

ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA  
NO. 28

ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA

*Editor-in-Chief*

JERZY ZDANOWSKI

*Subject Editors*

NICOLAS LEVI

JERZY ZDANOWSKI

*Statistical Editor*

MAHNAZ ZAHIRINEJAD

*Board of Advisory Editors*

NGUYEN QUANG THUAN

KENNETH OLENIK

ABDULRAHMAN AL-SALIMI

JOLANTA SIERAKOWSKA-DYNDO

BOGDAN SKŁADANEK

LEE MING-HUEI

ZHANG HAIPENG



Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures  
Polish Academy of Sciences

ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA  
NO. 28

ASKON Publishers  
Warsaw 2015

*Secretary*  
Nicolas Levi

*English Text Consultant*  
Stephen Wallis

© Copyright by Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures,  
Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw 2015

Printed in Poland

This edition prepared, set and published by

Wydawnictwo Naukowe ASKON Sp. z o.o.  
Stawki 3/1, 00-193 Warszawa  
tel./fax: (+48) 22 635 99 37  
[www.askon.waw.pl](http://www.askon.waw.pl)  
[askon@askon.waw.pl](mailto:askon@askon.waw.pl)

PL ISSN 0860-6102  
ISBN 978-83-7452-091-1

ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA is abstracted in  
*The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities,*  
*Index Copernicus*



Professor Roman Sławiński  
(1932–2014)



# Contents

INTRODUCTION .....	9
<b>ARTICLES</b>	
MARIANNE BASTID-BRUGUIÈRE, In Memory of Roman Sławiński .....	11
STANISŁAW TOKARSKI, Westernization and Easternization. At the Crossroads of Multicultural Dialogue .....	15
ADAM W. JELONEK, On the So-Called Asian Values Once Again .....	25
ADAM RASZEWSKI, Human Rights in China and the Philosophical Perspective ...	39
ARTUR KOŚCIAŃSKI, Becoming Citizens: The Taiwanese Civil Society .....	51
LARISA ZABROVSKAIA, Women in Confucian Society: Traditions and Developing New Trends .....	61
NICOLAS LEVI, La minorité chinoise à Paris .....	69
IRENA KAŁUŻYŃSKA, Chinese Naming – Substitution by Homophones .....	79
IZABELLA LABĘDZKA, Taiwanese Contemporary Dance: From the Chinese Body to Intercultural Corporality .....	93
LIDIA KASAREŁŁO, The Pop-Cultural Phenomenon of Taiwanese TV Drama: Remodelled Fairy Tales and Playing with Virtues .....	113
EWA CHMIEŁOWSKA, FU-SHENG SHIH, Reshaping the Tradition: Postpartum Care in Modern Taiwan .....	123
DIANA WOLAŃSKA, Musical Inspirations in Japanese Culture .....	137
WALDEMAR DZIAK, China and the October '56 Events in Poland .....	147
IWONA GRABOWSKA-LIPIŃSKA, The Culture and Policy of the People's Republic of China towards Southeast Asian Countries 1949–1976 .....	157
ANNA MROZEK-DUMANOWSKA, NGOs versus FBOs: Cooperation or Rivalry? The Case of the Chosen Asian and African Developing Countries .....	167
DOROTA RUDNICKA-KASSEM, Searching for the Truth: The Life and Work of Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī .....	181
MARCIN STYSZYŃSKI, Jihadist Activities in the Internet and Social Medias .	193

**FIELD STUDY REPORT**

ROMAN SŁAWIŃSKI, JERZY ZDANOWSKI, The Ethnic Groups and Religious Beliefs of Southern China in the Transformation Period  
Shown as in the Example of the Hunan Province ..... 203

Notes on Contributors ..... 212

## Introduction

Dear Readers!

We are presenting you yet another, already the 28th, issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* devoted to the countries and culture of Asia. Over the years of its activity the journal started to be issued in English and it has hosted on its pages many eminent experts on Asia, yet still it remained faithful to its formula which was proposed thirty years ago by Professor Roman Sławiński, the founder of the journal and its permanent editor in chief. This formula stipulated that the Asian cultures should present themselves in the journal and talk directly with their own voice. The idea was both: to include in the group of authors and editors of the magazine scientists who grew up in Asian cultures, as well as to publish materials based on or referring to the texts – philosophical, linguistic, historical, sociological, religious studies or political studies – which were created by the Asian culture. These could be proper names as an object of linguistic research, religious texts, political documents, ideological declarations, but also biographical materials, historiographical elaborations, experience of meeting other cultures and mutual acculturation phenomenon resulting from the relations.

Professor Roman Sławiński left us in November 2014. The more time passes from his death, the more I feel his absence and the more I realize how unique a character he was in the world of research on China. Professor Marianne Bastid-Bruguière, a prominent French scholar from Institut de France in Paris, who met Roman Sławiński in the times of his studies in Beijing, writes about that fact. Most striking is the variety of interests and multidimensionality of research on China which he ran. He was trained as a linguist, and he knew perfectly well not only the classical language, but also many dialects. There was even a time it was appreciated by Mao Zedong himself. Roman Sławiński was interpreting a conversation of the Chinese leader with the Polish state authorities. During the conversation Mao Zedong changed as usual from the classical language to the dialect of Hunan province, which was his place of origin. When he realized he was using the dialect, he noticed that it was not a slightest problem for the interpreter to understand his statements. Then he asked: „Who is that young man who understands the Hunan dialect?” It was known that many Chinese from the surroundings of the Chairman did not understand him when he spoke in the native dialect. It so happened, that Roman Sławiński knew the dialect.

He was interested not only in the language. History, politics, culture as well as China's economy were the subject of his interest and research. His views, opinions and insights on these matters were the inspiration for many researchers of China, some of which are the authors of the materials contained in this issue. Of the many research interests of Professor Sławiński in recent years at least two may be mentioned. First one became Confucianism, especially its latest colours and shades. Professor persistently sought and discovered them in the texts of Chinese scientists, government documents, archives and everyday citizens of China. In this regard he was a dedicated explorer and a keen observer. Even the slightest detail was important to him. Minor personnel changes on the bureaucratic ladder were important for the formation

of general conclusions. From my conversations with him, I got the impression that he was rather skeptical about the possibility of a revival of Confucianism under the supervision of the communist authorities. So he concluded after examining many texts of the so-called new wave of Confucianism in China. His works on the latest Chinese historiography constitute an invaluable contribution to global research on contemporary China. His second passion was the research on the minorities of China Southern. The field research among the peoples of Miao and Tujia that he ran and in which I had the opportunity to participate assumed getting to know the nature of change in the cultural identity of these minorities in the era of globalization and accelerated socio-economic transformation in China. These studies had not been completed, and we can only hope that one of the students of Professor will continue them in the near future.

