiaresource.org/.../2007/1009.html (12 December 2009)

remains the most widely available network, especially in rural areas, where a majority of the population lives.³⁶

Perhaps the most striking example of the transition of Indian TV market is Disney's effort to situate its shows in India. This was the first Asiatic country where local Disney Channels have been introduced. The decision was made after launching on the silver screen *Dhoom Machao Dhoom* (Hindi title for "Let's have a blast"). This was a Disney show targeted at teenagers. Success of *Dhoom* has some followers on the Indian TV market. Time Warner, which operates Pogo and Cartoon Networks channels launched in India *Gali, Gali, Sim, Sim* based on *Sezamese Street* but situated in Indian landscapes. The others produce the Indian remakes of *Big Brother*.

While celebrating the 50th Anniversary of Independence (15 August 1997), the congressmen held a parliamentary debate about national and local identity. With the implementation of the 1991 economic liberalization policy in India's television industry, the task has assumed primary importance with multinationals reconfiguring the boundaries of national taste and character. This reordering of national space and popular imagination has met with resistance by government officials and national elites who find their task of boundary maintenance complicated by the influx of competing definitions of state, citizen, and national identity.

The Indian TV industry is quickly expanding. Its capacity can be compared today to that of the film business. And whereas filmmakers have traditionally worked in a single language, media companies have been exploiting the large and growing capacity of cable and satellite networks to cheaply develop customized channels and shows for different parts of the country. Zee operates several regional-language entertainment and news channels.³⁷

As the country continues to experience major economic and social changes, the shape of Indian television is likely to keep evolving. In the meantime, the TV serves as the invaluable source of information about the Indian transition. It plays the important part in the process of transition of modern India. At the same time, it preserves multicultural tradition of entertainment, witnessing the wandering of ideas in space and time. As such, it has a considerable, creative impact on the new identities born in India in the third millennium. Its attraction is growing for one fundamental reason: for India, it serves not only as the mirror but also as the cross-roads where Indians meet and ask where they are going.

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ Ibidem.

KARIN TOMALA

China und die Europäische Union. Zur Entwicklung der Beziehungen

Von der Feindschaft zur strategischen Partnerschaft

Einführung in die Thematik

In der Studie möchte ich mich auf die Entwicklung der gegenseitigen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen konzentrieren, die zweifelsohne ein Ergebnis der makroökonomischen und globalen politischen Bedeutung dieses großen Staates und Entwicklungslandes sowie auch der veränderten globalen Konstellationen sind. Die Aufgabe soll nicht darin bestehen, die reiche Chronologie der Beziehungen aufzulisten, sondern die Hintergründe transparenter zu machen.

Wenn wir in Europa über China sprechen, so weckt das wahrlich noch immer die unterschiedlichsten Reaktionen. Das gilt auch für China, wenn man dort den Westen oder konkret die Europäische Gemeinschaft, später in die Europäische Union unbenannt, vor Augen hat und versucht, diese zu charakterisieren und zu bewerten. Jedoch infolge der auf zahlreichen Gebieten zunehmenden vertieften Zusammenarbeit und den seit Jahren über die verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Probleme unserer globalen Welt geführten Dialogen sind wir Zeuge, wie sich die Wahrnehmung des anderen, des kulturell Fremden, auf beiden Seiten, wenn auch sehr langsam, zu verändern beginnt.

Bei der Erarbeitung einer Analyse über die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und China muss man sich immer wieder von neuem bewusst machen, dass sich hier zwei Partner mit großen unterschiedlichen kulturellen und politischen Erfahrungen gegenüberstehen. Beide Zivilisationen, die abendländische so wie auch die chinesische, wenn auch in unterschiedlichen historischen Zeitabschnitten, spielten eine nicht unbedeutende Rolle für die weitere Entwicklung der menschlichen Geschichte. So werden vor dem Hintergrund egozentristischer Wahrnehmungen von beiden Seiten in diesem noch immer komplizierten Beziehungsgeflecht selbstbewusst die Werte der eigenen Kultur gespiegelt, obgleich im Laufe der Jahre infolge von Dialogen und vor allem infolge zwingender globaler Herausforderungen eine gewisse Annäherung von beiden Seiten gesucht wird.

Eine Folge der Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts besteht darin, dass alle bedeutenden Staaten und transnationalen Firmen auf dem chinesischen Markt und in der chinesischen Gesellschaft konkurrieren. Die EU, als Staatengemeinschaft, kann da zweifelsohne nicht fehlen.

Trotz aller Annäherungen, die es in den über 30 Jahren, seit der Aufnahme der Beziehungen, zu beobachten sind, muss man festhalten, dass dies bis auf den heutigen Tag noch immer komplizierte Beziehungen mit unterschiedlichen Interessengebieten der jeweiligen Seite sind. In der Studie wird der Versuch unternommen, diese aufzuzeigen und zu analysieren. Bei der Analyse ist es jedoch wichtig, auf den Unterschied zwischen den Deklarationen, den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Absichtserklärungen und deren tatsächlichen Umsetzung zu verweisen. Diese Differenzierung ist notwendig, weil beide Seiten letzten Endes diese bilateralen Beziehungen vor dem Hintergrund des eigenen Interessenfeldes im Zuge des sich entwickelnden verschärften Wettbewerbs wahrnehmen. Da es in diesem Beziehungsgeflecht an Konflikten und Problemen unterschiedlicher Couleur nicht fehlt, wird in der Studie aufgezeigt, wie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung und der zunehmenden gegenseitigen Abhängigkeiten beide Seiten sich immer wieder gezwungen sehen, nach neuen Kompromissen und Lösungsansätzen zu suchen.

Um die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen China und der EU einzuordnen, ist es wichtig, diese vor dem Hintergrund der seit der Proklamierung der Modernisierungspolitik verkündeten neuen Strategie der chinesischen Außenpolitik aufzuzeigen. Im Zentrum dieser langfristig angelegten Strategie, mit dem Ziel, wieder eine gebührende Stellung in der Welt einzunehmen, stehen die Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten, im Pazifik und zu Russland im Vordergrund. Europa gewinnt an Bedeutung, weil es als eine stabile Wirtschaftsmacht, die sich auch politisch emanzipiert, betrachtet wird. Politisch formal gilt Europa, global gesehen, jedoch immer noch als zweitrangiger Partner. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass Europa in der globalen Konstellation für das außenpolitische Beziehungsgeflecht chinesischer Politik nicht zunehmend an Gewicht gewinnt. Das zeigt u.a. das große Interesse der chinesischen Seite am Ausbau der Beziehungen sowie der Schaffung eines Instituts oder eines Forums, wo unterschiedliche Erkenntnisse in offener Form debattiert werden könnten.¹

Zweifelsohne nimmt Europa, vor allem die EU, bereits seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre in der chinesischen politischen Strategie zur Schaffung einer multipolaren Welt gegen die Vorherrschaft der einen gebliebenen Supermacht einen besonderen Platz ein. Zu erinnern sei daran, dass damals Europa noch als Opfer amerikanischer Hegemonie betrachtet wurde. In der politischen Taktik, Partner zu gewinnen, begannen sich in dieser Zeit die Beziehungen zu Russland zu verbessern. Im Weißbuch zu den Beziehungen mit der EU wurde zum ersten Mal in einem offiziellen Dokument auf die Rolle und den Einfluss der EU in der Welt verwiesen. Wörtlich heißt es in diesem Paper „Despite their twist and turns, China–EU relations as a whole have been growing stronger and more mature and are now on the track of a comprehensive and sound development.“ Mit Nachdruck wurde darauf verwiesen, dass die Beziehungen noch nie so gut wie aktuell gewesen seien, weil „there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other.“² Die EU antwortete erst Jahre später mit dem Dokument über engere

¹ Im April 2009 fand im Europaparlament in Brüssel eine Konferenz zu den bilateralen Beziehungen statt, auf der der Vorschlag zur Schaffung eines Dialog Forums oder eines Instituts debattiert wurde. Die Konferenz stand unter dem Motto „Can a renewed EU–China Dialog help to solve the global financial crises?“.

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *China's EU Policy Paper ...*, siehe auch unter: <http://www.delchn.ec.europa.eu>

Partnerschaft und wachsende Verantwortung. Zweifelsohne hat sich in den über fünfzig Jahren, seitdem es zur ersten Annäherung zwischen China und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft Ende der 1950 gekommen war, viel verändert.

Außenpolitischer Pragmatismus – Schaffung bilateraler Beziehungsgeflechte

Als im Jahre 1958 die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, hervorgegangen aus der Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, gegründet wurde, verurteilte die Volksrepublik China (VRCh) zusammen mit den anderen Ostblockstaaten nach den verpflichtenden ideologischen Prinzipien des Klassenkampfes dieses Bündnis. Es wurde wie überall im Osten Europas als monopolkapitalistische Institution zur Ausbeutung der Massen bezeichnet. Doch nach dem Zerwürfnis der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas mit Moskau und der Verkündung der Zwischenzonentheorie Anfang der 1960er Jahre hatte China einen neuen eigenen außenpolitischen Kurs verkündet und begann deshalb auch seine Politik gegenüber der EWG in der Hoffnung zu verändern, in Westeuropa einen Verbündeten gegen die beiden Hauptfeinde, die in den Vereinigten Staaten wie aber in der Sowjetunion gesehen wurden, zu gewinnen.

Sowohl die EWG als auch die Volksrepublik China zeigten Interesse an der Aufnahme bilateraler Beziehungen. Bereits vor der Aufnahme der Volksrepublik China (VRCh) als Mitgliedsstaat in die Vereinten Nationen 1971 fanden die ersten Sondierungsgespräche statt.

Mit der Aufnahme in die UNO und als ständiger Vertreter in den Sicherheitsrat war die VRCh auf die Weltbühne getreten. Die große diplomatische Anerkennungswelle dauerte bis Ende der 1970er Jahre an, als die Vereinigten Staaten diplomatische Beziehungen zu China knüpften. Als ständiges Mitglied im Sicherheitsrat entwickelte sich die VRCh zu einer politischen Kraft, die mit zum globalen Entscheidungsträger innerhalb der Vereinten Nationen geworden war – mit den Stimmen der Entwicklungsländer. Der angesagte Kampf gegen die Politik der Sowjetunion wurde in Westeuropa positiv aufgenommen und deshalb bemühte man sich auch intensiv um Kontakte mit China.

1975 – Aufnahme der gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen China und der EU

Nachdem der Westen die Aufnahme der Volksrepublik China in die Vereinten Nationen nachhaltig unterstützt und Taiwan zur Niederlegung seines Mandats gezwungen hatte, begann in China die außenpolitische Öffnungspolitik, die eine Welle der diplomatischen Anerkennung von Seiten der westlichen Länder nach sich zog. Innerhalb von zwei Jahren, bis Ende 1972 hatte China zu allen Staaten der EWG, außer Irlands, diplomatische Beziehungen aufgenommen. 1973 wurden zwei Journalisten der chinesischen Nachrichtenagentur Xinhua in Brüssel akkreditiert und 1975 waren die Verhandlungen über die Aufnahme von Beziehungen abgeschlossen. Im Mai kam es nach dem Chinabesuch von EWG-Kommissars Sirr Christopher Soames zur Unterzeichnung des Vertrages und zur Aufnahme von diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der EWG und der VRCh.³ China befand sich damals kurz vor Beendigung der Kulturrevolution am Rande der Anarchie, und die Neugestaltung der Politik gehörte zum obersten Gebot. Mit der Aufnahme der Beziehungen erhielt der chinesische Botschafter gleichzeitig seine Akkreditierung bei der EWG in Brüssel.

³ http://delchn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_china/Milestones.htm

Die Volksrepublik China war damit das erste Land im Ostblock, das mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft diplomatische Beziehungen aufgenommen hatte.

Nachdem die diplomatischen Beziehungen aufgenommen worden waren, begannen beide Seiten im Rahmen der Politik als Kunst der bestehenden Möglichkeiten mit den Vorbereitungen zur Gründung eines gemeinsamen Handelskomitees. Bereits im April 1978 wurde das erste Handelsabkommen in Brüssel abgeschlossen, in dem auch die Errichtung eines EU–China Handels-Komitees festgelegt worden war. Noch im selben Jahr wurde es gegründet. Im Jahre 1979 kommt es zur ersten Begegnung zwischen dem Präsidenten der Europäischen Kommission, Roy Jenkin und Deng Xiaoping, der ein halbes Jahr später die entscheidende Kraft auf dem 11. Plenum der KPCh darstellt, neue Entwicklungskonzeptionen für China zu entwerfen.