The arrangement of contents offered to you in the 28th issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* refers to the research passions of Professor Sławiński. The first article, written by Stanisław Tokarski – Indologist and long-time associate of Professor Sławiński, concerns dialogue between the East and the West and the possibility of mutual understanding and agreement. Understanding another culture is also the ability to read the symbols contained in the letters and that aspect of the intercultural dialogue interested Professor Sławiński in particular. The question of so-called Asian values – presented in the articles written by Adam Jelonek, Adam Raszewski, Artur Kościański and Larisa Zabrowskaia – was very close to Professor Sławiński and he dealt with it for many years as part of his research on the so-called new Confucianism. The issue of Chinese migration in the world was also in the interests of Professor – mainly in the context of global economic and social phenomena. This part of the research on China is presented in the article on the Chinese migration to France by Nicolas Levi. The issue of Chinese language was obviously important for Professor Sławiński as a linguist and he always welcomed in the columns of *Acta* the authors writing about language and linguistic issues. This area of research is presented in the current issue in the article on Chinese names written by Irena Kałużyńska. On the other hand, the artistic part of the culture is referred to in the articles by Izabella Łabędzka, Lidia Kasarełło, Ewa Chmielowska, Fu-sheng Shih and Diana Wolańska. The first three of these articles relate to Taiwan, where Professor conducted research for many years which resulted among others in a monograph *History of Taiwan*. The further three articles penned by Waldemar Dziak, Iwona Grabowska-Lipińska and Anna Mrozek-Dumanowska refer to the political sphere. Political sphere is inextricably linked with the ideology which was also the case of China. Confucianism and the new Confucianism emerged and developed in the shadow of the emperors, presidents and chairmen of the Chinese Communist Party. Researching them without the analysis of the political scene was not possible. The part of articles is closed by two texts unrelated with China, but with the Middle East. Their authors – Dorota Rudnicka-Kassem and Marcin Styszyński present materials based on the Middle Eastern sources and thus relate to the traditions of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*. The issue is closed by the report from field research in southern China by Professor Sławiński and me. For me it was a unique opportunity to get to know at least a little piece of China – a unique one, because my guide was Professor Sławiński – such a great scholar and such a seasoned expert on Asia.

I would like to thank the authors – students, colleagues and friends – for participation in the preparation of the issue, and the Directorate of the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Sciences for the possibility to dedicate the anniversary issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* to Professor Sławiński.

Jerzy Zdanowski

ANNA MROZEK-DUMANOWSKA

## NGOs versus FBOs: Cooperation or Rivalry? The Case of the Chosen Asian and African Developing Countries

### Abstract

On the positive side of global civil societies (NGOs) we could mention for instance the numerous civil initiatives which advance public education and public debate on global affairs. Many NGOs secured greater public support than governments and their officials. Most NGOs also undertook projects to fight for more equitable distribution of planetary resources. But at the same time the models of NGOs activities, growing and shaped by western patterns of economy and culture, were not properly understood and realized in the differentiated cultures of developing countries. This was the case especially at the end of cold war, when growing disappointment with globalization expanded the space for religious renewal. Alongside the erosion of traditional identities and sources of authority, religion was able to furnish the empty space of people's sense of security. In comparison with NGOs, religious social organizations (FBOs) have something qualitatively different to offer, particularly in terms of empowering people, e.g. giving them personal dignity and self-worth.

**Key words:** civil societies, religious social organizations, history, philosophy, sociology

### The conception of civil society in the opinion of philosophers

The term: "societas civilis" was already used by Aristotle (381–322 BC) in his work *Politics*. In his opinion, humanity only comes to full development in terms of the state, because 'the whole' is prior to any partial entity. The individual cannot fully realize its purposes, unless he or she reaches the position of a member of the state.<sup>1</sup> Hence, the people became citizens by virtue of their activity for the sake of political society i.e. the state. Similarly, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC) induced his fellow countrymen: "Exercise these minds of yours in the best pursuits which consist of promoting the good of government. For nothing on Earth is more agreeable to God... than the assemblies and societies of man' united together by laws, which are called states".<sup>2</sup> According to both philosophers presented above, the citizens – if mentioned at all are the subjects of the state.

---

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, 'The Politics: 1280a–1281b' in B. Russel: *A History of Western Philosophy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959, pp. 184–186.

<sup>2</sup> Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Re Publica, Book VI*, transl. by M. Plezia, Warszawa: PWN, 2002.

The first description of civil society close to our meaning of this term, appeared as late as the 18th century and was formulated for the first time by Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), in his work *Essay on the History of Civil Society*. In the Scottish philosopher's opinion, civil society was for the first time differentiated from the state and was presented as a society, whose members enjoy freedom thanks to the preservation of civil liberty applied by the state, which also watches the rights of the citizens.<sup>3</sup> Ferguson is also of the opinion that a Republic is the state in which the people, as a collective body, possess the sovereign power. In other words, in a republican state, the supreme power remains in the hands of a collective body of society. Ferguson's cited description of civil society, opens the field to a closer inspection of different forms and aims of NGOs and FBOs. Such kinds of communal organizations could also be also described as voluntary associations or movements, creating trust and solidarity, in order to reach common aims. All these elements, together with common rather, than individual aims, build up the principles of the contemporary NGOs and FBOs. But the present-day civil societies are also a kind of enactment of citizenship and claim rights, but at the same time take responsibility for their actions in the name of their members in a given polity.<sup>4</sup>

The international or global reach of NGOs takes into account not only the geographical dimension, but also the important activities of these organizations, participating in passing laws and solving matters important for citizens on a global scale. According to Scholte, the global character of NGOs maybe revealed in such issues as: climate change, debt crises, HIV/AIDS sickness and other Planetary challenges. The NGOs may also take part in many civil society campaigns, concerning diasporas, sexual minorities and the disabled, but also by helping to protect the rights of simple citizens in times of globalization.<sup>5</sup> We should also mention, that the global links in civil societies activities became possible thanks to world-wide communication, which conducts their operations.

Bearing in mind the opinion of the aforementioned Ferguson citation, the appearance of civil society was strictly connected with the democratic structure of nation states, the citizens of which, conscious of their rights, conclude an agreement or compromise with the government promising loyalty and co-operation, in order to gain its protection for their activities and participation in governmental policy. Hence the importance of civil society stressed in Ferguson's definition, as a basis of agreement and co-operation with the government. The rational structure of a national bureaucratic state as a necessary base of civil society, is also recalled by Max Weber.<sup>6</sup> But are the present day civil or citizens organizations in Developing Countries really founded on the national and rational structure of their states?

### **The specific character and forms of activity by civil societies in Developing Countries**

Most of the 'Southern' countries on our planet have not yet developed the rational, bureaucratic structures of state, nor have the common accepted systems of the basic democratic values have been 'grounded'. The lack of settled, rationalized structures of government in developing countries has its background in the traditional patterns of

<sup>3</sup> A. Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Section IX–X*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966, p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Jan Aarth Scholte, 'Global Civil Society. Opportunity or Obstacle for Democracy?', *Development Dialogue*, No. 49, November 2007, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, p. 975.

authority, which dominated in colonial times, and their remnants are still present in contemporary, independent countries of the South. So for instance, instead of rationalized structures of authority, we witness the prerogatives of traditional forms of clientelism as a form of mutual obligation between governments and citizens.<sup>7</sup> Such traditional values and practices are unfavorable for spontaneous civil activity and do not help to develop the mutual responsibility of NGOs and governments for the wellbeing of the citizens.

Talking of NGOs we ought to also mention, that their members (more specifically their activists) – not only in the South are not really representative of the interests of all the citizens of their countries, but mainly towards sections of society, which could be described as “civilized” and feel connected with the NGOs international programs and aims. The rest of society (or the ‘have not’), is often described by NGO activists as “deviant” or “uncivil”, and are often excluded from consultation over important matters. The lack of popular support for NGOs, especially in developing countries is ‘justified’ by the position and background of the activists of this organization: they recruit from the “civilized” representatives of the middle classes and they are usually men of a monotheistic faith, using the official language dominating in the country. The same activists, chosen members of society, sometimes tolerate people of lower ranks, mainly of dark skin, confessing to different faiths and using their own language, hence the people regarded as second class citizens.<sup>8</sup>

Besides this group of “tolerated citizens”, the accidental interests of civic activists sometimes awaken those regarded as ‘sub-human’, illegal immigrants, performing the most apparently ‘contemptuous’ works in the country, or the inhabitants from big city peripheries, constructing their own, parallel worlds.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore contacts with the “excluded” are in most cases combined with the realization of self-interests.

As program based non-profit making organizations, NGOs as well as FBOs do not dispose of their own funds, necessary in the fight with global poverty, injustice and environmental degradation. Most of the funding for NGOs and FBOs comes from private donors, churches or charity organizations, but also from governments, multilateral institutions and multinational corporations.<sup>10</sup> Lorenzo Fioramonti is also of the opinion, that most NGOs activities are based on funds, which are derived from governments and the often personalized ‘corporation foundations’. But according to the African proverb: “if you have your hand in another man’s pocket, you must move, when he moves”.<sup>11</sup> To whose patterns of democracy should the leaders of NGOs refer to? The same problem is emerging on a global scale regarding NGO activity.

Nevertheless, despite all those restraints and limits to NGO activity, the same organization plays a very important role not only on a social level, but also on a political platform. In the face of diminishing economic controls at a national level, as a result multi-national corporate pressure, the national authorities also lose their political importance, which partly goes to NGO structures. In this situation national governments strive for the support of these

---

<sup>7</sup> *Clientelism* means the informal relations between patron and client in the economic as well as political field.

<sup>8</sup> Jai Sen, ‘The Power of Civility’, *Development Dialogue*, No. 49, November 2007, p. 58.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p. 59.

<sup>10</sup> Löfgren, Thörn, ‘Introduction...’, p. 6; Fioramonti, ‘The Internal Conditions of Global Civil Society...’, p. 134.

<sup>11</sup> M. Edwards, D. Hulme, ‘Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Non-governmental Organizations’, *World Development*, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1996, p. 963.

organizations and readily help them with funding, because co-operation with NGOs may hasten their diminishing legitimization.<sup>12</sup> But the “marriage” between NGOs and national governments, often imposed by the latter, is not advantageous for social organizations like NGOs and FBOs, because it dismisses them from their main programmatic activities which are deemed advantageous for society.

### **The obstacles of NGOs activity in Developing Countries**

In 1980s the optimistic expectation of western social activists in connection with the structure of NGOs in Developing Countries, were viewed as flexible, participatory and democratically organized, as an alternative to dysfunctional and corrupt governments. As this expectation did not become true, the new policy of a neo-liberal economy and liberal democracy saw in NGOs the proper organization that knows the needs of the people and could efficiently implement new projects in their societies. But this expectation was also not fulfilled by NGOs, who were not prepared to implement such projects.<sup>13</sup>

From the beginning of the 21st century, NGOs have also had to cope with the problem of accountability. The rigid conditions imposed by the donors of funds, often deriving from abroad, often made southern NGOs easy objects of pressure in the choice of their aid programs which were not necessarily connected with the needs of local society. This tendency was often criticized by local people, and the southern organizations of NGOs were sometimes described as “neo-colonial representations”.<sup>14</sup> Similar opinions were expressed by Alexis Roy in connection with Mali who stated that the civil organizations acting in this country were created by Northern emissaries, which also brought the necessary funds for their activities. In the same country, the total number of NGOs acting in 2006 was estimated at 2,135. In Roy’s opinion, this enormous number of NGOs in one country may have been advantageous for the government, sponsors or some of the NGO leaders, but it may also have been connected with the phenomenon of corruption.<sup>15</sup> In the opinions of Kenyan citizens observed during field research between 2004–2008, corruption is not a sporadic feature of NGOs but their daily practice in the form of “institutionalized corruption”. The corruption takes many different forms: sometimes it is just the partial use of donation-funds for the salary of the leader of NGOs or his kin’s. Anyway, the staff of the NGOs are the highest paid people in the country.<sup>16</sup>

Another, milder form of corruption by NGO activists is in the form of “eating away” the received funds or using them for luxury articles instead channeling them to people in need. In the practice of this organization we could also recognize forms of clientelism or nepotism, which finds its way in the constant growing number of administration staff in NGOs.<sup>17</sup>

The forms of NGO activity could be illustrated shortly by the example of two Kenyan Non-governmental Organizations based on faith FBOs: Church Aid and Church to the People. Both of these organizations are international, faith-based in orientation, represented

<sup>12</sup> Noema Miranda, ‘Global Civil Society and Democracy. A Difficult but Unavoidable Task: Vision from the South’, *Development Dialogue*, No. 49, November 2007, p. 100.