Die Kontakte intensivierten sich. So kam es bereits 1980 zur Zusammenkunft zwischen Delegationen von europäischen Parlamentariern und des Chinesischen Nationalen Volkskongresses. 1984 drückten beide Seiten die Notwendigkeit aus, auch politische Konsultationen auf Ministerebene einzuführen. Seit dieser Zeit finden sie regelmäßig, wenn auch manchmal vertagt, statt. Im Jahre 1988 konnte die EWG ihr Delegierten-Büro in Peking eröffnen, dass 1993 dann als Delegiertenbüro der Europäischen Union umstrukturiert wurde. Auch in Hongkong kam es zur Eröffnung eines solchen Büros.⁴

In den Jahren 1983 und 1984 wurden die ersten Kooperationsprogramme in den Bereichen Wissenschaft, Management und der Entwicklung der chinesischen Dörfer abgeschlossen. Wie positiv sich die Beziehungen entwickelten, zeigt das chinesische Einverständnis, Aktivitäten der in China zahlreich entstandenen NGO aus EU-Mitteln mit zu finanzieren. 1985 verabschiedete die Europäische Kommission eine Absichtserklärung mit dem Dokument über den Ausbau der Beziehungen zu China.

In chinesischen Publikationen beginnt man jedoch über die EG erst Mitte der 1980 Jahre mehr zu berichten. Im Mittelpunkt standen damals jedoch vor allem Wirtschaftsfragen, wenn es auch nicht an politischer Rhetorik fehlte. Im politischen Kampf gegen den Hegemonismus werden Westeuropa und China als wichtige Kräfte zur Erhaltung des Weltfriedens herausgestellt, die den Fortschritt allgemein fördern.⁵

In den Jahren, nach dem 1975 die Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen erfolgte, haben sich die Beziehungen auf allen Ebenen entwickelt, da verstärktes Interesse von beiden Seiten bekundet wurde. Das wirtschaftliche Interesse an bilateraler Kooperation führte zum Abschluss zahlreicher Abkommen und Kooperationsprojekte.

Das chinesische strategische Ziel bestand von Anfang an darin, mit Hilfe der EWG die Sowjetunion in die Schranken zu weisen. Der sowjetisch-chinesische Konflikt hatte sich Ende der 1960er Jahre so weit zugespitzt, dass es zu Kämpfen und zahlreichen Scharmützeln am Grenzfluss Ussuri gekommen war. Auf Seiten der EWG, die damals noch als ein wichtiger und strategischer Partner in den transatlantischen Beziehungen galt, bestand die politische Herausforderung ebenfalls darin, das kommunistische sowjetische Imperium zu schwächen.

Auch wenn sich die Beziehungen 1989 nach dem Massaker auf dem Platz des Himmlischen Friedens abkühlten und von Seiten der EU ein Waffenembargo auferlegt wurde, so

⁴ http://delchn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_china/Milestones.htm

⁵ Su Humin, „Zhongguo tong xi'ou guanxi de wenti yu zhanwang“ (Die Beziehungen Chinas zu Westeuropa: Vergangenheit und Zukunft), *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, Nr. 2/1987, S. 58.

beobachten wir in den folgenden Jahren eine ständige Vertiefung der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen und eine Intensivierung der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Dialoge auf allen Gebieten.

Anlässlich des 30. Jahrestages der Aufnahme von diplomatischen Beziehungen wurde auf dem 8. China–EU-Gipfeltreffen im September 2005 in Helsinki auf den gewaltigen Wandel und Entwicklungsprozess dieser bemerkenswerten Beziehungen verwiesen.⁶

Zu den außenpolitischen Zielen Chinas nach 1978

Die außenpolitischen Ziele Chinas waren klar definiert. So bestand der Wunsch darin, die Beziehungen zu Westeuropa so schnell wie möglich zu vertiefen. Die Grundlage dafür wurde Ende 1978 mit der neuen Strategie der Öffnung nach Außen und der Verkündung des Programms der „Vier Modernisierungen zur Wirtschaftsentwicklung des Landes“ geschaffen.

Um die Politik Chinas gegenüber der EU besser zu verstehen sollten kurz die außenpolitischen Zielstellungen, die Ende der 1970er Jahre zusammen mit dem großen Reformprogramm proklamiert wurden, beleuchtet werden. Seit dieser Zeit heißt die Entwicklungsdevise in China, Anschluss an die Welt zu bekommen (*yu shijie jiegou*), worunter man mit der Welt die hoch entwickelten westlichen Industrieländer versteht. Es sind die internationalen Faktoren, die für die Zusammenarbeit, Wachstum, Entwicklung und Wandel im „Reich der Mitte“ von Bedeutung wurden. Obwohl das chinesische Entwicklungskonzept kulturspezifisch wahrgenommen und konzipiert wird, werden die internationalen Faktoren aus traditionellen oder ideologischen Beweggründen nicht mehr wie einst, als man noch der Klassenkampftheorie folgte, ausgeblendet. Besteht doch das Ziel chinesischer Politik seit der Öffnung des Landes darin, neue Stärke und alte Größe wiederzuerlangen, und das in einem lang angelegten Reform- und Modernisierungsprozess, der, wie man verkündet, sich im bilateralen und multilateralen Beziehungsgeflecht zum gegenseitigen Nutzen vollziehen soll. In diesem Kontext bedeutet die EU als äußerer Faktor ein wichtiges Element in der allseitigen Modernisierungspolitik Chinas.

In diesem Zusammenhang gilt an die Grundmuster chinesischer Außenpolitik zu erinnern, die darin bestehen, Pragmatismus, Flexibilität und Lernfähigkeit mit einander zu verbinden.⁷ So wurden in der Reformzeit in der Außenpolitik zwei beachtliche Wenden vollzogen. Zu erwähnen sei hier der Kurs hin zum Multilateralismus und die Abkehr streng abgegrenzter bilateraler Beziehungen, obgleich diese weiterhin gepflegt werden, wie innerhalb der EU besonders mit Deutschland und Frankreich. Auch die Reise- und Handelsdiplomatie ist als ein Novum in der chinesischen Außenpolitik zu betrachten, nicht nur um präsent zu sein, sondern auch um den wachsenden Bedarf an Rohstoffen, Energieträgern oder auch Nahrungsmitteln zu decken. Ebenfalls die neue Kulturdiplomatie als Teil der Außenpolitik wäre hier zu erwähnen. Die Konfuziusinstitute, die in allen den Ländern der EU bereits zahlreich entstanden sind, spielen hier eine besondere Rolle.

⁶ „Joint Statement of the 8th EU/China Summit“, <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=05/1091&format=HT>.

⁷ Eberhard Sandschneider, „Anleitung zur Drachepflege. Vom Umgang des Westens mit dem schwierigen Partner China“, *Internationale Politik*, Dezember 2005, Nr. 12, S. 9–10.

Wenn es um Konfliktprobleme internationaler Politik oder auch um Streitigkeiten mit der EU im Handel geht, so engagiert sich China eher verhalten im Ton, doch bestimmt in der Aussage und versucht, konstruktiv nach eigenen Kalkulationen Lösungen anzustreben. Doch es wäre vermessen zu glauben, dass politische Rhetorik sowohl von Seiten der EU als auch von China letztendlich nicht die eigennützige Perspektive, die die Entwicklung und Wachstum ohne Konfliktstoff und offene Rivalitäten voranzutreiben, im Auge behält. Obgleich China heute immer mehr in die Weltpolitik integriert ist, lässt sich die politische Führung keine fremden außenpolitischen Konzeptionen aufzwingen, auch nicht von der EU, die in ihrer Strategie gegenüber China immer wieder der Versuchung unterliegt, so eine Politik als sich neu herausbildender Ordnungsfaktor zu verfolgen. War Europa in der alten bipolaren Weltordnung noch in zwei antagonistische Blöcke geteilt, angeführt von den USA und der Sowjetunion, haben seit der Beendigung des Ost–West-Konflikts ebenfalls europäische Neuordnungsentwürfe Konjunktur.⁸ Das wird in der chinesischen Außenpolitik aufmerksam notiert.

Intensivierung der politischen Beziehungen

Da die EWG von Anfang an nicht nur als ökonomisches Instrument verstanden wurde, sondern vor allem auch als politisches, bemühte sich die chinesisch Politik um die Aufnahme von politischen Konsultationen, die seit 1984 zwei Mal im Jahr auf Ministerebene stattfinden. Doch über 10 Jahre mussten vergehen, bevor das erste Dokument von Seiten der EU zur Chinapolitik vorgelegt wurde.

1995 legte die Europäische Kommission ihr erstes Papier zur Politik gegenüber China vor, dass unter dem Motto stand: „Eine langfristige Politik der Europäischen Union gegenüber China.“⁹ Mit diesem Dokument waren folgende Zielsetzungen verbunden. Neben Handels- und Wirtschaftsfragen sollte eine einheitliche Strategie der EU-Mitglieder gegenüber politischen Entwicklungen in China, insbesondere gegenüber der Menschenrechtsfrage erzielt werden. Es waren die zunehmenden partikularen Interessen der einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten, die eine gemeinsame Politik gegenüber China erschwerten. So sah sich die europäische Kommission in Brüssel gezwungen, eine klarere Realpolitik gegenüber China einzufordern. Obgleich die Bedeutung der beschleunigten Entwicklung in China von zahlreichen Politikern nach wie vor bezweifelt wurde, kam es zur Verabschiedung einer neuen Strategie.¹⁰ Bereits im Jahre 1997 begann die Europäische Kommission auf Druck von Deutschland und Frankreich einen neuen Kurs der „soft power“ gegenüber China einzuleiten. Träumte man in Westeuropa bisher von der Politik der Konditionalität des Entweder Oder und der Sanktionen, so waren sich Politiker im Laufe der Jahre bewusst geworden, dass man China nicht mehr ein Entwicklungsmodell nach den eigenen Vorstellungen aufzwingen könne. So hatte sich die Europäische Kommission den Forderungen des Europäischen Parlaments widersetzt, die jährlich

⁸ S. Werner Link, „Ordnungsentwürfe in Europa“, in: *Die neue Weltpolitik*, Karl Kaiser, Hans-Peter Schwarz (Hrg.), Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995, S. 471.

⁹ Dokument KOM (1995), 279, *Die langfristige Politik der europäischen Kommission gegenüber China*.

¹⁰ Umfangreiches Material findet man auf der Homepage des Büros der Europäischen Kommission in Beijing, siehe: <http://ecd.org.cn>.

vorliegende Anti-China-Resolution in der Kommission für Menschenrechte in Genf zu unterzeichnen.¹¹

Hier entsteht die Frage, warum die Europäische Kommission sich gezwungen sah, ihre bisherige Strategie gegenüber China zu verändern? Die Veränderung erfolgte gewiss nicht aus Liebe zur chinesischen Politik, sondern infolge der Erkenntnis, dass Europa infolge des globalen Wandels eine neue Asienpolitik und konkret eine neue Chinapolitik benötigt. Diese Frage scheint heute im 21. Jahrhundert, wo die bisherigen Globalisierungsmechanismen nach der infolge ungehemmter und unkontrollierter Kapitalströme im Sommer 2008 ausgebrochenen Finanzkrise neu überdacht werden, nicht mehr so schwer zu beantworten sein. Doch das Bewusstsein vieler Menschen im Westen, noch immer im Besitz eines universalen Entwicklungsmodells, das als globaler Entwicklungsmotor gelten sollte, hat längst zu Gegenreaktionen geführt. So wächst gerade in vielen Ländern Asiens das Bewusstsein, dass Asien, und hier vor allem China, in den globalen Machtstrukturen zu einer bedeutenden Säule in der globalen Politik geworden ist. Asien und vor allem China sind deshalb zu einem neuen Element in der globalen Politik der Europäischen Union geworden.

Die erste Asienstrategie legte die Europäische Kommission in Brüssel im Jahre 1994 vor.¹² Seit dieser Zeit wurde die Strategie immer wieder aktualisiert, in dem regionale und länderspezifische Schwerpunkte neu bestimmt wurden. So kann man von der Annahme ausgehen, dass die Rückkehr Chinas nicht nur als große Wirtschaftsmacht, sondern ebenfalls als regionale Macht sowie zunehmend als Weltmacht die Asienpolitik Europas entscheidend mitbestimmt hat und weiterhin mitbestimmt.