<sup>13</sup> Matthew Harsh, Paul Mbatia, Wesley Shrum, ‘Accountability and Inaction: NGOs and Resource Lodging in Development’, *Development and Change*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2010, pp. 264–265.

<sup>14</sup> P.Y. Opoku-Mensah, D. Lewis, ‘Moving Forward Research Agendas on International NGOs: Theory, Agency and Context’, *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 18, No. 5, 2006, pp. 665–675.

<sup>15</sup> Alexis Roy, ‘Instrumentalization de la ‘société civile’’, *Alternatives Sud*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2010, p. 111.

<sup>16</sup> Harsh, Mbatia, Shrum, *Accountability and Inaction...* p. 264.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 260.

in several African countries, which focus on a mainly rural community level. Their programs concentrate on aid for children and adults, with special interests in problems of education, health and agriculture. The difference between both organizations lies in the form of the distribution of funds between the local society. The Church Aid works through local community-based organizations, and provides funds directly to those groups; on the other hand, Church to People involves its own, professional staff in the community which selects the individual beneficiaries.<sup>18</sup>

The aforementioned differences in the forms of fund division could lead us to the distinguishing Church Aid as a proper form of social activation and participation in the funding division. But in reality, the result of the selection of beneficiaries is in both organizations rather similar. In the case of Church Aid, the decisions are set up by members of village committees which result in constant conflicts between program staff and the community leaders and in result of the just division of funds are hindered. Similarly, in the Church to People model, the desperately needed shoes for a poor girl, are finally offered to the daughter of local elite parents.<sup>19</sup> The lack of co-ordination but mainly cooperation between the activists of non-governmental organizations and the members of local society, is in most cases the result of specific, differentiated cultural traditions of developing countries in comparison with the national and democratic background of western NGOs.

This difference is, amongst others, stressed by Naomi Hossain about the specifics of cultural customs in India and Bangladesh, countries still resistant to modern change. In both of these countries an unwritten law of etiquette forbids the rudeness of a lower caste representative towards the member of a more 'noble' one. So for instance an older woman in Bangladesh, waiting for a long time in the dispensary for a doctor's consultation, and expressing her dissatisfaction with the lack of accountability of the doctor towards the waiting people, appears to society as a rude person, showing her poor upbringing. In Bangladesh and India it is undeniably rude to complain about the behavior of a higher status person. Failure to pay the "symbolic taxes" of politeness to the powerful is typically taken by elites as insubordination. At the same time the officials are often at pains to protect their delicate status against the rudeness of rural citizens.<sup>20</sup> The aforementioned "rude behavior" of a poor old women in Bangladesh is certainly a kind of rebellion against traditional custom, but at the same time it is only an individual rebellion which cannot be compared with the collective protest by and for the society supported by NGOs. Only organized and engaged citizens may establish new modes of control over public institutions.

The lack of social engagement in the realization of NGO common programs, pave the way for the individual initiatives of chosen activists in developing countries. So for instances, the scholarship research realized in Nigeria between 2007–2008 revealed, that the principal motivation given by NGO workers for their involvement, was their concern with the suffering of the under-privileged, and the desire to assist them. Some of the NGO workers expressed particular concern for women suffering from domestic violence, other for widows or prisoners etc. The researchers often witnessed NGO workers giving their own money to people. But such kinds of NGO activity could also be described as assistance

---

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 269.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 271.

<sup>20</sup> Naomi Hossain, 'Informal Pressure on Frontline Bureaucrats in Bangladesh', *Development and Change*, Vol. 41, No. 5, 2010, pp. 908–909.

to poor people, or more precisely to its 'clients'. As one of the Nigerian NGO activists stated: "I'm just helping the people and it's giving me joy that I'm doing it... I have the passion for poor people".<sup>21</sup> Analyzing this behavior, Oliver de Sardan describes it as moral economy and talks of the Nigerian NGO worker as the kind of person who draws their morality from a redistributive ethic.<sup>22</sup>

The "connection" between NGO workers and their clients often ends up being one of sympathy, but they reinforce also a paternalistic dynamic to their relationship. Such kind of practices developed by NGO workers in Africa, do not correspond with the statutory programs of this organization dealing with activities, which have a broader impact on the members of this organization, such as: promotion of human rights and educating people about the rule of law. This education was intended to empower those who received it with such results, and that the people would be able to demand their rights themselves.<sup>23</sup> We observe similar misunderstandings of NGOs leading aims in the field of co-operation between the civil institutions and the local governments.

### **From negotiation to domination: the changing features of co-operation between NGOs and governments in the Developing Countries**

Despite the description of an NGO as a non-governmental organization, sometimes even critical towards the state, the same civil organization needs the state to fulfill its role and activities in society, but also to promote and protect its own position. On the other hand, the state needs civil society in order to gain support of the citizens and to legitimize its own rule.<sup>24</sup> According to M. Shaw also, civil society is not only a sphere of association in society, acting independently from the state, but also the external outpost of the state, through which the ruling classes maintain their dominance in society.<sup>25</sup>

The scarce examples of co-operation between NGOs and governments in Developing Countries shown by the researchers in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, apply mainly to the fields of health and education. According to the authors of the report, in all three countries the NGOs are not dependent on government's funds, which constitute only a small part of their resources, because these came mainly from local, but also international resources. In the same countries, government's policies include some commitment to collaboration with NGOs.<sup>26</sup> According to the same authors also, the advantages of NGOs independence is viewed as being threatened where they are being encouraged to work in collaboration with governments.<sup>27</sup>

The co-operation between governments and national NGOs, seems to be less harmonious in Africa. The public interests of NGOs in this area do not seem to abide with the private orientation of the members of governments. Hence the criticism often expressed by NGOs

<sup>21</sup> Laura Routley, 'NGOs and the Formation of the Public: Grey Practices and Accountability', *African Affairs*, Vol. 111, No. 422, December 2011, pp. 130–131.