Entwicklung der Partnerschaft

Zur Verabschiedung eines entsprechenden China-Dokuments kam es 1998 in Brüssel. Es stand unter dem Motto „A Long Term for China-Europe Relations – Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China“, in dem die EU ihren Wunsch zum Ausdruck brachte, die Beziehungen zu China allseitig zu entwickeln.¹³ Das angestrebte Ziel bestand darin, China stärker in die globale Politik und globale Weltwirtschaft einzubinden. Die EU erklärte aber auch, bereit zu sein, China bei der Transformation in Richtung Rechtsstaatlichkeit zu unterstützen und dem Land auf dem Weg zur Schaffung einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft zu helfen. Mit allem Nachdruck wurde jedoch auch auf die kritische Rechtslage, nach der immer noch viele Todesstrafen und die willkürliche Administrativstrafe verhängt werden, verwiesen und eine Reduzierung der Anwendung der verhängten Todesstrafen sowie eine grundlegende Reform der Administrativstrafe gefordert. Im Dokument werden die Bedeutung einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung und insgesamt die Notwendigkeit der Verbesserung der bilateralen und internationalen Zusammenarbeit hervorgehoben. Auch wird die Bereitschaft erklärt, den bilateralen

¹¹ Stefan Friedrich, „Europa und China in den 90er Jahren“, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 27/1998, S. 36–46.

¹² Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (ed.), *Europa und Asien, Ein strategischer Rahmen für vertiefte Partnerschaften*, Brüssel, 2001.

¹³ Dokument KOM (1998), 181.

Menschenrechtsdialogs, der 1995 zum ersten Mal aufgenommen wurde, konstruktiv fortzusetzen.¹⁴ Dass Dokument über eine umfassende Partnerschaft mit China gab den Anstoß, eine neue Periode in den gegenseitigen Beziehungen einzuleiten. Das Dokument war im Ergebnis einer politischen Neuorientierung entstanden, da sich die EU gezwungen sah, auf die international wachsende Position Chinas zu reagieren und mit der chinesischen politischen Elite engeren Kontakt aufzunehmen. So wurde am Rande des zweiten Asia–Europa-Gipfels in London im Frühjahr 1998 der Beschluss über jährliche Gipfeltreffen gefasst. Das erste Gipfeltreffen fand nach dem Asia–Europe Gipfel noch in demselben Jahr in Beijing statt, die folgenden in den Hauptstädten von EU-Mitgliedsländern.

Wenige Jahre später wurde die bisherige Strategie analysiert und entsprechend der neuen Bedingungen präzisiert. So ist zweifelsohne das Dokument aus dem Jahre 2001 „EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for More Effective EU-Policy“ von Interesse. Darin wird die bisherige EU-Politik gegenüber China allgemein positiv eingeschätzt, doch gleichzeitig auf die wichtigsten Schwerpunkte für die zukünftige Zusammenarbeit verwiesen.¹⁵

Einige Jahre später auf dem Gipfeltreffen im Jahre 2006 kam es zur Verabschiedung des Dokuments „EU–China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibility“, in dem mit allem Nachdruck auf die Notwendigkeit einer zu vertiefenden Partnerschaft und größerer Verantwortung verwiesen wurde.¹⁶ Die EU brachte hierin ihren Willen zum Ausdruck, weiterhin alle Anstrengungen zu unternehmen, China auf dem Weg zur Schaffung einer offeneren Gesellschaft zu unterstützen. Wie bereits in den vorhergehenden Dokumenten betont, wurde auch hier die Bedeutung nachhaltiger Entwicklung in China und die weitere Verbesserung der bilateralen und internationalen Beziehungen hervorgehoben. Doch besonderes Gewicht wurde hier auf die Verantwortung, die China in der globalen Politik und Weltwirtschaft übernehmen sollte, gelegt.

Obleich es nicht an zahlreichen Differenzen in unterschiedlichen Bereichen mangelte, haben sich die Beziehungen im Laufe der Jahre zunehmend entspannt und verbessert. Inzwischen zeigt auch die chinesische Seite verstärkt Interesse an einer Verbesserung der Beziehungen, und sie beteiligt sich an zahlreichen viel versprechenden Projekten. Zu erwähnen wäre hier das Projekt „EU Window“. Auf beiden Seiten wird der Hoffnung Ausdruck gegeben, dass ein vierjähriges Sprachprogramm, das zur Erlernung der chinesischen Sprache für Europäer angeboten wird, zur weiteren Annäherung und zum besseren gegenseitigen Kennenlernen beitragen könnte. Das Abkommen wurde vom chinesischen Bildungsminister Zhang Xinzheng und dem europäischen Kommissar für Bildung Leonard Orban in Brüssel unterzeichnet. Mit diesem Programm, das 2009 begann, sollen 200 Lehrer und 400 Schulleiter aus EU-Ländern die Möglichkeiten erhalten, ihre chinesischen Sprach- und Landeskennntnisse in China selbst zu verbessern. Die Kosten vor Ort übernimmt die chinesische Seite.

¹⁴ *The EU's China Policy*, http://ec.europa.com/comm/external_relations/china/intro/index.htm, Aufruf 27.04.2007.

¹⁵ http://www.delchn.cec.europa.eu/eu_and_china/EU_Agreement_China.htm, Aufruf 10.11.2006.

¹⁶ *The EU's China Policy*...

Wenn wir die Frage untersuchen, wie sich die Beziehungen in den Jahren gestalteten, so müssen wir darauf verweisen, dass es in den einzelnen Perioden unterschiedliche Strategien gab, die experimentiert wurden auf verschiedenen Gebieten, angefangen von Konsultationen über die verschiedensten Bereiche, Gipfeltreffen, regen gegenseitigem Besucherverkehr, politischen Dialogen, Rechtsdialogen, Dialogen über Fragen der Menschenrechte, Kooperationsprojekte in Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft, Technik oder Ausbildung, um nur einige zu nennen. Unabhängig von den politischen wie auch wirtschaftlichen Dialogen finden regelmäßig bereits auf 24 Sektoren umfangreiche Dialoge und Gesprächsrunden zwischen der Europäischen Kommission und China statt, wobei es der EU darum geht, nicht nur Probleme, wie zu Fragen der Umwelt, des Klimawandels, der Ausbildung oder der Industrie und Landwirtschaftspolitik zu debattieren. Es geht auch konkret um die Unterstützung technischer Hilfe bei der Transformation der ökonomischen und sozialen Reformen und der Umgestaltung Chinas in eine offenere Gesellschaft.¹⁷

Probleme bei der Entwicklung einer engeren Partnerschaft

Die angestrebte Partnerschaft versucht man auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen zu entwickeln. Doch im Vordergrund stehen nach wie vor Investitions- und Handelsfragen. Seit dem Jahre 2000 entfalten sich die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen China und der EU in einem beschleunigten Tempo. Seit 2006 konnte die EU zu Chinas größtem Handelspartner aufsteigen und diese Position ist weiterhin aktuell. 2007 konnte China zum zweitgrößten Handelspartner der EU aufsteigen. Allein im Jahre 2007 stiegen die chinesischen Ausfuhren, die einen Wert von 231 Mrd. Euro betrugen, um 18,7% und das Handelsdefizit der EU vergrößerte sich auf 160 Mrd. Euro. Trotz verschiedener Hindernisse und Barrieren, die in China auferlegt wurden, konnten auch die Ausfuhren der EU nach China, deren Wert 71,6 Mrd. Euro betrugen, um 12% zunehmen.

Trotz positivem Entwicklungstrend treten infolge verschärfter Konkurrenz auf den Weltmärkten zunehmend Spannungen auf. So forderte die EU im November 2006 China auf, seinen Markt in den Branchen Telekommunikation und Finanzen weiter zu öffnen, denn europäische Firmen zeigen sich zunehmend beunruhigt über den mangelnden Patentschutz und die Diskriminierung bei Investitionen im Finanzsektor. Deshalb wird China seit Jahren angemahnt, das Urheberrecht mehr zu schützen und gegen den Diebstahl geistigen Eigentums konsequenter vorzugehen.¹⁸ In einem Dokument des Europäischen Parlament wurde deshalb auch mit Nachdruck darauf hingewiesen, dass die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Europa und China auf Engagement und einer strategischen Partnerschaft beruhen sollten, und zwar auf der Grundlage anerkannter gemeinsamer Werte und unter Beachtung der WTO-Vorschriften, nach denen die Grundsätze der Reziprozität, des fairen Wettbewerbs und des fairen Handels gelten.

Doch EU-Firmen werden weiterhin mit unterschiedlichen Schwierigkeiten konfrontiert, wie nicht tarifären Handelshemmnissen, unfairen Wettbewerb, Produktfälschungen oder Markenpiraterie. Der EU ist sehr daran gelegen, und natürlich auch aus Wettbewerbsgründen, dass China weiter seine Märkte für Waren und Dienstleistungen öffnet, um

¹⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/index_en.htm.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

ausländischen Unternehmern einen gleichberechtigten Zugang zu gewähren. Doch das wird nur infolge der Durchführung von weiteren Wirtschaftsreformen möglich sein, deren Tempo und Umsetzung China selbst bestimmt. Bisher entscheidet noch immer der Staat, wann Eingriffe in die Wirtschaftspolitik zu erfolgen haben. So wundert es nicht, dass von Seiten der EU die Bereitstellung staatlicher Mittel zur Exportfinanzierung missbilligt. Aus diesem Grunde zeigt sich die Kommission auch noch nicht bereit, China den Status einer Marktwirtschaft zu zuerkennen. Die chinesische Seite versucht jedoch seit einiger Zeit der Europäischen Kommission Argumente vorzulegen, nach denen in China bereits Kriterien für den Status einer Marktwirtschaft vorhanden sind.¹⁹ Nach der im Sommer 2008 ausgebrochenen globalen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise haben jedoch auch die Staaten der EU protektionistische Maßnahmen ergriffen, um ihre eigene Wirtschaft zu stützen.

Nachdem das vor über 20 Jahren vereinbarte Abkommen über Handel und Zusammenarbeit 2007 ausgelaufen war, bemühten sich beide Seiten in langwierigen Verhandlungen, ein neues, für die EU und für China günstiges Abkommen über strategische Partnerschaft und Handel abzuschließen, so der EU Kommissar Ferrero Waldner in einem Artikel der chinesischen *China Daily*.²⁰ Die Konsultationen über das neue Abkommen begannen bereits Ende 2006. So wird berichtet, dass man plane, die Zusammenarbeit in 22 Bereichen aufzunehmen oder zu vertiefen, wie auf dem Gebiet der Energieversorgung, des Umweltschutzes, Landwirtschaft, Transport, Zoll, Bildung, Informatik, Wissenschaft und Technologie sowie Weltraumforschung. In dem neuen Abkommen sollen auch Fragen der Zusammenarbeit bei der Terrorismusbekämpfung und der Verhinderung des Rüstungswettlaufs bei der Herstellung von Massenvernichtungswaffen enthalten sein.²¹

Infolge der Beschlüsse auf dem 10. Gipfeltreffen, das im November 2007 in Peking stattfand, trat im April 2008 zum ersten Mal der Wirtschafts- und Handelsdialog auf Minister-Ebene zu seinen ersten Beratungen zusammen, da inzwischen zahlreiche Probleme von Seiten der EU im Investitions- und Handelsbereich aufgelistet wurden.

Mit den EU-Dokumenten „China – Closer Partners Growing Responsibilities“²² und „A Policy Paper on EU–China Trade and Investment: Competition and Partnership“²³ wurde die bisherige Politik konkreter formuliert. Der EU geht es um die zwingenden globalen Herausforderungen, denen man nur durch gemeinsames Handeln begegnen kann, was mit anderen Worten bedeutet, Übereinstimmungen zu finden, damit die Beziehungen effektiver gestaltet werden könnten. Es mangelt jedoch nicht an kritischen Hinweisen, die es u.a. über die chinesische Afrikapolitik, die Energiepolitik oder den Protektionismus gibt. Erneut wird die teilweise Missachtung der mit dem WTO-Beitritt verpflichtenden Regeln eines fairen Wettbewerbs angesprochen. Eingegangen wurde auch auf den Wunsch Pekings, das Rüstungsembargo aufzuheben. Doch die EU hält mit der Begründung an ihrer Forderung fest, dass die Aufhebung nur erfolgen könnte, wenn sich die allgemeinen

¹⁹ Europäisches Parlament China, *Ausschuss für internationalen Handel*, 2008/2171(INI), PR/744822DE.doc PE413.993v01-00.

²⁰ *China Daily*, 17.01.2007.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament (COM 2006) 631.

²³ Commission Working Documents (COM 2006) 632.

Bedingungen für eine Verbesserung Menschenrechtslage verändern und die chinesische Regierung ihre militärischen Ausgaben transparent mache.

Als in der EU über die Notwendigkeit einer vertiefenden allseitigen strategischen Partnerschaft debattiert und schließlich China als neue politische Strategie angeboten wurde, fehlte es auch nicht an Stimmen, die für eine Aufhebung des Waffenembargos optierten, was von einigen Vertretern als Verrat an der Politik der eigenen Werte eingeschätzt wurde. Für die Aufhebung der Sanktionen sprachen sich vor allem der ehemalige deutsche Bundeskanzler G. Schröder wie aber auch der ehemalige französische Präsident J. Chirac aus. Während des Besuchs des deutschen Bundeskanzlers im Dezember 2003 in China sprach er von der Notwendigkeit, das Waffenembargos so schnell wie möglich aufzuheben. Auf der EU-Spitzensitzung am 11. Oktober 2004 kam dieses Problem erstmals auf die Tagesordnung, dass doch die Frage des Embargos von Zeit zu Zeit überprüft werden müsste. Bisher konnte innerhalb der EU darüber keine Übereinstimmung erzielt werden, da das Votum für eine Aufhebung einstimmig ausfallen muss. So sucht man von deutscher Seite in Reihen der SPD nach Alternativen, die Waffenlieferungen nicht mehr auszuschließen, sondern sie an politische Bedingungen, sprich an die Verbesserung der Menschenrechtslage, zu knüpfen. Darunter wird u.a. gefordert die rasche Ratifizierung und Umsetzung des UN-Paktes über politische- und bürgerliche Rechte, Stärkung der Autonomierechte der Minderheiten im Lande, der Umgang mit Konflikten wie gegenüber Tibet oder Taiwan.²⁴

Entwicklung wissenschaftlich-technischer Zusammenarbeit und der Produktionssicherheit

Bereits Ende der 80er Jahre entwickelte sich die wissenschaftlich-technische Zusammenarbeit zwischen China und der EU. So wurde China Partner bei zwei europäischen Großprojekten, dem Satellitennavigationssystem Galileo und dem experimentellen Fusionsreaktor ITER. Am 11. Oktober 2006 wurde in Brüssel das Wissenschafts- und Technologiejahr China und die EU eröffnet. Wichtige gemeinsame Zusammenkünfte, wie der Unternehmerkongress zu Forschung und Entwicklung in Le Havre (Dezember 2006), der Forschungskongress zur Mobilität von Wissenschaft und Forschung in Berlin und einem biowissenschaftlichen Kongress in Shanghai im Frühjahr 2007 sind zu vermerken. So ist u.a. auch vorgesehen, europäischen Forschern die Möglichkeit zu geben, sich an chinesischen Forschungsprogrammen zu beteiligen.²⁵

Die Zusammenarbeit umfasst zahlreiche Gebiete, wie die Wettbewerbspolitik, die China an die europäischen Maßstäbe annähern soll, aber auch Umweltweltpolitik, wo Erfahrungen weiter gegeben und im Rahmen der Entwicklungshilfe Industrieanlagen modernisiert werden. Die EU hat inzwischen zahlreiche Projekte zur Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, vor allem jedoch der Produktkontrollmechanismen für Lebensmittel, Textilien und Lederwaren eingeleitet. Entstanden ist ein langer und schwer zu realisierender Katalog von anstehenden Problemen.

Im November 2008 wurde zwischen der EU, den USA und China in einem gemeinsamen Dokument beschlossen, gemeinsame Sicherheitsstandards bei Spielzeug zu koordinieren. Geplant ist, diese Zusammenarbeit auch auf andere Produktbereiche auszubauen, denn die

²⁴ FAZ, SPD und Grüne gegen Aufhebung des China-Embargos, 28.10.2004.

²⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/intro/index.htm, Aufruf 27.04.2007.

Hälfte der in den letzten Jahren vom EU-Markt entfernten Produkte stammten aus China. Die EU und China vereinbarten außerdem eine engere Zusammenarbeit im Kampf gegen gefährliche Produkt- und Lebensmittelimporte. China verpflichtet sich, alle drei Monate zu berichten, welche Ergebnisse beim Auffinden gefährlicher Produkte erzielt wurden.²⁶

Gesellschaftliche Dialoge

Man sollte es immer wieder betonen, dass globale Herausforderungen nicht im Alleingang gelöst werden können. Die Überalterung der Bevölkerung ist für viele Länder, vor allen aber auch für China, so ein soziales Problem. Durch die die Ein-Kind-Politik wurde das Generationsverhältnis verändert und China befindet sich unter den Ländern, in denen die Gruppe der Leistungsempfänger immer größer wird. Auf der 3. chinesisch-europäischen Sozialkonferenz, die im September 2008 in Beijing stattfand, debattierten Vertreter beider Seiten über die Möglichkeiten eines staatlich verankerten Sozialsystems, um den Herausforderungen des demografischen Wandels und der Abwanderung von Landarbeiter in die Stadt zu begegnen sowie Fragen einer Pflegeversicherung.²⁷

In diesem Kontext wäre auch noch das China–Europa-Forum, eine Plattform politischer und gesellschaftlicher Dialoge, das im Jahre 2004 in Hamburg gegründet wurde, zu erwähnen.. Im September 2008 fand in Hamburg die dritte Sitzung statt, auf der von beiden Seiten die Bedeutung der bilateralen Beziehungen betont wurde. Fast 400 Teilnehmer aus Politik Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft nahmen daran teil. Im Mittelpunkt der Debatten standen die bilateralen Handelsbeziehungen, Fragen des Umweltschutzes und des Klimawandels. Neu dagegen war die Fragestellung, wie man die bilaterale Entwicklungsperspektive gestalten könnte. Der stell. Ministerpräsident Zhang Dejiang verwies auf das große Entwicklungspotential seines Landes und betonte, dass dieses doch zum gegenseitigen Vorteil noch besser genutzt werden könnte. Betont wurde, dass für die chinesische Politik inzwischen viel mehr Übereinstimmungen mit der EU vorhanden seien als Differenzen, die es natürlich auch weiterhin gebe. Wichtig sei, so die chinesische Seite, die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit in der Perspektive globaler Herausforderungen zu betrachten. Zhang Dejiang unterstrich den Friedenswillen der chinesischen Regierung, wie es bei internationalen Begegnungen schon zum verpflichtenden Ritual geworden ist. Angesichts der zahlreichen Publikationen im Westen, die von einer aufkommenden Gefahr für den Westen sprechen, wurde mit Nachdruck Chinas Entwicklungskurs beleuchtet, dessen Ziel es sei, das Land in eine blühenden Landschaft zu verwandeln, das weder für Europa noch insgesamt für Welt eine Bedrohung darstelle.²⁸ China geht es in den kommenden Jahren darum, mit der EU die pragmatische und für die Modernisierung des Landes so notwendige Zusammenarbeit in allen Bereichen zu vertiefen.

Wenn man auch von einer positiven Entwicklung der bilateralen Beziehungen ausgehen kann, so gibt es, und das vor allem aus europäischer Sicht, weiterhin viele komplizierte Probleme, die einer Lösung bedürften. Bei dem Forderungskatalog der EU gegenüber China scheint man sich jedoch nicht immer nach den Kriterien der Kunst des Möglichen zu richten, sondern nach eigenen Wahrnehmungen und auch nach den Modellen, die in

²⁶ <http://www.ksa.de/jks/artikel.spj?id=1226670968483>, nach dpa.

²⁷ Information der chinesischen Botschaft in Berlin, 15.09.2008.

²⁸ Radio Beijing International, 23.09.2008.

Osteuropa funktionieren, vorzugehen. So wird in den unterschiedlichen Forderungskatalogen nach wie vor das gesamte zivilisatorische Entwicklungsniveau Chinas nicht genug berücksichtigt. So ist es wahrlich unrealistisch zu glauben, dass die chinesische Regierung und die örtlichen Behörden über die Möglichkeiten verfügen, mit Hilfe von Anordnungen und Regelungen die existierende Situation schnell möglichst zu verändern. Man muss sich wundern, wie noch Anfang unseres Jahrhunderts immer wieder Forderungen in einzelnen EU-Ländern laut werden, doch gegenüber China Sanktionen zu verhängen. Hier denke man nur an die zahlreichen Artikel und Pamphlets in der westlichen Presse, die vor der Olympiade erschienen waren. Wer glaubt, China mit Sanktionen erpressen zu können, der irrt. Eine Politik der Sanktionen würde wenig bringen und mehr schaden.

Dagegen sollte man beachten, dass die chinesische Seite sich im Gespräch über Konfliktprobleme heute weit offener als noch vor Jahren zeigt. Schwierige Themen werden weiterhin über Tibet oder Taiwan bleiben, da die chinesische Seite das als innere Angelegenheit betrachtet.

Neue Realpolitik der EU als „soft power“

Die neue Realpolitik spielt gewiss eine bedeutende Rolle in den Beziehungen zu China. So sollte man betonen, dass die EU nicht nur in Folge der Veränderungen globaler Konstellationen ihre Chinapolitik aktiv und allseitig versucht neu auszurichten, sondern auch aufgrund neu entstandener Bedingungen der gegenseitigen Interessenlage.²⁹ In der konkreten Zusammenarbeit ist die europäische Kommission abgegangen von den ehemaligen Forderungen, China das westliche Entwicklungsmodell aufzuzwingen, wonach nur ein Rechtsstaat nach abendländischer Vision Entwicklung und Sicherheit gewähren könne. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass Brüssel seine Visionen insgesamt verabschiedet hat. Neu ist nicht nur die Taktik, sondern auch die Strategie, nach der mit Hilfe einer Politik der Zusammenarbeit sich ein allmählicher Wandel auch im „Reich der Mitte“ versprochen wird. Dieser Wandel ist in China bereits zu beobachten, doch gewiss nicht nach allen Wünschen, die in Brüssel nach wie vor in der bilateralen Politik eine Rolle spielen.

Und wenn es um die in China bereits erfolgten zahlreichen Veränderungen in Staat und Gesellschaft geht, hat zweifelsohne auch die EU mit ihrer Politik der Kooperation und finanziellen Unterstützung beigetragen. Hier sei vor allem die neue sanfte Diplomatie in der Frage der Menschenrechte zu erwähnen, mit der wahrlich mehr erreicht werden konnte, als mit offener Kritik und lauten Beschuldigungen an die Adresse der chinesischen Führung. Hat sich doch seit der Verkündung des Reformkurses Ende der 1970er Jahre das politische System von einem totalitären Herrschaftsapparat in ein autoritäres Herrschaftssystem, rule of law, verwandelt, was zweifelsohne weit von dem entfernt ist, was man unter einem westlichen Rechtsstaat versteht. Allgemein bedeutet das jedoch eine Entwicklung hin zu mehr Good Governance. Und diese Entwicklung ist zweifelsohne positiv zu werten.

Dieser systempolitische Wandel vollzog sich nicht nur dank der auf unterschiedlichen administrativen und wissenschaftlichen Ebenen geführten Rechtsdialoge und Dialoge zu Fragen der Menschenrechte, sondern er ist auch ein Ergebnis der Zusammenarbeit bei der Ausbildung von Juristen, Richter, Anwälte, Staatsanwälte

²⁹ „An Overview of Sectoral Dialogues between China and the European Commission“, siehe: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/introsect.htm

und der so vielfältigen Kooperationsprojekte, bei denen Europäer und Chinesen die Anschauungen und differenzierten Wahrnehmungen des anderen kennen lernen. Gewiss haben die Europäer, vor allem die Entscheidungsträger, noch großen Nachholbedarf dessen, wie man China, die chinesische Politik und die chinesische Realität verstehen sollte. Die Gründe dafür sind allgemein bekannt, weil nämlich die Wahrnehmung des anderen und Fremden oft noch zu einseitig und nach eigenen Wertekriterien und theoretischen Ansätzen aufgenommen wird und nicht in dem großen Zusammenhang der Entwicklungsprobleme eines großen Landes analysiert werden. An der praktischen Umsetzung mangelt es noch zu oft. Zu betonen gilt, dass in einigen EU-Ländern, dazu gehört vor allem Polen, die chinesische Entwicklung in den Medien nach wie vor allem negativ gespiegelt wird. Doch Chinas Politik kann man nur komplex und vor dem Hintergrund der chinesischen Geschichte und chinesischen Ideenwelt begreifen. Und das betrifft natürlich nicht nur China.