<sup>22</sup> J.P. Oliver de Sardan, 'A Moral Economy of Corruption In Africa?', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1999, pp. 25–27.

<sup>23</sup> Routley, *NGOs and...*, p. 129.

<sup>24</sup> Jai Sen, 'The Power of Civility', *Development Dialogue*, No. 49, p. 56.

<sup>25</sup> M. Shaw, 'Civil Society', *Encyclopaedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, L. Kurtz (ed.), San Diego: Academic Press, 1999, pp. 269–278.

<sup>26</sup> Richard Batley, Pauline Rose, 'Collaboration in Delivering Education: Relations between governments and NGOs in South Asia', *Development In Practice*, Vol. 20, No. 4–5, June 2010, pp. 579–581.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 584.

workers towards the government can take drastic forms. So, for instance, in eastern Nigeria, during field research between 2007–2008, the NGO activists working in this area presented an opinion, that the state is fragmented by private interests, whereas civil society is seen as the honest broker of “the people’s interests”.<sup>28</sup> According to such points of view, the development policy of NGOs is holding the state to account for the benefit of the wider, public good.<sup>29</sup> The Nigerian NGO workers are not asking for favors of the government’s free will, but rather demand a change of its orientation: “It is not necessary that a nation with so much wealth cannot deliver. Our challenge is to make this wealth to deliver”.<sup>30</sup>

In Mali in 2006, the number of appraised NGOs was 2,135. By the initiative of the government the same organizations were becoming more political, and the Mali President, Amadou Toumani Touré, established his own party of Solidarity and Economic Progress in 2010, which included many former NGOs.<sup>31</sup>

Another interesting example of NGO activities, this time in Benin, concerns their claims directed to the government, asking for readiness to fight corruption in the country in order to construct respect for the principles of “good governance”.<sup>32</sup>

The most vivid example of a lack of co-operation between an NGO and the government, with the consequence of the growing dominance and control of the latter towards civil societies, comes from the central Asiatic Republic of Uzbekistan, the former Republic of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan, gaining independence in 1991, was not ready to accept the development of civil society. The earlier Soviet system of governance was characterized by its attempts to control every aspect of the economy and societal lives. The result was a low base of autonomous traditional grassroots associations including the local *mahalla*.<sup>33</sup>

At the beginning of independence in 1991, the Uzbekistan regime, staying in contact with the rest of the newly established, independent countries in Central Asia, was: “inherently uneasy about civil society, suspicious of its intentions and fearful of their dissent and critique”.<sup>34</sup> At first, the creation of modern NGOs was tolerated by the government of Uzbekistan, as long as they focused on service delivery, and channeling foreign funds to local development. Those funds were not small. In 2002 US assistance to Uzbekistan, thanks to the strategic Uzbekistan partnership with the USA operation in Afghanistan, came to around \$224 million including over \$26 million directly invested in democracy promotion programs of which NGOs were included.<sup>35</sup> But the expansion of NGOs did not last long in Uzbekistan.

<sup>28</sup> Routley, *NGOs and the Formation of the Public...*, p. 120.

<sup>29</sup> C. Hewitt de Alcántara, ‘Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Governance’, *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 155, 1998, pp. 105–113.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Ugwu, National NGOs Leader in Eastern Nigeria, 28 April 2008; quoted after Routley, *NGOs and the Formation...*, p. 121.

<sup>31</sup> Alexis Roy, Mali: ‘Instrumentalisation...’, pp. 111–116.

<sup>32</sup> Elieth P. Eyébiyi, Bénin: ‘Un front ‘anticorruption’ catalyseur...’, pp. 81–86.

<sup>33</sup> It is commonly accepted that the difference between the traditional, grassroots organizations and contemporary civil society, is the voluntary activity of free citizens of the latter, which was not possible in the traditional society. Daniel Stevens, ‘Osama or the Georges: Shifting Threats and State Policy towards Civil Society in Uzbekistan’, *Development and Change*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2010, p. 356.

<sup>34</sup> See J.A. Howell, A. Ishkanian, E. Obadare, H. Seckinelgin and M. Glasius, ‘The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror’, *Development in Practice*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2007, p. 82–93; Quoting after Stevens, *Shifting Threats...*, p. 256.

<sup>35</sup> Stevens, *Shifting Threats...*, p. 257.

From the end of 2003 a shift in state policy was witnessed and a change of Uzbekistan's political partnership from USA to Russia. According to international observers, from 2005 to 2007 the Uzbekistan government forced 269 of the most active and independent NGOs to close down.<sup>36</sup> At the same time, the demand to re-register every NGO in the Ministry of Justice, secured the control of the regime over foreign help for these organizations, which as a result stopped its funds for Uzbekistan. Many NGOs in Uzbekistan became temporarily inactive and afterwards were heavily reliant on state grants, which took the place of foreign funds. With the government claiming a total presence of over 5,000 NGOs, this sector has increasingly become an adjunct of the state. Similar fates have befallen the traditional mahalla community associations, who are increasingly perceived as a branch of local government.<sup>37</sup> Exactly the same process, with reference to mahallas, has taken place in Tajikistan.

The *mahalla*, a grassroots community association playing an important role in traditional culture in Central Asia as an autonomous, informal institution, did not lose its influence even during the 70-year control by the Soviet Union. Mahallas were operating in towns, as well as in villages, and under the pressure of modernization and growing emigration.<sup>38</sup> According to the global structural changes which reached also Tajikistan, the government of this country passed a new bill in 2008 dealing with the organization of social activity in the country. In the light of the new law, the mahalla organizations received a formal declaration, as the lowest hierarchical grade of government representation in the country, and the possibility of co-operation with higher governmental institutions. But at the same time the mahallas were controlled under the auspices of the government itself. So for instance, the leaders of the mahallas (the traditional 'rais') are nominated by governmental authorities, and the convent of mahallas (majlis) could only confirm the apparatus.<sup>39</sup> The conflict between the traditional authority of the rais and their actual dependence on the government, was also an obstacle in the realization of the Aga Khan Foundation project, whose intention was to build new forms of social initiatives in the country's villages.<sup>40</sup>

Special attention should be focused on the activities of non-governmental organizations in Turkey. After the military coup d'état in Turkey in 1980, any social activity was suppressed in order to strengthen the new regime. Hence the delegalization of all parties and social associations. But already by 1990, modern civil organizations had reappeared in Turkey's big cities and their character indicates that they were at least connected with international NGO programs. One of this voluntary social organizations was the Human Rights Association, created by the Turkish families of political prisoners in 1986. Another social organization was the Woman's Association against discrimination, which was established in

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 252.