Chinabeobachter, Experten und Wissenschaftler sprechen bereits von moderner Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung, die bereits zu rechtlichen Normen wurden.³⁰ Viele Gesetze, die in China in einem langwierigen Prozess erarbeitet wurden, stammen im Kern aus der europäischen Gesetzgebung. Als Beispiel möge die Gesetzgebung über den Schutz des Geistigen Eigentums angeführt werden, die bereits Ende der 1997 verabschiedet wurde.³¹ Doch der Nepotismus, die Verbindung von Politik und Wirtschaft, sowie ein mangelndes Rechtsbewusstsein in breiten Kreisen der Gesellschaft stellen für die Umsetzung noch eine große Barriere dar.

Wir beobachten, um es ganz allgemein zu sagen, dass im Globalisierungsprozess eine Verschiebung von der national orientierten freien Marktwirtschaft zum globalen neoliberalen angelsächsischen Modell stattgefunden hat mit all seinen Krisen behafteten Auswirkungen. Hatte sich doch der Nationalstaat in den letzten Jahren in den westlichen Demokratien zunehmend vom Interventionismus in Wirtschaftsfragen zurückgezogen und war, bis zum Ausbruch der großen Finanzkrise im Sommer 2008 vom Glauben beseelt, dass die Wirtschaft für sich ohne jegliches Regelsystem von Außen wohl die besten Bedingungen für die weitere Entwicklung der Gewinneffizienz schaffen würde.

Anders in China und das auch nach dem Beitritt in die WTO. Der Staat funktioniert als Nationalstaat, und die Führungspartei, die Kommunistische Partei Chinas, so wird verkündet, betreibt Politik für das Wohlergehen des Nationalstaates und seiner Menschen. Im Unterschied zum bisherigen westlichen Entwicklungsmodell wird versucht, mittels Interventionspolitik Grenzen zu setzen, um damit für die eigene Wirtschaft optimale Bedingungen im globalen Wettbewerb zu schaffen. Und das geschieht auch, wenn es als notwendig betrachtet wird, unter Missachtung von international verpflichtenden Regelungen in unterzeichneten Verträgen und Abkommen.

Doch insgesamt ist ein positiver Trend zu beobachten, und man muss davon ausgehen, dass die weitere Öffnung und Liberalisierung des öffentlichen Lebens und die Lockerung der Kontrollmechanismen sowohl in der Administration als auch im ideologischen Bereich zur weiteren Vielfalt der Meinungen führen werden, wodurch mehr Druck auf die Regierung

³⁰ *Lanpishu* (Blaubuch), 2007.

³¹ New Star Publisher (ed.), *China Protects Intellectual Proper Rights*, Beijing: New Star Publisher, 1997.

ausgeübt werden kann. Schon heute ist der Parteiapparat nicht mehr in der Lage, die Kontrolle landesweit und flächendeckende über alle Bereiche auszuüben.

Europa stellt keine Gefahr für China dar

Auch die Politik Chinas gegenüber Europa, konkret gegenüber der EU, hat sich natürlich in den Jahren gewaltig gewandelt. Heute wird die EU in der chinesischen Politik als strategischer Partner bezeichnet und nicht mehr als Opfer oder Gegner amerikanischer Politik wahrgenommen. So nimmt Europa als Block einen besonderen Stellenwert in der chinesischen globalen Strategie zur Schaffung einer globalen multilateralen Weltordnung ein, weil Europa für China keine strategische Gefahr, Bedrohung und Konkurrenz darstellt, weder politisch, militärisch, noch wirtschaftlich.

Diese veränderte Einschätzung erfolgte nach dem Wandel der EU-Europapolitik gegenüber China, der sich seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre vollzieht, eine möglichst eigenständige, d.h. von den Vereinigten Staaten unabhängige Politik gegenüber China zu betreiben. Diesem Politikwandel der EU war vorausgegangen, dass infolge des Irakkrieges neue Politikansätze gegenüber den Bündnisverpflichtungen mit den USA heiß debattiert wurden. Ein Signal wurde gegeben, als die EU nicht mehr ihre Bereitschaft erklärte, sich von den USA unter Druck setzen zu lassen bezüglich der jährlich vorgelegten Resolutionen in der Menschenrechtsfrage in der Menschenrechtskommission in Genf. Das Ergebnis dieser Neuorientierung war, dass die AntiChina-Resolution nicht mehr mit unterzeichnet wurde. Dieser Entwicklung liegen globale Veränderungen zu Grunde. Zu erwähnen wäre hier vor allem die neue regionale und globale Position Chinas und das daraus erwachsende Selbstbewusstsein von Staat und Gesellschaft, in der internationalen Gemeinschaft bereits ein entscheidendes Glied zu sein, wie aber auch infolge der wachsenden Rolle der EU infolge der schwächer werdenden globalen Position der USA. Dadurch haben sich auch die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und der NATO gewandelt. Insgesamt ist der Einfluss der USA in Europa geringer geworden.³²

Eine neue Wende chinesischer EU-Politik war nach der Veröffentlichung des EU-Dokuments über die strategische Partnerschaft im Jahre 2003 „A Maturing Partnership – Shared Interest – Challenge in China–EU Relations“ zu beobachten. In dem chinesischen Grundsatzpapier über die EU-Politik „A Policy Paper on the Relationship with the EU“ verwies die chinesische Regierung auf den gewichtigen Stellenwert, den nach chinesischer Einschätzung die EU in der chinesischen globalen Strategie einnimmt. Auch wenn darin generell keine neuen Aspekte formuliert wurden, so war das eine Bekräftigung bisheriger politischer Visionen von einer multilateralen Weltordnung, die u.a. bis heute mit der EU angestrebt wird. Mit Nachdruck wurde auf die sich verändernde Situation in der Weltpolitik zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts verwiesen, in der sich die Konflikte häufen. So wurde mit allem Nachdruck darauf verwiesen, dass ein instabiles Umfeld nicht im Interesse chinesischer Politik liege, weil zur Realisierung der langfristigen Modernisierungspläne des Landes zweifelsohne Stabilität im Lande wie auch ein günstiges internationales Umfeld benötigt wird. Deshalb wurde die Schaffung und Erhaltung eines friedlichen Umfelds, jedoch, wie stets betont, unter Bedingungen einer multilateralen Weltordnung, als die wichtigste globale Frage dargestellt. Dabei sollte jedoch die internationale Kooperation,

³² Renmin Ribao, 30.03.07.

die ein wichtiges Element zur Umsetzung der Modernisierungspläne ist, nicht vor den Kerngrundsätzen chinesischer Außenpolitik gestellt werden, das wichtigste Grundprinzip trotz allen Veränderungen die Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten bleibe.

Die Souveränität des Landes wird in der chinesischen Politik nach leidvollen historischen Erfahrungen als ein besonderer Wert betrachtet. Deshalb finden neu etablierte völkerrechtliche Mechanismen, wie unilaterale Interventionsstrategien keine direkte Unterstützung. Die der eigenen Modernisierung dienende internationale Kooperation sollte sich dagegen zunehmend im Rahmen eines neuen internationalen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Ordnungssystems entwickeln, ohne Konditionalitäten. Dabei hofft man auf die Unterstützung der EU, die, wie es im Weißbuch heißt, zu einer Hauptkraft in der Welt geworden sei. Eine der wichtigsten Forderungen lautet deshalb im EU-Weißbuch, Demokratie in den internationalen Beziehungen zu schaffen. Damit sind Reformen der großen internationalen Organisationen gemeint, angefangen von der UNO oder dem Internationalen Währungsfond, in dem man mehr Stimmrechte erhalten möchte.³³

Klar wurde formuliert, dass die EU eine der mächtigsten zentralen Kräfte in der Welt und für die chinesische Wirtschaft von großer Bedeutung sei. Mit großer Genugtuung wurde festgestellt, dass China von der EU respektiert werde und zu einem gleichberechtigten Partner aufsteigen konnte. Besonders anzumerken sei, dass anerkennende Worte über die konstruktiven Menschenrechtsdialoge fielen. Dagegen wurde die Hoffnung zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass es in Zukunft mehr Konsultationen über internationale Fragen geben sollte. Interessant ist, dass die chinesische Seite in diesem Papier auch ihr Interesse an militärischen Kooperationen und Konsultationen über internationale Sicherheitsaspekte zum Ausdruck bringt. Appelliert wurde an die EU, das Waffenembargo, das 1989 gegenüber China nach der gewaltsamen Niederschlagung der Studentenproteste verhängt worden war, aufzuheben, um auch zukünftig in Bereichen der Rüstungsindustrie zu kooperieren. Verwiesen wurde auf die zunehmende gegenseitige Abhängigkeit und der Rolle, die die EU in der chinesischen Außenpolitik spielt.³⁴

Obleich es der EU im 21. Jahrhundert noch nicht gelungen ist, zu einem entscheidenden globalen Ordnungsfaktor aufzusteigen, wird sie von China als wichtiger strategischer Partner zu Errichtung einer neuen Weltordnung gesehen. Offensichtlich ist der Abgang von der Konfrontationspolitik.

Die Chronik der bilateralen Beziehungen füllt inzwischen viele Seiten.³⁵ Während zu Beginn der Beziehungen die europäische Politik noch eine doppelte Strategie befolgte, politisch von einer großen zivilisatorischen Missionsaufgabe gegenüber China erfüllt, öffentlich das politische System, vor allem nach der Niederschlagung der Studentenunruhen in Peking im Sommer 1989, die Menschenrechtssituation einer heftigen Kritik zu unterziehen, werden heute die Forderungen anders formuliert, wie die „Unterstützung der Entwicklung einer offenen Gesellschaft.“ Wie bekannt, reagierte China auf diese Vorwürfe stets abwehrend. Im Weißbuch zur Frage der Menschenrechte hieß es dann, fast entschuldigend, dass doch auf „Vorschlag des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas im

³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *China's EU Policy Paper...*

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ http://www.delchn.cec.int/en/eu_and_china/EU_Agreements_China.htm, Aufruf 10.11.2006.

Jahre 2003 die Respektierung der Menschenrechte in die chinesische Verfassung aufgenommen worden sei.³⁶

Wie sich die Anschauungen gewandelt haben, zeigen zahlreiche Veröffentlichungen, aber auch Debatten, wie u.a. die anlässlich des 50. Jahrestages der Unterzeichnung der Römischen Verträge in der Redaktion der Parteizeitung *Renmin Ribao* mit Vertretern der Wissenschaft, in der eine Diskussion über die Rolle der NATO und der EU in der Weltpolitik stattfand. Auch hier wurde versucht, demonstrativ und mit Nachdruck auf die wachsende Bedeutung der EU in der internationalen Politik zu verweisen, die sie in den unterschiedlichen Institutionen, wie z.B. der NATO oder dem Internationalen Währungsfonds spielt.³⁷ Doch die Außenpolitik ist allseitig ausgerichtet. So setzt man gleichzeitig auf den Ausbau der bilateralen Beziehungen zu solchen Staaten wie den USA, Japan, Russland, Indien oder Brasilien oder auch Deutschland, eigentlich zu allen Staaten, die chinesischen Interessen weiter helfen. Die NATO dagegen wird als aktuell heftiger Kritik unterzogen und als ein Militärblock bezeichnet, der ausschließlich den amerikanischen Interessen diene und in der Europapolitik als Instrument des gegenseitigen Ausspielens genutzt werde. Nach chinesischer Einschätzung gebe es gegenwärtig bereits viele Differenzen zwischen der NATO und der EU, wenn es um die Ziele und konkreten Handlungen gehe. Die NATO, so hieß es, sei zu einem neuen politisch-militärischen Block geworden, wo nicht mehr die kollektive Verteidigung im Vordergrund stehe, sondern die Administration von Krisenherden. Dadurch würden die alten Dämonen aus der Zeit des kalten Krieges wieder vorgeholt werden. Verändert hätten sich auch die russisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen sowie die russisch-europäischen Beziehungen, da sie als instabil gewertet werden. Der Grund dafür wird in den Bestrebungen der USA gesehen, die eigene bisherige globale Vorherrschaft aufrechtzuerhalten. Mit Besorgnis werden deshalb alle Schritte beobachtet, die NATO mit neuen Mitgliedern in Zentralasien zu erweitern. Die chinesische Politik sieht in dieser Strategie nichts anderes, als das Ziel, Russland zu umkreisen, um auf China vom Westen und Norden her Druck ausüben zu können. Beschuldigt werden die USA, die europäische Integration verhindern zu wollen, indem sie einige neue EU-Mitglieder zu beeinflussen versuchen. Obgleich die EU und Russland den Wunsch äußern, ihre Beziehungen zu vertiefen, auch im Bereich der Sicherheit, so werde in Russland eine wachsende Aversion gegen die Erweiterung der NATO im Osten empfunden.³⁸ An dieser Analyse chinesischer Experten hat sich eigentlich aktuell wenig verändert.

EU – ein besonderer Partner in der chinesischen Außenpolitik

Für die chinesische Außenpolitik bedeutet die EU ein besonderer Partner in der Weltpolitik, anders gewertet als die USA, die infolge ihrer Strategie von den globalen Konstellationen abhängig sind, an vielen Orten der Welt, auch an den Grenzen Chinas, Stützpunkte errichten und Präventionspolitik verkünden und intervenieren nach einem selbst erstellten Völkerrecht.

³⁶ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (ed.), *Progress in China's Human Rights Cause in 2003*, Beijing: New Star Publishers, 2004.

³⁷ *Renmin Ribao*, 30.03.07.

³⁸ Ibidem.

Die EU dagegen gewann zunehmend an Vertrauen, weil sie einen möglichst schnellen Beitritt Chinas zur WTO unterstützte. Deshalb förderte sie auch bewusst einige Programme, um China bei der Implementierung der WTO-Regeln zu unterstützen. Mit Aufmerksamkeit wurde von chinesischer Seite Verlautbarungen der EU wahrgenommen, dass doch eine WTO ohne China tatsächlich nicht universal gelten könne, denn der EU ging es letztlich beim Beitritt Chinas zur WTO um einen konkreten Abschlussprozess, der zur vollständigen Integration der chinesischen Wirtschaft in die Weltwirtschaftsordnung symbolisieren sollte.

Im Unterschied zu den freundlichen Tönen an die Adresse der EU, fielen die Töne gegenüber den USA wesentlich kritischer aus. Die chinesischen Unterhändler bezichtigten die USA der Diskriminierung und lobten demgegenüber den realistischen Ansatz der EU. Wurde doch der WTO-Beitritt von der EU nicht von Themen, wie Menschenrechtslage in China abhängig gemacht. Einigkeit zwischen den USA und Europa wurde aber insoweit darin erzielt, dass die chinesische Mitgliedschaft in der WTO von Übergangsphasen und Schutzklauseln abhängig gemacht wird.

Die chinesische Politik verfolgte kritisch die politische Strategie der USA des „containments“ im Gegensatz zur EU, die eben versuchte mit Kooperationsprojekten, China international einzubinden, mit dem Ziel, China in die globale Verantwortung zu nehmen. Notiert wurde gewiss auch die Reaktion der USA, als 2003 die EU China eine vertiefende allseitige strategische Partnerschaft angeboten hatte und über die Aufhebung des Waffenembargos debattiert wurde, die USA dagegen heftigen Widerstand leisteten und der EU vorwarfen, die eigenen Werte aufzugeben.

Zweifelsohne ist die EU als Wirtschaftspartner für die chinesische Modernisierungspolitik von großem Interesse. Seit dem Jahre 2004 ist die EU größter Handelspartner und 2006 wurde China der zweitgrößte Handelspartner der EU. Die chinesische Seite verweist auf das Vorwort in dem Bericht der EU „Future Opportunities and Challenges in EU–China Trade and Investment Relations 2006–2010“, dass für Europa China wahrhaftig eine globale Erfolgsgeschichte bedeute. Bei allen Differenzen werden sich vor allem die bilateralen Handelsgeschäfte weiterhin gut entwickeln.³⁹

Mit der Entwicklung der Beziehungen zur EU entwickelten sich gleichzeitig auch die besonderen bilateralen Beziehungen mit einigen Mitgliedsländern. Polen hat hier noch großen Nachholbedarf. Doch erste Anstrengungen werden unternommen, China größere Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. Allgemein kann man davon ausgehen, dass in dem noch immer komplizierten Beziehungsgeflecht die Handels- und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen weiterhin Priorität haben. Die Koordinierung nationalen Aktivitäten im Außenhandel wie auch in politischen Fragen stehen dagegen erst an zweiter und weiterer Stelle.⁴⁰

Die chinesische Führung zeigt in der letzten Zeit immer mehr Bereitschaft an einer breiteren Zusammenarbeit mit dem Europaparlament. So wünscht man sich nicht nur Delegationen, die Sozialisten angehören, sondern man ist an einem breiten politischen

³⁹ Liu Yunyun, „China & Europe: Will the Honeymoon Continue? Despite recent trade frictions, the latest EU report suggest China and the EU will experience more opportunities in 2007“, *Beijing Review*, April 5, 2007, S. 38.

⁴⁰ Gunter Schubert, „China und die Europäische Union im Kontext der Gesamteuropäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik“, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B. 19–20/2002, S. 26.

Spektrum von Besuchern interessiert. So hofft man, dass mehr Delegationen China besuchen, damit sie sich ein eigenes Bild von der Dynamik des Landes machen könnten, um zu einer komplexeren Zusammenarbeit beizutragen. Das brachte der chinesische Gastgeber beim Empfang einer Gruppe von Sozialisten, die auf Einladung der KPCh China besuchten, zum Ausdruck.⁴¹

China und die EU stehen für Multilateralismus

Mit dem Ende des Ost–West-Konflikts Ende der 1980er Jahre veränderten sich in China wie auch in Europa allgemein die Ansichten und somit die theoretischen Ansätze zur Bewertung globaler Entwicklungen.

Eine ständig erhobene Forderung, die in der chinesischen Außenpolitik Politik als Priorität gilt, ist die Forderung, ein friedliches multilaterales Umfeld zu schaffen. Ein stabiles Umfeld dient der Entwicklung des Landes. Die der eigenen Modernisierung dienende internationale Kooperation sollte sich nach den politischen Vorstellungen der chinesischen Elite im Rahmen eines neuen internationalen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Ordnungssystems entfalten. Eine der wichtigsten Forderungen lautet deshalb, Demokratie in den internationalen Beziehungen zu schaffen. Hierbei erhofft sich die chinesische Politik direkte oder indirekte Unterstützung von Seiten der EU⁴². Angesichts der Finanzkrise, die in den USA ihren Anfang nahm, hört man in China immer öfter Töne über das Ende der U.S. Hegemonie und den Beginn der Ära einer multilateralen globalen Ordnung. So lesen wir in der englischsprachigen *People's Daily* in einem Leitartikel: „With the breakdown of the U.S.-dominated international power structure, the world attention would be focused on such unavoidable question: Does the decline of U.S. geopolitical hegemony make multilateral global governance more likely?... The U.S. is no longer King of the hill, as a new phase of multipolar world power structure will come into being in 2009.”⁴³

Chinabeobachter verweisen darauf, wie die chinesische Politik in den letzten Jahren bemüht ist, sich auch außenpolitisch der EU weiter anzunähern, um sich der amerikanischen Umklammerung zu entziehen. China versucht, die EU in ihrer Politik als internationalen Akteur in der Welt zu unterstützen. So bringt die chinesische Regierung nicht nur ihre Anerkennung gegenüber den Wirtschaftsleistungen der EU zum Ausdruck, sondern verweist auch auf die besondere Sicherheitsrolle, die die EU bei der Schaffung einer sicheren, multilateralen Weltordnung spielen könnte.⁴⁴

Nach der 11 tägigen Europareise des chinesischen Ministerpräsidenten Wen Jiabao im Jahre 2004 schrieben chinesische Kommentatoren, dass das goldene Zeitalter in den Beziehungen Chinas zur EU begonnen hätte. Der chinesische Ministerpräsident besuchte zum ersten Mal den Hauptsitz der Europäischen Kommission in Brüssel und führte dort auch Gespräche über die bilateralen Beziehungen, die wie festgestellt wurden, sich in den letzten Jahren deshalb so gut entwickeln konnten, da sie auf einem gemeinsamen politischen

⁴¹ *Xinhua*, 28.02.2006.

⁴² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *China's EU Policy Paper...*

⁴³ *People Daily Online*, 24.02.2009, <http://English.people.com.cn/90002/96417/6599374.html>

⁴⁴ Eberhard Sandschneider, „Transatlantic divergences on the rise of China“, in: *American and European Relations with China: Advancing Common Agendas*, David Shambaugh u.a. (ed.), Berlin 2008, S. 26–27.

Konsens beruhen, denn sowohl China als auch die EU würden für den Multilateralismus optieren. Darüber hinaus betonten sowohl China als auch die EU, die Zivilisationsvielfalt in der Welt zu berücksichtigen. Dieses neue Verständnis habe bereits zu zahlreichen Dialogen geführt.⁴⁵

Für die chinesische Politik gilt Europa nun als Ganzes, deshalb wird auch zunehmend Interesse an den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern gezeigt. Die ehemalige Aufteilung in West und Osteuropa nahm damit ein Ende. Die beiden Abteilungen für West- und Osteuropa, die es in den unterschiedlichen Institutionen gab, wurden zu einer Europaabteilung zusammengelegt. Während seines Treffens in Dublin mit dem irischen Präsidenten bemerkte der chinesische Ministerpräsident, dass ein starkes und stabiles Europa nicht nur für den europäischen Kontinent wichtig sei, sondern für die gesamte Welt.⁴⁶

Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zeigt, wie wichtig heute China als Partner internationaler Politik geworden sei. Hier gehe es um geopolitische Faktoren, um strategische Interessen und insgesamt um die Zusammenarbeit in Asien und im Pazifik.⁴⁷

Zur Menschenrechtsfrage

Wie bekannt, erregt die Frage der Menschenrechte große Debatten und auch Kontroversen in den bilateralen Beziehungen. EU-Politiker stehen nämlich in der Verpflichtung ihrer Bürger, bei den Besuchen in China die Menschenrechtsfrage in den Gesprächen aufzuwerfen. Besuchen europäische Politiker China, so befindet sich im Gepäck immer ein Forderungskatalog, in dem es um die Freilassung von Dissidenten geht.

Die Wahrung der Menschenrechte gehört heute zur europäischen Selbstbestimmung, auch wenn es Zeiten gab, wo die Menschenrechte im Abendland mit Füßen getreten wurden. Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und Pluralismus sind die Kernbereiche des Menschenrechtsverständnisses, das sich im Laufe der Jahrhunderte herausgebildet hat. Die Visionen über Menschenrechte entstanden erst in der europäischen Aufklärung. Das Ziel wurde darin gesehen, in der ganzen Welt demokratische Herrschaftssysteme zu schaffen, in denen die Würde des Menschen unantastbar ist und das Individuum seine Rechte einzuklagen vermag. Im Grunde stimmt die chinesische Politik diesen Grundsätzen zu, nachdem sie Ende der 1970 Jahre infolge der Modernisierungsstrategie von den Prinzipien des Klassenkampfes abgegangen ist. Die Einbindung Chinas in die globale Welt hat bereits dazu geführt, dass sich Staat und Regierung gezwungen fühlen, verbal die universalen Menschenrechte anzuerkennen, doch mit der Einschränkung, dass diese nach wie vor, wie die globalen Probleme zeigen, nur eine Vision sei. Nach dem chinesischen Verständnis haben sich nach der inzwischen modifizierten Menschenrechtsauffassung im Laufe der Geschichte drei Generationen von Menschenrechten herausgebildet, die erste Generation mit den politischen Rechten, die zweite Generation mit den sozialen und kulturellen Rechten und die dritte Generation mit den kollektiven Rechten, wie das Recht auf Entwicklung, auf eine gesunde Umwelt, Rechte der Minderheiten oder auch Frauenrechte, um nur einige zu

⁴⁵ Kang Ji, „Das goldene Zeitalter der Beziehungen zwischen der EU und China“, *Beijing Rundschau*, Nr. 24, 2004.