<sup>37</sup> N. Noori, 'Expanding State Authority, Cutting Back Local Services: Decentralization and its Contradiction In Uzbekistan', *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2007, pp. 533–549; Stevens, *Shifting Threats...* pp. 358–361.

<sup>38</sup> Anna Cieślowska, 'Organizacje międzynarodowe w procesie budowania samorządności lokalnej w Tadżykistanie, na przykładzie działalności Fundacji Aga Khana i Programu Narodów Zjednoczonych /UNDP/ [International Organizations in the Process of Building New Forms of Local, Social Initiatives in Tajikistan thanks to the Activity of the Aga Khan Foundation and United Nations Development Programmers] in K. Górac-Sosnowska, J. Jurewicz (eds), *Kulturowe uwarunkowania rozwoju w Azji i Afryce* [The Cultural Conditions of Development in Asia and Africa], Łódź 2010, pp. 367–368.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 369.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 370–371.

1999. Another interesting social organization in modern Turkey is the Foundation of Social Volunteers, created in 2009 mainly by University students, whose activities concentrated around different social projects for public welfare benefit.<sup>41</sup>

The social activities of Turkish NGOs since 1980 is linked to growing religious enlightenments and an interesting experiment in binding together social laic activity with a religious agenda. Hence the connection of civil society's activities in Turkey with Faith Based Organizations.

### **The growing importance of FBOs in developing countries in the era of globalization**

By 1980 the earlier enthusiasm for state-centric models of development has given way to a search for an alternative service delivery mechanism. For decades, religion, spirituality and faith have been practically marginalized or even avoided in development theory, policy and practice. But since 1980 some observers started to realize, that sustainable development can be achieved only if it incorporates cultural values and beliefs and that in many cases FBOs may be the most effective agencies to deliver development. The expanded sphere for religion in connection with globalization and the accompanying social change which it causes, opened the door for FBOs and new relief actors. The most interesting implementation of religion to the new social aid organizations appeared in Turkey. In this field Fethullah Gülen (born 1941) is often acknowledged as the founder of the first FBO by stressing the importance of interfaith and intercultural activities and work towards a peaceful co-existence and alliance of civilizations.<sup>42</sup>

Gülen has build up the basis for the establishment of many charitable organizations, hospitals, schools, universities, media outlets, journals, poverty eradication foundations and interfaith/ intercultural dialogue institutions. Voluntary spirit with donations from trusts and foundations, were the basis for establishing schools and to provide scholarships to help students. The philosophy of the Gülen movements is based on four major components of civility: tolerance, co-operation, reciprocity and trust, which made the movement a vehicle for development and the securing of civil societies.<sup>43</sup>

The Gülen educational projects introduced on an international level, mainly in developing countries where ethnic and religious conflicts were escalating, succeeded in forming programs that have brought together different ethno-religious communities as a necessary first step towards civil society. It also provides intermediary networks that contribute to the integration of individual citizens in relation to the state.<sup>44</sup>

Summing up, the Gülen movement with its several faith-based NGOs initiatives, has empowered civil societies by promoting inter-faith and inter-civilization dialogue. It is of

---

<sup>41</sup> Anna Fortuna, 'Organizacje pozarządowe w życiu społeczno-politycznym Turcji' [The Non-government Organizations in the Social and Political Life of Turkey] in *Kulturowe uwarunkowania rozwoju...*, pp. 165–185.

<sup>42</sup> Jenny Lunn, 'The Role of Religion, Spirituality and Faith In Development: a Critical Theory Approach', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 5, 2009, pp. 937–940; Ihsan Yilmaz, 'Civil Society and Islamic NGOs in Secular Turkey and their Nationwide and Global Initiatives: The Case of the Gülen Movement', *Journal of Regional Development Studies*, 2010, pp. 115–116.

<sup>43</sup> Wanda Krause, 'Civility in Islamic Activism: Towards a Better Understanding of Shared Values for Civil Society Development', *Muslim World in Transition: Contribution of the Gülen Movement*, Ihsan Yilmaz et al (eds), London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007, p. 166.

<sup>44</sup> Yilmaz, *Civil Society and Islamic NGOs...*, p. 123; T. Kalyoncu, 'Preacher of Dialogue: International Relation and Interfaith Theology' in *Muslim World...*, pp. 511–525.

highly promising value even if not all organizations based on religion accept this point of view.

Talking of FBOs, we would like to illustrate their activities in the field of education in co-operation with the state in relation to the 'madrasa engagement', in six countries in different regions: in the Middle East (in Egypt, Turkey and Syria) and in South Asia (in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India). Both of these regions and countries were the object of field research between 2006–2009. The topic of investigation and object of analysis was the co-operation between FBOs and government officials dealing with traditional Koranic schools, in connection with the introduction of modernization programs.<sup>45</sup> According to Bano, traditional Koranic schools (or 'madrasas'), seem to be a good case in which to examine the potential of FBOs to start co-operation and involvement with many donor agencies and governments reform projects, especially after 9/11. Since that time, the growing recognition of religious organizations contribution to the process of radicalization, has forced governments and developing agencies alike to explore means to engage religious groups in development programs, in order to prevent their members from taking interest in radical options.<sup>46</sup>

In Egypt many Islamic centers of education, including the famous al-Azhar in Cairo, attained state control immediately after regaining independence. In Syria before the actual war, religious education was under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, although a selected number of private Islamic foundations were allowed to continue Islamic education. The most prominent, such as for instance the Abu Nur Foundation in Damascus, often attracted students from Turkey and Pakistan. In comparison with Middle Eastern countries, in South Asia the state tolerated the private ownership of madrasas. The estimated, global number of madrasas acting in this region, range from between 10 to 30,000 schools.<sup>47</sup> But the governments in South Asia also undertook a scheme to modernize the madrasa education system, by introducing secular subjects such as English, science and mathematics along with religious subjects. Such types of reforms were already introduced in Bangladesh by 1979, but in India the main attempt to implement such reforms was introduced by governmental institutions as late as 1993/4. The focus was on introducing the teaching of science, mathematics, social studies, Hindi and English in the madrasa curriculum, in order to provide education comparable to the national system of education.<sup>48</sup> The experience of six countries may be grouped into three types of relationship between governments and madrasa according to the modernization of the latter: co-optation (Bangladesh and Egypt), collaboration (Syria and India), and confrontation (Pakistan and Turkey).<sup>49</sup> According to another point of view, the Bangladesh model can be classified as a co-optation model, as is the case of al-Azhar in Egypt, where state ideology has become more dominant in education programs.