⁴⁶ *Renmin Ribao*, 13.05.2004.

⁴⁷ Terry Narramore, „China and Europe: Engagement, Multipolarity and Strategy“, *The Pacific Review* (Oxford), 21.03.2008, 1, S. 90–91.

nennen. Dieses Verständnis führt zweifelsohne zu ständig neuen Kontroversen mit der EU, wenn es um die Bewertung der Priorität der einzelnen Generationen von Menschenrechten geht. Abgelehnt wird das westliche Verständnis, nach dem diese angeboren, unveräußerlich und vorstaatliche Rechte seien und die Schaffung von Demokratie und Rechtsstaat Voraussetzung für Good Governance sei.⁴⁸

Bereits seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre hatte die chinesische Führung eine modifizierte Argumentation entwickelt, die ihre Vertreter auf der Menschenrechtskonferenz 1993 in Wien vorlegten. So wurde betont, dass die Umsetzung von Menschenrechtsstandards von den historischen, sozialen und kulturellen Bedingungen des jeweiligen Staates abhängig gemacht werden müsste, wobei individuelle und kollektive Interessen eng mit einander verbunden seien. Der chinesische Vertreter versuchte, es unpolemisch vorzubringen, als er in Wien von gleich wichtigen Rechten sprach, die voneinander abhängig, untrennbar und unentbehrlich seien, wobei in den unterschiedlichen historischen Etappen und infolge des kulturellen Erbes eben die unterschiedlichen Menschenrechtsforderungen auf der Tagesordnung stehen und es deshalb keine allgemein gültigen geben könne.⁴⁹

In Vorbereitung zu dieser Weltkonferenz schlugen die chinesischen Vertreter vor, Regionalkonferenzen über Fragen der Menschenrechte zu organisieren. China war bemüht, die kollektiven Menschenrechte, wie den Kampf gegen Hunger, Rassismus, gegen Aggression oder angesichts der ungerechten Weltwirtschaftsordnung das Recht auf Entwicklung zum Hauptgegenstand auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen. Auf dem regionalen Vorbereitungstreffen in Bangkok vom 29. März bis zum 2. April fand China in seiner Auffassung Unterstützung, dass Armut das Haupthindernis für die Realisierung der Menschenrechte sei. Man sprach sich auch gegen die Konditionalität aus – bis dahin von Westeuropa als ideologische Waffe genutzt – nach der die Sicherung der Menschenrechte eine Vorbedingung für Entwicklungshilfe sei. In der Bangkok-Deklaration wurde zwar erneut betont, dass die Menschenrechte universal seien, doch in der Praxis nur im Zusammenhang mit dem historischen Entwicklungsprozess gesehen werden könnten, damit wurde auf den kulturspezifischen Charakter der Menschenrechte verwiesen.⁵⁰

Die Debatten über die Menschenrechte sind seit Jahren geprägt von den Auseinandersetzungen um die Universalität ihrer Geltung. Der Katalog, der 1948 in der Menschenrechtsdeklaration von San Francisco verabschiedet wurde, hat bereits viele Abstriche erhalten. China geht es in der Debatte auch um den Stellenwert von Nation, Souveränität oder Kultur, wonach Menschenrechte zur inneren Zuständigkeit von Staaten gehören müssen. Abgelehnt wird damit eine Verantwortung der Staatengemeinschaft, die im Namen eines oder mehrerer Staaten agiert und sich das Recht herausnimmt, zu intervenieren. In der westlichen Ideengeschichte werden die Menschenrechte als Wertorientierung und Fundament demokratischer Ordnungen betrachtet, gleichzeitig erhebt man jedoch den Anspruch auf die universelle Gültigkeit. Dieser Widerspruch bedeutet eine Herausforderung. In Zeiten der Globalisierung sind unterschiedliche Akteure gefordert, damit die

⁴⁸ Ibid., S. 33–34.

⁴⁹ Zhu Feng, „An Outline of Marx' Theory on Human Rights“, *Social Sciences*, Summer 1993, S. 66–67.

⁵⁰ Karin Tomala, *Das chinesische Selbstverständnis und die Frage der Menschenrechte*, Warszawa: Verlag Semper, 1993, S. 39–41.

Menschenrechte zur Grundlage einer globalen humanen politischen und sozialen Ordnung werden können, und nicht nur in Absichtserklärungen, sondern in der Umsetzung. In der Menschenrechtsdebatte in China, wiederholt sich das Argument, dass die chinesische Politik sich nicht gegen die Menschenrechtsidee wende, sondern gegen das westliche Konzept, anderen Ländern das eigene Menschenrechtskonzept als das einzig wahre und richtige aufzuzwingen.⁵¹ Und das kann als das Grundprinzip betrachtet werden, wenn chinesische Politiker oder auch Wissenschaftler in den Dialog mit der EU gehen.

China hat inzwischen zahlreiche Menschenrechtskonventionen unterschrieben, darunter auch die beiden wichtigen Konventionen über politische und Bürgerrechte (1998) sowie über ökonomische, soziale und kulturelle Rechte (1997). Auf dem XV. Parteitag der KPCh im September 1997 wurde die Absicht bekräftigt, das Rechtssystem weiter zu entwickeln und in einigen Fragen internationalen Standards anzupassen. Zugleich wurde jedoch auf die Vorrangstellung staatlicher und kollektiver Interessen verwiesen. Damit wurde die Menschenrechtsfrage zum Gegenstand der staatlichen Ordnung, was sich in der Verabschiedung oder auch Novellierung von Gesetzen niederschlug. Neue Gesetze bezüglich von Administrativstrafen wurden verabschiedet, das Strafrecht und die Strafprozessordnung wurden novelliert, teilweise findet die Unschuldsvermutung – u.a. eine Forderung seitens der EU-Anerkennung. Rechtsbeistand und Rechtshilfe, sowie die Bedeutung der Rechtsanwaltschaft und gewisse Unabhängigkeit der Justiz fanden in den Novellen ihren Niederschlag.⁵² Von Bedeutung ist auch die Verfassungsänderung aus dem Jahre 2004, die nach dem Beschluss des ZK der KPCh im Jahre 2003 auf der Sitzung des X. Nationalen Volkskongresses beschlossen wurde, einen Passus aufzunehmen, in dem es heißt, die Menschenrechte zu achten.

Doch wie oben bereits erwähnt, werden andere Prioritäten gestellt, da die Menschenrechte als historische Rechte definiert werden. So wundert es nicht, dass sich die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und China nach der Niederschlagung der Studentendemonstrationen und dem Massaker auf dem Platz des Himmlischen Friedens 1989 abkühlten und Sanktionen infolge der Menschenrechtssituation verhängt wurden.

So ist es wichtig festzuhalten, dass die Problematik der Menschenrechtsfrage und der Identität von Staat, Gesellschaft und Individuum nicht allein vor dem Hintergrund abendländischer politischer und rechtlicher Kategorien analysiert werden kann, sondern die zivilisatorische, d.h. die andere kulturelle Perspektive sollte als Erklärungsansatz mit einbezogen werden, um eben die andere historische und ideelle Verständnisperspektive aufzuzeigen vor dem Hintergrund der Herausbildung politischer Handlungsziele, wie aber auch pluralistischer Lebensformen, die neue Identitäten, Freiheiten und Unfreiheiten schaffen.

Zweifelsohne sollte man betonen, dass die Anerkennung der Universalität der Menschenrechte durch die internationale Staatengemeinschaft, auch durch China, zu den großen Errungenschaften des 20. Jahrhunderts, das von zahlreichen dramatischen Entwicklungen gekennzeichnet war, gehört. Das bedeutet jedoch noch lange nicht, dass

⁵¹ *Xinhua*..., S. 72.

⁵² Ann E. Kent, *China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: the Limits of Compliance*, *Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999, S. 204–210.

die Würde und Freiheit des Menschen, die Kernaussage der Menschenrechtsidee, menschliches Dasein in der heutigen globalen Welt charakterisiert. Die Streitfrage geht weiter darum, ob ein Menschenrechtskatalog in unterschiedlichen Kulturen unter verschiedenen Entwicklungsvoraussetzungen universal definiert werden kann. Die chinesische politische Elite setzt in der Menschenrechtspolitik ihre eigenen Schwerpunkte. Auf die Frage, warum die Werte chinesischer Ideengeschichte in China so präsent seien, erhalten wir die Antwort, weil sie so tiefgründig und allumfassend wären. Kern sei die Gerechtigkeit für alle.⁵³

Gab es bisher nur offizielle Stellungnahmen chinesischer Politiker, so veröffentlichte das Informationsbüro des Staatsrates 1991, zwei Jahre nach der Niederschlagung der Protestbewegung 1989, das erste Weißbuch über die Menschenrechte in China. In gebündelter Form wurde hier das chinesische Menschenrechtsverständnis als eigene Wertekonzeption vorgelegt. So lesen wir bereits im Vorwort, dass zwischen einem „universalen Ideal“ und „umfassenden Menschenrechten“ und denen, die in der Wirklichkeit respektiert werden oder respektiert werden können, doch große Unterschiede beständen.⁵⁴ Das „*Recht auf Leben*“ wird als das wichtigste Menschenrecht bezeichnet. So heißt es im Weißbuch, wer kein Recht auf Leben habe, für den seien alle anderen Menschenrechte bedeutungslos.

Mit allem Nachdruck wird darauf verwiesen, dass die Interessen des Staates vor den Interessen des Individuums Priorität hätten. Wer die Interessen des Staates verletze, Anschläge auf die Regierung plane, die Spaltung des Landes anstrebe, wer Menschenansammlungen zur bewaffneten Aufruhr aufwiegle, werde nach dem Strafgesetz von 1979 als „konterrevolutionärer Verbrecher“ klassifiziert und bestraft. Im dritten Weißbuch (2000), das unter dem Titel erschien *50 Jahre Entwicklung der Menschenrechte in China*,⁵⁵ wird die Entwicklung der Menschenrechte in den letzten 50 Jahren als „großer historischer Sprung“ in der chinesischen Geschichte gewertet. Die Etikette des „kranken Mannes in Ostasien“ habe China abgelegt und führe ein wohlhabendes, zivilisiertes, gesundes Leben und genieße Freiheiten und demokratische Rechte wie nie zuvor.⁵⁶ Doch wie bereits im ersten (1991) und zweiten Menschenrechtsweißbuch (1996) wird auch im dritten die Bereitschaft der chinesischen Führung zum internationalen Dialog erklärt, gleichzeitig aber unterstrichen, dass in China die westlichen Menschenrechtsauffassungen nicht einfach kopiert werden könnten.

Die EU bekannte sich zum ersten Mal in ihrem Asienkonzept von 1994 zur Förderung von Menschenrechten und Demokratie in diesen Ländern.⁵⁷ In dem von der EU 1995 veröffentlichte Dokument zur strategischen Partnerschaft wird indirekt auf die kritische Menschenrechtssituation in China verwiesen, wenn es darin heißt, dass die Unterstützung

⁵³ Wang Zhengping, Zhou Zhongzhi, *Xianda, Lunli xue* (Über Fragen der heutigen Ethik), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 2002, S. 367–377.

⁵⁴ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (ed.), *Human Rights in China*, Beijing 1991, S. 1.

⁵⁵ Presseamt des Staatsrates der Volksrepublik China, Februar 2000; *Beijing Rundschau*, 2000, No. 11.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

⁵⁷ Europäische Kommission, *Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Asienstrategie*, COM (94) 314.

der Resolution in Genf, in der die Menschenrechtssituation in China einer Kritik unterzogen wurde, doch von Erfolg sein könnte.⁵⁸ Die EU führte in dieser Frage doch eher eine Doppelstrategie, weil die Wirtschafts- und Kooperationsfragen ebenfalls bedenken musste.

China zeigt seine Bereitschaft zu Dialogen über die Menschenrechtsproblematik, doch es wird mit allen Kräften versucht, den eigenen Standpunkt in den Menschenrechtsdialogen, die zwischen der EU und China seit 1995 stattfinden, vorzubringen. Samuel P. Huntington versuchte mit seinem Ansatz von der Konfrontationen der Kulturen eine neue Antwort auf die Gründe der Beschleunigung der so unerwarteten globalen Entwicklung zu geben.⁵⁹ Auch in den Beziehungen zur Europäischen Union beobachten wir in einigen essentiellen Bereichen Anti-Reaktionen, doch langfristig gesehen wird das Verhältnis nicht von andauernden Konflikten, wie es Huntington in seinen kulturspezifischen Thesen prognostiziert hat, bestimmt sein, sondern von der Vertiefung der Kooperation und dem Bemühen, Konsensregelungen zu erzielen, was den gesellschaftlichen Wandel in China weiter voranbringen kann.

Kurzfristige Einbrüche scheinen jedoch immer wieder auf der Tagesordnung zu stehen, wenn die chinesische Politik ihr Veto vorbringt, wie beim EU-Sacharow-Preis. Am 17. Dezember 2008 hatte das Europäische Parlament in Strassburg diesen Preis an den chinesischen Dissidenten Hu Jia verliehen, der zu den bekannten Dissidenten in China gehört, der nicht nur eine Untersuchung des Massakers vom 4. Juni auf dem Platz des Himmlischen Friedens gefordert hat, sondern auch für eine gesunde Umweltpolitik und die Fürsorge von Aidskranken eingetreten ist. Im April 2008 wurde er „wegen Anstiftung zur Untergrabung der Staatsgewalt“ angeklagt und zu 3 Jahren Haft verurteilt. So hatte der chinesische Botschafter bei der EU in einem Brief den Präsidenten des Europäischen Parlaments Hans-Gert Pöttering gewarnt, diesen Preis nicht zu verleihen, da sonst die Beziehungen zwischen China und der EU ernsthaft geschädigt werden könnten. Doch das EU-Parlament ließ sich von seiner Entschlossenheit nicht abbringen, da mit der Verleihung dieses Preises das Engagement aller, die für Freiheit und Menschenrechte kämpfen, unterstützt werden sollte. Die deutsche Bundeskanzlerin, die bei der Verkündung der Entscheidung gerade auf dem Europa-Asiengipfel in Peking weilte, befürwortete ebenfalls diese Entscheidung.⁶⁰

Doch wie erwartet, erfolgte prompt die Reaktion Chinas. So fand das für den 1. Dezember 2008 in Lyon anberaumte 11. Gipfeltreffen, an dem der französische Staatspräsident Nicolas Sarkozy als Ratspräsident der EU, der Vorsitzende der Europäischen Kommission Jose Barrosa und der Generalsekretär des Rates und Hohe Vertreter der EU Javier Solana sowie von chinesischer Seite Ministerpräsident Wen Jiabao vertreten sein sollten, nicht statt. Die chinesische Seite hatte das Gipfeltreffen abgesagt. Diese Entscheidung sei getroffen worden, so hieß es, da man von einer angespannten Atmosphäre auszugehen habe.⁶¹ Ein weiterer Anlass sollte die Teilnahme von Nicolas Sarkozy an den Feierlichkeiten in Polen anlässlich des 25. Jahrestages der Verleihung des Nobelpreises an Lech Wałęsa werden, wo es zu einer inoffiziellen Begegnung zwischen dem EU-Ratspräsidenten und dem Dalai Lama gekommen war. Die chinesische Seite brachte ihren Unmut zum Ausdruck, als sie

⁵⁸ Com (95)279.

⁵⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, „Clash of Civilizations“, *Foreign Affairs*, Sommer 1993.

⁶⁰ *Das Parlament*, Nr. 44/45, 2008.

⁶¹ *Xinhua*, 27.11.2008.

betonte, dass so eine Begegnung sich auch negativ auf die Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und China auswirken könne. Gewertet wurde es als kurzsichtige und manipulierte Politik zur Unterstützung Tibet, die im Endergebnis nichts bringen würde. Mit allem Nachdruck wurde auch bei dieser Gelegenheit betont, dass die chinesische Führung gegen jegliche Kontakte ausländischer Entscheidungsträger mit dem Dalai Lama seit.⁶² In einem westlichen Kommentar hieß es dazu, dass es doch wohl nicht angehen könne, dass China entscheidet, mit wem sich europäische Politiker zu treffen haben und mit wem nicht. Doch Kommentare, dass so ein Verhalten Chinas als „unverschämt und aggressiv“ gelten müsse,⁶³ wird Chinas Haltung kaum ändern.

Das 11. Gipfeltreffen fand dann im Mai 2009 in Prag statt. Von der Verstimmung war nichts mehr zu merken und beiden Seiten ging es um Probleme, die einer dringenden Lösung bedürfen, wie der Frage des Klimawandels und der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise. Kooperationsabkommen über Wissenschafts- und Energieprojekte wurden unterzeichnet. Im Bericht der Europäischen Kommission wurde betont, dass es auch Gespräche über die Frage der Menschenrechte in Tibet gegeben habe.⁶⁴ Die chinesische Nachrichtenagentur setzte in ihrer umfangreichen Berichterstattung auch auf andere Akzente. Neben der Bedeutung für die Vertiefung der bilateralen Kooperation wurden u.a. die Worte des chinesischen Ministerpräsidenten Wen Jiabao zitiert, die die Kernprinzipien chinesischer Außenpolitik sind, „The key to China–EU strategic cooperation is the principle of mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s international affairs while taking into consideration each other’s core concerns and properly handling sensitive issues.”⁶⁵

Abschließende Bemerkungen

Die sich vertiefenden bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen der EU und China werden von beiden Seiten aus pragmatischen politischen und ökonomischen Gründen befürwortet. Für China bedeutet die EU in erster Linie ein wichtiger Handelspartner, der Investitionen und Know How nach China bringt, für die EU bedeutet China vor allem ein großer Absatzmarkt und ein kostengünstiger Produktionsort. Der zweite gemeinsame Berührungspunkt besteht darin, nach den globalen Veränderungen eine neue Weltordnung zu schaffen, obgleich es hier gewiss doch unterschiedliche Vorstellungen gibt.

Angesichts der Größe Chinas und seines potentiellen Marktes, bestehen für alle europäischen Länder gute Chancen für intensivierte Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit China, das andererseits wohl, so lange, wie das Auftreten der EU-Mitglieder noch von Uneinigkeit und Konkurrenzdenken geprägt ist, versuchen wird, den größtmöglichen Nutzen für seine Wirtschaft zu erzielen, entweder durch das Ausspielen einzelner EU-Länder oder durch gemeinsame Kooperationsprogramme der EU. Im besten Fall wird China beide Bereiche für sich zu nutzen zu wissen.

⁶² *Xinhua*, 06.12.2008

⁶³ Kommentar: „China sagt das Gipfeltreffen mit der EU ab“, *Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung*, 27.11.2008.

⁶⁴ European Commission, „EU–China summit“, http://ec.europa.eu/news/external_relations/090520_en.htm, Aufruf 26.09.2009.

⁶⁵ „Premier Wen attends 11th China–EU summit“, *Xinhua*, 21.05.2009, zitiert nach: http://english.gov.cn/2009-05/21/content_1320595.htm

Ogleich es an Absichtserklärungen nicht fehlt, gibt es bisher keine einheitliche EU-Politik gegenüber China, vielmehr handeln immer noch Einzelstaaten nach ihrer eigenen Interessenlage. Das könnte unter Umständen gefährlich werden, wenn China diese Gelegenheiten nutzt, um ein europäisches Land gegen ein anderes zu seinem Vorteil auszuspielen und die europäischen Länder keinen Konsens finden können.

Wenn in der westlichen Diplomatie die Ansicht vertreten wird, Zivilisationskriege, nicht unbedingt militärische, gegen Staaten zu führen, die nicht bereit sind, sich der westlichen Politik unterzuordnen, so muss man die Frage stellen, ob denn auch China, wenn seine Pläne erreicht sind, ein reicher und starker Staat zu sein, der die Welt mitregieren möchte, sich entschließen könnte, einen Zivilisationskrieg in die Wege zu leiten, indem das Souveränitätsprinzip aufgegeben wird? So eine Fragestellung ist provokativ, doch sie soll zum Reflektieren der eigenen Selbstdarstellung anregen. Deshalb sei dem Westen und somit auch der EU geraten, sich beschleunigt bewusst zu machen, dass internationale Probleme ohne China, dem neuen Gravitationszentrum der globalen Wirtschaft und Politik, nicht mehr gelöst werden können.

Trotz großer Fortschritte in den Beziehungen ist in der chinesischen Wahrnehmung immer noch die Vorstellung verbreitet, dass die westliche Welt weiterhin vor allem auf sich selbst bezogen ist, Western-centered, obgleich sich doch die globale Situation verändert hat. Die westliche antichinesische Kampagne in den Monaten vor der Olympiade und die Politik gegenüber Tibet haben zu neuem Misstrauen gegenüber dem Westen geführt. Die Einrichtung eines EU-Zentrums in Peking soll helfen, die Präsenz der EU in der globalen Politik besser zu verstehen, doch die Politik der EU gegenüber China erfolgt vor allem auf einem westlich geprägten sozialanthropologischen Erkenntnisprozess. Die Reaktion chinesischer Politik auf die von der EU immer wieder gebotene Herausforderung als eine „Ohrfeige für China“ zu betrachten, zeigt die Enge der Erkenntnis.⁶⁶ Auf der anderen Seite droht Peking, dass Sarkozy einen hohen Preis zahlen werde, da er sich als amtierender EU-Präsident mit dem Dalai Lama getroffen habe. Diese gemeine Provokation berühre die fundamentalen Interessen der nationalen Einheit.⁶⁷ Wird die chinesische Politik bei den Drohungen bleiben oder Konsequenzen ziehen? Bisher fehlte es nicht an Drohungen, die nach gewisser Zeit, wenn man wieder zur Tagesordnung übergehen musste, ohne Bedeutung blieben. Wenn man auch nicht umhin kann, die EU-Politik in gewisser Weise als eine „Western-centered“ Strategie zu bezeichnen, so gilt das Gleiche auch für China, nur unter anderen Vorzeichen – „Sino-centered“.

Neben der Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen gründen die normativen Prinzipien der EU-China-Politik auf die Universalität der Menschenrechte, die im Geiste einer Zivilisationsmission vermittelt werden sollen. Doch wenn man die anderen auffordert, so wie die chinesische Seite, sich für eine solche politische Orientierung verantwortungsbewusst einzusetzen, so sei das nicht nur nicht logisch, sondern entspricht auch nicht den internationalen Praktiken, heißen kritische chinesische Verlautbarungen.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ *Prasa o spotkaniu Sarkozy – Dalajlama: „Policzek dla Chin”, PAP podaje artykuł włoskiej gazety „Corriere della Sera”, 07.12.2008, <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1356,title>*

⁶⁷ Leitartikel der *Renmin Ribao*, 08.12.2008, *Xinhua*, 08.12.2008.

⁶⁸ In einem Interview mit dem ehemaligen chinesischen Botschafter in Frankreich, und Präsident des Internationalen Ausstellungszentrums, Wu-Jiamin, veröffentlicht unter dem Titel „Defining

Auf den Punkt offizieller chinesischer Wahrnehmung brachte es der ehemalige langjährige Botschafter in Deutschland. Mei Zhourong, der auf einer Veranstaltung kurz vor der Buchmesse 2009 in Frankfurt am Main, wo China Partnerland war, während eines Eklat- es ging um die Anwesenheit chinesischer Dissidenten, erklärte: „Wir sind nicht gekommen, um uns in Demokratieunterricht belehren zu lassen. Die Zeiten sind vorbei.“⁶⁹ Wie wir sehen, kommt im bilateralen Beziehungsgeflecht der Problematik der Menschenrechte eine außerordentliche Bedeutung zu, an der gemeinsam, global gearbeitet werden muss, um sich auf sie zu berufen. Ein China nach unseren westlichen Wünschen und Vorstellungen wird es gewiss nicht geben.

Responsibility“ über die vom Westen eingeforderte Verantwortung, die China in der globalen Welt übernehmen sollte, in: *Beijing Review*, May 10, 2007. Zum ersten Mal wurde diese Forderung vom stell. Amerikanischen Staatssekretär Robert Zoellik gefordert, als er China aufforderte, mit zum „stakeholder“ zusammen mit den USA werden.

⁶⁹ Matthias Nass, „Die Hosen voll. Eklat vor der Frankfurter Buchmesse: Ein bisschen mehr Mut gegenüber Chinas Zensoren dürften die Gastgeber schon zeigen“, *Die Zeit*, Nr. 39, 17 September 2009.

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4. Zygmunt Komorowski, *Kultura Afryki Czarnej* (Cultures of Black Africa), Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1994, p. 89.
5. L. Dimond, "Rethinking of Civil Society", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 1994, 4.

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