---

<sup>45</sup> Masooda Bano, 'Co-Producing with FBOs, Lessons from State-madrasa Engagement in the Middle East and South Asia', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 7, 2011, p. 1277.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1275. On the other hand, nowadays the growing importance of FBOs is also noted in the Global Civil Society Report: 'There is no way we can understand the logic, strategies and dynamics of civil societies anywhere in the Third World, unless we bring a transcendental dimension back into our analysis. Religious devotion is a fundamental movement in the South, from Latin America to Africa and South Asia' in *Global Civil Society and International Development*, H. Anheier, M. Glasius, M. Kaldor (eds), London 2004, p. 45.

<sup>47</sup> Bano, *Co-Producing with FBOs...*, p. 1281.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1282; D. Nair, 'The State and Madrasas in India' in *Religions and Development Research Consortium Working Paper 15*, University of Birmingham, 2009.

<sup>49</sup> Bano, *Co-producing with FBOs...*, p. 1283.

The different forms of FBO co-operation with governments are also a reflection of the far reaching autonomy of madrasas institutions in the state. If their contacts with the state are deemed too close, the religious institutions lose their social support, something which became apparent in the case of Bangladesh and partly India.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, the constant growing number of madrasas in the Muslim world and the continuing high social position of their leaders, stresses their present dynamic and importance in Muslim society.

Despite the many critical opinions about the structure and activities of NGOs and FBOs in developing countries, we should also stress their advantages, which among others consist of the animation and support of social activity, thanks to their involvement in remedying social problems. In this aspect we can hardly exaggerate the influence of both kinds of organizations in the awakening of social engagement in public affairs. We may also suppose, that the growing activity of NGOs and FBOs in Africa and Asia, open doors for the political participation of citizens, demanding for instance more accountability of the regime, and broader citizen's admittance to the decision-making processes of their countries. A confirmation of this thesis is the example of West Africa, where the local people created an association, which undertook control of the main part of local production, but also the problems of society as a whole.<sup>51</sup>

Another example of growing social responsibility derives from Indonesia. In 1998, after the fall of the autocratic government of president Suharto, a new form of association connected with madrasas, called Pesantren was constructed. This organization was mainly interested in the introduction of new features of modern Islam with new forms of religious education. The leaders of Pesantren were eager to realize the true, moral prescription of Islam in education, such as the duty to fight for social justice, freedom and democracy. The members of Pesantren also stressed its autonomous position, far from governmental control, which brings them closer to the programs of NGOs and FBOs, acting also in Indonesia.<sup>52</sup>

The importance of FBOs in Indonesia, especially the Pesantren, was also confirmed lately by the political activity of Kyai Muzakkin, the spiritual leader of Pesantren in East Java. In 2009 he combined his vocational interest in 'spirits' and 'sent' a thousand spirits to Jakarta, to protect the supporters of the Indonesian president at an anti-corruption rally. The introduction of spirits into Indonesian politics in 2009 proved apt, as it was embarrassing to both the modernist ideas of secular politics, and the sensibilities of many orthodox Muslims.<sup>53</sup> But despite the long-lasting criticism in the Indonesian media for the "spiritual forces" used against the expected demonstrations in the 'Day of Anti-Corruption', it does not change the fact, that the riots, waiting for such occasion did not appear in Jakarta in 2009. It is once more a confirmation of the high position of leading FBOs in Indonesia. It is also worth mentioning

---

<sup>50</sup> Masooda Bano, 'Allowing for Diversity: the State Madrasas Relationship in Bangladesh' in DFID *Religions and Development Research Consortium, Working Paper 13*, University of Birmingham 2008; Nair, *The State and Madrasas in India...*, p. 2010.

<sup>51</sup> Mohamadoul Magha, 'Movement paysan ouest-africain: entre efficacité et fragilité', *Alternative Sud*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2010, pp. 243–244.

<sup>52</sup> R. Bush, 'Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia. Paper presented at the SCID Sixth Annual Conference on Democracy and Development' in *The Changes for Islamic World*, Washington 2005, p. 22–23; M. Sirry, 'The Public Expression of Traditional Islam: the Pesantren and Civil Society in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *The Muslim World*, Vol. 100, No. 1, 2010, pp. 60–61.

<sup>53</sup> Nils Bubandt, 'An Embarrassment of Spirits': Spirits, Hauntology, and Democracy in Indonesia, *Paideuma*, 2014, p. 115.

that the “hero of spirits” by sending them to Jakarta, regardless of constant mockery and irony addressed at him, was able to keep his religious, social and political position.<sup>54</sup> In a case study similar to Indonesia, the traditional forms of religion come into contact with politics, this time in south-western Togo in Africa. The cultural, social and political meanings of a ‘vodun’ ceremony, are constantly renegotiated by members, but mainly by the leaders of these rituals. This region of field research revealed, that the local vodun cult, once contesting state power, had entered into the processes of politicization and mediatization of their ceremonies, appearing as a privileged arena in reinforcing or contesting state power.<sup>55</sup>

### NGOs versus FBOs

The narratives of modernization and secularization that shaped social science for most of the post-war period, have also shaped the program of development studies. From this perspective, religion was seen as a conservative and traditional force designed to withdraw and eventually disappear from public life as part of societal progress towards an increasingly modern society. In this aspect, religion was regarded as an obstacle to development. In the era of globalization, the Western secular development models have either encountered their limits, or failed in several parts of the global periphery, and expanded the space for faith-based models.<sup>56</sup> In 2000, the sociologist Kurt Allan ver Beek declared that religion was a “development taboo”.<sup>57</sup> Even in the field of development, the increase and visibility of religious organizations has been observed. At the beginning of our century the World Faith Development Dialogue came to life, proclaiming an international and national dialogue among faith and development institutions.<sup>58</sup> Alongside with these initiatives, a new object of research emerged focusing on religion and development, concentrating sometimes on faith-based organizations. The academic interest in religion and development has resulted in a range of publications, in the form of articles, reports and books. In 2005 the UK’s Department for International Development was arguing for a more systematic understanding of the role that faith plays in achieving the ‘Millennium Development Goals’<sup>59</sup> In Holland, five Dutch NGOs established the ‘Knowledge Forum for Religion and Development Policy’ in 2007. In Sweden SIDA has hosted a number of workshops on the role of religion in development. In the USA, governmental funding to faith-based organizations almost doubled from 10.5 percent of aid in 2001 to 19.9 percent in 2005.<sup>60</sup> But the stress placed lately on the faith-based organizations seems also to have another background.

The development ideology connected with NGOs, has grown out of experience of power and hegemony, of colonizing, but also out of sentiments of collective guilt and a sense of complicity in the creation of the “distant sufferer”, stemming from the same colonial legacy. In contrast, the FBOs aid culture is shaped by experiences of marginalization, or being

---

<sup>54</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>55</sup> Marco Gordini, ‘Nowadays Spirits Allow Themselves to be Photographed’. Renegotiating the Political Role of Yam ceremonies in Agou, South Western Togo, *Anthropos*, Vol. 109, No. 1, 2014, p. 33.

<sup>56</sup> Bruno de Cordier, ‘Humanitarian Frontline’, Development and Relief, and Religion: what Context, which Threats and which Opportunities?, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2009, p. 663.

<sup>57</sup> Kurt Allan ver Beek, *Voices of the Poor*, World Bank 2000.

<sup>58</sup> Marie Juul Petersen, *Muslim Aid Serving Humanity*, University of Copenhagen 2011, p. 23.

<sup>59</sup> Department for International Development, 2005, p. 14.

<sup>60</sup> Petersen, *Muslim Aid Serving...*, p. 25; Gerard Clark and Michael Jennings (ed.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations*, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

colonized. So for instance, Islamic aid culture is shaped by experiences of marginalization, of being colonized, and of the poor, not as a distant sufferer, but also a fellow member of a religious community (umma).<sup>61</sup> But in comparison with NGOs, whose central values are a culture of universal development aid based on terms of an inclusive, non-discriminatory approach to recipients, the leading values of FBOs are concentrated on notions of solidarity and a brotherhood of co-believers.<sup>62</sup>

### Conclusion

The FBOs organization has emerged from development studies only in the last decade as a result of the “religious turn”, i.e. the increasing visibility of religion in the public sphere. Today, some of the largest NGOs have a religious background, as do the Muslim NGOs for example. The World Bank estimates that as much as 50% of all health and education services in Sub-Saharan Africa are today provided by religious organizations.<sup>63</sup> Studies initiated by the World Bank also stress the importance of religious organizations for the poor, concluding that many people have more trust in religious organizations than in secular NGOs, governments or other societal institutions. Besides, the recent trends in development studies have made space for religion. After growing criticism towards the structural adjustments connected with globalization, development studies shifted away from classical liberal theory, towards more heterodox approaches. This opening of development space has facilitated the inclusion of religious actors in academic studies of development. Some development researchers even argue, that faith-based organizations (FBOs) contribute to providing an alternative vision of development.<sup>64</sup>

By trying to address the mooted question— in the title of this paper, we did not find any references concerning rivalries between NGOs and FBOs in any of the literature collected for the purpose of this paper. But the fast growing number of FBOs in recent decades indicates a slight domination of the latter over NGOs, especially because the religious organizations gain more importance and significance thanks to their local grassroots approach. On the other hand, the practices of the last decade demonstrate, that whenever religion brings to show something other than mediation between man and God, it retains a high position not only in people’s attention, but also in politics.

---

<sup>61</sup> Petersen, *Muslim Aid Serving...*, s. 223.

<sup>62</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., pp. 24–26.



## Notes on Contributors

MARIANNE BASTID-BRUGUIÈRE, an outstanding sinologist graduated from the Ecole Nationale des Langues et Civilisations Orientales and Peking University who worked for the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris and was named Grand Officer of the Légion d'honneur in 2010

STANISŁAW TOKARSKI, Professor Emeritus at the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, e-mail: s-tokarski@o2.pl

ADAM W. JELONEK, Professor at the Institute of Middle and Far Eastern Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, e-mail: ajelonek@hotmail.com

ADAM RASZEWSKI, PhD student at the Institute of Political Science of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, e-mail: voland7@onet.eu

ARTUR KOŚCIAŃSKI, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, e-mail: akoscian@ifispan.waw.pl

LARISA ZABROVSKAIA, Professor at the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of Far Eastern People of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Vladivostok, e-mail: larisa51@hotmail.com

NICOLAS LEVI, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, e-mail: nicolas\_levi@yahoo.fr

IRENA KALUŻYŃSKA, Professor at the Department of Sinology of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, e-mail: i.s.kaluzynska@uw.edu.pl

IZABELLA ŁABĘDZKA, Professor at the Chair of Asian Studies of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, e-mail: izarab@amu.edu.pl

LIDIA KASAREŁŁO, Professor at the Department of Sinology of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, and at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Jagiellonian University, e-mail: lidia.kasarello@uw.edu.pl

EWA CHMIELOWSKA, PhD candidate of Department of Anthropology, Institute of Zoology, Jagiellonian University, e-mail: ewa.chmielowska@uj.edu.pl

FU-SHENG SHIH, PhD, Assistant Professor of Department of Sociology, Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan, e-mail: fusheng@scu.edu.tw

ANNA MROZEK-DUMANOWSKA, Professor at the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, e-mail: abdumanowscy@wp.pl

DIANA WOLAŃSKA, Doctoral Candidate at the Faculty of Humanities, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, e-mail: alanis7@wp.pl

WALDEMAR J. DZIAK, Professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw

IWONA GRABOWSKA-LIPIŃSKA, PhD, politologist-sinologist graduated from the Warsaw University, former co-worker of Professor Roman Sławiński in Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, e-mail: iwona.grabowska.lipinska@gmail.com

MARCIN STYSZYŃSKI, Associate Professor in the Faculty of Arabic and Islamic Studies at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, e-mail: martin@amu.edu.pl

DOROTA RUDNICKA-KASSEM, Associate Professor at the Institute of Middle and Far Eastern Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, e-mail: d.rudkass@interia.pl

ROMAN SŁAWIŃSKI (1932–2014) was a Professor of Sinology at the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw and the Editor-in-Chief of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*

JERZY ZDANOWSKI, Professor at the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, e-mail: [jerzyzda@gmail.com](mailto:jerzyzda@gmail.com)